STATION:	SALEM							
SYSTEM:	Admin							
TASK:	Respond to a Void in the Reactor Vessel							
TASK NUMBER:	R: N1150410501							
JPM NUMBER:	09-01 NRC RO Admin A1-1							
ALTERNATE PATH:		K/A NUMBER:	EPE10 EA1.1					
APPLICABILITY: EO	RO X STA	SRO X	3.8 3.6 SRO					
EVALUATION SETTING	G/METHOD: Classroom							
REFERENCES: 2-F	FRCI-3 Rev. 25 Response to	Void in Reactor Vessel						
TOOLS AND EQUIPME	NT: None							
VALIDATED JPM COM	PLETION TIME:	8 min						
TIME PERIOD IDENTIF	IED FOR TIME CRITICAL ST	EPS:N/	Α					
Developed By:	G Gauding Instructor	Date:	07-20-11					
Validated By:	J Pierce, Jr SME or Instructor	Date:	07-28-11					
Approved By:	Training Department	_ Date:	8-2-11					
Approved By:	Operations Representa	Date:	8/1/11					
ACTUAL JPM COMPLE	ETION TIME:							
ACTUAL TIME CRITICA	AL COMPLETION TIME:							
PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT	UNSAT							
REASON, IF UNSATISE	FACTORY:							
EVALUATOR'S SIGNA	TURE:		DATE:					

	NAME:
	DATE:
SYSTEM:	Admin
TASK:	Respond to a Void in the Reactor Vessel
TACK NUMBER.	N1150410501
TASK NUMBER:	101130410301
SIMULATOR SETUP	

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Unit 2 is performing 2-EOP-FRCI-3, Response to Void in Reactor Vessel, due to an unexpected void formation in the Rx Vessel following a LOCA.

- Containment temperature is 220 degrees F.
- Containment hydrogen concentration is 1.0%.
- RCS pressure is 800 psig.

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to calculate the maximum Rx Vessel Head venting time using Attachment 1 of FRCI-3.

Successful Completion Criteria:

- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Calculate maximum head vent time to be 20-24 minutes.

NAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM Admin

TASK: Respond to a Void in the Reactor Vessel

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT
		Once operator has read Initial Condition and Initiating Cue, provide them with FRCI-3 Attachment 1 and Figure 1.			
	Att. 1 Step 1	Record the following data:	Operator records the following data given in Initial Conditions: 1.1 Containment temperature: 220 1.2 Containment hydrogen concentration (H): 1.0 1.3 RCS pressure: 800		
*	Att. 1 Step 2	Determine containment air volume at standard temperature and pressure 2.1 Calculate containment absolute temperature, T _{abs} T _{abs} = Containment temperature (°F) +460= 2.2 Calculate containment air volume (V) at STP: V=1.28E09/T _{abs} =	Operator calculates containment absolute temperature. 220 + 460= 680 Operator calculates containment air volume at STP. 1.28E09/680=1.88E6 (actual value of 1.882353E6 will be used for bounding number, and can be used by operator)		

NAME:	 	_
DATE:		

SYSTEM Admin

TASK:

Respond to a Void in the Reactor Vessel

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT
*	Att. 1 Step 3	Determine maximum hydrogen vent volume			
		3.1 Record containment hydrogen concentration (from Step 1.2)	Operator records 1.0		
		3.2 Record containment air volume at STP (from Step 2.2)	Operator records 1.88E6 (or 1.882353E6)		
		3.3 Calculate maximum vent volume (M) M= (3.0%-H) x V 100%	Operator calculates maximum vent volume M= (3.0%-1.0%) x 1.88E6(or 1.882353E6) 100%		
			M= 37600 (or 37647)		

NAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM Admin

TASK: Respond to a Void in the Reactor Vessel

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT
*	Att. 1 Step 4	Determine maximum vent time 4.1 Record RCS pressure (from Step 1.3) 4.2 Record calculated maximum vent volume (from Step 3.3) 4.3 Record hydrogen vent flow rate (from Figure 1)	Operator records 800 Operator records 37600 (or 37647) Operator records 1600-1800 (allowed extrapolation) Operator calculates maximum vent time	3/0	UNSAT
		4.4 Calculate maximum vent time (T _v) T _v =M/F	T _v = 37600/1600 T _v = 23.5 minutes Note: Using the 37647 (M) value and the 1600-1800 allowed extrapolation from Figure 1, the bounding correct answers for Tv are 20.89 minutes and 23.53 minutes. The allowable answer for this JPM is 20-24 minutes.		
			Once operator has provided maximum head vent time, state JPM is complete.		

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST

NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.

1	_ 1. Task description and number, JPM description an	nd number are identified.
_2	2. Knowledge and Abilities (K/A) references are incli	uded.
1	_ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control	room, or simulator)
2	4. Initial setup conditions are identified.	
	5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identi	fied.
-y	6. Task standards identified and verified by SME rev	view.
1	7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps an	d are identified with an asterisk (*).
-y	_ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM match that procedure: Procedure Rev25_ Date _4/2	ches the most current revision of
- Y	 9. Pilot test the JPM: a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of b. ensure performance time is accurate. 	conflict, and
1	10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with p	proper responses, then revise the JPM.
1/	_ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign	n and date JPM cover page.
SME/Inst	tructor: J. PIERCE	Date: 7/28/11
SME/Inst	tructor:	Date:
SME/Inst	tructor:	Date:

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Unit 2 is performing 2-EOP-FRCI-3, Response to Void in Reactor Vessel, due to an unexpected void formation in the Rx Vessel following a LOCA.

- Containment temperature is 220 degrees F.
- Containment hydrogen concentration is 1.0%.
- RCS pressure is 800 psig.

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to calculate the maximum Rx Vessel Head venting time using Attachment 1 of FRCI-3.

STATION:	SALEM					
SYSTEM:	Admin					
TASK:	TCAF a Loss of Spent Fuel F temperature will exceed Des		the time at which SFP			
TASK NUMBER:	N1140900401					
JPM NUMBER:	09-01 NRC RO Admin A1-2					
ALTERNATE PATH:	IMPO	K/A NUMBER: _ DRTANCE FACTOR:	2.4.47 3.8 3.6			
APPLICABILITY: EO F	RO X STA	SRO X	RO SRO			
EVALUATION SETTING	/METHOD: Classroom					
S1.	OP-AB.SF-0001, Rev. 7 Loss OP-AR.ZZ-0003, Rev. 17, Ove em UFSAR Section 9.1.3 Spe	erhead Annunciator Wir	ndow C			
TOOLS AND EQUIPME	NT: Calculator					
VALIDATED JPM COM	PLETION TIME: 1	0 min				
TIME PERIOD IDENTIFI	ED FOR TIME CRITICAL STE	EPS: N//	4			
Developed By:	G Gauding Instructor	Date:	07-20-11			
Validated By:	J Pierce, Jr SME or Instructor	Date:	07-28-11			
Approved By:	Training Department	Date:	8-2-11			
Approved By:	Operations Representat	Date:	8/1/11			
ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME:						
ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME:						
PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT UNSAT						
REASON, IF UNSATISF	ACTORY:					
EVALUATOR'S SIGNAT	TURE:		DATE:			

		NAME: _	 	
		DATE:		
SYSTEM:	Admin			

SFP temperature will exceed Design Bases)

TCAF a Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (Calculate the time at which

TASK NUMBER:

TASK:

N1140900401

SIMULATOR SETUP

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Salem Unit 1 is defueled during a regular refueling outage.

Spent Fuel Pool temperature is stable at 121°F.

On November 30th at 0100, the operating Spent Fuel Pool Cooling pump trips, and cannot be re-started.

The standby Spent Fuel Pool Cooling pump cannot be started.

At 0115, OHA C-19, SFP TEMP HI alarms.

INITIATING CUE:

At 0200, the CRS directs you to calculate the time of day at which the Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool will reach its Design Temperature, IAW S1.OP-AB.SF-0001, if no operator actions are taken.

Assume the heat-up rate has been linear from 0100 to 0200.

Successful Completion Criteria:

- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Calculates that SFP temp will exceed Design Temp (180) @ 0436-0442. See bases for range on page 5.

NAME:		
DATE:		

SYSTEM Admin

TASK: TCAF a Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (Calculate the time at which SFP temperature will exceed Design Bases)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT
		Provide candidate with blank copy of S1.OP-AB.SF-0001, Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling.	IF asked, provide a copy of S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0003, Overhead Annunciator Window C. Cue: IF asked by candidate if the OHA C-19 has been adjusted to a temporary setpoint, THEN state" OHA C-19 has not been adjusted to a temporary setpoint.		
	AB.SF-1 Step 3.3	INITIATE Attachment 5, Spent Fuel Pool Heatup Trending, for Unit 1 Spent fuel Pool, as directed by the CRS.	Refers to S1.OP-AB.SF-0001, Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling, Attachment 5, Spent Fuel Pool Heatup Trending.		
*	AB.SF-1 Att.5		Enters 121 as Initial SFP TEMP (A) on Attachment 5.		
	AB.SF-1 Att.5		Refers to S1.OP-AR.ZZ-0003, Overhead Annunciator Window C, and determines the alarm setpoint is 125°F.		

NAME:	 			_
DATE:				

SYSTEM Admin

TASK:

TCAF a Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (Calculate the time at which SFP temperature will exceed Design Bases)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT
*	AB.SF-1 Att. 5		Determines the SFP TEMP (A) at "+1 HR" is 137 based on the temperature rise from 0100 (121°) to the alarm at 0115 (125°) over 15 minutes, and multiplies by 4 to get heatup for the hour of 16°.		
*	AB.SF-1 Att. 5		Determines the ΔTEMP/HR (B) at +1HR is 16 .		
	AB.SF-1 Att. 5		Performs calculation to determine the time to 180°F: (180-A)/B (180-137)/16 = 2.6875 HRS Note: 2.6875 hrs= 2 hours, 41.25 min.		

NAME:		
DATE:		

SYSTEM Admin

TASK:

TCAF a Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (Calculate the time at which SFP temperature will exceed Design Bases)

*.	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT
			Calculates the time of day at which SFP temp will reach Design Temp: Time of calculation: 0200 Time to reach 180: 2 hours, 41.25 min 04:41:15 Determination to the second is not required. The Task Standard states the band is 0436 (if rounded down to 2.6 hours, and 0442 (if round up to 2.7 hours)		
			Terminate the JPM when all paperwork has been returned to the evaluator.		

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST

NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.

7	_ 1. Task description and number, JPM description	and number are identified.
-7	_ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (K/A) references are i	ncluded.
- V	_ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, cont	rol room, or simulator)
	_ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified.	
- V	_ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly ide	entified.
_1/	_ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME	review.
	_ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps	
-2	_ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM m that procedure: Procedure Rev7 Date _7	natches the most current revision of
<u>}</u>	 9. Pilot test the JPM: a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free b. ensure performance time is accurate. 	of conflict, and
2	_ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written wi	th proper responses, then revise the JPM.
	_ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor	sign and date JPM cover page.
SME/Insti	ructor: J. PIRRCE	Date: 7/28/11
SME/Inst	ructor:	Date:
SME/Insti	ructor:	Date:

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Salem Unit 1 is defueled during a regular refueling outage.

Spent Fuel Pool temperature is stable at 121°F.

On November 30th at 0100, the operating Spent Fuel Pool Cooling pump trips, and cannot be re-started.

The standby Spent Fuel Pool Cooling pump cannot be started. At 0115, OHA C-19, SFP TEMP HI alarms.

INITIATING CUE:

At 0200, the CRS directs you to calculate the time of day at which the Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool will reach its Design Temperature, IAW S1.OP-AB.SF-0001, if no operator actions are taken.

Assume the heat-up rate has been linear from 0100 to 0200.

STATION:	SALEM	44.00	
SYSTEM:	Admin		
TASK:	Prepare a Manual Tagout		
TASK NUMBER:	N3130060301		
JPM NUMBER:	09-01 NRC RO Admin A2		
ALTERNATE PATH:		K/A NUMBER:	2.2.13
APPLICABILITY: EO	RO X STA	SRO X	4.1 4.3 SRO
EVALUATION SETTING	G/METHOD: Classroom		
REFERENCES: OF	P-AA-109-115, Rev. 2, Safety	Tagging Operations	
TOOLS AND EQUIPME	NT: None		
VALIDATED JPM COM	PLETION TIME:	30 min	
TIME PERIOD IDENTIF	TED FOR TIME CRITICAL ST	ΓΕΡS: N/	Α
Developed By:	G Gauding Instructor	Date:	07-20-11
Validated By:	J. Pierce SME or Instructor	Date:	07-28-11
Approved By:	Training Department		8-2-11
Approved By:	Operations Representa	Date:	8/1/11
ACTUAL JPM COMPLE	ETION TIME:	-	
ACTUAL TIME CRITICA	AL COMPLETION TIME:		
PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT	UNSAT		
REASON, IF UNSATISE	FACTORY:		
EVALUATOR'S SIGNA	TURE:		DATE:

	NAME:
	DATE:
SYSTEM:	Admin
TASK:	Prepare a Manual Tagout

TASK NUMBER: SIMULATOR SETUP

N3130060301

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

While performing a surveillance on 11 Safety Injection Pump, a leak was observed on the pump outlet flange discharge piping.

The Work Clearance Module is not available due to an emergent power outage.

INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to perform the following:

- 1. Determine the correct blocking points which will allow repair of the 11 SI pump.
- 2. Sequence those blocking points in the correct order.
- 3. Determine the correct tag type for each blocking point.
- 4. Determine the required positions necessary to allow repair on 11 SI pump.
- 5. Enter all the above information on the provided OP-AA-109-115, Safety Tagging Operations Form 4.

Specific WCM identifiers are NOT required.

Successful Completion Criteria:

- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

- 1. Identifies correct blocking points.
- 2. Sequence tagging in order by 1: Bezels, 2: Electrical, 3: Mechanical isolation, 4: Vents and drains.
- 3. Identifies correct tag types for components.
- 4. Identifies desired positions.

NAME:	_		_
DATE:			

SYSTEM Admin

TASK: Prepare a Manual Tagout

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT
		Provide candidate with package containing several blank Form 4's, (Tagging/Untagging Worklist), a copy of OP-AA-109-115, Safety Tagging Operations, drawings 205234 sheets 1-4, 203002, 207910-207912, and 207931-207933. Several of these drawings are not required.	Note: If requested, provide extra blank copies of Form 4 Tagging/Untagging Work List		
*			Determines Blocking Points as per key.		
*			Sequences Blocking Points in following order: 1. Bezels 2. Electrical Isolation 3. Mechanical Isolation 4. Vents and Drains		
*			Determines correct tag type for each Blocking Point as per key.		
*			Determines position required for each Blocking Point as per key.		

NAME:	 	
DATE:		

SYSTEM Admin

TASK:

Prepare a Manual Tagout

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT
			Notes for Evaluators: Attachment 2, Component Tagging Rules, contains information which allows for the following: 1. A minimum of 1 vent or drain is required to be RBT opened, there is no limit to how many can be used inside boundaries. 2. MOV's are allowed to be used as Blocking Points. It would be acceptable procedurally if the 11SJ113 AND 12SJ113 were used as Blocking Points instead of the single manual valve 1SJ114. IF used as blocking points, the 11/12SJ113 breakers (RBT-OFF), bezels (INFO), and valve handwheels (RBT- SHUT)would also be required to be tagged. Note: Actual WCD 4278552 (CRTE) used as the bases for the blocking points in JPM, with addition of vents and drains.		

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST

NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.

¥_	1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified.			
1	_ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (K/A) references are in	ncluded.		
-2	_ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator)			
	_ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified.			
	_ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly ide	entified.		
2	_ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review.			
1	7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*).			
7	8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. 2 Date 6/10/11			
<u>Y</u>	 9. Pilot test the JPM: a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free b. ensure performance time is accurate. 	of conflict, and		
-2	_ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written wit	th proper responses, then revise the JPM.		
2	_ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor s	sign and date JPM cover page.		
SME/Inst	ructor: J. PIERCE	Date: 7/28/11		
SME/Inst	SME/Instructor: Date:			
SME/Inst	ructor:	Date:		

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power. While performing a surveillance on 11 Safety Injection Pump, a leak was observed on the pump outlet flange discharge piping.

The Work Clearance Module is not available due to an emergent power outage.

INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to perform the following:

- 1. Determine the correct blocking points which will allow repair of the 11 SI pump.
- 2. Sequence those blocking points in the correct order.
- 3. Determine the correct tag type for each blocking point.
- 4. Determine the required positions necessary to allow repair on 11 SI pump.
- **5.** Enter all the above information on the provided OP-AA-109-115, Safety Tagging Operations Form 4.

