

STATUS OF NRC ACTIVITIES OF POTENTIAL INTEREST TO OM MAIN COMMITTEE

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ASME OM Code Committee Meeting on December 7-9, 2011, at Clearwater, FL

10 CFR 50.55a Rulemaking

New Rulemaking was published on June 21, 2011, which amended 10 CFR 50.55a to incorporate by reference the 2005 and 2006 Addendas of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Operation and Maintenance (OM) Code, the 2005 Addenda through 2008a Edition of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code Section XI, and 2004 Edition through 2008 addenda of the ASME Section III.

In the spring of 2011, the NRC started the next 10 CFR 50.55a rulemaking to incorporate the 2009 Edition of the ASME OM with 2011 Addenda and the 2009 Addenda and 2010 Edition with 2011 Addenda of ASME Section III and XI into 10 CFR 50.55a. This proposed rulemaking is currently scheduled to be published for public comment in November 2012.

Regulatory Guide (RG) Update – OM Code Case Acceptability

The NRC staff has completed its review of the new and revised code cases published in the 2003 Addenda through the 2006 Addenda of the ASME OM. The proposed rulemaking and RGs (Revision 1 of RG 1.192, Revision 36 of RG 1.184, and Revision 17 of RG 1.147) for the code cases published in the 2003 Addenda through the 2006 Addenda of the ASME OM and the Section III and XI code cases listed in Supplements 1 through 10 to the 2007 B&PV Code are scheduled to be published for public comment in February 2012. The NRC staff has also completed a review of the new and revised code cases published in the 2009 Edition and 2011 Addenda of the ASME OM. The proposed rulemaking and RGs for these code cases will be issued following the incorporation of the 2009 Edition and 2011 Addenda of the ASME OM into 10 CFR 50.55a. Beginning with Revision 1 of RG 1.192, code cases will be numbered as the code case is described in the OM Code. Each code case in Revision 1 of RG 1.192 will be identified by the number assigned by the OM Code and the applicable edition or addendum of the OM Code.

Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2010-06 and Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 10-001 for Inservice Inspection and Testing Requirements of Snubbers

On June 1, 2010, the NRC issued RIS 2010-06 and EGM 10-001 related to the Inservice Inspection and Testing of Snubbers. The NRC discovered that some operating reactor licensees were not following the regulatory requirements for snubbers as specified in 10 CFR 50.55a.

NRC expects that licensees not meeting the 10 CFR 50.55a regulations have entered their noncompliances into a corrective action program, and have submitted relief requests to the

NRC to use alternatives in lieu of the Code requirements. All actions for RIS 2010-06, as described in EGM 2010-01, are required to be completed by June 1, 2012.

NRC plans to issue an inspection procedure to review the compliance of licensees' snubber programs with 10 CFR 50.55a requirements in 2012.

Draft NUREG-1482, Revision 2, "Guidelines for Inservice Testing at Nuclear Power Plants," "Inservice Testing of Pumps and Valves and Inservice Examination and Testing of Dynamic Restraints (Snubbers)"

Draft NUREG-1482, Revision 2 was issued for public comment in August 2011 and the public comment period ends on December 20, 2011. Based on previous public comments on draft NUREG-1946, most of the information contained in NUREG-1482, Revision 1 will be retained in Revision 2. The text from draft NUREG-1946 is now included in the main text of the proposed draft NUREG-1482, Revision 2. Appendix A to Revision 2 contains most of the information that was provided in Revision 1 for pumps and valves. This information has been updated and provides details for the development of inservice testing (IST) programs at nuclear power plants, especially new reactors. Appendix B to Revision 2 contains guidance related to inservice examination and testing of snubbers, which is included for the first time in NUREG-1482. As of November 2011, the principle comment received on Revision 2, is related to the setup of the NUREG (i.e. main text with an Appendix A and Appendix B). During the December 2011 ISTOG/ASME meetings, the EPTB staff plans to discuss this issue with the key members of ISTOG and the ASME OM Subgroups.

