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Docket Nos.: 50-424

NL-11-2195

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant-Unit 1  
Licensee Event Report 2011-003-00  
Control Room Air Damper Found Closed Results in  
Technical Specification Non-Compliance

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report.

This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please contact Doug McKinney at (205) 992-5982.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "T. E. Tynan".

T. E. Tynan  
Vice President – Vogtle

TET/TMH/kss

Enclosure: Licensee Event Report 2011-003-00

cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company  
Mr. S. E. Kuczynski, Chairman, President & CEO  
Mr. D. G. Bost, Chief Nuclear Officer  
Ms. P. M. Marino, Vice President – Engineering  
RType: CVC7000

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Mr. V. M. McCree, Regional Administrator  
Mr. D. H. Jaffe, NRR Senior Project Manager - Vogtle  
Mr. L. M. Cain, Senior Resident Inspector – Vogtle

JE22  
NRR

**Enclosure**  
**Vogtle Electric Generating Plant-Unit 1**  
**Licensee Event Report 2011-003-00**  
**Control Room Air Damper Found Closed Results in**  
**Technical Specification Non-Compliance**

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to [infocollects.resource@nrc.gov](mailto:infocollects.resource@nrc.gov), and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

<b>1. FACILITY NAME</b> Vogtle Electric Generating Plant – Unit 1	<b>2. DOCKET NUMBER</b> 05000424	<b>3. PAGE</b> 1 OF 4
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**4. TITLE**  
Control Room Air Damper Found Closed Results in Technical Specification Non-Compliance

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
09	19	2011	2011	003	00	11	18	2011	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

<b>9. OPERATING MODE</b>  1	<b>11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)</b>									
<b>10. POWER LEVEL</b>  100	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(I)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(II)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(III)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(IV)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(V)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(I)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(VI)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(I)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A						

**12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER**

FACILITY NAME Vogtle Electric Generating Plant/Mark Hickox, Principal Licensing Engineer	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 706-826-4129
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**13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT**

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

<b>14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED</b> <input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	<b>15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE</b>	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

**ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)**

On September 22, 2011 at approximately 0155 hours Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) as a System Operator entered the control room, he noted that the differential pressure across the door was not what he was accustomed to. The Unit Operator was notified and it was determined that the Control Room Normal HVAC (Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning) Outside Air Damper, AHV-12153 was closed. With AHV-12153 closed, all air flow through the control room radioactive gas monitors is stopped, rendering them inoperable. After verifying that there was not a valid reason for the damper to be closed, AHV-12153 was opened restoring air flow through the control room radioactive gas monitors. A subsequent review of the plant computer shows that the damper closed on September 19, 2011 at approximately 2029 hours EDT. Because the Technical Specifications (TS) require the control room emergency filtration system (CREFS) to be placed in the emergency mode if the control room air intake radioactive gas monitors are inoperable for more than one hour, and this was not done, the units operated in a condition prohibited by the TS.

An investigation into the cause for the damper to close was inconclusive. However, to preclude this event from happening in the future, a design change will be implemented to provide a control room annunciation to alert the operators of the condition.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
CONTINUATION SHEET**

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE	
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant – Unit 1	05000424	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2	OF 4
		2011	- 003	- 00		

**NARRATIVE**

**A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT**

This report is required per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) since the unit operated in a condition prohibited by Technical Specification (TS). With damper AHV-12153 closed all air flow through both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room radioactive gas monitors [IL] is stopped rendering them inoperable. TS 3.3.7 Condition P requires that one Control Room Exhaust Filtration System (CREFS) [VI], in each unit, be placed in the emergency mode within one hour. Since it was not recognized that the damper had closed until after the one hour completion time had elapsed and a CREFS train in each unit had not been placed in the emergency mode, the unit operated in a condition prohibited by TS 3.3.7.

**B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT**

At the time the damper was found closed, Unit 1 was in Mode 1 at 100% of rated thermal power. Unit 2 was in Mode 6 (refueling) at 0% rated thermal power. Other than that described herein, there was no inoperable equipment that contributed to the occurrence of this event.

**C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT**

On September 22, 2011 at approximately 0155 hours Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) a System Operator entered the control room and noticed that the control room doors did not open as he had become accustomed to due to decreased differential pressure across the door. He immediately informed the Unit 1 Operator who investigated the condition and found that the Control Room Normal HVAC (Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning) Outside Air Damper, AHV-12153 was closed. The Unit 1 Operator verified that there was no valid reason for the damper to be closed and then opened the damper on September 22, 2011 at approximately 0214 hours EDT, thereby restoring air flow through the control room radioactive gas monitors returning them to operable status.

Subsequent investigation found that the damper had closed on September 19, 2011 at approximately 2029 hours EDT based upon indication from the Integrated Plant Computer (IPC) [ID]. TS 3.3.7 Condition P requires one CREFS train in each unit to be placed in the emergency mode within one hour if all four control room radioactive gas monitor channels are inoperable. Since the damper closed on September 19, 2011 at 2029 hours EDT but was not discovered until September 22, 2011 at 0155 hours EDT, the one hour completion time to place one CREFS train in each unit in the emergency mode was not met.

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**NARRATIVE**

**D. CAUSE OF EVENT**

An investigation into the cause for the damper going closed was inconclusive. A review of operating logs, tagging orders and outage work did not find any activity which should have resulted in the damper going closed. Additionally, an inspection of the damper and solenoid valves did not find any condition which would have caused the damper to close unexpectedly.

**E. SAFETY ASSESSMENT**

During this event, the damper was closed while Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and Unit 2 was in Mode 6 with no fuel movement or core alterations in progress. The CREFS acts to terminate the supply of unfiltered outside air to the control room, initiate filtration, and pressurize the control room. This ensures the control room is kept habitable for operators stationed there during accident recovery and post accident operations by minimizing the radiation exposure of control room personnel. In Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4, the radioactive gas monitor actuation of the CREFS is a backup for the Safety Injection (SI) signal actuation. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and core alterations, the radioactive gas monitor actuation is the primary means to ensure control room habitability in the event of a fuel handling accident. During the time the damper was closed, the SI actuation for the Unit 1 CREFS remained operable. Since there was no movement of irradiated fuel assemblies or core alterations on Unit 2 during the time the damper was closed, the radioactive gas monitors were not required to be operable for Unit 2. Since the SI actuation for the Unit 1 CREFS remained operable during the time the damper was closed, the event does not represent a safety system functional failure. Also, based upon these considerations, there was no adverse affect on plant safety or on the health and safety of the public.

**F. CORRECTIVE ACTION**

A design change package will be developed to provide a control room annunciation to alert the operator of the condition so that necessary actions can be taken. The expected implementation date for the design change is November 15, 2014.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
CONTINUATION SHEET**

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**NARRATIVE**

**G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION**

1) Failed Components:

None

2) Previous Similar Events:

A review of Licensee Event Reports (LER) over the past seven years finds that a similar event occurred in 2004 as documented in LER 2004-002-00. In that event, the damper was found closed also. However, the cause for the damper closing was traced back to switchgear cleaning that caused two of the solenoid valves that are required to be energized to maintain the damper open, to lose power. The switchgear cleaning procedure was revised to alert personnel that this activity would cause the damper to close. The closure of the damper on September 19, 2011 could not be tied to any maintenance activity, including switchgear cleaning.

3) Energy Industry Identification System Code:

Control Room Emergency Filtration System – VI  
 Radiation Monitoring System – IL  
 Integrated Plant Computer System – ID