Specific WCM identifiers are NOT required.

FORM 4 TAGGING / UNTAGGING WORK LIST



_	R	F	\cap	П	F	ST	•
_	Γ	_	w	U		OΙ	

Verified Q0		Release QO Ve	Desired Apply/Recognition Date/T	ent Desir ion Positi	Position	I ype INFO INFO	Tagging Point Description	WCM Identifier S1SJ -11SIPP-BZL	
Verified Q0	QO Verified	Release QO Ve	Desired Apply/Ro Position Date/T	ent Desir ion Positi	Position	Type INFO INFO	Tagging Point Description 11 SI Pump Bezel	WCM Identifier	Seq.
1 1			Position Date/T	ion Positi	Position	Type INFO INFO	11 SI Pump Bezel		
			Di			INFO	<u> </u>	S1SJ -11SIPP-BZL	1
			Di			1	1440 100 D		
			DI		_	l .	11SJ33 Bezel	S1SJ -11SJ33-BZL	2
			Di			INFO	11SJ113 Bezel	S1SJ -11SJ113-BZL	3
			DI			INFO	12SJ113 Bezel	S1SJ -12SJ113-BZL	4
				_ DI		RBT	11 SI Pump 4KV breaker	S14KV-1AD1AX5D	5
			OFF	OFF		RBT	11SJ33 Valve Motor	S1230-1AY2AX3E	6
		1	OFF	OFF		RBT	11SJ113 Valve Motor	S1230-1AY2AX3I	7
			OFF	OFF		RBT	12SJ113 Valve Motor	S1230-1BY2AX8A	8
			Х	X		RBT	11 SI Pump Suction valve	S1SJ -11SJ33	9
			Х	X		RBT	11 SI Pump Discharge valve	S1SJ -11SJ35	10
			Х	X		RBT	11 SI Pump mini flow isolation	S1SJ -11SJ65	11
			Х	X		RBT	11 SI Pump mini flow isolation	S1SJ -11SJ922	12
			Х	X		RBT	SJ-CHG pump x-over isolation vlv	S1SJ -1SJ114	13
			Х	×		RBT	11SJ113 Cross over	S1SJ -11SJ113	14
			Х	X		RBT	12SJ113 Cross over	S1SJ -12SJ113	15
			0	0		RBT	SJ-CHG pump x-over drain vlv	S1SJ -1SJ181	16
			0	0		RBT	SJ-CHG pump x-over vent viv	S1SJ -1SJ326	17
			0	0		RBT	11 SI Pump drain	S1SJ -11SJ102	18
			0	0		RBT	11 SI Pump drain	S1SJ -11SJ106	19
			0	0		RBT	11 St Pump drain	S1SJ -11SJ104	20
			0	0		RBT	11 SI Pump vent	S1SJ -11SJ103	21
			0	0		RBT	11 SI Pump vent	S1SJ -11SJ105	22
			0 0 0	0 0	E/TIME:	RBT RBT RBT RBT	11 SI Pump drain 11 SI Pump drain 11 SI Pump vent	S1SJ -11SJ106 S1SJ -11SJ104 S1SJ -11SJ103	19 20 21 22

STATION:	SALEM			
SYSTEM:	ADMINISTRATIVE			
TASK:	Perform Duties of Secondar	ry Communicator During	an Alert	
TASK NUMBER:	N1240100501			
JPM NUMBER:	09-01 NRC RO Admin A4			
ALTERNATE PATH:	IMP	K/A NUMBER: _ ORTANCE FACTOR:	2.4.39	
APPLICABILITY: EO F	RO X STA	SRO	RO SRO	
EVALUATION SETTING	S/METHOD: Simulator			
REFERENCES: Sal	lem ECG, Attachment 8 Seco	ondary Communicator Lo	og, Rev. 24	
TOOLS AND EQUIPME	NT: None			
VALIDATED JPM COM	PLETION TIME:	8 min		
TIME PERIOD IDENTIF	IED FOR TIME CRITICAL ST	EPS: N/.	Α	
Developed By:	G Gauding Instructor	Date:	7-19-11	
Validated By:	J Pierce, Jr SME or Instruc	Date: tor	07-28-11	
Approved By:	Training Departm	Date:	8-1-11	
Approved By:	Operations Repres	Date:	8/1/11	
ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME:				
ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME:				
PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT UNSAT				
REASON, IF UNSATISF	FACTORY:			
EVALUATOR'S SIGNA	TURE		DATE:	

		NAME:	
		DATE:	
SYSTEM.	Administrative	-	

TASK:

Perform Duties of Secondary Communicator During an Alert.

TASK NUMBER:

N1240100501

SIMULATOR OPERATOR

CALL THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER ON LAND LINE 1-301-951-0550 BEFORE STARTING JPMS TO INFORM THEM ERDS WILL BE ACTIVATED DURING EXAM. PLACE FOLLOWUP CALL AFTER LAST

RO HAS PERFORMED JPM.

ENSURE modem in simulator computer room, by 3 monitors is turned ON.

Reset simulator to MODE 3 HSB IC, and place simulator in RUN.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

An ALERT was declared at Salem due to the Unit 2 reactor failing to trip when a manual trip signal was initiated. The Rx tripped when the second trip

handle was used.

The unit is currently stable in MODE 3.

INITIATING CUE:

You are the Secondary Communicator. You are directed to perform Salem

ECG Attachment 8, Secondary Communicator Log.

Successful Completion Criteria:

- All critical steps completed 1.
- All sequential steps completed in order 2.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

- 1. Activate ERDS.
- 2. Does NOT provide plant information to outside caller.
- Terminate ERDS.

NAME:		
DATE:		

System: ADMINISTRATIVE

	1					
*	STEP NO.	STEP (* Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)	
		Provide a copy of ECG Attachment 8.				
			Fills out ECG Attachment 8 by:			
			Printing name			
			Circles ALERT and circles CM2.			
	A.1	OBTAIN a copy of Attachment 6 and ASSIST Primary Communicator with 15-minute notifications, as necessary.	Cue: Primary Communicator does not require assistance.			
	A.2	DIRECT the Shift Rad Pro Tech (SRPT) (2644) to implement SC.EP- EP.ZZ-0301(Q) Shift Radiation Protection Technician Response. (N/A for Common Site)	Cue: Shift Rad Pro Tech (Matt Hassler) has been notified to implement SC.EP-EP.ZZ-0301(Q) Shift Radiation Protection Technician Response.			
	A.3	For an ALERT or higher Emergency; a. IF an on-shift SRO is not available to fill the OSC Operations Supervisor position, CALLOUT an additional SRO and have him/her report to the OSC.	Cue: The WCC Supervisor is the OSC Supervisor.			

NAME:		
DATE:		

System: ADMINISTRATIVE

*	STEP NO.	STEP (* Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
*	A.3	 b. ACTIVATE ERDS within 60 minutes from the affected unit's SPDS terminal: 1. CLICK <erds> button</erds> 2. CLICK<initiate> button</initiate> 3. CHECK for the following status: ERDS	Uses SPDS display to activate ERDS by: 1. Clicking <erds> button 2. Clicking<initiate> button 3. Checking for the following status:</initiate></erds>		
T + + 3 + 5 + 5 + 6 + 4 + 6 + 6 + 6 + 6 + 6 + 6 + 6 + 6	A.3	c. <u>IF</u> ERDS Activator is not successful, CONTACT IT Support: Network Operations (DID 7008), EOF IT Supervisor (NETS 5009), or the IT Help Desk (Ext. 5555) for assistance.	Determines ERDS Activator was successful.		
	A.4	ENSURE FAXed or FAX the ICMF to Group A.	Cue: The ICMF has been FAXed to Group A.		

NAME:			
DATE:			

System: ADMINISTRATIVE

*	STEP NO.	STEP (* Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
*		Simulator Operator: After candidate has performed step A.4 above, call the desk phone and say the following: "This is Anderson Cooper calling from CNN headquarters in Atlanta.	Does NOT give plant information to caller.		
		We have received a report that the Salem 2 reactor has experienced a Rx accident and the core is melting. Can you give me an update on the current condition of Salem Unit 2?"	Attachment 8, Section C, INCOMING CALLS, MEDIA, CAUTION, states, "Communicators are NOT authorized to release any information to the News Media."		
			May read either Attachment 8, section C, Incoming Calls, 3B, OR tell them he cannot provide any information.		
			CUE: If asked, state the ENC is activated.		
			CUE: Once ERDS is activated AND Media call action is complete, then state, "The Station Event has been terminated. The NRC Operations Center directs you to terminate ERDS transmission."		

OPERATOR	TRAINING	PROGRAM
JOB PERFO	ORMANCE	MEASURE

NAME:		
DATE:		

System: ADMINISTRATIVE

*	STEP NO.	STEP (* Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
*	C.4	WHEN directed by the NRC to TERMINATE ERDS transmission, THEN GO TO any SPDS terminal of the affected unit AND PROCEED as follows: a. CLICK <erds> button b. CLICK<terminate> button c. CHECK for the following status: ERDS Inactive LINK Not Connected d. WHEN completed, NOTIFY the SM</terminate></erds>	Uses SPDS display to activate ERDS by: 1. Clicking <erds> button 2. Clicking<terminate> button 3. Checking for the following status: ERDS Inactive LINK Not Connected Cue: SM notified, JPM is complete.</terminate></erds>		

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST

NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.

	_ 1. Task description and number, JPM description	and number are identified.
	2. Knowledge and Abilities (K/A) references are i	ncluded.
1	_ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, conti	rol room, or simulator)
2	_4. Initial setup conditions are identified.	
2	_ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly ide	entified.
2	6. Task standards identified and verified by SME	review.
2	7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps	and are identified with an asterisk (*).
_2	_8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM m that procedure: Procedure Rev2_4_ Date 7/	atches the most current revision of
-r	 9. Pilot test the JPM: a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free b. ensure performance time is accurate. 	of conflict, and
-V-	_ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written wit	th proper responses, then revise the JPM.
<u>/</u>	_ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor s	sign and date JPM cover page.
·		, ,
SME/Instr	ructor: J, PIERCE	Date: 7/28/11
SME/Instr		Date:
SME/Inst	ructor:	Date:

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

An ALERT has been declared at Salem due to the Unit 2 reactor failing to trip when a manual trip signal was initiated. The Rx tripped when the second trip handle was used.

The unit is currently stable in MODE 3.

INITIATING CUE:

You are the Secondary Communicator. You are directed to perform Salem ECG Attachment 8, Secondary Communicator Log.

	JOD I LIVI OKIVIAN	IOE MEAGOINE	
STATION:	SALEM		
SYSTEM:	Administrative		
TASK:	Determine the required ac conditions.	tions based on abnormal	Secondary Plant chemistry
TASK NUMBER:	N1140530402		
JPM NUMBER:	09-01 NRC SRO Admin A	1-1	
ALTERNATE PATH:	IM	K/A NUMBER: PORTANCE FACTOR:	2.1.34 3.5
APPLICABILITY: EO	RO STA	SRO X	RO SRO
EVALUATION SETTING	G/METHOD: Classroom	m	
REFERENCES: S2.	OP-AB.CHEM-0001, Rev. 2	21	
TOOLS AND EQUIPME	NT: None		
VALIDATED JPM COM	PLETION TIME: 1	0 minutes	
TIME PERIOD IDENTIF	ED FOR TIME CRITICAL S	STEPS: N/	A
Developed By:	G Gauding Instructor	Date:	7-21-11
Validated By:	C Recchione SME or Instructor	Date:	07-28-11
Approved By:	Training Department		8-2-11
Approved By:	Operations Departme	nt Date:	8/1/11
ACTUAL JPM COMPLE	ETION TIME:		
ACTUAL TIME CRITICA	AL COMPLETION TIME:		
PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT	UNSAT		
REASON, IF UNSATISE	FACTORY:		
EVALUATOR'S SIGNA	TURE:		DATE:

NAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM:

Administrative

TASK:

Determine the required actions based on abnormal Secondary Plant chemistry

conditions.

TASK NUMBER:

N1140530402

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

While operating at 100% power, Salem Unit 2 has experienced a rise in Sodium levels in 22B main condenser hotwell. Chemistry samples have been reported at 0800 on September 11th:

S/G Blowdown pH: 10.1 S/G Blowdown Cl⁻: 38 ppb S/G Blowdown Na: 40 ppb

S/G blow down Cation Conductivity: 0.9 uS/cm.

Feedwater DO: 0.25 ppb

INITIATING CUE:

Using the assumption that the Secondary Chemistry conditions do not change, develop a timeline that describes how these conditions will affect Unit 2 operation, starting at 0800 on September 11th.

Assume that any plant power changes will only be the minimum required.

Successful Completion Criteria:

- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

- 1. Calculates that Unit 2 must be < 30% power by 1600 on September 18th.
- 2. Calculates that Unit 2 must be <5% power by 1600 on September 22nd.

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

IAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM:

Administrative

TASK:

Determine the required actions based on abnormal Secondary Plant chemistry conditions.

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
		When asked, provide a clean copy of S2.OP-AB.CHEM-0001, Abnormal Secondary Chemistry.			
			Note : Once entered, the AB would not be exited until the conditions cause were found and isolated.		
			Note: Action Levels are found on Attachment 4.		
			S/G blowdown Cl- and S/G blowdown Cation Conductivity both meet Action Level 1 at 0800 on September 11 th .		
			Operation in Action Level 1 for 7 days is the escalation to Action Level 2, which is entered at 0800 on September 18 th .		
*			Action Level 2 actions are directed at Step 3.28, which requires initiation of actions and reduce power ≤30 % in the next 8 hours, by 1600 on September 18 th .		
			100 hours of operation at Action Level 2 is the escalation to Action Level 3 , which is entered at 1200 on September 22 nd .		

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

NAME:		
DATE:		

SYSTEM: Administrative

TASK: Determine the required actions based on abnormal Secondary Plant chemistry conditions.

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
*			Action Level 3 actions are directed at Step 3.18, which requires initiation of actions and reduce power <5% in the next four hours, by 1600 on September 22 nd .		
			Terminate JPM when operator turns in paperwork.		

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST

NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.

_G	1. Task description and number, JPM description a	and number are identified.
4	2. Knowledge and Abilities (K/A) references are inc	cluded.
<u>a</u> :	3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, contro	room, or simulator)
U	4. Initial setup conditions are identified.	
<u> </u>	5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly ider	itified.
<u> </u>	6. Task standards identified and verified by SME re	eview.
	7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps a	and are identified with an asterisk (*).
<u>q</u> 8	8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM ma that procedure: Procedure Rev. <u>てし</u> Date <u></u>	
_ U :	 Pilot test the JPM: a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of b. ensure performance time is accurate. 	of conflict, and
Mr.	10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with	proper responses, then revise the JPM.
Ms.	11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sig	gn and date JPM cover page.
SME/Instru	uctor: CM~	Date: 7/28/11
SME/Instru	uctor:	Date:
SME/Instru	leter:	Date:

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

While operating at 100% power, Salem Unit 2 has experienced a rise in Sodium levels in 22B main condenser hotwell. Chemistry samples have been reported at 0800 on September 11th:

S/G Blowdown pH: 10.1 S/G Blowdown Cl⁻: 38 ppb S/G Blowdown Na: 40 ppb

S/G blow down Cation Conductivity: 0.9 uS/cm.

Feedwater DO: 0.25 ppb

INITIATING CUE:

Using the assumption that the Secondary Chemistry conditions do not change, develop a timeline that describes how these conditions will affect Unit 2 operation, starting at 0800 on September 11th.

Assume that any plant power changes will only be the minimum required.

STATION:	SALEM		
SYSTEM:	Administrative		
TASK:	Determine the TSAS(s) for a dropped rod and complete the appropriate log		
TASK NUMBER:	1120700302		
JPM NUMBER:	09-01 NRC SRO A1-2		
ALTERNATE PATH:	IMD	K/A NUMBER:	2.1.18
APPLICABILITY: EO	RO STA	ORTANCE FACTOR: $_$	RO 3.8 SRO
EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Classroom			
	lem Tech Specs P-SA-108-115-1001, Rev. 2		
TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None			
VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 20 min			
TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A			
Developed By:	G Gauding Instructor	Date:	07-21-11
Validated By:	C Recchione SME or Instructor	Date:	07-28-11
Approved By:	Training Department	Date:	8-2-11
Approved By:	Operations Representati	Date:	a) । 11
ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME:			
ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME:			
PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT UNSAT			
REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY:			
EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE:			DATE:

NAME:		
DATE:		

SYSTEM:

ADMINISTRATIVE

TASK:

Determine the TSAS(s) for a dropped rod and complete the applicable log

TASK NUMBER:

1120700302

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

- 1. Unit 2 is at EOL in a 300 hundred day run at 100% power.
- 2. Control Rod 2SA4 dropped fully into the core at 1015, the reactor did not trip.

