



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV  
612 EAST LAMAR BLVD, SUITE 400  
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4125

December 13, 2011

EA-11-159

Eric W. Olson  
Site Vice President  
Entergy Operations, Inc.  
River Bend Station  
5485 US Highway 61  
St. Francisville, LA 70775

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION – PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE  
SUMMARY NRC INVESTIGATION REPORT 4-2010-064

Dear Mr. Olson:

The NRC held a Predecisional Enforcement Conference (PEC) on November 21, 2011, with you and members of your staff. The PEC was held at the Region IV office in Arlington, TX. A brief summary of the PEC is enclosed.

The apparent violation and the slides presented by your staff are under review by the NRC and the final enforcement decision will be communicated to you after completion of the review.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Docket Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC's web site at [http://www.nrc.gov/reading\\_rm/adams.html](http://www.nrc.gov/reading_rm/adams.html).

No response to this letter is required. Please contact Mark Haire of my staff at (817) 860-8159 if you have any questions regarding this matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "AV Vegel".

Anton Vegel  
Director, Division of Reactor Safety

Docket: 50-458  
License: NPF-47

Enclosure: PEC Summary

cc w/enclosure via Electronic Distribution

## PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY

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Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility: River Bend Station

License No.: NPF-47

Docket No.: 50-458

EA-11-159

On November 21, 2011, representatives of Entergy Operations, Inc., met with NRC personnel in the Region IV office located in Arlington, TX, to discuss the apparent violation identified in NRC Investigation Report Number 4-2010-064. The conference was held at the request of the licensee.

The licensee presented a summary of the causes for the apparent violation and their corrective actions. The licensee agreed with the apparent violation.

The attendance list and the licensee's presentation are attached to this summary

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this summary and its attachments will be made available to the Public.

Attachments:

1. Attendance List
2. Licensee Presentation

**Attendance List**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Title</b>
Bryan Ford	Entergy Operations, Inc.	Senior Manager, Licensing
Jerry Roberts	Entergy Operations, Inc.	Director, Nuclear Safety
John McCann	Entergy Operations, Inc.	VP Nuclear Safety, Licensing, and Emergency Planning
Eric Olson	Entergy Operations, Inc.	Site VP, River Bend
Richard Gadbois	Entergy Operations, Inc.	GMPO, River Bend
Joey Clark	Entergy Operations, Inc.	Licensing Manager, River Bend
Terry Evans	Entergy Operations, Inc.	Operations Manager, River Bend
Thomas Blount	NRC, RIV	Deputy DRS
Mark Haire	NRC, RIV	Chief, Operations Branch
Elmo Collins	NRC, RIV	Regional Administrator
Tony Vogel	NRC, RIV	Director, DRS
Kriss Kennedy	NRC, RIV	Director, DRP
Ray Keller	NRC, RIV	Senior Enforcement Specialist
Vince Gaddy	NRC, RIV	Chief, RPB
Bob Hagar	NRC, RIV	Senior PB, RPB
Mike Bloodgood	NRC, RIV	Operations Engineer
Stephen Garchow	NRC, RIV	Senior Operations Engineer
Karla Fuller	NRC, RIV	Regional Counsel
Art Howell	NRC, RIV	Deputy Regional Administrator
Heather Gepford	NRC, RIV	Chief, ACES

# **RIVER BEND NUCLEAR POWER STATION**

## **Control Room Operator Internet Access Pre-decisional Enforcement Conference**

November 21, 2011



*Entergy*<sup>®</sup>

# AGENDA

- ◆ Opening Remarks E. Olson
- ◆ Event Description/Timeline J. Clark
- ◆ Independent Investigation J. Clark
- ◆ Causes /Corrective Actions J. Clark
- ◆ Regulatory Perspective J. Roberts
- ◆ Closing Remarks E. Olson

# Opening Remarks

Eric Olson  
Site Vice President

# **Description of Event**

**Multiple occurrences identified in which non-plant / company related web sites were accessed from the ATC (At-The-Controls) computer in the Main Control Room**

# Event Timeline

- ◆ On April 18, 2010, a Reactor Operator (RO) notified a Control Room Supervisor (CRS) that he suspected another RO was using the ATC work station computer to access the internet
  - IT removed internet access from the ATC computer
- ◆ On April 19, 2010, the Operations Manager requested a review of internet usage for all 16 licensed ROs for the available period (January through April 2010)
  - IT instructed to collect internet access records for the Reactor Operators
- ◆ On June 15, 2010, initial fact-finding interviews began



# Initial Investigation Results

- ◆ Control Room computers were found to allow internet access
- ◆ Management believed internet access was unavailable from the ATC computer
- ◆ Initial review of internet data concluded that at least 5 ROs inappropriately used the ATC computer to access the internet
- ◆ Determination that this OE should be shared with the Fleet

# Actions Taken

- ◆ Two paths initiated:
  - Initiated Condition Report to address programmatic issue
  - Initiated actions for personnel non compliance with station procedures
- ◆ Removed two ROs from all watch-standing duties and removed two ROs from ATC duties until the full investigation could be completed
- ◆ Initiated independent investigation of condition
- ◆ Initiated independent review of internet data by a subject matter expert

# Independent Investigation

- ◆ Internet data revealed that a group of Reactor Operators had inappropriately accessed the internet from the ATC computer
- ◆ The amount of time spent on the internet by each Reactor Operator ranged from very low (approximately 1.5 minutes) to extensive (hours)
- ◆ Operators were aware that station procedures prohibited internet use at the ATC watch station

# Personnel Actions

- ◆ Re-emphasized procedural compliance / personnel accountability
- ◆ A graded approach, based on amount of time spent on the internet by each Operator, was used to determine the severity of discipline
- ◆ Three ROs received days-off (5) without pay
- ◆ Twelve ROs received letters-to-file
- ◆ No internet access was identified for one RO

# Apparent Causes

- ◆ Personnel did not follow station procedure
- ◆ Policy guidance and management expectations for IT control and setup of Control Room computers was not well defined
- ◆ Prior industry / in-house operating experience was not effectively used to prevent problems

# **Programmatic Corrective Actions**

- ◆ Fleet Administrative Procedure issued entitled “Control of External Internet Access” (set-up, labeling, and periodic monitoring), with implementation at RBS and other Entergy sites
- ◆ Internet access blocked for three (ATC, Unit Operator, and Control Room Supervisor) control room computers
- ◆ Identification labels added to blocked computers

# Regulatory Perspective

- ◆ **Assessment**
  - River Bend concurs that apparent violations occurred
- ◆ **Actual Safety Consequences**
  - No actual degradation of plant safety
- ◆ **Potential Safety Consequences**
  - Potential for degradation of Control Room Standards

# Regulatory Perspective

- ◆ Credit for self identification
- ◆ Consideration of comprehensive investigations and prompt corrective actions
- ◆ Discretion may be applied to mitigate potential enforcement action



# Concluding Remarks

Eric Olson  
Site Vice President