Task Interface Agreement (TIA) 2010-001– Evaluation of Application of Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.0.3, Surveillance Requirement Applicability

The NRC issued TIA 2010-001 on April 19, 2010 addressing the incorrect usage of TS SR 3.0.3 for a missed ASME OM Code inservice test, at the Clinton Power Station.

NRC staff are preparing a RIS and an EGM to explain the operational impacts of this TS interpretation and to provide guidance to licensees prior to the issuance of a long term solution for this issue (i.e. ASME OM code case/change). This EGM establishes a proper generic application of TS requirements consistent with TIA 2010-001. The enforcement discretion made available by this EGM for inservice tests performed under 10 CFR 50.55a (f), not related to TS SRs, permits licensees to apply the provisions of the TS SR frequencies and TS SR 3.0.2 but not the provisions of TS SR 3.0.3. The EGM will be published for a 30-day public comment period in December 2011. EPTB staff are also working with the ASME OM Subcommittee on O&M Codes to develop a separate code case and/or code change to address requirements for inservice testing frequency and allowable testing grace periods. For missed inservice tests (i.e. tests not performed within the required testing frequency), in lieu of TS SR 3.0.3, licensees should use the guidance in RIS 2005-20, Revision 1, "Revision to NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 Technical Guidance, "Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments for Resolution of Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety,"" and perform an appropriate operability evaluation or functionality assessment, as needed.

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 1, Red Inspection Finding

On October 23, 2010, at BFN, Unit 1, Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI)/residual heat removal (RHR) outboard injection valve, 1-FCV-74-66 failed to open when the plant operators attempted to place the RHR Shutdown Cooling loop II in service. Subsequently, the licensee determined that the valve disc had separated from the stem and become lodged in the valve seat, preventing RHR flow.

In the NRC's Final Significance Determination Inspection Report (NRC Inspection Report No. 05000259/2011008) (ADAMS No. ML111290482), dated May 9, 2011, the NRC determined that the failure of 1-FCV-74-66 resulted in a violation of the BFN Unit 1, TSs. This valve stem/disc failure was determined to be highly safety significant (RED Finding) by the NRC due to the significant increase in core damage frequency during certain fire mitigation strategies at BFN, Unit 1. Initially, the NRC determined that the Performance Deficiency associated with this issue resulted from the failure of the licensee to properly implement Sections ISTC 4.1 and ISTC 4.2.3 of the ASME OM Code, 1995 Edition with the 1996 and 1997 Addenda. These sections involve verification of valve obturator position and movement.

In June 2011, the NRC convened an independent panel of NRC management and staff to review the BFN Unit 1 Red Finding and Performance Deficiency. The independent panel determined that the ISTC 4.1 and ISTC 4.2.3 requirements were not sufficiently clear to detect a stem/disc failure in certain types of valves. However, the panel determined that other Performance Deficiencies related to this issue did exist. Specifically, the panel determined that the licensee failed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V since the procedure that was used to perform partial Motor Operated Valve Analysis and Test System (MOVATS) testing did not include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria. Additionally, the panel concluded that the licensee failed to include 1-FCV-74-66, within the scope of their Generic Letter 89-10, "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance," program. The panel also noted that there was a need to address issues associated with the intent and requirements in ISTC 4.1 and ISTC 4.2.3 through either a revision to the ASME OM Code or establishment of new or revised NRC requirements.

On September 23, 2011, the NRC completed Phase 1 of the NRC Supplemental Inspection Procedure 95003, due to the RED Finding, which placed BFN Unit 1 in the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Column. The objectives of this inspection were to provide the NRC with information regarding BFN's: (1) maintenance and testing program related to IST; (2) maintenance and testing program related to motor operated valves (MOVs); and (3) the corrective action program (CAP), to include the immediate corrective actions taken to address the RED Finding. The inspection also evaluated the broader extent of condition aspects of the testing programs used at the station to comply with technical specifications and other regulatory requirements.