3. The crew has implemented S2.OP-AB.ROD-0002, Dropped Rod.

- 4. Control Rod 2SA4 has been declared inoperable, and Reactor Engineering reports it will be at least 2 hours before they determine how to recover the rod.
- 5. The 3rd NCO has just completed a QPTR at 1025. The highest reading quadrant is 1.031.
- 6. Computerized LCO tracking is not being used.

INITIATING CUE:

As CRS, determine all TSAS(s) that apply and make the appropriate log entries on OP-SA-108-114-1001, Operability Assessment and Equipment Control Program, Attachment 4-1, and Form 1.

Creation or documentation of notifications is not required.

Successful Completion Criteria:

- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

- 1. Identify TSAS 3.1.3.4.b , 3.1.3.1.c, and 3.2.4.a are applicable with 3.1.3.1.c as the most Time Limiting TSAS.
- 2. Fill out Attachment 4-1 and Form 1 as per Standard in JPM body.

NAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE

TASK: Determine the TSAS(s) for a dropped rod and complete the applicable log

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
		Provide candidate with blank copy of OP-SA-108-114-1001, Operability Assessment and Equipment Control Program. Provide marked up copy of Attachment 4-1.			
*		Obtains a copy of Plant Technical Specifications and reviews for LCO applicability.	Determines the following LCO's apply: 3.1.3.4.b , 3.1.3.1.c, 3.2.4.a		
			Refers to Section 5.2, Entry into an Active/Tracking Technical Specification (T/S) LCO Action Statements of OP-SA-108-114-1001, Operability Assessment and Equipment Control Program		
*	5.2.2	DETERMINE if the T/S LCO Action Statement is ACTIVE or TRACKING based on the following criteria:	Determines the LCOs are ACTIVE.		
	5.2.3	IF the cause of the SSC being INOPERABLE is a plannedevolution	Determines the cause of the SSC being INOPERABLE it is NOT a planned evolution.		
	5.2.4	For activities that cause a TECH SPECS SSC to be INOPERABLE that do not meet the criteria of Section 5.2.3, DOCUMENT the condition as follows:			

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM	1
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE	

NAME:		
DATE:		

SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE

TASK:

Determine the TSAS(s) for a dropped rod and complete the applicable log

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
	5.2.4.A	For SAP LCO tracking, REFER TO guidance provided in OP-SH-108-115-1001, LCO Entry/Exit & Operability Determination SAP Guidance.	Determines computerized SAP LCO tracking is not being used as per stem.		

NAME:			
DATE:			

SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE

TASK: Determine the TSAS(s) for a dropped rod and complete the applicable log

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
*	5.2.4.B	For LCO tracking using Attachment 4 and Form 1, PERFORM the following: 1. ASSIGN the next consecutive LCO Index Number obtained from the Action Statement Log Index (Attachment 4) and LOG the T/S LCO ACTION Statement on the Index. 2. UPDATE Unit Status Board for the Technical Specification Action Statement.	CUE: Provide copy of Attachment 4-1 and Form 1. On Att. 4-1, the first LCO Index No. should is filled in so the candidate can number sequentially. Makes entries on Att. 4-1: Next LCO Index No. is 11-234 TS No's. 3.1.3.4.b. 3.1.3.1.c, 3.2.4.a Active Summary Descriptions Planned? NO Entry Date/Time Expiration: 3.1.3.1.c- 1 hour, 3.2.4.a – 2 hrs. (or less) from QPTR completion, 3.1.3.4.b 1 hour CUE: Another operator will update the Unit Status Board.		

IAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM: AD

ADMINISTRATIVE

TASK:

Determine the TSAS(s) for a dropped rod and complete the applicable log

STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
5.2.4.B	 RECORD the LCO Index Number (from Attachment 4) RECORD the LCO Status (Active / Tracking) RECORD the applicable Technical Specification LCO number. When an INOPERABLE TECH SPECS/SSC affects multiple LCO Action Statements, RECORD the LCO number with the most limiting Action Time. RECORD the Date/Time entered. RECORD the Date/Time Action Required. When recording the date and time that Action is required for an LCO Actions, use the most limiting Action time. 	 Makes entries on Form 1: LCO Index No: same as Att. 4 LCO Status: Active TS No.: 3.1.3.1.c Date/Time entered: Same as Att. 4 Applicability: MODES 1 & 2 Date/Time Action Required: Within one hour from entry 	S/U	evaluation)
	Action Statements, record 'N/A'. PSEG Restricted – Possession	Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Page 6 of 9	Training	

IAME:			
DATE:	_		

SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE

TASK: Determine the TSAS(s) for a dropped rod and complete the applicable log

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
	5.2.4.B	RECORD Other Applicable T/S. List only active LCO's. Applicable Tracking LCOs should be listed seperately in the Summary Description of the Log Sheet.	Other Applicable TS: 3.2.4, 3.1.3.4.b		
		RECORD the Equipment description.	 Equipment: Shutdown Rod 2SA4 Summary: Brief summary of TS and the 		
		Briefly STATE the reason for the SSC condition in the Summary Description section and include a brief summary of actions required, including submittal of any special reports to the NRC. NOTIFY the SOS of any reporting requirements.	power reduction required within 1 hour from entry.		
			When candidate returns all paperwork, terminate JPM.		

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST

NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.

4	_ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified.
4	2. Knowledge and Abilities (K/A) references are included.
9	_ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator)
_0	_4. Initial setup conditions are identified.
_0	5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified.
9	_6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review.
_0	7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*).
<u>G</u>	8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. Date
<u>G</u>	9. Pilot test the JPM: a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and b. ensure performance time is accurate.
M2	_ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM.
uh4	_ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page.
OME/lessel	ructor: Date: 7/28/1/
SME/Instr	ructor: Date: VICOTI
SME/Insti	ructor: Date:
SMF/Inst	ructor: Date:

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

- 1. Unit 2 is at EOL in a 300 hundred day run at 100% power.
- 2. Control Rod 2SA4 dropped fully into the core at 1015, the reactor did not trip.
- 3. The crew has implemented S2.OP-AB.ROD-0002, Dropped Rod.
- 4. Control Rod 2SA4 has been declared inoperable, and Reactor Engineering reports it will be at least 2 hours before they determine how to recover the rod.
- 5. The 3rd NCO has just completed a QPTR at 1025. The highest reading quadrant is 1.031.
- 6. Computerized LCO tracking is not being used.

INITIATING CUE:

As CRS, determine all TSAS(s) that apply and make the appropriate log entries on OP-SA-108-114-1001, Operability Assessment and Equipment Control Program, Attachment 4-1, and Form 1.

Creation or documentation of notifications is not required.

STATION:	SALEM		
SYSTEM:	ADMINISTRATIVE		
TASK:	Review a completed surveillance to cal	culate Shutdown Margin	
TASK NUMBER:	1200030301		
JPM NUMBER:	09-01 NRC SRO Admin A2		
ALTERNATE PATH:	L	NUMBER: 2.2.12 FACTOR: 4.1	
APPLICABILITY: EO I	IMPORTANCE	RO SRO	
EVALUATION SETTING	G/METHOD: Classroom		
S1	C.RE-ST.ZZ-0002, Rev. 19 Shutdown Ma .RE-RA.ZZ-0016, Rev. 3 Figures (Cycle : lem Unit 1 Technical Specifications TSAS	21)	
TOOLS AND EQUIPME	•	S Morabio Control / tocombiled	
VALIDATED JPM COM	PLETION TIME: 20 minutes		
TIME PERIOD IDENTIF	IED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS:	25 minutes	
Developed By:	G Gauding Instructor	Date: 07-21-11	
Validated:	C Recchione SME or Instructor	Date: 07-28-11	
Approved By:	Araining Department	Date: 8-2-1,	
Approved By:	Operations Representative	Date: 8/1/11	
ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME:			
ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME:			
PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT	UNSAT		
REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY:			
EVALUATOR'S SIGNA		DATE:	

NAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM:

Administrative

TASK:

Review a completed surveillance to calculate Shutdown Margin

TASK

1200030301

NUMBER:

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Control Rod 1D5 was declared INOPERABLE at 2210 today due to not moving during a rod exercise test.

A NCO has completed a SDM as required by Tech Spec 3.1.3.1 IAW SC.RE-ST.ZZ-0002, Shutdown Margin Calculation, and reports that SDM is SAT.

Unit 1 Reactor Power is 70%. Control Bank D is at 174 steps.

Current boron concentration is 300 ppm.

Current core burnup is 10,000 EFPH.

INITIATING CUE:

Review the attached SDM calculation procedure SC.RE-ST.ZZ-0002 for completeness and accuracy.

Note any discrepancies found by the review on Attachment 7.

The current time is 2245. This is a time critical JPM. Time will start when procedures are given to you. Time will stop when procedures are given to proctor.

Successful Completion Criteria:

- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

- 1. Operator identifies incorrect Total Control Bank Worth at Step 4.2.1 of Att. 3.
- 2. Operator identifies incorrect Total Shutdown Bank Worth at Step 4.2.2 of Att. 3.
- 3. Operator identifies incorrect Integral Rod Worth inserted at Step 4.2.5 of Att. 3
- 4. Operator identifies incorrect value of Power Defect at Step 4.3.3 of Att. 3.
- 5. Operator completes review within 25 minutes.

NAME:			
DATE:			

System: ADMINISTRATIVE

Task: Review a completed surveillance to calculate Shutdown Margin

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT Evaluation)
			Note to Evaluator: The actions contained in this JPM do not require the SRO candidate to perform the Shutdown Margin, only to identify the portions that have been performed incorrectly. The time critical aspect refers to the time required when the Shutdown Margin requirement of TSAS 3.1.3.1.c must be met.		
		Provide the candidate with the marked up copy of SC.RE-ST.ZZ-0002 and copy of S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0016, Curve Book. Time Start:	Ensures Sections 3 and 4 are completed.		
	2	Review Section 5 to ensure the correct Attachment was performed.	Reviews Section 5 and determines the correct Attachment (3) was performed.		

NAME:	
DATE:	

System: ADMINISTRATIVE

Task: Review a completed surveillance to calculate Shutdown Margin

*	STEP	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT
	NO.			S/U	Evaluation)
	3	Review the completed Shutdown Margin Calculation:			
		4.1.1 Power Level	Verifies power is 70% from stem initial conditions.		
		4.1.2 Boron Concentration	Verifies 300 ppm from initial conditions		
		4.1.3 Control Bank Position	Verifies Bank D at 174 from initial conditions.		
		4.1.3 Burnup	Verifies burnup 10,000 EFPH from initial conditions.		
		Step 4.1.5	Verifies 1 from stem.		
*		Step 4.2.1	Determines Total Control Bank Worth is incorrect from Figure 15/Table G (Should be -3018)		
*		Step 4.2.2	Determines Total Shutdown Bank Worth is incorrect from from Figure 16/Table H (Should be -3743)		
		Step 4.2.3	Verifies 722 from Figure 14/Table I		
		Step 4.2.4	Verifies 722 for 1 control rod.		
*		Step 4.2.5	Determines Integral Rod Worth Inserted is incorrect from Figure 2C/Table 1-7 or Figure 2A/Table 1-8. (Should be 221)		

IAME:		
DATE:		

System: ADMINISTRATIVE

Task: Review a completed surveillance to calculate Shutdown Margin

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT Evaluation)
*		Step 4.2.6	Determines errors carried forward. (Should be -5096)		
*		Step 4.3.1	Determines errors carried forward. (Should be -5096)		
*		Step 4.3.2	Determines errors carried forward. (Should be 604)		,
*		Step 4.3.3	Determines incorrect Power Defect is used. (Should be 1937)		
*		Step 4.3.4	Determines SDM is incorrect. (Should be -2555)		
*	4	Acceptance Criteria	Determines Acceptance Criteria are met.		
		Time Stop:	Turns in procedures within 25 minutes of start time.		
			Total time to complete JPM MUST be 25 minutes or less.		

TQ-AA-106-0303Revision 4

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST

NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.

M	1. Task description and number, JPM description	and number are identified.
_CM	2. Knowledge and Abilities (K/A) references are i	ncluded.
<u>G</u>	3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, contr	ol room, or simulator)
4	4. Initial setup conditions are identified.	
<u> </u>	5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly ide	entified.
<u></u>	6. Task standards identified and verified by SME	review.
<u> </u>	7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps	and are identified with an asterisk (*).
	8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM m that procedure: Procedure Rev. 15 Date	
4	9. Pilot test the JPM: a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are fr b. ensure performance time is accurate.	ree of conflict, and
M	10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written wit	h proper responses, then revise the JPM.
M	11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor s	sign and date JPM cover page.
SME/Inst	ructor: CHAII RECCHIONIA	Date: 7/26/7
SME/Inst	ructor:	Date:
SME/Inst	ructor:	Date:

INITIAL	Name:
CONDITIONS:	

Control Rod 1D5 was declared INOPERABLE at 2210 today due to not moving during a rod exercise test.

A NCO has completed a SDM as required by Tech Spec 3.1.3.1 IAW SC.RE-ST.ZZ-0002, Shutdown Margin Calculation, and reports that SDM is SAT.

Unit 1 Reactor Power is 70%. Control Bank D is at 174 steps.

Current boron concentration is 300 ppm.

Current core burnup is 10,000 EFPH.

INITIATING CUE:

Review the attached SDM calculation procedure SC.RE-ST.ZZ-0002 for completeness and accuracy.

Note any discrepancies found, corrections needed, and any actions required by the review on Attachment 7.

The current time is 2245. This is a time critical JPM. Time will start when procedures are given to you. Time will stop when procedures are given to proctor.

sC.RE-ST.ZZ-0002(Q)

ATTACHMENT 3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN VERIFICATION FOR MODES 1 OR 2 Page 2 of 3

SALEM UNIT

4.0	PROC	CEDURE CEDURE
4.1	CRITIC	CAL CONDITIONS
	4.1.1	POWER LEVEL
	4.1.2	BORON CONCENTRATION <u>300</u> ppm
	4.1.3	CONTROL BANK POSITION Bank D at 174 Steps
	4.1.4	BURNUP <u>10,000</u> EFPH
	4.1.5	# OF INOPERABLE RODS rods rods
4.2	CALC	ULATION OF ROD WORTH TOTAL CONTROL BANK WORTH (Figure 15/Table G) - 30/8 (-) 2536 pcm wed 63 /0/100 TOTAL SHUTDOWN BANK WORTH (Figure 16/Table H) 5743 (-) 2881 pcm
	4.2.1	TOTAL CONTROL BANK WORTH (Figure 15/Table G)-3018 (-) 2536 pcm used 63 743)
	4.2.2	TOTAL SHUTDOWN BANK WORTH (Figure 16/Table H) 5743 (-) 2881 pcm
	4.2.3	MOST REACTIVE STUCK ROD WORTH (Figure 14/Table I) 722 pcm
	4.2.4	INOPERABLE ROD(s) WORTH $ \frac{1}{1 \text{ Item 4.1.5}} \times \frac{722}{1 \text{ Item 4.2.3}} = $ $ \frac{722}{1 \text{ pcm}} $
	4.2.5	INTEGRAL ROD WORTH INSERTED AT POSITION IN ITEM 4.1.3 (If ARO, use zero) (HFP: Figure 2C/Table 1-7 or HZP: Figure 2A/Table 1-8)
	4.2.6	TRIPPABLE ROD WORTH $-50\% -3835$ pcm (Item 4.2.1) + (Item 4.2.2) + (Item 4.2.3) + (Item 4.2.4) + (Item 4.2.5) =
4.3	CALC	CULATION OF SDM (Note: See Precaution 3.4)
	4.3.1	TRIPPABLE ROD WORTH (Item 4.2.6) - 5096 _ 3835 pcm
	4.3.2	TEN PERCENT ROD WORTH PENALTY ($2536 + 2881 - 722$) x 0.10 = abs(Item 4.2.1) abs(Item 4.2.2) (Item 4.2.3) 3018 3743 722 POWER DEFECT (From 174 (Table 2.1)) (1937) 4940 pcm
	4.3.3	POWER DEFECT (Figure 17A/Table 2-1) 1937 2040 pcm
	4.3.4	SDM (Item 4.3.1) + (Item 4.3.2) + (Item 4.3.3) =

STATION:	SALEM					
SYSTEM:	Waste Liquid					
TASK:	Select Release Path t	for Radi	oactive Liquid	l Waste R	elease	
TASK NUMBER:	N0680070302					
JPM NUMBER:	09-01 NRC SRO Adm	nin A3				
ALTERNATE PATH:				JMBER:_	2.3	3.6
APPLICABILITY:	ROSTA		SROXX	ACTOR:_	RO	3.8 SRO
EVALUATION SETTING	G/METHOD: Class	sroom				
REFERENCES: S1	.OP-SO.WL-0002, Rev.	.25, 20	5209 (CW), 2	205242 (S	W) .	
TOOLS AND EQUIPME	NT: None					
VALIDATED JPM COM	PLETION TIME:	30 r	ninutes			
TIME PERIOD IDENTIF	IED FOR TIME CRITIC	AL STE	PS:	_		
Developed By:	G Gauding Instructor			Date:	06-24-11	
Validated By:	A Crampton SME or Instruc			Date:	06-30-11	
Approved By:	Araining Depart	ment		Date:	8-2-11	
Approved By:	Operations Depar	rtment		Date:	7/8/11	
ACTUAL JPM COMPLE	TION TIME:					
ACTUAL TIME CRITICA	AL COMPLETION TIME	: :				
PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT	UNSAT					
REASON, IF UNSATISI	ACTORY:					
EVALUATOR'S SIGNA	TURE:				DATE:	

NAME:			
DATE:			

SYSTEM: Waste Liquid

TASK: Select Release Path for Radioactive Liquid Waste Release

TASK NUMBER: N0680070302

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Salem Unit 2 is on day 25 of a scheduled 45 day refueling outage.

