



**UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

REGION III  
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210  
LISLE, IL 60532-4352

December 7, 2011

Mr. Michael J. Pacilio  
Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation Company, LLC  
President and Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO), Exelon Nuclear  
4300 Winfield Road  
Warrenville, IL 60555

SUBJECT: LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2  
TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT  
05000373/2011009; 05000374/2011009(DRS)

Dear Mr. Pacilio:

On November 18, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a triennial fire protection inspection at your LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on November 18, 2011, with Mr. P. Karaba and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert C. Daley, Chief  
Engineering Branch 3  
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374  
License Nos. NPF-11; NPF-18

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000373/2011009; 05000374/2011009(DRS)  
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No: 50-373; 50-374

License No: NPF-11; NPF-18

Report No: 05000373/2011009; 05000374/2011009(DRS)

Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Facility: LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2

Location: Marseilles, IL

Dates: October 19, 2011 – November 18, 2011

Inspectors: A. Dahbur, Senior Reactor Inspector, Lead  
M. Munir, Reactor Inspector  
R. Winter, Reactor Inspector

Approved by: R. Daley, Chief  
Engineering Branch 3  
Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

## **SUMMARY OF FINDINGS**

IR 05000373/2011009, 05000374/2011009(DRS); 10/19/2011 – 11/18/2011; LaSalle County Station; Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection.

This report covers an announced triennial fire protection baseline inspection. The inspection was conducted by Region III inspectors. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified by the inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

### **A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings**

#### **Cornerstone: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity**

No violations of significance were identified.

### **B. Licensee-Identified Violations**

No violations of significance were identified.

## REPORT DETAILS

### 1. REACTOR SAFETY

#### **Cornerstones: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems**

##### 1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05T)

The purpose of the fire protection triennial baseline inspection was to conduct a design-based, plant specific, risk-informed, on-site inspection of the licensee's fire protection program's defense-in-depth elements used to mitigate the consequences of a fire. The fire protection program shall extend the concept of defense-in-depth to fire protection in plant areas important to safety by:

- preventing fires from starting;
- rapidly detecting, controlling and extinguishing fires that do occur;
- providing protection for structures, systems, and components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of the reactor plant; and
- taking reasonable actions to mitigate postulated events that could potentially cause loss of large areas of power reactor facilities due to explosions or fires.

The inspectors' evaluation focused on the design, operational status, and material condition of the reactor plant's fire protection program, post-fire safe shutdown systems, and B.5.b mitigating strategies. The objectives of the inspection were to assess whether the licensee had implemented a fire protection program that: (1) provided adequate controls for combustibles and ignition sources inside the plant; (2) provided adequate fire detection and suppression capability; (3) maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition; (4) established adequate compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems or features; (5) ensured that procedures, equipment, fire barriers and systems exist so that the post-fire capability to safely shut down the plant was ensured; (6) included feasible and reliable operator manual actions when appropriate to achieve safe shutdown; and (7) identified fire protection issues at an appropriate threshold and ensured these issues were entered into the licensee's problem identification and resolution program.

In addition, the inspectors' review and assessment focused on the licensee's post-fire safe shutdown systems for selected risk-significant fire areas. Inspector emphasis was placed on determining that the post-fire safe shutdown capability and the fire protection features were maintained free of fire damage to ensure that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was available. The inspectors' review and assessment also focused on the licensee's B.5.b related license conditions and the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2). Inspector emphasis was to ensure that the licensee could maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities utilizing the B.5.b mitigating strategies following a loss of large areas of power reactor facilities due to explosions or fires. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

The fire zones and B.5.b mitigating strategies selected for review during this inspection are listed below and in Section 1R05.11. The fire zones selected constituted four inspection samples and the B.5.b mitigating strategies selected constituted two inspection samples, respectively, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05T.

Fire Area	Fire Zone	Description
4	4E2	Unit 2 Auxiliary Equipment Room
5	5C11	Turbine Building Ground Floor- Diesel Generator Corridors
7	7B3	Division 1 Standby Diesel-Generator Room
4	4D2	Unit 2 - Cable Spreading Room

.1 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities

a. Inspection Scope

For each of the selected fire areas, the inspectors reviewed the fire hazards analysis, safe shutdown analysis, and supporting drawings and documentation to verify that safe shutdown capabilities were properly protected.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee’s procedures and programs for the control of ignition sources and transient combustibles to assess their effectiveness in preventing fires and in controlling combustible loading within limits established in the fire hazards analysis. The inspectors performed plant walkdowns to verify that protective features were being properly maintained and administrative controls were being implemented.