The inspection was conducted to provide the NRC additional information to be used in deciding whether continued operation of the facility was acceptable and whether additional regulatory actions were necessary to prevent declining plant performance. The inspection examined activities related to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules, regulations and conditions of the BFN operating license. The NRC concluded that the evaluated programs at BFN generally met the requirements of the NRC's rules, regulations, and the ASME OM Code. The inspection identified several issues involving programmatic requirements and implementation of those programs. Complete details of the 95003 inspection are contained in

the (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000259/2011011, 05000260/2011011, and 05000296/2011011) issued on November 17, 2011 (ADAMS No. ML113210602).

A member of the EPTB staff, on the ASME O&M Subgroup on ISTA/ISTC, presented several recommended changes at the August ASME OM meeting, to clarify the requirements in ASME OM, Subsection ISTC, for obturator movement verification. These changes and clarifications include:

- Deletion of the exemptions in the first paragraph of ISTC-1200.
- Separate the concepts of position indication testing and exercise testing (i.e., position indication testing verifies accuracy of light indication; exercise testing verifies obturator movement)
- Add obturator movement verification for passive valves
- Clarify obturator movement verification requirements for the various check valve exercise test methods

At the December ASME OM meeting, the ISTA/ISTC subgroup members will discuss and debate the changes proposed to ISTC regarding valve obturator movement verification and will explore possible alternatives to the ASME OM requirements. Following the December meeting, EPTB staff will assess the subgroup actions and determine the need for any further regulatory guidance.

Generic Letter (GL) 96-05 Periodic Verification of Motor-Operated Valves (MOV)

GL 96-05 requested each plant to establish a program, or ensure the effectiveness of its current program, to verify on a periodic basis that safety-related MOVs continue to be capable of performing their safety functions within the current licensing basis of the facility. The industry responded to GL 96-05 by forming a Joint Owners Group (JOG) to address the concerns of the GL.

A final report with recommended actions was submitted to the NRC for review. The NRC approved the final report with conditions. Plants committed to implement the final program recommendations within six years from the date of NRC safety evaluation, September 25, 2006.

EPTB staff, at the NRC, have developed a draft RIS which provides guidance for addressing periodic verification programs for valves not covered by the JOG MOV Periodic Verification (PV) program. The draft has been issued for public comment and a public meeting was held on August 17, 2011. The target completion date for this RIS is January 2012.

Risk-informing Special Treatment Requirements of 10 CFR 50.69

The NRC 50.69 working group, comprised of NRR headquarters staff, with regional participation, developed a draft inspection procedure which was shared with the nuclear industry for comments in early 2011. Industry comments regarding this document have been resolved and the NRC Inspection Procedure ((IP) 37060 was issued on September 14, 2011. The IP draws in part from the ASME developed Part 29 (Standard), "Alternative Treatment

Requirements for Risk-Informed Safety Class (RISC)-3 Pumps and Valves,” as well as from insights gained through a review of the South Texas Project 50.69-like treatment program.

At this time, no licensee has submitted an application requesting to implement 10 CFR 50.69, though at least one licensee has indicated that they will submit a pilot application in the first half of 2012. Following the initial pilot application, lessons learned from the application review will be used to revise the associated industry guidance and RG 1.201. The NRC staff recognizes the need for an effective, stable and predictable regulatory climate for the implementation of 10 CFR 50.69.

NRC Approval for Restart of North Anna Units 1 & 2 following the August 23, 2011 Earthquake

On August 23, 2011, with the North Anna Power Station (NAPS), Units 1 and 2, operating at 100 percent power, the site experienced ground motion from a seismic event (a Magnitude 5.8 earthquake reported by the U.S. Geological Survey) in Mineral, Virginia, approximately 10 miles from NAPS. Following the earthquake, both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactors tripped, and there was a loss of offsite power to the station. Subsequently, both units were stabilized, taken to a safe shutdown condition, and offsite power was restored.

Subsequent analysis, performed by the licensee, indicated that the spectral and peak ground accelerations for the Safe Shutdown and Operating Basis Earthquakes (SSE and OBE, respectively) for NAPS were exceeded at certain frequencies for a short period of time during this seismic event.

In accordance with 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, “Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,” Section V (a) (2), a licensee is required to demonstrate to the Commission that no functional damage has occurred to those features necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public, prior to resuming operations, when the vibratory ground motion exceeds the OBE for the site.

