

Exelon Generation Company, LLC      www.exeloncorp.com  
LaSalle County Station  
2601 North 21<sup>st</sup> Road  
Marseilles, IL 61341-9757

10 CFR 50.73

RA11-066

December 14, 2011

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555


LaSalle County Station, Unit 1  
Facility Operating License No. NPF-11  
NRC Docket No. 50-373

Subject: Licensee Event Report 2011-004-01

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Exelon Generation Company (EGC), LLC, is submitting Unit 1 Licensee Event Report Number 2011-004-01. This revision corrects the Operating Mode and Power Level data in blocks 9 and 10 of NRC Form 366.

There are no regulatory commitments in this report. Should you have any questions concerning this report, please contact Mr. Terrence W. Simpkin, Regulatory Assurance Manager at (815) 415-2800.

Respectfully,



*for* Peter J. Karaba  
Plant Manager  
LaSalle County Station

Enclosure: Licensee Event Report

cc: Regional Administrator – NRC Region III  
NRC Senior Resident Inspector – LaSalle County Station

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects.resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

<b>1. FACILITY NAME</b> LaSalle County Station, Unit 1	<b>2. DOCKET NUMBER</b> 05000373	<b>3. PAGE</b> 1 OF 3
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**4. TITLE**  
Loss of Secondary Cooling Function Due to Spurious Closure of the Shutdown Cooling Suction Isolation Valve

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
02	02	2011	2011	- 004	- 01	12	14	2011	N/A	N/A
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
									N/A	N/A

<b>9. OPERATING MODE</b>  003	<b>11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §:</b> (Check all that apply)									
<b>10. POWER LEVEL</b>  000	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)						
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER							
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A							

**12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER**

<b>FACILITY NAME</b> John Washko, Operations Director	<b>TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)</b> 815-415-2200
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**13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT**

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

<b>14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED</b> <input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	<b>15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE</b>	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

**ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)**

On February 2, 2011, Unit 1 was in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown), and was being cooled down to Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) in order to perform forced outage work following an unplanned reactor scram. At 16:57 hours CST, while in Mode 3, the 1B Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump was started in preparation for starting the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) system. When the pump was started, a momentary high pump suction flow signal was received, causing the common pump suction isolation valve 1E12-F009 to close and the 1B RHR pump to trip.

Both SDC trains were declared inoperable, and Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.9, "RHR Shutdown Cooling System – Hot Shutdown," Required Action (RA) A.1 was entered, which requires that action be initiated immediately to restore the RHR shutdown cooling system to operable status. The control room operators determined that the isolation was spurious, reset the containment isolation logic, and at 17:10 hours reopened 1E12-F009 and exited the TS RA.

The cause of the isolation was determined to be a spurious high pump suction flow signal. Corrective actions included increasing the time delay for the RHR SDC isolation for SDC suction high flow from one second to three seconds.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
CONTINUATION SHEET**

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE
LaSalle County Station, Unit 1	05000373	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	2 OF 3
		2011	- 004	- 1	

**NARRATIVE**

LaSalle County Station Units 1 is a General Electric Company Boiling Water Reactor with 3546 Megawatts Rated Core Thermal Power.

**A. CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT:**

Unit(s): 1	Event Date: February 2, 2011	Event Time: 16:57 CST
Reactor Mode(s): 3	Mode(s) Name: Hot Shutdown	Power Level: 0 percent

**B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:**

On February 2, 2011, Unit 1 was in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown), cooling down to Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) in order to perform forced outage work following an unplanned reactor scram. At 16:57 hours CST, while in Mode 3, the 1B Residual Heat Removal (RHR)[BO] pump was started in preparation for starting the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) system. When the pump was started, a momentary high pump suction flow signal was received, causing the common pump suction isolation valve 1E12-F009 to close and the 1B RHR pump to trip.

Both SDC trains were declared inoperable, and Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.9, "RHR Shutdown Cooling System – Hot Shutdown," Required Action (RA) A.1 was entered, which requires that action be initiated immediately to restore the RHR shutdown cooling system to operable status. The control room operators determined that the isolation was spurious and reset the containment isolation logic. At 17:10 hours the 1E12-F009 valve was reopened and the TS RA exited.

This occurrence is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) as an event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove decay heat.

This event constitutes a safety system functional failure.

**C. CAUSE OF EVENT:**

The cause of the isolation was determined to be a spurious high pump suction flow signal due to a flow transient when the 1B RHR pump was started.

**D. SAFETY ANALYSIS:**

The safety significance of this event was minimal. With Unit 1 in Mode 3 with both the 1A and 1B Reactor Recirculation (RR) pumps running, SDC was not required to be in operation. Had the event occurred with SDC in operation, there was no equipment failure that would have presented a challenge in restarting the system.

**E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:**

- The containment isolation logic was reset and the 1E12-F009 valve was reopened. The containment high suction flow isolation logic was bypassed in accordance with procedure, and the 1B RHR pump was started and placed in operation.

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		2011	- 004	- 1	

**NARRATIVE**

- The time delay on the SDC High Flow Isolation Relays 1(2)B21H-K74 and 1(2)B21H-K 77 were modified from one second to three seconds in order to preclude spurious isolations.

**F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:**

LER 373-09-002-00

On Unit 1, on July 20, 2009, with 'A' RHR loop in shutdown cooling, the common RHR pump suction containment isolation valve (1E12-F009) unexpectedly closed, causing a loss of shutdown cooling. The cause of this event was determined to be poor contact continuity in time delay relay 1B21H-K77.

**G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:**

Not applicable, as no component failure occurred.