21 CCHX is in service, 22 CCHX is removed from service and drained.

All Unit 2 Circulators are O/S.

Salem Unit 1 is operating at 75% power.

12A Circulator is O/S for waterbox cleaning.

The Non-Rad Waste Treatment System is in service performing a release, and must remain in service.

Unit 1 is NOT in any active Tech Specs.

12 CVCS Monitor Tank is in Recirc using **11** CVCS Monitor Tank Pump, and Chemistry has granted permission to release the tank with a minimum dilution flow rate of 100,000 gpm.

INITIATING CUE: You are the Unit 1 CRS. Select the release path for 12 CVCS Monitor Tank IAW S1.OP-SO.WL-0002, Attachment 2, Section 2.2 Release Verification AND provide marked up drawings of the flow path from 12 CVCS Monitor tank to its ultimate release point.

Successful Completion Criteria:

- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

- 1. Candidate determines the release path as 21 CCHX to 12A AND/OR 12B CW Pump I/S (Att. 2 Step 2.2.3)
- 2. Provides release flow path drawing of 12 CVCS MT to 21 CCHX, (via Unit x-conn) to discharge of 12A/12B Circulators.

NAME:		 _
DATE:		

SYSTEM: Waste Liquid

TASK: Select Release Path for Radioactive Liquid Waste Release

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT Evaluation)
		Provide marked up copy of S1.OP-SO.WL-0002., and blank copies of drawings: 205230 205239-1 205229-2 205242-4 205339-1 205342-3,4,5,6 205209-2 and a colored marker.	Note: Drawings 205229-2 205242-4 205342-5 are not needed for flowpath but are included to ensure an incorrect alternate flowpath could be selected.		
*			Uses S2.OP-SO.WL-0002, Attachment 2, Section 2.2, to select the release flow path based on CCHX's available and Circulators in service, as 12 CVCS Monitor Tank to 21 CCHX, to 12A and/or 12B CW pumps I/S.		

NAME:		_	
DATE:			

SYSTEM: Waste Liquid

TASK: Select Release Path for Radioactive Liquid Waste Release

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT Evaluation)
*			Candidates mark the appropriate drawings, from the 12 CVCS MT on drawing 205230 to 205239 Sheet 1, to 205339 Sheet 1 via x-connect line, to 205342 Sheet 4, to 205342 Sheet 3, through 21SW222, to 205342 Sheet 6, to 205342 Sheet 3, to 205209 Sheet 2.		
			Terminate JPM when candidate has returned procedures and marked up drawings.		

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST

NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.

A	_ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified.
An	_ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (K/A) references are included.
M	_ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator)
1	_ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified.
A	_ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified.
M	_ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review.
R	_ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*).
L	_8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev
h	 9. Pilot test the JPM: a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and b. ensure performance time is accurate.
~/A	_ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM.
~/1	_ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page.
SME/Insti	ructor: <u> </u>
SME/Inst	ructor: Date:
SME/Inst	ructor: Date:

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Salem Unit 2 is on day 25 of a scheduled 45 day refueling outage.

21 CCHX is in service, 22 CCHX is removed from service and drained.

All Unit 2 Circulators are O/S.

Salem Unit 1 is operating at 75% power.

12A Circulator is O/S for waterbox cleaning.

The Non-Rad Waste Treatment System is in service performing a release, and must remain in service. Unit 1 is NOT in any active Tech Specs.

12 CVCS Monitor Tank is in Recirc using **11** CVCS Monitor Tank Pump, and Chemistry has granted permission to release the tank with a minimum dilution flow rate of 100,000 gpm.

INITIATING CUE:

You are the Unit 1 CRS. Select the release path for 12 CVCS Monitor Tank IAW S1.OP-SO.WL-0002, Attachment 2, Section 2.2 Release Verification AND provide marked up drawings of the flow path from 12 CVCS Monitor tank to its ultimate release point.

STATION:	SALEM				
SYSTEM:	Emergency Plan				
TASK:	Classify an event and comp limit (ESG-1)	lete an ICMF within the r	egulatory committed time		
TASK NUMBER:	1240020502				
JPM NUMBER:	09-01 NRC SRO Admin A4-	-1 (ESG-1)			
ALTERNATE PATH:		K/A NUMBER: _	2.4.41		
APPLICABILITY: EO F	RO STA	ORTANCE FACTOR: $_$	RO SRO		
EVALUATION SETTING	S/METHOD: Simulate (S	Simulator or Classroom)			
REFERENCES: Sal	em ECG				
TOOLS AND EQUIPME		erators – DO NOT ERAS /ALUATOR APPROVES	E ANY PROCEDURES		
VALIDATED JPM COM		minutes			
TIME PERIOD IDENTIFI	ED FOR TIME CRITICAL ST	TEPS: 15 min	utes		
Developed By:	G Gauding Instructor	Date:	07-05-11		
Validated By:	B Boos SME or Instructo	Date:	07-28-11		
Approved By:	Training Departme	Date:	8-2-11		
Approved By:	Facility Representa	Date:	8/1/11		
ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME:					
ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME:					
PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT UNSAT					
REASON, IF UNSATISF	ACTORY:				
EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE:					

NAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM:

Emergency Plan

TASK:

Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit

(ESG-1)

TASK NUMBER:

1240020502

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

You have a maximum of 5 minutes to review the Emergency Operating Procedures used during this
scenario to refresh your memory of all events/paths. At the end of your review you will become the
Shift Manager (SM). Inform the Evaluator when you are ready to assume SM duties. You may
continue to reference the procedures or to look at the control board but "the clock will be running." If
there are multiple ECG calls, classify the most severe.

INITIATING CUE:

You are the Duty SM. Classify the event, complete the correct ECG Attachment and provide an ICMF to the Primary Communicator.

This is a Time Critical JPM.

Successful Completion Criteria:

- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Complete the ICMF with the classification of **ALERT under EAL 3.2.2.a** (or 3.2.2.b if subcooling is 0°F) is and provide it to the Primary Communicator within 15 minutes of Start Time.

NAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM:

Emergency Plan

TASK:

Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-1)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
		Provide candidate with "Tear-off sheet"	Reviews initial conditions and EOP's (as necessary – 5 minute limit prior to starting)		
		*START TIME: *Start time begins when candidate reports he/she is ready to assume SM duties	Cue: The regulatory commitment time clock has started.		
	1	Reviews ECG to classify event	Note: It is acceptable to use the laminated tables in the simulator, rather than the ECG		
	2	Classifies the event	Determines the classification of the event and refers to ECG Attachment 2 (ALERT)		
	3	Fills out Section A of Emergency Coordinator Log Sheet, Attachment 2	Unit: 2 EAL#(s):EALs 3.2.2.a (or 3.2.2.b if subcooling is 0°F) Declared at: Current Time and Date Initials as EC		
	4	CALL communicators to the Control Room	Pages communicators and initials as SM Cue: I am the Primary Communicator		

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

NAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM:

TASK:

Emergency Plan Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-1)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
	5	ACTIVATE "ERO Emergency Callout" per posted instructions titled: "Emergency Callout Activation (EP96-003)	Cue: Activation of ERO Emergency Callout is not required for this JPM.		
*	6	COMPLETE the INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM (ICMF) (last page of this attachment).	Fills out Section II of ICMF: Time/Date: Time/date filled in on Attachment 2 EAL#(s): 3.2.2.a (or 3.2.2.b if subcooling is 0°F) Description of Event: Potential Loss of the Reactor Coolant System Barrier (or Loss of the Reactor Coolant System Barrier)		
			Note: Description of Event is found in Section IV of the ECG. Fills out Section III: Checks No Radiological Release is in progress Fills out Section IV: Retrieves wind speed and direction data from SPDS Initials for approval to transmit		

OPERATOR TRAINING PROG	BRAN
JOB PERFORMANCE MEAS	URE

IAME:	 		
DATE:			

SYSTEM:

TASK:

Emergency Plan
Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-1)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
*	7	PROVIDE the ICMF to the Primary Communicator and DIRECT the Communicator to implement ECG Attachment 6.	Provides ICMF to Primary Communicator within 15 minutes of START TIME COMPLETION TIME:		

INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM

I.	T	HIS IS	(NAME)	, '	COMM	IUNICATO	R IN THE	☑ CONT	ROL ROOM
	A	T THE SALEN	I NUCLEAR	GENERATII	NG STA	ATION, UN	NIT(s) NO	22	·
II.	Ø	THIS IS NO	ΓΙFICATION	OF A ALER	T WHI	CH WAS			
		DECLAR	ED AT (Time-	TIME_ -24 HR CLO	<u>CK)</u> C	N	_TODAYS (DAT	DATE	
	EA	L #(s) 3.2.2.a	(or 3.2.2.b if s	ubcooling is	0°F)				
	DES	SCRIPTION O	F EVENT:	Potential L the Reacto				ystem Barr	ier (Loss of
III.		•							and the second s
		diological Releases or 2.1E+01 u		NOT as: Plant Efflu		Federal Lim	it of 2.42E+	05 uCi/sec	Noble
	\checkmark	<u>NO</u> RADIOL	GICAL RELE	ASE IS IN P	ROGR	ESS.		NOTE release	
		THERE <u>IS</u> A	RADIOLOGI	CAL RELEA	SE IN	PROGRES		inition	
IV.	☑	33 FT. LEVE (From 1	L WIND DIRI	ECTION (Fr r /SPDS)	om):	DEGREES)	WIND S	PEED:	(MPH)
V.	☑	NO PROTEC	CTIVE ACTIO	ONS ARE R	ECOM	MENDED	AT THIS T	[IME	
								I INITIAL C Initials to Transm	_

SGS Rev. 08

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST

NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.

M	1. Task description and number, JPM description	and number are identified.
BB	2. Knowledge and Abilities (K/A) references are i	ncluded.
BB	3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, contr	ol room, or simulator)
M	4. Initial setup conditions are identified.	
PB_	5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly ide	ntified.
SS	6. Task standards identified and verified by SME	review.
M	7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps	and are identified with an asterisk (*).
<u>N</u>	8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM mathematical that procedure: Procedure Rev. 2 Date 2	atches the most current revision of
Al.	9. Pilot test the JPM: a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are fr b. ensure performance time is accurate.	ree of conflict, and
1/4	10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written wit	h proper responses, then revise the JPM.
n/h	11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor s	ign and date JPM cover page.
SME/Inst	tructof Jan J. Jan	Date: <u>07-28-20</u> 1)
SME/Inst	tructor:	Date:
SME/Inst	tructor:	Date:

You have a maximum of 5 minutes to review the Emergency Operating Procedures used during this scenario to refresh your memory of all events/paths. At the end of your review you will become the Shift Manager (SM). Inform the Evaluator when you are ready to assume SM duties. You may continue to reference the procedures or to look at the control board but "the clock will be running."

INITIATING CUE:

You are the Duty SM. Classify the event, complete the correct ECG Attachment and provide an ICMF to the Primary Communicator.

This is a Time Critical JPM.

STATION:	SALEM		
SYSTEM:	Emergency Plan		
TASK:	Classify an event and completed limit (ESG-2)	te an ICMF within the	regulatory committed time
TASK NUMBER:	1240020502		
JPM NUMBER:	09-01 NRC SRO Admin A4-2	(ESG-2)	
ALTERNATE PATH:		K/A NUMBER:	2.4.41
APPLICABILITY: EO		RTANCE FACTOR: $_$	RO SRO
EVALUATION SETTING	3/METHOD: Simulate (Sin	nulator or Classroom)	
REFERENCES: Sa	lem ECG		
TOOLS AND EQUIPME	NT: Inform Simulator Oper		SE ANY PROCEDURES
VALIDATED JPM COM		ninutes	
TIME PERIOD IDENTIF	IED FOR TIME CRITICAL STE	PS :15 mir	nutes
Developed By:	G Gauding Instructor	Date:	07-05-11
Validated By:	B Boos SME or Instructor	Date:	07-28-11
Approved By:	Training Department		8-2-11
Approved By:	Facility Representativ	Date:	8/1/11
ACTUAL JPM COMPLI	ETION TIME:		
ACTUAL TIME CRITICA	AL COMPLETION TIME:		
PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT	UNSAT		
REASON, IF UNSATISE	FACTORY:		
EVALUATOR'S SIGNA	TURE		ΝΔΤΕ ·

NAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM:

Emergency Plan

TASK:

Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit

(ESG-2)

TASK NUMBER:

1240020502

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

You have a maximum of 5 minutes to review the Emergency Operating Procedures used during this
scenario to refresh your memory of all events/paths. At the end of your review you will become the
Shift Manager (SM). Inform the Evaluator when you are ready to assume SM duties. You may
continue to reference the procedures or to look at the control board but "the clock will be running." If
there are multiple ECG calls, classify the most severe.

INITIATING CUE:

You are the Duty SM. Classify the event, complete the correct ECG Attachment and provide an ICMF to the Primary Communicator.

This is a Time Critical JPM.

Successful Completion Criteria:

- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Complete the ICMF with the classification of **SAE under EAL 5.1.3**. and provide it to the Primary Communicator within 15 minutes of Start Time.

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

NAME:		
DATE:		

SYSTEM:

Emergency Plan

TASK:

Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-2)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
		Provide candidate with "Tear-off sheet"	Reviews initial conditions and EOP's (as necessary – 5 minute limit prior to starting)		
		*START TIME: *Start time begins when candidate reports he/she is ready to assume SM duties	Cue: The regulatory commitment time clock has started.		
	1	Reviews ECG to classify event	Note: It is acceptable to use the laminated tables in the simulator, rather than the ECG		
	2	Classifies the event	Determines the classification of the event and refers to ECG Attachment 3 (SAE)		
	3	Fills out Section A of Emergency Coordinator Log Sheet, Attachment 3	Unit: 2 EAL#(s):EALs 5.1.3 Declared at: Current Time and Date Initials as EC		
	4	CALL communicators to the Control Room	Pages communicators and initials as SM Cue: I am the Primary Communicator		

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

NAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM:

TASK:

Emergency Plan
Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-2)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
	5	ACTIVATE "ERO Emergency Callout" per posted instructions titled: "Emergency Callout Activation (EP96-003)	Cue : Activation of ERO Emergency Callout is not required for this JPM.		
*	6	COMPLETE the INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM (ICMF) (last page of this attachment).	Fills out Section II of ICMF: Time/Date: Time/date filled in on Attachment 2 EAL#(s): 5.1.3 Description of Event: Reactor Trip Failure with power above 5% Note: Description of Event is found in Section IV of the ECG. Fills out Section III: Checks No Radiological Release is in progress Fills out Section IV: Retrieves wind speed and direction data from SPDS Initials for approval to transmit		
*	7	PROVIDE the ICMF to the Primary Communicator and DIRECT the Communicator to implement ECG Attachment 6.	Provides ICMF to Primary Communicator within 15 minutes of START TIME COMPLETION TIME:		_

INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM

I.	T	HIS IS, COMMUNICATOR IN (NAME)	THE	☑ CONTR □ TSC □ EOF	OL ROOM
	A	T THE SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT(s) NO	22	·
II.	<u> </u>	THIS IS NOTIFICATION OF A SITE AREA EMERGENCY	WHIC	TH WAS	
		DECLARED ATTIMEONTO	DAYS (DAT		<u>.</u> •
		L #(s) 5.1.3 SCRIPTION OF EVENT: Reactor Trip Failure with po	ower	above 5%	
III.					
		NOTE: diological Release is defined as: Plant Effluent > Federal Limit of 2 s or 2.1E+01 uCi/sec I-131.	2.42E+	05 uCi/sec N	Joble
		NO RADIOLGICAL RELEASE IS IN PROGRESS. THERE IS A RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE IN PROGRESS	for	NOTE release	
IV.	<u> </u>	33 FT. LEVEL WIND DIRECTION (From): W (From MET Computer /SPDS) (DEGREES)	/IND S	PEED:	(МРН)
V.	☑	NO PROTECTIVE ACTIONS ARE RECOMMENDED AT	THIS	ГІМЕ	
		(Ap	E	I INITIALS C Initials to Transmi	

SGS

Rev. 09

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST

NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.