The inspectors also reviewed the licensee’s design control procedures to ensure that the process included appropriate reviews and controls to assess plant changes for any potential adverse impact on the fire protection program and/or post-fire safe shutdown analysis and procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Passive Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire area barriers, penetration seals, fire doors, electrical raceway fire barriers, and fire rated electrical cables. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed barriers, seals, doors, and cables. The inspectors reviewed approved construction details and supporting fire tests. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license documentation, such as NRC safety evaluation reports, and deviations from NRC regulations and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards to verify that fire protection features met license commitments.

The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to observe material condition and the adequacy of design of fire area boundaries (including walls, fire doors, and fire dampers) to ensure they were appropriate for the fire hazards in the area.

The inspectors reviewed the installation, repair, and qualification records for a sample of penetration seals to ensure the fill material was of the appropriate fire rating and that the installation met the engineering design.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Active Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire suppression and detection systems. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed fire detection and suppression systems. The inspectors reviewed design documents and supporting calculations. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license basis documentation, such as, NRC safety evaluation reports, deviations from NRC regulations, and NFPA standards to verify that fire suppression and detection systems met license commitments.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Protection from Damage from Fire Suppression Activities

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors verified that redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown would not be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems including the effects of flooding. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of each of the selected fire areas to assess conditions such as the adequacy and condition of floor drains, equipment elevations, and spray protection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.5 Alternative Shutdown Capability

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's systems required to achieve alternative safe shutdown to determine if the licensee had properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. The inspectors also focused on the adequacy of the systems to perform reactor pressure control,

reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, decay heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions.

The inspectors conducted selected area walkdowns to determine if operators could reasonably be expected to perform the alternate safe shutdown procedure actions and that equipment labeling was consistent with the alternate safe shutdown procedure. The review also looked at operator training as well as consistency between the operations shutdown procedures and any associated administrative controls.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.6 Circuit Analyses

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's post-fire safe shutdown analysis to verify that the licensee had identified both required and associated circuits that may impact safe shutdown. On a sample basis, the inspectors verified that the cables of equipment required achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions, in the event of fire in the selected fire zones, had been properly identified. In addition, the inspectors verified whether these cables had either been adequately protected from the potentially adverse effects of fire damage, mitigated with approved manual operator actions, or analyzed to show that fire-induced faults (e.g., hot shorts, open circuits, and shorts to ground) would not prevent safe shutdown. In order to accomplish this, the inspectors reviewed electrical schematics and cable routing data for power and control cables associated with each of the selected components.

In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensee's evaluation of potential circuit protective coordination issues for the safe shutdown systems' electrical power and instrumentation busses.

(1) Review of Licensee's Multiple Spurious Operations Circuit Analyses In Accordance with Guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.189, Revision 2

Background

In October 2009, the NRC issued guidance in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.189, "Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 2, to identify acceptable methods for resolving issues related to circuits required for post-fire safe shutdown and circuits important to post-fire safe shutdown. Equipment required for post-fire safe shutdown (credited train) must use one of the three methods identified in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 to protect the circuits located within the same fire area from damage, including single and multiple spurious operations (MSOs). For important to post-fire safe shutdown circuits, the licensee may use operator manual actions if the licensee demonstrates they can be shown to be feasible and reliable or resolve issues using other analysis methods including fire modeling.

In May 2009 the NRC issued Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 09-002, "Enforcement Discretion for Fire-Induced Circuit Faults," which described the conditions limiting enforcement discretion during the resolution of the fire protection

concerns involving MSOs. The EGM limited the enforcement discretion to three years from the date of issuance of RG 1.189, Revision 2: (1) six months following the issuance of RG 1.189, Revision 2, for licensees to identify non-compliances related to multiple fire-induced circuit faults, place the non-compliances into their corrective action program and implement compensatory measures for the non-compliances and (2) three years following the issuance of RG 1.189, Revision 2, for licensees to complete the corrective actions associated with non-compliant multiple fire-induced circuit faults. The enforcement discretion would not be granted to identified non-compliances that are found to be willful or findings that the Reactor Oversight Process Significant Determination Process would evaluate as (Red) or categorized at Severity Level I.