In order to restart the NAPS units, the licensee submitted related post-earthquake information to the NRC, including walkdowns, inspections, tests, and related evaluations. The NRC staff used 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A and the guidance provided in RG 1.167, “Restart of a Nuclear Power Plant Shut Down By a Seismic Event”, which endorses the EPRI NP-6695, “Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants Response to an Earthquake” to evaluate if the NAPS units were ready for restart and continued operation. In addition, the NRC staff also utilized the information provided in IAEA Safety Report Series No. 66, “Earthquake Preparedness and Response for Nuclear Power Plants,” to determine the adequacy of the licensee’s restart determinations. The IAEA Safety Report acknowledges the prospect that hidden damage (specifically after the SSE) is a real possibility and the effects of the SSE should be evaluated with analytical work. Since the August 23, 2011 earthquake magnitude exceeded the SSE for the site, the NRC staff reviewed the licensee’s evaluations and inspections for restart to ensure the plant structures, systems, and components (including pumps, valves, and snubbers) remained operable to protect public safety and health. The NRC also dispatched an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) to NAPS, Units 1 and 2, on August 30, 2011, to evaluate the licensee’s response to the seismic event. Additionally, the NRC sent another team of inspectors (Restart Readiness Inspection Team) to NAPS to assess the licensee’s inspection program prior to restart and the preparations for starting NAPS, Units 1 and 2. The Restart Readiness Inspection Team

followed Inspection Procedure 92702, "Follow-up on Traditional Enforcement Actions including Violations, Deviations, Confirmatory Actions Letters, Confirmatory Orders, and Dispute Resolution Confirmatory Orders."

The NRC concluded that the licensee acceptably demonstrated that no functional damage occurred at NAPS to those features necessary for continued operation, and that NAPS, Units 1 and 2, could be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. As part of the restart process, the licensee identified several activities (inspections and tests) that needed to be performed to support the various mode changes and plant operations. The NRC monitored the startup of both NAPS units and confirmed that both units were ready to support safe operations. Several long-term action items, related to this seismic event, were identified by the licensee, including items from Section 6.3 of EPRI NP-6695 and changes to the NAPS Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. These long-term commitments were documented in the NRC's Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) No. NRR-2011-002 and will be addressed by the licensee during future activities. (For more details, see ADAMS Nos. ML11308B405 and ML11308B406).

One item noted by the EPTB staff, during the reviews of the NAPS restart readiness, was the lack of information or requirements in the ASME OM Code that provided any examinations or testing of pumps, valves, and snubbers, following a seismic event at a site that exceeds an SSE or OBE. The various ASME OM subgroups and the Standards Committee should consider if the ASME OM Code should include requirements or guidance for actions needed following an earthquake that exceeds the licensee's SSE or OBE.

NRC Activities Associated with the Follow-up to the Events at the Japanese Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Plant After the March 11, 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami

In response to NRC Commission direction, the agency established a Near-Term Task Force to review processes and regulations and determine if additional improvements should be made to the regulatory system and to make recommendations to the Commission regarding policy direction, in light of the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant. In examining the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident for insights for reactors in the United States, the Task Force addressed protecting against accidents resulting from natural phenomena, mitigating the consequences of such accidents, and ensuring emergency preparedness. The Task Force studied the manner in which the NRC has historically required protection from natural phenomena and how the NRC has addressed events that exceed the current design basis for plants in the United States. In general, the Task Force found that the current NRC regulatory approach includes:

- requirements for design-basis events with protection and mitigation features controlled through specific regulations or the general design criteria (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants")
- requirements for some "beyond-design-basis" events through specific regulations (e.g. station blackout, large fires, and explosions)
- voluntary industry initiatives to address severe accident features, strategies, and guidelines for operating reactors

The current regulatory approach and the resultant plant capabilities allowed the Task Force to conclude that a sequence of events like the Fukushima accident is unlikely to occur in the United States. Therefore, continued operation and licensing activities do not pose an imminent risk to public health and safety.