BB	1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified.			
BB	2. Knowledge and Abilities (K/A) references are included.			
M	3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator)			
BB	4. Initial setup conditions are identified.			
M	5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly ider	ntified.		
SS	_ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME re	eview.		
BB	7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps a	nd are identified with an asterisk (*).		
SS	8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev Date			
<u>A</u>	9. Pilot test the JPM: a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are freb. ensure performance time is accurate.	ee of conflict, and		
	_ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with	proper responses, then revise the JPM.		
	_ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor si	gn and date JPM cover page.		
SME/Inst SME/Inst	No market and the second secon	Date: <u>07-28-20</u> り		
SME/Inst	ME/Instructor: Date:			

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. You have a maximum of 5 minutes to review the Emergency Operating Procedures used during this scenario to refresh your memory of all events/paths. At the end of your review you will become the Shift Manager (SM). Inform the Evaluator when you are ready to assume SM duties. You may continue to reference the procedures or to look at the control board but "the clock will be running."

INITIATING CUE:

You are the Duty SM. Classify the event, complete the correct ECG Attachment and provide an ICMF to the Primary Communicator.

This is a Time Critical JPM.

STATION:	SALEM		
SYSTEM:	Emergency Plan		
TASK:	Classify an event and complete ar limit (ESG-3)	ICMF within the re	egulatory committed time
TASK NUMBER:	1240020502		
JPM NUMBER:	09-01 NRC SRO Admin A4-3 (ESC	G-3)	
ALTERNATE PATH:		K/A NUMBER: _	2.4.41
APPLICABILITY: EO F	RO STA SRO		RO SRO
EVALUATION SETTING	i/METHOD: Simulate (Simulat	or or Classroom)	
REFERENCES: Sale	em ECG		
TOOLS AND EQUIPME	NT: Inform Simulator Operators UNTIL THE SRO EVALUA		E ANY PROCEDURES
VALIDATED JPM COM			
TIME PERIOD IDENTIFI	ED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS:	15 min	utes
Developed By:	G Gauding Instructor	Date:	07-05-11
Validated By:	B Bonner SME or Instructor	Date:	07-28-11
Approved By:	Training Department	Date:	8-2-11
Approved By:	Facility Representative	Date:	8/1/11
ACTUAL JPM COMPLE	TION TIME:		
ACTUAL TIME CRITICA	AL COMPLETION TIME:		
PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT	UNSAT		· .
REASON, IF UNSATISF	ACTORY:		
EVALUATOR'S SIGNA	TURE:		DATE:

NAME:		
DATE:		

SYSTEM:

Emergency Plan

TASK:

Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit

(ESG-3)

TASK NUMBER:

1240020502

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. You have a maximum of 5 minutes to review the Emergency Operating Procedures used during this scenario to refresh your memory of all events/paths. At the end of your review you will become the Shift Manager (SM). Inform the Evaluator when you are ready to assume SM duties. You may continue to reference the procedures or to look at the control board but "the clock will be running." If there are multiple ECG calls, classify the most severe.

INITIATING CUE:

You are the Duty SM. Classify the event, complete the correct ECG Attachment and provide an ICMF to the Primary Communicator.

This is a Time Critical JPM.

Successful Completion Criteria:

- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Complete the ICMF with the classification of **ALERT under EAL 5.1.2.a** and provide it to the Primary Communicator within 15 minutes of Start Time.

OPE	RATOR	TRAINI	NG P	ROGF	RAN
JOB	PERF	ORMAN	CE MI	EASU	RE

NAME:		
DATE:		

SYSTEM:

TASK:

Emergency Plan
Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-3)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
		Provide candidate with "Tear-off sheet"	Reviews initial conditions and EOP's (as necessary – 5 minute limit prior to starting)		
		*START TIME: *Start time begins when candidate reports he/she is ready to assume SM duties	Cue: The regulatory commitment time clock has started.		
	1	Reviews ECG to classify event	Note: It is acceptable to use the laminated tables in the simulator, rather than the ECG		
	2	Classifies the event	Determines the classification of the event and refers to ECG Attachment 2 (ALERT)		
	3	Fills out Section A of Emergency Coordinator Log Sheet, Attachment 2	Unit: 2 EAL#(s):EALs 5.1.2.a Declared at: Current Time and Date Initials as EC		
	4	CALL communicators to the Control Room	Pages communicators and initials as SM Cue: I am the Primary Communicator		

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

NAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM:

TASK:

Emergency Plan
Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-3)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
	5	ACTIVATE "ERO Emergency Callout" per posted instructions titled: "Emergency Callout Activation (EP96-003)	Cue: Activation of ERO Emergency Callout is not required for this JPM.		
*	6	COMPLETE the INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM (ICMF) (last page of this attachment).	Fills out Section II of ICMF: Time/Date: Time/date filled in on Attachment 2 EAL#(s): 5.1.2.a Description of Event: Reactor Trip Failure Note: Description of Event is found in Section IV of the ECG. Fills out Section III:		
			Checks No Radiological Release is in progress Fills out Section IV: Retrieves wind speed and direction data from SPDS		
			Initials for approval to transmit		
*	7	PROVIDE the ICMF to the Primary Communicator and DIRECT the Communicator to implement ECG Attachment 6.	Provides ICMF to Primary Communicator within 15 minutes of START TIME COMPLETION TIME:		

INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM

I.	TI	HIS IS, COMMUNICATOR (NAME)	R IN THE	☑ CONTF	ROL ROOM
	A7	I THE SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNI	T(s) NO	2	·
Π.	\square	THIS IS NOTIFICATION OF A ALERT WHICH WAS			
		DECLARED ATTIMEON (Time-24 HR CLOCK)	TODAYS I (DATI	DATE E)	_•
	EA	L #(s) 5.1.2.a			
	DES	SCRIPTION OF EVENT: Reactor Trip Failure			
III.					
		NOTE: liological Release is defined as: Plant Effluent > Federal Limit s or 2.1E+01 uCi/sec I-131.	of 2.42E+(05 uCi/sec l	Noble
		NO RADIOLGICAL RELEASE IS IN PROGRESS.	4	NOTE release	
		THERE <u>IS</u> A RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE IN PROGRESS	defi	nition	
IV.	☑	33 FT. LEVEL WIND DIRECTION (From): (From MET Computer /SPDS) (DEGREES)	_ WIND SI	PEED:	(MPH)
V.		NO PROTECTIVE ACTIONS ARE RECOMMENDED A	AT THIS T	TME	

SM INITIALS
EC Initials
(Approval to Transmit ICMF)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. You have a maximum of 5 minutes to review the Emergency Operating Procedures used during this scenario to refresh your memory of all events/paths. At the end of your review you will become the Shift Manager (SM). Inform the Evaluator when you are ready to assume SM duties. You may continue to reference the procedures or to look at the control board but "the clock will be running."

INITIATING CUE:

You are the Duty SM. Classify the event, complete the correct ECG Attachment and provide an ICMF to the Primary Communicator.

This is a Time Critical JPM.

STATION:	SALEM		
SYSTEM:	Emergency Plan		
TASK:	Classify an event and complete limit (ESG-4)	an ICMF within the r	egulatory committed time
TASK NUMBER:	1240020502		
JPM NUMBER:	09-01 NRC SRO Admin A4-4 (E	ESG-4)	
ALTERNATE PATH:	IMPOB	K/A NUMBER: _	2.4.41 4.6
APPLICABILITY: EO F		RO X	RO SRO
EVALUATION SETTING	/METHOD: Simulate (Simu	ulator or Classroom)	
REFERENCES: Sale	em ECG		
TOOLS AND EQUIPME			E ANY PROCEDURES
VALIDATED JPM COM	UNTIL THE SRO EVAL PLETION TIME: 12 mir		
TIME PERIOD IDENTIFI	ED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEP	S: 15 min	utes
Developed By:	G Gauding Instructor	Date:	07-22-11
Validated By:	B Bonner SME or Instructor	Date:	07-28-11
Approved By:	Training Department	Date:	8-2-11
Approved By:	Facility Representative		8/1/11
ACTUAL JPM COMPLE	TION TIME:		
ACTUAL TIME CRITICA	L COMPLETION TIME:		
PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT	UNSAT		
REASON, IF UNSATISF	ACTORY:		
EVALUATOR'S SIGNA	TURE:		DATE:

NAME:	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 	
DATE:		

SYSTEM:

Emergency Plan

TASK:

Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit

(ESG-4)

TASK NUMBER:

1240020502

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. You have a maximum of 5 minutes to review the Emergency Operating Procedures used during this scenario to refresh your memory of all events/paths. At the end of your review you will become the Shift Manager (SM). Inform the Evaluator when you are ready to assume SM duties. You may continue to reference the procedures or to look at the control board but "the clock will be running." If there are multiple ECG calls, classify the most severe.

INITIATING CUE:

You are the Duty SM. Classify the event, complete the correct ECG Attachment and provide an ICMF to the Primary Communicator.

This is a Time Critical JPM.

Successful Completion Criteria:

- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Complete the ICMF with the classification of **ALERT under EAL 3.2.2.b** and provide it to the Primary Communicator within 15 minutes of Start Time.

OR

2. Complete the ICMF with the classification of **SAE under EAL 3.2.2.b AND 3.3.3.b** and provide it to the Primary Communicator within 15 minutes of Start Time. This is the classification if the cavitating charging pump is not recognized and it fails.

NAME:			_	_
DATE:				

SYSTEM: Emergency Plan

TASK: Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-4)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
			Note: This ECG call can either be an ALERT or a SAE based on whether or not the crew tripped the cavitating charging pump.		
		Provide candidate with "Tear-off sheet"	Reviews initial conditions and EOP's (as necessary – 5 minute limit prior to starting)		
		*START TIME: *Start time begins when candidate reports he/she is ready to assume SM duties	Cue: The regulatory commitment time clock has started.		·
	1	Reviews ECG to classify event	Note: It is acceptable to use the laminated tables in the simulator, rather than the ECG		
	2	Classifies the event	Determines the classification of the event and refers to ECG Attachment 2 (Alert) OR refers to Att. 3 (SAE)		

NAME:				
DATE:				

SYSTEM:

Emergency Plan
Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-4) TASK:

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
	3	Fills out Section A of Emergency Coordinator Log Sheet, Attachment 2	Unit: 2 EAL#(s):EAL 3.2.2.b (OR 3.2.2.b AND 3.3.3.b) Declared at: Current Time and Date Initials as EC		
	4	CALL communicators to the Control Room	Pages communicators and initials as SM Cue: I am the Primary Communicator		
	5	ACTIVATE "ERO Emergency Callout" per posted instructions titled: "Emergency Callout Activation (EP96-003)	Cue: Activation of ERO Emergency Callout is not required for this JPM.		

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

NAME:	 		
DATE:			

SYSTEM:

Emergency Plan

TASK:

Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-4)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
*	6	COMPLETE the INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM (ICMF) (last page of this attachment).	Fills out Section II of ICMF: Time/Date: Time/date filled in on Attachment 2 EAL#(s): 3.2.2.b (or 3.2.2.b AND 3.3.3.b) Description of Event: Loss of the Reactor Coolant System Barrier OR Loss of the Reactor Coolant System Barrier, Loss of the Containment Barrier. Note: Description of Event is found in Section iV of the ECG. Fills out Section III: Verifies No Radiological Release is in progress is checked. Fills out Section IV: Retrieves wind speed and direction data from SPDS Initials for approval to transmit		
*	7	PROVIDE the ICMF to the Primary Communicator and DIRECT the Communicator to implement ECG Attachment 6.	Provides ICMF to Primary Communicator within 15 minutes of START TIME COMPLETION TIME:		

INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM

I.	T	HIS IS(NAME)	, COMMUNICATOR	. IN THE ☑ CONTR ☐ TSC	ROL ROOM
	A	T THE SALEM NUCLEAR G	GENERATING STATION, UNI	Γ(s) NO2	·
Π.		THIS IS NOTIFICATION O	F AN ALER T WHICH WAS		
			TIME ON	(DATE)	<u>.</u>
	EA	L #(s) 3.2.2.b	ESCRIPTION OF EVENT:	Loss of the Reactor	
	Ce	oolant System Barrier			
III.					
		diological Release is defined as s or 2.1E+01 uCi/sec I-131.	NOTE: S: Plant Effluent > Federal Limit	of 2.42E+05 uCi/sec 1	Noble
	\checkmark	NO RADIOLGICAL RELEA	ASE IS IN PROGRESS.	see NOTE	
		THERE <u>IS</u> A RADIOLOGIC	AL RELEASE IN PROGRESS	for release definition	
IV.	Ø	33 FT. LEVEL. WIND DIREC (From MET Computer	CTION (From):	_ WIND SPEED:	(MPH)
V.	☑	NO PROTECTIVE ACTIO	NS ARE RECOMMENDED A	AT THIS TIME	
			(<u>SM INITIALS</u> EC Initials Approval to Transmi	

SGS Rev. 08

INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM

I.	T	HIS IS	(NAME)	, CC	OMMUNICATO	OR IN THE	☑ CONTE □ TSC □ EOF	ROL ROOM	
	A	T THE SALE ?	M NUCLEAR	GENERATING	STATION, UN	NIT(s) NO	2		
II.	Ø	THIS IS NO	TIFICATION	OF A SITE AR	EA EMERGE	NCY WHIC	H WAS		
		DECLAR	RED AT(Time	TIME_ -24 HR CLOCK	ON	_TODAYS (DAT	DATEE)	_·	
	DES		F EVENT:	Loss of the Re		System Bar	rier, Loss	of the Containn	ient
III.									
		liological Rele s or 2.1E+01 u		NOTE: as: Plant Effluer	nt > Federal Lim	it of 2.42E+	05 uCi/sec l	Noble	
	\checkmark	<u>NO</u> RADIOL	GICAL RELE	EASE IS IN PRO	OGRESS.		NOTE release		
		THERE <u>IS</u> A	RADIOLOGI	CAL RELEASI	E IN PROGRES		inition		
IV.	<u></u> ☑			ECTION (Fron rr/SPDS)	n): (DEGREES)	WIND S	PEED:	(MPH)	
V.	Ø	NO PROTEG	CTIVE ACTION	ONS ARE REC	COMMENDED	AT THIS T	ГІМЕ		
						\mathbf{E}	I INITIALS C Initials to Transmi	-	

SGS

Rev. 09

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST

NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. 2. Knowledge and Abilities (K/A) references are included. 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*). 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. 2 Date <u>1/3/10</u> 9. Pilot test the JPM: a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and b. ensure performance time is accurate. 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page.

SME/Instructor:

SME/Instructor:

SME/Instructor:

Date:

Date:

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

You have a maximum of 5 minutes to review the Emergency Operating Procedures used during
this scenario to refresh your memory of all events/paths. At the end of your review you will
become the Shift Manager (SM). Inform the Evaluator when you are ready to assume SM duties.
You may continue to reference the procedures or to look at the control board but "the clock will be
running."

INITIATING CUE:

You are the Duty SM. Classify the event, complete the correct ECG Attachment and provide an ICMF to the Primary Communicator.

This is a Time Critical JPM.