### Inspection Effort

During this inspection, the inspectors reviewed representative sampling of single and multiple spurious issues throughout the plant to verify:

- The licensee successfully addressed single and multiple spurious issues in a way that met regulations;
- The licensee properly classified equipment required for safe shutdown and equipment important for safe shutdown;
- The adequacy of the licensee's evaluation of multiple spurious actuations, in accordance with RG 1.189 and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 00-01, "Guidance for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis," Revision 2; and
- The adequacy of the licensee's compensatory actions taken for identified non-compliances.

The inspectors reviewed a selected sample of the licensee's post-fire safe shutdown analysis to verify that the licensee had identified both required and important circuits that could impact safe shutdown, entered the findings into the corrective action program, and initiated appropriate compensatory measures. The inspectors reviewed the LaSalle's expert panel results for the potential fire-induced operations of component supported safe shutdown at LaSalle County Station. The expert panel performed this review in accordance with RG 1.189 and guidance provided in NEI 00-01. The purpose of the expert panel was to review the applicable industry developed generic boiling water reactor (BWR) owners' group list of MSOs for applicability to LaSalle County Station. The expert panel was also tasked with considering plant specific MSOs similar to those in the generic list, but not specifically listed. The expert panel identified MSOs as applicable to LaSalle County Station and provided recommendations to resolve these issues. The inspectors reviewed a sample of MSO scenarios identified by the expert panel as potential non-compliances requiring further evaluations to determine corrective action needed.



The licensee initiated several ARs to document the identified non-conforming MSO scenarios. In addition, the licensee implemented alternate compensatory measures as a form of enhanced documented operator rounds as justified by the fire protection engineering evaluation EC-379592, "GL 86-10 Evaluation: Use of Alternate Compensatory Measures Related to Multiple Spurious Operations (MSOs)," Revision 1. The inspectors reviewed a sample of the non-conforming MSO scenarios identified by the licensee. The inspectors noted that the licensee has not completed the analyses and evaluations of the identified non-conforming MSOs. The licensee was in the process of determining the appropriate long term corrective actions needed to address these findings. The documents and ARs reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Attachment to this report. The licensee's plans to complete corrective actions to address the identified MSOs prior to November 2, 2012, (the end of the enforcement discretion period per EGM 09-002). The licensee evaluated the sample MSO scenarios for potential significance and determined that none of the sample MSOs were considered to be risk-significant.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.7 Communications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed, on a sample basis, the adequacy of the communication system to support plant personnel in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions and fire brigade duties. The inspectors verified that plant telephones, page systems, sound powered phones, and radios were available for use and maintained in working order. The inspectors reviewed the electrical power supplies and cable routing for these systems to verify that either the telephones or the radios would remain functional following a fire.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.8 Emergency Lighting

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a plant walkdown of selected areas in which a sample of operator actions would be performed in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions. As part of the walkdowns, the inspectors focused on the existence of sufficient emergency lighting for access and egress to areas and for performing necessary equipment operations. The locations and positioning of the emergency lights were observed during the walkdown and during review of manual actions implemented for the selected fire areas.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.9 Cold Shutdown Repairs

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures to determine whether repairs were required to achieve cold shutdown and to verify that dedicated repair procedures, equipment, and material to accomplish those repairs were available on-site. The inspectors also evaluated whether cold shutdown could be achieved within the required time using the licensee's procedures and repair methods. The inspectors also verified that equipment necessary to perform cold shutdown repairs was available on-site and properly staged.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.10 Compensatory Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a review to verify that compensatory measures were in place for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems, or features (e.g., detection and suppression systems, and equipment, passive fire barriers, pumps, valves or electrical devices providing safe shutdown functions or capabilities). The inspectors also conducted a review of the adequacy of short term compensatory measures to compensate for a degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective actions were taken.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.11 B.5.b Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's preparedness to handle large fires or explosions by reviewing selected mitigating strategies. This review ensured that the licensee continued to meet the requirements of their B.5.b related license conditions and 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) by determining that:

- Procedures were being maintained and adequate;
- Equipment was properly staged, maintained, and tested;
- Station personnel were knowledgeable and could implement the procedures; and
- Additionally, inspectors reviewed the storage, maintenance, and testing of B.5.b related equipment.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's B.5.b related license conditions and evaluated selected mitigating strategies to ensure they remain feasible in light of operator training, maintenance/testing of necessary equipment and any plant modifications. In addition, the inspectors reviewed previous inspection reports for commitments made by the

licensee to correct deficiencies identified during performance of Temporary Instruction 2515/171 or subsequent performances of these inspections.