However, the Task Force also concluded that a more balanced application of the Commission's defense-in-depth philosophy, using risk insights, would provide an enhanced regulatory framework. Such a framework would support appropriate requirements for increased capability to address events of low likelihood and high consequence, thus significantly enhancing safety. The Task Force determined that the application of the defense-in-depth philosophy can be strengthened by including explicit requirements for beyond-design-basis events. Additionally, the Task Force noted that voluntary industry initiatives should not serve as a substitute for regulatory requirements but as a mechanism for facilitating and standardizing implementation of such requirements.

The Task Force developed a set of recommendations that take a balanced approach to defense-in-depth as applied to low-likelihood, high-consequence events, such as prolonged station blackout resulting from severe natural phenomena. The Task Force's overarching recommendations were:

- Clarify the Regulatory Framework
- Ensure Protection
- Enhance Mitigation
- Strengthen Emergency Preparedness
- Improve Efficiency of NRC Programs

The Task Force report, "SECY-11-0093: Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century," (ADAMS No. ML111861807) is available on the [nrc.gov](http://www.nrc.gov) website.

Following the issuance of the Task Force report, the NRC staff issued SECY-11-0117, "Charter for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Steering Committee to Conduct a Longer-Term Review of the Events in Japan." This charter established the structure, scope, and expectations for the NRC's longer-term review of the Fukushima accident. The objective of this effort was to oversee assessment of the Near-Term Task Force's recommendations, their implementation as directed by the Commission, identify any additional recommendations, and address the items identified for longer-term review in the NRC Chairman's March 23, 2011 tasking memorandum, COMGBJ-11-0002, "NRC Actions Following the Events in Japan," and consistent with the Commission's direction in the Staff Requirements Memoranda (SRM) for SECY-11-0093 and COMWDM-11-0001/COMWCO-11-001, "Engagement of Stakeholders Regarding the Events in Japan."

As required by the SRM to SECY-11-0093, the NRC staff provided the Commission with a 21-day paper (SECY-11-0124, "Recommended Actions to be Taken Without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report") and a 45-day paper (SECY-11-0137, "Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned").

Although the NRC staff determined in SECY-11-0124 (ADAMS No. ML11245A127) that none of the Near-Term Task Force recommendations identified an imminent hazard to public health and

safety, the staff did identify several actions that had the greatest potential for safety improvement in the near-term. These included:

- Seismic and flood hazard reevaluations
- Seismic and flood walkdowns
- Station blackout (SBO) regulatory actions
- Equipment covered under 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2)
- Reliable hardened vents for Mark I containments
- Strengthening and integrating emergency operating procedures, severe accident management guidelines (SAMGs), and extensive damage mitigation guidelines
- Emergency preparedness regulatory actions (staffing and communications)

The staff proposed to issue Orders that would redefine the level of protection of public health and safety that should be regarded as adequate regarding equipment covered under 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) and reliable hardened vents for Mark I containments. In staff recommended issuance of Orders as the appropriate regulatory vehicle in the cases where the staff determined that sufficient basis exists to support the initiation of the development of new requirements in the near-term to redefine what level of protection of public health and safety should be regarded as adequate. In cases where the staff determined that more information was required before taking additional regulatory action, the staff recommended issuance of requests for information pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f). In the remaining cases, the staff proposed initiation of rulemaking.

In SECY-11-0137 (ADAMS No. ML11269A204), the NRC staff provided the Commission with the proposed prioritization of the Near-Term Task Force recommendations to (1) reflect regulatory actions to be taken by the staff in response to the Fukushima lessons-learned; (2) identify implementation challenges; (3) include the technical and regulatory bases for the prioritization; (4) identify additional recommendations; and (5) include a schedule and milestones with recommendations for appropriate stakeholder engagement and involvement of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). As a result of the staff's prioritization and assessment process, the Near-Term Task Force recommendations were prioritized into three tiers. The first tier should be started without unnecessary delay and consisted of the actions noted above from SECY-11-0124 with the addition of the following items:

- Inclusion of Mark II containments in the recommendations for reliable hardened vents
- Implementation of SFP instrumentation