	OOD I LINI QINIMANO	LIVILAGOINE	
STATION:	SALEM		
SYSTEM:	Rod Control		
TASK:	Take corrective actions for a	dropped control rod(s)	
TASK NUMBER:	1140330401		
JPM NUMBER:	09-01 NRC Sim a		
ALTERNATE PATH:	X	K/A NUMBER: ORTANCE FACTOR:	003 AA2.03 3.6 3.8
APPLICABILITY: EO F	RO X STA	SRO X	RO SRO
EVALUATION SETTING	S/METHOD: Simulator		,
REFERENCES: S2.	OP-AB.ROD-0002 Rev. 10 (c	hecked 6/30/11)	
TOOLS AND EQUIPME	NT: None		
VALIDATED JPM COM	PLETION TIME: 5 r	minutes	
TIME PERIOD IDENTIF	ED FOR TIME CRITICAL ST	EPS: N/A	4
Developed By:	G Gauding Instructor	Date:	06-17-11
Validated By:	K Riedmuller SME or Instructor	Date:	06-30-11
Approved By:	Training Department	Date: 1	7/25/1,
Approved By:	Operations Department	Date:	7/8/11
ACTUAL JPM COMPLE	ETION TIME:		
ACTUAL TIME CRITICA	AL COMPLETION TIME:		
PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT	UNSAT		
REASON, IF UNSATISF	ACTORY:		
EVALUATOR'S SIGNA	TURE		DATE

NAME:		
DATE:		

SYSTEM:

Rod Control

TASK:

Take corrective actions for 2 dropped control rods

TASK NUMBER:

1140330401

SIMULATOR SETUP

IC-251

Insert RT-1, RD0267, ANY ROD DROPS INTO RX, Final Severity 5 after

candidate has assumed the watch.

Modify RD0267 ANY ROD DROPS INTO RX, to Final Severity 53 when candidate has completed step 3.10 of S2.OP-AB.ROD-0002 \underline{OR} if candidate attempts to change Main Turbine load due to Tavg being >1.5 degrees lower

than Tref.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

40% power, BOL.

Control Bank D is at 108 steps.

A power reduction to bring the Main Turbine off-line is on hold.

INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Respond to all alarms and indications.

Successful Completion Criteria:

- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

- 1. Candidate places Rod Control in Manual following 1st dropped rod.
- 2. Candidate trips the reactor upon discovery of 2nd dropped rod.

NAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM:

ROD CONTROL

TASK:

Take corrective actions for a dropped control rod(s)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
		SIMULATOR OPERATOR:			
		Insert <u>RT-1</u> RD0267, ANY ROD DROPS INTO RX, Final Severity 5, when candidate assumes the watch.	Candidate announces cluster of rod related "E" Window OHAs as unexpected alarms. Announces indications of rod 2SA1 dropped into the core.		
			Enters S2.OP-AB.ROD-0002, Dropped Rod.		
	2.1	<u>IF</u> more than one rod is verified to be tripped, <u>THEN</u> Manually TRIP Reactor <u>AND</u> GO TO 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip OR Safety Injection.	Verifies only 1 rod has dropped into core.		
*	3.1	PLACE Rod Bank Selector Switch in MAN.	Places Rod Bank Selector Switch in MAN.		
	3.2	<u>IF</u> a Turbine load change is in progress	Verifies no turbine load change in progress.		

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRA	Ν
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE	Ξ

IAME:	_	
DATE:		

SYSTEM:

ROD CONTROL

TASK:

Take corrective actions for a dropped control rod(s)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
	3.3	ADJUST T _{ave} to within 1.5 ⁰ of program as follows:	Verifies T _{ave} is within 1.5 ⁰ of program.		
		 <u>IF</u> Main Turbine is operating, <u>THEN</u> adjust Turbine load. 	Simulator Operator: <u>IF</u> operator attempts to lower turbine load, then		
		 <u>IF</u> Main Turbine is NOT operating, <u>THEN</u> ADJUST Steam Dumps OR 21-24MS10 valves. 	change RT-1 as described on next page now.		
	3.4	Is Reactor subcritical as a result of the dropped rod?	Answers NO, GOES TO step 3.9		
	3.9	IF AT ANY TIME a power reduction becomes necessary, THEN BORATE AND ADJUST Turbine load or Steam Dump System flowrate to maintain T _{ave} within 1.5° F of program.	Determines no power reduction is necessary.		
	3.10	Is power above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER?	Answers NO, and GOES TO Step 3.12		
			SIMULATOR OPERATOR: Modify malfunction RD0267, ANY ROD DROPS INTO RX, to Final Severity 53, when candidate has completed step 3.10 of S2.OP-AB.ROD-0002.		

NAME:			
DATE:			

SYSTEM: ROD CONTROL

TASK: Take corrective actions for a dropped control rod(s)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
*	2.1	IF more than one rod is verified to be tripped, THEN Manually TRIP Reactor AND GO TO 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip OR Safety Injection.	Candidate should observe a second rod bottom light by direct observation, or by depressed power in the region of the 2 dropped rods, Terr or Tavg lowering, or OHA D-32 TAVE LO, and MANUALLY TRIP the Reactor IAW Step 2.1.		
			Evaluator: See next step if candidate does not recognize the second dropped rod and continues in the procedure. (This will allow the candidate to continue in the JPM until the 2 times validation time has been reached and the JPM is terminated.)		
	3.12	REQUEST Maintenance to determine if an Individual Rod Position Indicator (IRPI) malfunction has occurred.	Candidate contacts Maintenance or requests CRS to contact Maintenance to determine if an IRPI malfunction has occurred. Cue: Maintenance has been contacted.		
	3.13	Has an IRPI malfunction occurred?	Candidate answers NO based on rod bottom, OHAs, and primary plant parameter changes, and GOES TO Step 3.15.		
	3.15	INITIATE a power reduction to <75% Rated Thermal Power	Candidate recognizes power is 40%.		

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

NAME:		
DATF.		

SYSTEM:

ROD CONTROL

TASK: Take corrective actions for a dropped control rod(s)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
	3.16	REQUEST Reactor Engineering assistance to recover rod.	Candidate contacts Reactor Engineering or requests CRS to contact Reactor Engineering for assistance in recovering dropped rod. Cue: Reactor Engineering has been contacted.		
	3.17	Is dropped rod to be recovered, per Reactor Engineering?	Cue: Reactor Engineering will be performing a flux map to aid in determination of whether a recovery will be made of the dropped rod.		
			Terminate the JPM once the candidate has inserted a manual Reactor Trip or reaches two times the validation time.		

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST

NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.

1cm	_ 1. Task description and number, JPM description	and number are identified.			
Ker	2. Knowledge and Abilities (K/A) references are included.				
μω	_ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, cont	trol room, or simulator)			
16	4. Initial setup conditions are identified.				
14	_ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly id	lentified.			
166	_ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME	E review.			
160	7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps	s and are identified with an asterisk (*).			
Kan	8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM n that procedure: Procedure Rev. 16 Date				
Ko	9. Pilot test the JPM: a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and b. ensure performance time is accurate.				
	10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with	ith proper responses, then revise the JPM			
	_11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor	sign and date JPM cover page.			
SME/Inst	tructor: Juni . Rudmulle	Date:6.30.11			
SME/Inst	tructor:	Date:			
SME/Inst	tructor:	Date:			

INITIAL CONDITIONS:
40% power, BOL. Control Bank D is at 108 steps. A power reduction to bring the Main Turbine off-line is on hold.
INITIATING CUE:
You are the Reactor Operator. Respond to all alarms and indications.

PSEG Restricted – Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 8 of 8

STATION:	Salem Generating Station			-
SYSTEM:	Emergency Core Cooling S	Systems		
TASK:	Raise ECCS Accumulator	Level with a Safety Injecti	ion Pump	
TASK NUMBER:	0065010101			
JPM NUMBER: ALTERNATE PATH:	09-01 NRC Sim b	MA NUMBER	006 44	1.07
ALIERNATE PATH:	L	K/A NUMBER: _ PORTANCE FACTOR:	006 A4 4.4	4.4
APPLICABILITY:	IIVII	FORTANGE PACTOR	RO	SRO
	RO X STA	SRO X		
EVALUATION SETTING	S/METHOD: Simulator	/ Perform		
REFERENCES: S2	.OP-SO.SJ-0002, Accumulat	tor Operations, Rev. 22		
TOOLS AND EQUIPME	NT: None			
VALIDATED JPM COM	PLETION TIME: 8	3 minutes		
TIME PERIOD IDENTIF	IED FOR TIME CRITICAL S	TEPS: N/.	Α	
Developed By:	G Gauding Instructor	Date:	07-09-11	
Validated By:	S Harris SME or Instructor	Date:	07-28-11	
Approved By:	Fraining Department	Date:	8-2-11	
Approved By:	Operations Represent	Date:	8/1/11	
ACTUAL JPM COMPLE	TION TIME:			
ACTUAL TIME CRITICA	AL COMPLETION TIME:			
PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT	UNSAT			
REASON, IF UNSATISF	FACTORY:			
EVALUATOR'S SIGNA	TURF:		DATE:	

ALARAE.

	IVAIVIE.
	DATE:
SYSTEM:	Emergency Core Cooling Systems
TASK:	Raise ECCS Accumulator Level with a Safety Injection Pump
TASK NUMBER:	006 501 01 01
INITIAL	IC-254

- 1. The plant is at 100% power with all systems in their normal alignment with control systems in automatic.
- 2. 24 Accumulator is at 57.9% level.
- 3. The Safety Injection System is available.
- 4. RWST Boron Concentration is 2400 ppm.

INITIATING CUE:

Raise 24 ECCS Accumulator to 60% using 21 SI pump IAW S2.OP-SO.SJ-0002, Accumulator Operations, Section 5.2.

Successful Completion Criteria:

- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Raise 24 Accumulator to 60% using 21 SI pump, and return system to normal lineup.

NAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM: Emergency Core Cooling Systems

TASK: Raise ECCS Accumulator Level with a Safety Injection Pump

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT Evaluation)
		Provide copy of S2.OP-SO.SJ-0002(Q), Accumulator Operations, with Prerequisites signed off.	Reviews procedure, and initials all Precautions and Limitations.		
	5.2.1	ENSURE either of the following conditions exist: • ALL RCS Cold Leg Temperatures >312°F OR • The Reactor Vessel Head is Removed.	Determines ALL RCS Cold Leg Temperatures >312°F.		
	5.2.2	IF RCS Pressure <2000 psig, THEN ENSURE CLOSED 21SJ134, COLD LEG DISCHARGE.	Determines RCS pressure is >2000 psig and marks step N/A		
*	5.2.3	START 21 Safety Injection Pump.	Operator depresses 21 Safety Injection Pump START PB. Cue if required: IF operator asks for a Field Operator to do pre-start checks on 21 SI pump, THEN report as NEO that 21 SI Pump is ready for start.		

NAME:		_	
DATE:			

SYSTEM: Emergency Core Cooling Systems

TASK: Raise ECCS Accumulator Level with a Safety Injection Pump

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT Evaluation)
*	5.2.4	OPEN 2SJ53, 21 SI PUMP DISCHARGE TEST LINE VALVE.	Depresses 2SJ53 21 SI PUMP DISCHARGE TEST LINE VALVE OPEN PB and notes change in light status.		
*	5.2.5	OPEN 2SJ123, TEST LINE TO CVCS HUT.	Depresses 2SJ123 TEST LINE TO CVCS HUT OPEN PB and notes change in light status.		
*	5.2.6	OPEN associated Accumulator fill valve: ◆ 21SJ20, 21 ACCUMULATOR FILL ◆ 22SJ20, 22 ACCUMULATOR FILL ◆ 23SJ20, 23 ACCUMULATOR FILL ◆ 24SJ20, 24 ACCUMULATOR FILL	Depresses 24SJ20 24 ACCUMULATOR FILL OPEN PB; notes change in light status, and monitors level on the applicable level channels.		

NAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM: Emergency Core Cooling Systems

TASK: Raise ECCS Accumulator Level with a Safety Injection Pump

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT Evaluation)
*	5.2.7	When desired level is reached, CLOSE the associated Accumulator fill valve: ◆ 21SJ20, 21 ACCUMULATOR FILL ◆ 22SJ20, 22 ACCUMULATOR FILL ◆ 23SJ20, 23 ACCUMULATOR FILL ◆ 24SJ20, 24 ACCUMULATOR FILL	Cue: After level starts to rise in 24 Accumulator, state: "24 Accumulator level has risen to 60%." After acknowledging cue, depresses 24SJ20 24 ACCUMULATOR FILL CLOSE PB.		
	5.2.8	If required, REPEAT Steps 5.2.6 and 5.2.7 to fill additional Accumulators.	Determines no other Accumulators will be filled.		
*	5.2.9	CLOSE 2SJ53.	Depresses 2SJ53 CLOSE PB.		
*	5.2.10	CLOSE 2SJ123.	Operator depresses 2SJ123 CLOSE PB.		
*	5.2.11	STOP 21 Safety Injection Pump.	Depresses 21 SI Pump STOP PB.		
	5.2.12	IF in modes 1,2, or 3, AND 21SJ134 was CLOSED in Step 5.2.2, THEN OPEN 21SJ134.	Determines 21SJ134 was not previously shut.		

NAME:	 _
DATE:	

SYSTEM:

Emergency Core Cooling Systems

TASK:

Raise ECCS Accumulator Level with a Safety Injection Pump

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT Evaluation)
	5.2.13	IF required, BLEED off the SI Pump discharge pressure by performing the	Determines SI pump discharge pressure is lowering.		
		following:	Cue if required: <u>IF</u> candidate states intention to bleed off SI pump discharge pressure, <u>THEN</u> state:"SI pump discharge pressure is lowering steadily."		
	5.2.14	Direct a second Operator to PERFORM Independent Verification IAW Attachment 1, Section 2.0	Cue: Independent Verification is complete.		
	5.2.15	IF TSAS 3.5.2 was entered, THEN REVIEW continued applicability of the Action Statement.	Determines TSAS 3.5.2 was NOT entered.		
	5.2.16	IF the Unit is in Mode 1 or 2, or Mode 3 with Pressurizer pressure > 1000 psig, THEN PERFORM S2.OP-ST.SJ-0008(Q), Emergency Core Cooling - Accumulators.	Identifies the need to perform S2.OP-ST.SJ-0008(Q) Emergency Core Cooling – Accumulators.		

TERMINATING CUE: Terminate JPM after Candidate determines whether (or not) S2.OP-ST.SJ-0008 must be performed.

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST

NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.

1		
1. Task description a	and number, JPM descrip	tion and number are identified.
2. Knowledge and A	bilities (K/A) references a	are included.
3. Performance loca	ition specified. (in-plant, c	control room, or simulator)
4. Initial setup condi	tions are identified.	
5. Initiating and term	ninating Cues are properly	y identified.
6. Task standards ic	dentified and verified by S	ME review.
7. Critical steps mee	et the criteria for critical st	eps and are identified with an asterisk (*).
8. Verify the procedure: P	ure referenced by this JPi rocedure Rev. <u> </u>	M matches the most current revision of $\frac{12/3900}{0}$
9. Pilot test the JPM a. verify Cues b		,
10. If the JPM cannot	ot be performed as writter	n with proper responses, then revise the JPM.
11. When JPM is re	validated, SME or Instruc	tor sign and date JPM cover page.
SME/Instructor: Jun	7fm_	Date: 7/28/11
SME/Instructor:/		Date:
SME/Instructor:		Date:

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

- 1. The plant is at 100% power with all systems in their normal alignment with control systems in automatic.
- 2. 24 Accumulator is at 57.9% level.
- 3. The Safety Injection System is available.
- 4. RWST Boron Concentration is 2400 ppm.

INITIATING CUE:

Raise 24 ECCS Accumulator to 60% using 21 SI pump IAW S2.OP-SO.SJ-0002, Accumulator Operations, Section 5.2.