The B.5.b mitigating strategies selected for review during this inspection are listed below. The off-site and on-site communications, notifications/emergency response organization activation, initial operational response actions and damage assessment activities identified in Table A.3 1 of NEI 06-12, "B.5.b Phase II and III Submittal Guidance," Revision 2, are evaluated each time due to the mitigation strategies' scenario selected.

<b>NEI 06-12, Revision 2, Section</b>	<b>Licensee Strategy</b>
2.3.1	SFP Makeup – External Strategy
3.4.2	DC Power Supplies to Allow Depressurization of RPV and Injection With Portable Pump

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

**4. OTHER ACTIVITIES**

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program procedures and samples of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying issues related to the fire protection program at an appropriate threshold and entering them in the corrective action program. The inspectors reviewed selected samples of condition reports, design packages, and fire protection system non-conformance documents.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

On November 18, 2011, the inspectors presented the inspection results, to Mr. Karaba, and other members of the licensee's staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

## **SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION**

### **KEY POINTS OF CONTACT**

#### Licensee

P. Karaba, Plant Manager  
E. Ballou, Engineering  
J. Bauer, Site Training Director  
W. Hilton, Engineering Manager  
J. Houston, Regulatory Assurance  
B. Houston, Maintenance Manager  
W. Keller, Engineering  
K. Lyons, Chemistry Manager  
T. Riddle, Engineering  
J. Vergara, Regulatory Assurance  
H. Vinyaed, Engineering Director  
K. Ihnen, Nuclear Oversight Manager  
J. Washko, Operations Director  
E. Zacharias, Engineering

#### Nuclear Regulatory Commission

R. Daley, Chief, Engineering Branch 3  
R. Ruiz, Senior Resident Inspector

### **LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED**

#### Opened, Closed, and Discussed

None

## LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

### ASSESSMENTS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
FRPT 1137806-03	2011 LaSalle Station Fire Protection Triennial FASA [Focused Area Self-Assessment]	7/14/2011
NOSA-LAS-09-09	Fire Protection Audit Report	12/9/2011

### CALCULATIONS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
L-001947	Safe Shutdown Control Circuit Breaker – Fuse Coordination	01
135571	Hydraulic Calculation LaSalle Auxiliary Bldg. Elev 749'0" Cable Spreading Room Unit 2 ,System 218	12/12/1983
L-000776	LaSalle County Station Combustible Load	Revision 6

### CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS (A/Rs) ISSUED DURING INSPECTION

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
AR1278096	Fire Protection Walkdown Results	10/18/ 2011
AR1278679	Procedure Improvement Identified for Wrench Location	10/19/ 2011
AR1278739	Procedure Improvement Identified for LOS-SY-SR1	10/19/ 2011
AR1279684	Improvement Identified During LOA-SY-004 Walkdown	10/21/2011
AR1279681	Improvement Identified During LOA-SY-003 Walkdown	10/21/2011
AR1279678	Improvement Identified During LOA-SY-SR1 Walkdown	10/21/2011
AR1279687	Improvement Identified During LGA-RI-103	10/21/2011
AR1279324	Roll of Electrical Tap Removed from Cable Tray	10/20/2011
AR1285680	Drawing Error	11/3/2011
AR1286129	Error in Calculation L-001947	11/4/2011
AR1286151	Incorrect Fire Zone Assigned to Cable	11/4/2011
AR1286298	NRC Identified Issues During FP Walkdown in AEER	11/4/2011
AR1285884	CCP Robust Barrier Missing	11/3/2011
AR1289033	Additional IR Written to Resolve IR 1286298	11/10/2011
AR1287863	FP Report not Updated for Appendix R III.G.3	11/8/2011
AR1289300	Inconsistent Use of Roman Numerals in Station Documents	11/11/2011
AR1290901	Editorial Error in FPR Table	11/15/2011
AR1291416	UFSAR 7.2.2.1 Incorrect	11/16/2011
AR1291956	Sprinkler Head Partially Blocked in U1 DG Corridor	11/17/2011

**CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS (A/Rs) REVIEWED**

<b><u>Number</u></b>	<b><u>Description or Title</u></b>	<b><u>Date or Revision</u></b>
AR00363677	Door 393 Inactive Leaf Not Pinned	8/16/2005
AR 01060658	MSOPS 3C ADS SRV-Spurious Failure of ADS Initiation Logic	04/23/2010
AR 00882733	U2 Div 2 AEER Fire – Possible Hot Short to SRVs	02/19/2009
AR 01060267	Use of Alternate Compensatory Measures for Multiple	04/22/2010
AR 01060542	MSOPS 2C Main Steam Line Drain Shutoffs Spuriously Open	04/23/2010
AR01289533	1LL240E Float Voltage High	11/11/2011

**DRAWINGS**

<b><u>Number</u></b>	<b><u>Description or Title</u></b>	<b><u>Date or Revision</u></b>
1E-2-4226AR	Schematic Diagram – Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System	S
1E-2-4005AT	Schematic Diagram – 4160 SWGR 242Y Auxiliary Compartment System AP PT. 18	K
8.1-3	One-Line Diagram, Station Auxiliary Power Distribution System	0
1E-2-4000M	Key Diagram, 6900V and 4160V Switchgear	F
1E-2-4220AC	Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal Pump 2B	T
1E-2-4203AM	Schematic Diagram Main Steam/Nuclear Boiler System	J
M-116	P & ID Main Steam	AD
1E-2-4223AE	Schematic Diagram High Pressure Core Spray Pump	P
1E-2-4222AE	Schematic Diagram High Pressure Core Spray System	N
1E-2-4222AB	Schematic Diagram High Pressure Core Spray System	S
1E-2-4222AD	Schematic Diagram High Pressure Core Spray System	P
1E-2-4200ZD	Loop Schematic Diagram Nuclear Boiler Process Instrumentation System	B
1E-2-42220CM	Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System	G
1E-2-4000AN	Key Diagram 4160 V Switchgear 243	C
1E-2-4000DA	Key Diagram 480 V AC MCC 243-1	T
1E-2-4415AC	Internal/External Wiring Diagram 480V MCC 243-1 (2AP79E)	N
1E-2-4201AA	Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System	G
1E-2-4000FC	Key Diagram 125 V DC Distribution –ESS Div 2	N
1E-2-4220AZ	Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System	L
1E-2-4220BB	Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System	I
M-142, Sheet 2	P & ID Residual Heat Removal System	AW
M-142, Sheet 4	P & ID Residual Heat Removal System	AD
M-142, Sheet 1	P & ID Residual Heat Removal System	AX
M-95	P & ID High Pressure Core Spray	AP
M-116	P & ID Main Steam	N
1E-2-4201AJ	Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System	E
1E-2-4201AH	Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System	H
1E-2-4201AB	Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System	K
1E-2-4201AA	Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System	G

## CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS (A/Rs) REVIEWED

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
1E-2-4201AK	Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System	E
1E-2-4223AD	Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 243 Feed from Diesel Generator 2B System	T
1E-2-4223AB	Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 243 Normal Feed ACB 2432 System	Q
1E-2-4000B	Single Line Diagram Stand-By Generators and 4160V Buses	N
1E-2-4345AK	Internal/External Wiring Diagram 4160 V Switchgear 242Y	K
15	Cable Spreading Rooms Supervised Preaction Systems	10
16A	Auxiliary Building El. 749'0" cable Spreading Rooms Details & Sections Supervised Preaction Systems	11
36	Diesel Generator Corridors Elevation 710'6"	3
1E-0-3932	Fire Detection System Floor El. 677'0", 749'0" and 843'6"	K
1E-0-3933	Fire Detection System Floor El. 728'0", 731'0", 734'6", 735'0", 740'0'	L
1E-0-3933B	Fire Detection System Floor El. 731'0"	C
1E-0-3934 AE	Heat Detector Locations Unit 1 Diesel Generator Rooms	D
1E-2-3745	Lighting Auxiliary Building El. 731'0" Columns 18-21; J-N	H
1E-2-3752	Lighting Auxiliary Building El. 768'0" Columns 15-19; N-R	Z
A-187	Auxiliary Building Mezzanine Floor Plan	AR
S-1073	Auxiliary Building Floor Framing Plan El. 749'0" South Area	AL
S-1075	Auxiliary Building Floor Framing Plan El. 768'0" South Area	AQ