The second tier consisted of the Task Force recommendations which could not be initiated in the near term due to the need for further technical assessment and alignment, dependence on Tier 1 issues, or availability of critical skill sets. However, these actions do not require long-term study. These actions included:

- SFP makeup capability
- Emergency preparedness regulatory actions

The third tier consisted of the Task Force recommendations that require further NRC staff study to support a regulatory action, have as associated shorter-term action that needs to be completed to inform the longer-term action, are dependent on the availability of critical skill sets, or are dependent on the resolution of the "Clarify the Regulatory Framework" recommendation

from the Near-Term Task Force Report (SECY-11-0093). The Tier 3 actions include the following items:

- Ten-year confirmation of seismic and flooding hazards
- Potential enhancements to the capability to prevent and mitigate seismically-induced fires and floods
- Reliable hardened vents for other containment designs
- Hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other buildings
- Emergency preparedness (EP) enhancements for SBO and multiunit events
- Enhanced ERDS capability
- Additional EP topics for prolonged SBO and multiunit events
- EP topics for decision-making, radiation monitoring, and public education
- Reactor Oversight Process modifications to reflect the recommended defense-in-depth framework
- Staff training on severe accidents and resident inspector training on SAMGs

The NRC staff identified a number of additional issues, with a nexus to the Fukushima accident, which warrant further consideration and potential prioritization, but were not identified in the Task Force recommendations. These issues include:

- Filtration of containment vents
- Instrumentation for seismic monitoring
- Basis for emergency planning zone size
- Prestaging of potassium iodide beyond 10 miles
- Transfer of spent fuel to dry cask storage
- Loss of ultimate heat sink

As noted in SECY-11-0137, the overriding challenge the NRC staff will face when implementing actions for the Task Force recommendations will be redefining agency priorities while ensuring that the process does not displace ongoing agency work that has a greater safety benefit, work that is necessary for continued safe operation, or other existing high priority work. For new reactor designs currently under review, safety issues identified by the Near-Term Task Force or in SECY-11-0124 or SECY-11-0137 should be resolved at the design stage, to the extent practical. It would be prudent to implement safety enhancements prior to certification or design certification renewal. The NRC staff intends to begin interactions with new reactor stakeholders in the near term to allow sufficient opportunity for design certification applicants and design certification renewal applicants to address recommended design-related safety enhancements prior to completion of the staff's review.

Additionally, based on direction from the NRC Commission, the NRC and the Department of Energy signed an agreement involving a cooperative research program, to conduct a study of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, in order to develop a thorough understanding of the accident progression of each reactor and spent fuel pool. The purpose of the study is to reconstruct the sequence of events at Fukushima Dai-ichi in order to characterize and model events from the perspective of accident mitigation and response and validate severe accident modeling.

On October 18, 2011, the NRC Commission issued the SRM to SECY-11-0124. The Commission approved the NRC staff's proposed actions to implement without delay the Near-Term Task Force recommendations as described in SECY-11-0124, subject to comments in the

SRM, and they directed the staff to strive to complete and implement the lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident by 2016. The Commission also directed the staff to designate the SBO rulemaking as a high priority rulemaking with a goal of completing the rulemaking in 24 to 30 months after the date of the SRM. Additionally, the Commission noted that the NRC staff should monitor nuclear industry efforts underway to strengthen SBO coping times and consider whether any interim regulatory controls (e.g. commitment letters or confirmatory action letters) for coping strategies for SBO event would be appropriate while rulemaking activities are in progress. This SRM is available under ADAMS No. ML112911571.

ASME-Related Generic Communications

ASME-related generic communications issued by (or in the process of being issued by) the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Office of New Reactors (NRO) since the last report (August 2011) to the OM Standards Committee are listed below:

Bulletins (BLs)

None

Generic Letters (GLs)

None

Information Notices (INs)

IN 2011-20 (11/18/2011): Concrete Degradation by Alkali-Silica Reaction

IN 2011-19 (09/26/2011): Licensee Event Reports Containing Information Pertaining to Defects in Basic Components

Regulatory Issue Summaries (RISs)

None

The full text of any of these NRC generic communications can be accessed by visiting the NRC's public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/index.html>.