STATION:	SALEM				
SYSTEM:	Pressurizer Pressure a	and Level			
TASK:	TCAF Pressurizer Pres	ssure Malfunction (Faile	d open	Pressurizer	Spray Valve)
TASK NUMBER:	1140240401				
JPM NUMBER:	09-01 NRC Sim c				
ALTERNATE PATH:	X	K/A NUMB		010 A	
		IMPORTANCE FACTO	DR:	3.7	3.5
APPLICABILITY: EO F	RO X STA	SRO X		RO	SRO
EVALUATION SETTING	s/METHOD: Simul	ator			
REFERENCES: S2.	OP-AB.PZR-0001, Rev.	. 18 (Rev. checked 6-30-	-11)		
TOOLS AND EQUIPME	NT: None				
VALIDATED JPM COM	PLETION TIME:	4 min			
TIME PERIOD IDENTIFI	ED FOR TIME CRITICA	AL STEPS:	N/A	······	
Developed By:	G Gauding Instructor	С	Date:	6-17-11	
Validated By:	W. Neiheiser SME or Instruct		Date:	6-30-11	
Approved By:	J. J. Com. Training Departm		Date: 7	7-21-11	
Approved By:	Operations Depart		Date:	7/8/11	
ACTUAL JPM COMPLE	TION TIME:				
ACTUAL TIME CRITICA	L COMPLETION TIME	:			
PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT	UNSAT				
REASON, IF UNSATISF	ACTORY:				
EVALUATOR'S SIGNAT	NIRE.			DATE:	

NAME:			
DATE:			

SYSTEM:

Pressurizer Pressure and Level

TASK:

TCAF Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction (Failed open Pressurizer Spray Valve)

TASK

114 024 04 01

NUMBER:

SIMULATOR SETUP: IC-253 4% power, BOL.

I/O B304 OVLO Pressurizer Relief Valve Outlet Temperature- Value: 98.6

MALF: PR018A PZR PORV 2PR1 develops leak – Value: 40000 Tied to ET-1

RT-1 PR0019A PZR Spray Valve 2PS1 fails open

ET-1 kal06tph 23 RCP Stop

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Reactor power is stable at 4.0% power. The power ascension is on hold temporarily.

INITIATING CUE:

You are the Reactor Operator . Respond to all indications and alarms.

Successful Completion Criteria:

- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

- 1. Trip Rx.
- 2. Stops 21 and 23 RCP.
- 3. Stop 22 OR 24 RCP.

NAME:		
DATE:		

SYSTEM: F

Pressurizer Pressure and Level

TASK:

TCAF Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction (Failed open Pressurizer Spray Valve)

STEP NO.	STEP (* Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT Evaluation)
	Simulator Operator: Insert RT-1 on direction of evaluator. MALF: PR0019A , 2PS1 fails open	Note: The time between the 2PS1 failing open and RCS pressure reaching 2,000 psig is ~ 4 minutes and 15 seconds.		
		Recognizes lowering PZR Pressure and/or alarm and/or change in 2PS1 position. Acknowledges OHA E-28 PZR HTR ON PRESS LO. Recognizes 22 PZR B/U heaters energized. If candidate refers to ARP for OHA E-28, it directs entry into S2.OP-AB.PZR-0001, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction.		
		Enters S2.OP-AB.PZR-0001 directly or via OHA E-28 ARP. Note: It is acceptable for the candidate to attempt closing 2PS1 prior to entering S2.OP-AB.PZR-001.		

NAME:		
DATE:		

SYSTEM:

Pressurizer Pressure and Level

TASK:

TCAF Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction (Failed open Pressurizer Spray Valve)

STEP NO.	STEP (* Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT Evaluation)
3.1	INITIATE Attachment 1 Continuous Action Summary.	Initiates Attachment 1 Continuous Action Summary. Note: There is a CAS action to trip the Rx if RCS pressure lowers to 2,000 psig and continues to drop. IF the candidate were to trip the Rx during this JPM based on that CAS action and not at step 3.24.A on page 6 as expected, THEN AFTER the candidate has tripped the Rx, verified the Main Turbine is tripped, verified SI not actuated or required and all 4KV vital buses energized, the following cue must be given: Cue: The immediate actions of TRIP-1 have been verified by the CRS and RO. The CRS directs you to continue actions of S2.OP-AB.PZR-0001, while the remaining crew members will continue to perform TRIP-1.		
3.2	Is POPS in service?	Determines POPS is not in service by initial conditions or console indications.		

NAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM: Pressurizer Pressure and Level

TASK: TCAF Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction (Failed open Pressurizer Spray Valve)

STEP NO.	STEP (* Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT Evaluation)
3.3	Is the controlling Pressurizer Pressure Control Channel (I or III) failed?	Determines Pressurizer Pressure Control Channel (I or III) is not failed and GOES TO Step 3.11		
3.11	Is the Master Pressure Controller failed? (Refer to Attachment 2 for guidance)	Determines Master Pressure Controller is not failed and GOES TO Step 3.17 (may not refer to Attachment 2 if 2PS1 has been noted open with pressure below closing setpoint.)		
3.17	Is a Spray Valve(s) failed? (Refer to Attachment 2 for guidance)	Determines 2PS1 is failed open.		
3.18	PLACE the Spray Valve(s) in MANUAL	Depresses MANUAL PB for 2PS1 and verifies AUTO light extinguished and MANUAL light illuminates.		
3.19	OPERATE the Spray Valves to control pressure consistent with Attachment 2.	Depresses the CLOSE PB for 2PS1 and recognizes that 2PS1 remains open.		
3.20	PLACE all Pressurizer heaters in MANUAL and ON	Determines all PZR heaters are in MANUAL and ON.		

NAME:	_	
DATE:		

SYSTEM:

Pressurizer Pressure and Level

TASK:

TCAF Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction (Failed open Pressurizer Spray Valve)

	STEP NO.	STEP (* Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT Evaluation)
	3.21	Has pressure control been regained?	Determines pressure control has not been regained since 2PS1 remains open.		
	3.22	Is RCS pressure dropping rapidly?	Determines RCS pressure is dropping rapidly from console indication.		
	3.23	Are Reactor Trip Breakers CLOSED?	Determines Reactor Trip Breakers are closed by initial conditions or console indication.		
	3.24 A	PERFORM the following:			
*		A. TRIP the Reactor.	Initiates a Reactor Trip using either MANUAL TRIP handle.		
	3.24 B	B. Is Reactor Trip Confirmed?	Determines Reactor Trip is confirmed after identifying PRNI reading < 5% and IR NI indication dropping.		
*	3.24 C	STOP 21 <u>AND</u> 23 RCPs:	Depresses STOP PBs for 21 and 23 RCP and verifies start lights extinguish and stop lights illuminates. Simulator Operator: Ensure ET-1 is TRUE when 23 RCP stop PB is depressed.		

NAME:			_
DATE:			

SYSTEM:

Pressurizer Pressure and Level

TASK:

TCAF Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction (Failed open Pressurizer Spray Valve)

	STEP NO.	STEP (* Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT Evaluation)
*	3.24 D	IF Pressurizer Pressure continues to drop, THEN STOP all but one RCP.	Determines Pressurizer Pressure continues to drop, and depresses STOP PB on 22 <u>OR</u> 24 RCP and verifies start light extinguishes and stop light illuminates.		
	3.24 E	GO TO 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, AND CONTINUE with this procedure.	Begins performing Immediate Actions of 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Cue: When candidate begins performing Immediate Actions of 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, state JPM is complete.		·

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST

NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.

_ ω	_ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified.				
<u></u> い	_ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (K/A) references are included.				
ω	_ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, cont	rol room, or simulator)			
$\underline{\omega}$	_ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified.				
ω	_ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly ide	entified.			
$-\omega_{-}$	_ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME	review.			
_ W	7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*).				
ω	8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev/ 8_ Date 6-30-1/_				
<u></u>					
	_ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written wi	th proper responses, then revise the JPM.			
	_ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor	sign and date JPM cover page.			
SME/Inst	ructor: William	Date: 6-30-11			
SME/Inst	ructor:	Date:			
SME/Inst	ructor:	Date:			

OD I EN ONMANGE MEAGONE	
INITIAL CONDITIONS:	
Reactor power is stable at 4.0% power. The power ascension is on hold temporarily.	
INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Respond to all indications and alarms.	

STATION:	SALEM 1 & 2		
SYSTEM:	Emergency Operating Proc	cedures	
TASK: TASK NUMBER:	Respond to a Loss of Heat Head Vents) N1150290501	Sink (Initiate Bleed and	Feed with SI pumps and Rx
JPM NUMBER:	09-01 NRC Sim d		
JPW NOWIDER.	09-01 NRC 3III d		
ALTERNATE PATH:	X IMF	K/A NUMBER: _ PORTANCE FACTOR:	EPE E05 EA1.1 4.1 4.0
APPLICABILITY: EO F	RO X STA	sro X	RO SRO
EVALUATION SETTING	METHOD: Simulator	- Perform	
REFERENCES: 2-E	OP-FRHS-1, Loss of Second	dary Heat Sink, Rev. 24	(checked 6/20/11)
TOOLS AND EQUIPMEN	NT: None		
VALIDATED JPM COME	PLETION TIME: 5	5 minutes	
TIME PERIOD IDENTIFI	ED FOR TIME CRITICAL S	TEPS: N	/A
Developed By:	G Gauding Instructor	Date:	06-17-11
Validated By:	J Klein SME or Instructor	Date:	06-30-11
Approved By:	Training Department	Date:	7-21-1
Approved By:	Operations Department	Date:	8/1/11
ACTUAL JPM COMPLE	TION TIME:		-
ACTUAL TIME CRITICA	L COMPLETION TIME:		
PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT	UNSAT		
REASON, IF UNSATISF	ACTORY:		
EVALUATOR'S SIGNAT	TIIRE:		DATF.

	NAME:	
	DATE:	
SYSTEM:	Emergency Operating Procedures	

TASK:

TCAF a Loss of Heat Sink (Initiate Bleed and Feed with SI pumps and Rx Head

Vents)

TASK NUMBER: N1150290501

SIMULATOR SETUP:

IC-252 developed by : MSL rupture downstream of MSIVs. Fail auto MT trip. Fail all MSIVs open. All AFW pumps failed. Fail <u>2PR2</u> shut. 21 CVCS pp C/T. Performed TRIP-1 through Step 20. 22 CVCS pp tripped during TRIP-1.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

- Unit 2 initiated a Rx trip from 100% power in response to a Main Steamline break at the mixing bottle.
- An automatic Safety Injection initiated.
- The Main Turbine failed to trip automatically, and was manually tripped from the control console.
- MSLI failed, and all MSIV's remain open.
- All AFW flow has been lost.
- 21 charging pump is C/T.
- 22 charging pump tripped 3 minutes ago.
- EOP-TRIP-1 was performed and a transition to FRHS-1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink was made at Step 20.

INITIATING CUE:

You are the Reactor Operator. Perform FRHS-1 starting at Step 1.

Successful Completion Criteria:

- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

- 1. Stop ALL RCPs.
- 2. Open 2PR1.
- 3. Open Rx Head Vent Valves 2RC40-2RC43.

NAME:		
DATE:		

SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures

TASK: Respond to a Loss of Heat Sink (Initiate Bleed and Feed with SI pumps and Rx Head Vents)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (* Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
			Operator states he has the watch.		
	1	IS TOTAL AFW FLOW LESS THAN 22E04 LB/HR DUE TO OPERATOR ACTIONS	Determines it was not operator action which caused total AFW flow to be less than 22E04 lb/hr.		
	2	IF AT LEAST ONE INTACT OR RUPTURED SG IS AVAILABLE, THEN DO NOT FEED A FAULTED SG	Recognizes ALL SGs are faulted.		
	3	IS RCS PRESSURE GREATER THAN ANY INTACT OR RUPTURED SG PRESSURE	Checks RCS pressure on control console and determines it is greater than all SG pressures checked on control console.		
	3.1	ARE RCS T-HOTS GREATER THAN 350°F	Checks RCS Thot indication on control console and determines that RCS Thots are greater than 350°F.		
	4	IS 21 <u>OR</u> 22 CHARGING PUMP AVAILABLE	Determines neither 21 nor 22 charging pump is available based on initial conditions and/or control console indications.		
		GO TO STEP 23	Goes to Step 23.		

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

IAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM:

Emergency Operating Procedures

TASK: Respond to a Loss of Heat Sink (Initiate Bleed and Feed with SI pumps and Rx Head Vents)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (* Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
	23	CAUTION TO ESTABLISH RCS HEAT REMOVAL BY RCS BLEED AND FEED, STEPS 24 THRU 29 MUST BE PERFORMED QUICKLY AND WITHOUT INTERRUPTION	Reads Step.		
*	23	STOP <u>ALL</u> RCPS	Depresses STOP PB for 21-24 RCPs and verifies green stop light illuminates and red start light extinguishes.		
	24	INITIATE SI	Uses Safeguards key and initiates SI on at least one train of Safeguards initiation.		
	25	ARE SI VALVES IN SAFEGUARDS POSITION	Checks 2RP4 and/or console indication to determine that all valves listed in Table B are in Safeguards position. Table B valves are: 2SJ4 OPEN BIT INLET 2SJ5 OPEN BIT OUTLET 2SJ12 OPEN BIT OUTLET 2SJ13 OPEN BIT OUTLET 2CV68 CLOSED CHARGING DISCHARGE 2CV69 CLOSED CHARGING DISCHARGE (continued next page)		

IAME:		_	
DATE:			

SYSTEM:

Emergency Operating Procedures

TASK:

Respond to a Loss of Heat Sink (Initiate Bleed and Feed with SI pumps and Rx Head Vents)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (* Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
			Table B Valves (con't): 21-24SJ54 OPEN ACCUMULATOR OUTLET 2SJ1 OPEN RWST TO CHARGING 2SJ2 OPEN RWST TO CHARGING 2CV40 CLOSED DISCHARGE STOP 2CV41 CLOSED DISCHARGE STOP		
	25.1	IS 21 <u>OR</u> 22 CHARGING PUMP RUNNING	Checks control console and determines neither 21 nor 22 charging pump is running.		
	25.2	IS <u>ANY</u> SI PUMP RUNNING	Checks control console and determines both 21 and 22 SI pumps are running.		
	25.2	ARE VALVES IN TABLE C OPEN FOR AT LEAST ONE RUNNING SI PUMP	Checks control console indication for valves listed in Table C and determines the valves are open for at least one running SI pump. Table C valves are: 21/22 SI PUMPS 2SJ30 (FROM RWST) 21/22SJ33 (SI PUMP SUCTION) 2SJ135 (COLD LEG DISCHARGE) 21/22SJ134 (COLD LEG DISCHARGE)		
	26	OPEN <u>BOTH</u> PZR PORV STOP VALVES	Checks control console and determines BOTH 2PR6 and 2PR7 PORV STOP VALVES are open.		

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

IAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM:

Emergency Operating Procedures

TASK: Respond to a Loss of Heat Sink (Initiate Bleed and Feed with SI pumps and Rx Head Vents)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (* Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
*	26	OPEN <u>BOTH</u> PZR PORVS	Depresses 2PR1 PZR PORV open PB and verifies green closed light extinguishes and red open light illuminates.		
			Depresses 2PR2 PZR PORV open PB and reports that 2PR2 will not open.		
	26.1	ARE <u>BOTH</u> PZR PORV STOP VALVES OPEN	Checks control console and determines BOTH 2PR6 and 2PR7 PORV STOP VALVES are open.		
		ARE <u>BOTH</u> PZR PORVS OPEN	Determines 2PR2 PZR PORV is not open.		
*	26.1	OPEN 2RC40 THRU 2RC43 (REACTOR HEAD VENTS)	Inserts key into each 2RC40 THRU 2RC43 (REACTOR HEAD VENTS) switch on 2RP3, turns to open, and verifies each valve opens.	_	
			Terminate JPM when operator has opened 2RC40 thru 2RC43 Reactor Head Vents.		

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST

NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.

Qy_	_ 1. Task description and number, JPM descri	ption and number are identified.
gi	2. Knowledge and Abilities (K/A) references	are included.
9r	3. Performance location specified. (in-plant,	control room, or simulator)
gr_	4. Initial setup conditions are identified.	
<u> </u>	5. Initiating and terminating Cues are proper	ly identified.
Jr	_6. Task standards identified and verified by	SME review.
M_	7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical s	teps and are identified with an asterisk (*).
an_	_ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JF that procedure: Procedure Rev. ユリ_ Da	
JAL_	9. Pilot test the JPM: a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are b. ensure performance time is accurate.	
	_ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as writte	en with proper responses, then revise the JPM.
	_ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instru	ctor sign and date JPM cover page.
SME/Instr	ructor: Oklein	Date: <u>6-30-11</u>
SME/Instr	ructor:	Date:
SME/Instr	ructor:	Data

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

- Unit 2 initiated a Rx trip from 100% power in response to a Main Steamline break at the mixing bottle.
- An automatic Safety Injection initiated.
- The Main Turbine failed to trip automatically, and was manually tripped from the control console.
- MSLI failed, and all MSIV's remain open.
- All AFW flow has been lost.
- 21 charging pump is C/T.
- 22 charging pump tripped 3 minutes ago.
- EOP-TRIP-1 was performed and a transition to FRHS-1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink was made at Step 20.