## MISCELLANEOUS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
EC-373385	Diesel Fire Pump Room Sprinkler Heat-UP Analysis	000
L-003384	Diesel Fire Pump Room Sprinkler System	0
Letter	Issuance of Amendments (TAC NOS. M96266 and M96267)	6/10/1998
Pre-Fire Plan	Unit 2 Elevation 749'0" Cable Spreading Room	0
Pre-Fire Plan	Unit 1 Elevation 710'0" Division 1 Standby Diesel Gen Rm	0
EC 379592	GL 86-10 Evaluation for Use of Alternate Compensatory Measures Related to Multiple Spurious Operations	

## PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
LOA-AP-201	Unit 2, AC Power System Abnormal	Revision 33
LOA-FX-201	Unit 2, Safe Shutdown with a Fire in the Control Room or AEER	Revision 24
LOA-FP-201	Unit 2 Fire Protection System Abnormal	Revision 18
LOP-RH-13	Suppression Pool Cooling Operation	Revision 30

## PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
LOS-FP-D1	Fire Protection Door Daily Surveillance	Revision 24
CC-AA-211	Fire Protection Program	4
LES-FP-05	Fire Protection System Low Voltage Ionization Detectors Channel Functional Test for Plant Fire Zones	19
LOS-FP-R6	Preaction Spray Systems Functional Test	9
LOA-SY-003	Extreme Damage Mitigation Guideline	6
N-C-0018	Control Cable Terminations	6
OP-AA-201-003	Fire Drill Performance	12
OP-MW-201-007	Fire Protection System Impairment Control	7
OP-AA-201-009	Control of Transient Combustible Material	11
SA-AA-122	Handling and Storage of Compressed Gas Cylinders/Portable Tanks and Cryogenic Containers/Dewars	10

## REFERENCES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
LSCS-FPR	Fire Protection Report	4

## WORK ORDERS (WOs)

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
01112003 01	Electrical Fire Penetrations Inspection	2/18/2011
01194497 01	Insp of Exterior Bus Duct Seals (Inspect 10% Sample)	6/10/2010
01200947 01	Fire Damper Visual Inspection	6/29/2010
01214459 01	LES-DC-106 Lamp Check on 2LL194 E & 2LL228E	2/15/2011
01261519 01	Yard Loop Fire Hydrant Inspection	8/12/2010
01264945 01	U-2 Cable Spreading Room Sprinkler Sys Chan. Func. Test	11/17/2010
01361961 01	U-1 Diesel Generator Corridor Dry Pipe Sprnklr Sys Chanl Func	9/8/2011
01364128 01	Yard Loop Fire Hydrant Inspection	8/8/2011
01393002 01	A Diesel Fire Pump Engine 6 Month Surveillance	5/19/2011
01432336 01	Safe Shutdown (App R) DC Emergency Light Inspection (ATT 2B)	8/5/2011
01435479 01	Safe Shutdown (App R) DC Emergency Light Inspection (ATT 2C)	8/7/2011



## List of Acronyms Used

ADAMS	Agencywide Document Access Management System
AR	Action Request
BWR	Boiling Water Reactor
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
DC	Direct Current
EGM	Enforcement Guidance Memorandum
IMC	Inspection Manual Chapter
IP	Inspection Procedure
IPEEE	Individual Plant Examination of External Events
IR	Inspection Report
MSO	Multiple Spurious Operation
NEI	Nuclear Energy Institute
NFPA	National Fire Protection Association
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PARS	Publicly Available Records
RG	Regulatory Guide
TS	Technical Specification
UFSAR	Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
WO	Work Order

M. Pacilio

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Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert C. Daley, Chief  
Engineering Branch 3  
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374  
License Nos. NPF-11; NPF-18

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