

# IMPLEMENTATION OF NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Japan Lessons Learned Emergency  
Preparedness Team  
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# JLLEPT Composition

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# Recommendation 9.3 Tier 1 Discussion

Staffing Analysis and Communications

# Potential Assumptions

- Beyond design basis natural event resulting in the following:
  - Affects all nuclear reactors
  - Initiates a prolonged SBO (e.g., 72 hours)
  - Impedes external support for an extended period (e.g., 72 hours)
  - Interrupts access to normal ultimate heat sink
- Each licensee develops and implements guidance and strategies intended to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities
- These are preliminary assumptions and are based on NRC Steering Committee initial concepts and stakeholder input.

# NTTF Recommendation 9.3

## Communications

Provide a means to power communications equipment to communicate onsite (e.g., radios for response teams and between facilities) and offsite (e.g., cellular telephones, satellite telephones) during a prolonged station blackout.

*10 CFR 50 Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Preparedness ...*

*IV. Content of Emergency Plans,*

*D. Notification Procedures*

... means for notifying local, State, and Federal officials and agencies for the prompt notification of the public and for public evacuation or other protective measures, should they become necessary ... and a backup method ...

*E. Emergency Facilities and Equipment*

9. At least one onsite and one offsite communications system; each system shall have a backup power source.

# Expected Response

*10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV. E. 9. (continued)*

- a. [Offsite] communications with contiguous State/local governments.
- b. [Offsite] communications with Federal emergency response organizations.
- c. [Onsite] communications among:
  - the nuclear power reactor control room,
  - the onsite technical support center,
  - the emergency operations facility,
  - [Offsite] from the nuclear facility to the principal State and local emergency operations centers, and
  - [Offsite] field assessment teams.
- d. [Offsite] communications by the licensee with NRC Headquarters and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations Center

# NTTF Recommendation 9.3

## Staffing Analysis

Task : Determine the appropriate staff to fill all necessary positions for responding to a multiunit event.

The Potential Event Assumptions are applicable

Goal: Inform the process through stakeholder input

**10 CFR 50 Appendix E \***  
**Emergency Planning and Preparedness**  
**IV. Content of Emergency Plans**

- A. Organization
- The organization for coping with radiological emergencies shall be described, including definition of authorities, responsibilities, ***and duties of individuals assigned to the licensee's emergency organization*** and the means for notification of such individuals in the event of an emergency. Specifically, the following shall be included:
  - 9. Nuclear power reactor licensees shall ***perform a detailed analysis demonstrating that on-shift personnel assigned emergency plan implementation functions are not assigned responsibilities that would prevent the timely performance of their assigned functions as specified in the emergency plan.***

\* New EP Rule, effective December 24, 2011



# International Community Engagement

- The NRC intends to engage the following:
  - WANO
  - IAEA
  - NEA
  - Countries as appropriate
- The NRC is interested in NEI's engagement of the international community and analysis of the proposed changes to regulations, guidance, and procedures

# Industry Insights

# Public input and Questions

# Closing Remarks

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