INITIATING CUE:

You are the Reactor Operator. Perform FRHS-1 starting at Step 1.

STATION:	SALEM			
SYSTEM:	Main Turbine			
TASK:	TCAF Main Turbine Trip < F	P-9 (Loss of Turbine Au	xiliaries Cooling Expansion	
TASK NUMBER:	Tank Level) N1140420401			
JPM NUMBER:	09-01 NRC Sim e			
ALTERNATE PATH:	X	K/A NUMBER:	2.4.31	
APPLICABILITY:		ORTANCE FACTOR:	4.2 4.1 RO SRO	
EO F	RO X STA	SRO X		
EVALUATION SETTING	S/METHOD: Simulator -	Perform		
l .	OP-AR.ZZ-0007, Rev. 46, Ov OP-AB.TRB-0001, Rev. 14, 7		h rev checked 6-21-11)	
TOOLS AND EQUIPME	NT: None			
VALIDATED JPM COMI	PLETION TIME:	5 min		
TIME PERIOD IDENTIFI	ED FOR TIME CRITICAL ST	EPS: N/A	Ą	
Developed By:	G Gauding Instructor	Date:	06-17-11	
Validated By:	J. Klein SME or Instructor	Date:	06-30-11	
Annual Dill	A serve	Deter		
Approved By:	Training Department	Date:	2-2-1	
Approved By:	Operations Department	Date:	7/8/11	
ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME:				
ACTUAL TIME CRITICA	AL COMPLETION TIME:			
PERFORMED BY:				
GRADE: SAT	UNSAT			
REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY:				
EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE:				

NAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM:

Main Turbine

TASK:

TCAF Main Turbine Trip < P-9 (Loss of Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling Expansion

Tank Level)

TASK NUMBER:

N1140420401

SIMULATOR SETUP

IC-255

RT-1

MALF

AN0105 SER 105 Fails-: G8 Turbine Auxiliary Cooling

MALF

TU0118A 21MS28 Turb Stop Valve Fails Open

Override CK23 Turbine Trip-Trip

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

40% power, BOL.

Control Bank D is at 108 steps.

A power reduction to bring the Main Turbine off-line is on hold.

INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Respond to all alarms and indications.

Successful Completion Criteria:

- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

- 1. Trip the Main Turbine.
- 2. Trip the Rx.

NAME:		
DATE:		

SYSTEM: Main Turbine

TASK: TCAF Main Turbine Trip < P-9 (Loss of Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling Expansion Tank Level)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
		SIMULATOR OPERATOR:			
		Insert <u>RT-1</u> after candidate assumes the watch.	Announces unexpected OHA G-8 TAC EXP TK LVL HI OR LO.		
			Refers to S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0007, Overhead Window G.	,	
	ARP 1.0/2.0		Reviews causes and determines there are no automatic actions associated with this alarm.		
	ARP 3.1	petermine if level alarm is high or low from the Annunciator CRT: CRT Point Description 104 Turbine Auxiliary Cooling Expansion Tank Level High 105 Turbine Auxiliary Cooling Expansion Tank Level Low	Determines CRT point 105 Turbine Auxiliary Cooling Expansion Tank Level Low is in alarm.		

NAME:		
DATE:		

SYSTEM:

Main Turbine

TASK:

TCAF Main Turbine Trip < P-9	(Loss of Turbine Auxiliaries	Cooling Expansion	Tank Level)
------------------------------	------------------------------	-------------------	-------------

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
	3.2	<u>IF</u> level is high, <u>THEN:</u>	Determines level is not high, and continues to next step.		
	3.3	IF level is low, THEN: A. Send an operator to MAKEUP to tank. B. Send an operator to IDENTIFY AND ISOLATE any leaks.	Dispatches an operator to makeup to tank, and identify and isolate any leaks.		
		Simulator Operator: 2 minutes after being dispatched, call control room and report: "This is the Secondary Operator. The Unit 2 TAC expansion tank level is 7" and lowering one inch per minute. The auto makeup valve is stuck shut, and I can't get the bypass valve open."			

NAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM: Main Turbine

TASK: TCAF Main Turbine Trip < P-9 (Loss of Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling Expansion Tank Level)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
*	3.4	IF unable to maintain tank level above 6 inches, THEN: A. IF >P-9 (49% power), THEN TRIP the Reactor, AND GO TO 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. B. IF <p-9 (49%="" and="" below="" go="" p-9.<="" power)="" s2.op-ab.trb-0001(q),="" td="" the="" then="" to="" trip="" turbine="" turbine,=""><td>Determines tank level cannot be maintained above 6 inches, and attempts to trip the Main Turbine with the Turbine Trip handle, and reports the Main Turbine did not trip. Depresses the Turbine Trip PB and determines the Turbine has tripped. Goes to S2.OP-AB.TRB-0001. Note: IF the candidate observes the 21MS28 remaining open at this point, THEN they may determine the turbine is not tripped, and perform a MSLI by depressing all 4 MSLI PBs on either Safeguards bezel. Initiating a MSLI before the Rx is tripped is an incorrect action which may challenge SG safeties if they lift. Initiating a MSLI renders the Main Steam Dumps inoperable and prematurely isolates the SGFPs. With Rx power >P-10 (10%) and steam dumps not available, a Rx trip is required IAW CAS actions 1.0 and 2.0. See page 8 for complete discussion. Go to page 7 for required actions IF a Rx trip is performed here.</td><td></td><td></td></p-9>	Determines tank level cannot be maintained above 6 inches, and attempts to trip the Main Turbine with the Turbine Trip handle, and reports the Main Turbine did not trip. Depresses the Turbine Trip PB and determines the Turbine has tripped. Goes to S2.OP-AB.TRB-0001. Note: IF the candidate observes the 21MS28 remaining open at this point, THEN they may determine the turbine is not tripped, and perform a MSLI by depressing all 4 MSLI PBs on either Safeguards bezel. Initiating a MSLI before the Rx is tripped is an incorrect action which may challenge SG safeties if they lift. Initiating a MSLI renders the Main Steam Dumps inoperable and prematurely isolates the SGFPs. With Rx power >P-10 (10%) and steam dumps not available, a Rx trip is required IAW CAS actions 1.0 and 2.0. See page 8 for complete discussion. Go to page 7 for required actions IF a Rx trip is performed here.		

NAME:			_
DATE:			

SYSTEM:

Main Turbine

TASK:

TCAF Main Turbine Trip < P-9 (Loss of Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling Expansion Tank Level)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
	AB.TRB 3.1	INITIATE Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary.	Initiates Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary.		
	3.2	VERIFY the Turbine is tripped.	Note: IF the candidate observes the 21MS28 remaining open at this point, THEN they may determine the turbine is not tripped, and perform a MSLI by depressing all 4 MSLI PBs on either Safeguards bezel. Initiating a MSLI before the Rx is tripped is an incorrect action which may challenge SG safeties if they lift. Initiating a MSLI renders the Main Steam Dumps inoperable and prematurely isolates the SGFPs. With Rx power >P-10 (10%) and steam dumps not available, a Rx trip is required IAW CAS actions 1.0 and 2.0. See page 8 for complete discussion. See next page for required actions IF a Rx trip is performed here.		

NAME:		
DATE:		

SYSTEM: Main Turbine

TASK: TCAF Main Turbine Trip < P-9 (Loss of Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling Expansion Tank Level)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
*	EOP- TRIP-1	TRIP REACTOR IS REACTOR TRIP CONFIRMED TRIP TURBINE	IF candidate initiates a Rx trip prior to initiating a MSLI based on CAS actions 1.0 and 2.0 which would occur if they initiated a MSLI, then successful performance of TRIP-1 immediate actions must be performed as follows: Trips the Rx using either Trip handle. Confirms Rx trip Attempts to trip the Main Turbine using the Trip handle. Determines the Trip handle did not close all Main Turbine Stop Valves. Depresses Turbine Trip bezel. Determines the Trip handle did not close all Main Turbine Stop Valves. Initiates a MSLI. Terminate JPM after MSLI has been performed.		
	3.3	Are all Turbine Stop Valves closed?	Determines all Turbine Stop Valves are NOT closed from 2RP4. Goes to Step 3.7.		
	3.7	TRIP the Reactor, GO TO 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.	Trips the Reactor using either of the Reactor Trip handles.		

NAME:		_
DATE:		

SYSTEM:

Main Turbine

TASK:

TCAF Main Turbine Trip < P-9 (Loss of Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling Expansion Tank Level)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
			Begins performing immediate actions of 2- EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.		
			Terminate JPM when Reactor has been tripped.		

<u>Turbine Trip requirements-</u> During performance of this JPM, the candidate will receive direction from the Alarm Response Procedure S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0007, Overhead Window G, OHA G-8, page 18-19, which states "**TRIP** the Turbine and GO TO S2.OP-AB.TRB-0001, Turbine Trip <P-9."

When outside the EOP network, initiating a MSLI to perform a Turbine Trip is NOT an appropriate action, since in TRIP-1 the steps for tripping the Rx precede the steps for tripping the Turbine, and the MSLI would only be performed AFTER all attempts to trip the Rx from the control room have already been performed. IF the Rx trip were NOT confirmed, then the Turbine trip steps would include the MSLI since the overriding concern at that point would be reduction of Rx power by removing the Main Turbine from service.

After entering the EOP Network, actions for tripping the Reactor and tripping the Turbine have special definitions as described in OP-AA-101-111-1003, Use of Procedures, which **ONLY** apply while in the EOP network. When defining turbine trip while in EOP-TRIP-1, it states on page 13, "Steps 2.2 and 3, **TRIP TURBINE**, are defined as,

"Operate the turbine trip switch"

IF turbine trip NOT confirmed,

THEN trip the turbine using the Turbine Trip bezel.

IF turbine trip NOT confirmed,

THEN initiate main steam isolation.""

For these reasons, initiating a MSLI during this JPM prior to initiating a Rx trip will be considered as failure criteria due to the possible challenge to SG safeties which may occur due to this action, and which otherwise would not occur in the JPM.

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST

NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.

Ju	1. Task description and number, JPM description	and number are identified.
Ju.	2. Knowledge and Abilities (K/A) references are i	included.
4	3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, cont	rol room, or simulator)
AL.	4. Initial setup conditions are identified.	
CAN.	5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly ide	entified.
<u>Qu</u>	6. Task standards identified and verified by SME	review.
<u> J</u>	7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps	and are identified with an asterisk (*).
_#	_8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM m that procedure: Procedure RevDate	natches the most current revision of
<u>OK</u>	 9. Pilot test the JPM: a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free b. ensure performance time is accurate. 	e of conflict, and
<u> </u>	_ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written wi	th proper responses, then revise the JPM
4	_11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor	sign and date JPM cover page.
SME/Instr	ructor: Klein	Date: 6-30-11
SME/Instr	ructor:	Date:
SME/Instr	ructor:	Date:

Control Bank D is at 108 steps A power reduction to bring the	s. Main Turbine off-line i	is on hold.	
3			
INITIATING CUE:			
MITIATING COL.			
You are the Reactor Operator. Re	espond to all alarms ar	nd indications.	

Page 10 of 10
PSEG Restricted – Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

STATION:	SALEM				
SYSTEM:	AC Electrical Distribution				
TASK:	Transfer A 4 KV Group Bus To The Alternate Power Supply (SPT to APT)				
TASK NUMBER:	N0620110101				
JPM NUMBER:	09-01 NRC Sim f				
ALTERNATE PATH:	X	K/A NUMBER: PORTANCE FACTOR:	062 A4.01 3.3 3.1		
APPLICABILITY: EO R	O X STA	SRO X	RO SRO		
EVALUATION SETTING	METHOD: Simulator	- Perform			
	DP-IO.ZZ-0003, Rev. 35, H DP-SO.4KV-0008, Rev. 12,				
TOOLS AND EQUIPMEN	IT: None				
VALIDATED JPM COMP	LETION TIME:	12 min			
TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIE	ED FOR TIME CRITICAL S	STEPS: N/	4		
Developed By:	G Gauding Instructor	Date:	06-17-11		
Validated By:	J Klein SME or Instructor	Date:	06-30-11		
Approved By:	Araining Department	Date:	7-21-11		
Approved By:	Operations Departmen	Date:	7/8/11		
ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME:					
ACTUAL TIME CRITICA	L COMPLETION TIME:				
PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT	UNSAT				
REASON, IF UNSATISFA	ACTORY:				
EVALUATOR'S SIGNAT	URE:		DATE:		

		NAME:	
		DATE:	
SYSTEM:	AC Electrical Distribution		

TASK NUMBER: N0620110101

TASK:

SIMULATOR SETUP IC-256 19.2% power BOL.

MALFS: AN0637 SER 637 Fails-: J14 21ESD Breaker Failure tied to ET-1

RP0058 Failure of Automatic Reactor Trip

Transfer A 4 Kv Group Bus To The Alternate Power Supply (SPT to APT)

Overrides: C308 OVDI 2AEGD 2E GROUP BUS FEEDER -CLOSE OFF All tied C308 OVDI 2AEGD 2E GROUP BUS FEEDER-OPEN ON to ET-1 C312 OVDI 21ESD 2E GROUP BUS FEEDER-OPEN ON C312 OVDI 21ESD 2E GROUP BUS FEEDER-CLOSED OFF C307 OVDI 21HSD 2H GROUP BUS FEEDER-OPEN ON C307 OVDI 21HSD 2H GROUP BUS FEEDER-CLOSED OFF C601 OVDI 13 KV SECTION 1-6-OPEN ON C601 OVDI 13 KV SECTION 1-6-CLOSED OFF

Check APT voltage the same as the Group bus voltage pre-req 2.3.3

Note to Evaluator: The bus transfer sequence - H,E,F,G corresponds to RCPs 21, 22, 23, AND 24.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

19.2% power, BOL.

The Main Turbine was synchronized 10 minutes ago.

Steam Dumps are in Tavg Mode-Auto.

Rod Control is in Auto.

Group buses are powered from the Station Power Transformers.

INITIATING CUE: You are the NCO assigned to transfer the 4KV Group Buses. The CRS directs you to transfer all 4KV Group buses from their respective Station Power Transformers to the Aux Power Transformers, starting with H Group Bus, IAW S2.OP-SO.4KV-0008, 4KV Group Buses Power Supply Transfer. All pre-requisites are complete SAT.

The CRS directs you to transfer the buses in this order: H, E, F, G

Successful Completion Criteria:

- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

- 1. Transfer 2H 4KV Group bus from SPT to APT.
- 2. Trip Rx upon ATWT while transferring 2E 4KV Group bus from SPT to APT

NAME:				
DATE:				

SYSTEM: Electrical

TASK: Transfer A 4 Kv Group Bus To The Alternate Power Supply (SPT to APT)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
			Reviews Precautions and Limitations.		
	5.4.1	ENSURE all Overhead Annunciators for 2 APT are clear.	Checks OHA Windows and determines all Overhead Annunciators for 2 APT are clear.		
	5.4.2	ENSURE 2B APT voltage is 4.22 - 4.36KV.	Checks 2B APT reading on 2CC3 and determines 2B APT voltage is 4.22 - 4.36KV.		
	5.4.3	IF Auxiliary Power Unit Isolation Transfer is tripped, THEN RESET Auxiliary Power Unit Isolation Transfer (UIT).	Determines Auxiliary Power Unit Isolation Transfer is not tripped from control console indication.	_	
*	5.4.4	PRESS the Mimic Bus 2H GROUP BUS INFEED 2AHGD BREAKER pushbutton, AND ENSURE console bezel 2AHGD MIMIC BUS INTLK CLOSE SELECTION illuminates.	Depresses Mimic Bus 2H GROUP BUS INFEED 2AHGD BREAKER pushbutton and checks console bezel 2AHGD MIMIC BUS INTLK CLOSE SELECTION Illuminates.		

NAME:			
DATE:			

SYSTEM: Electrical

TASK: Transfer A 4 Kv Group Bus To The Alternate Power Supply (SPT to APT)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
*	5.4.5	PRESS control console 2AHGD CLOSE pushbutton, AND ENSURE the following: A. 21HSD is OPEN. B. 2AHGD is CLOSED. C. 2H 4KV Group Bus voltage is from 4.22 - 4.36KV. D. Console bezel 2AHGD MIMIC BUS INTLK CLOSE SELECTION is extinguished.	Depresses control console 2AHGD CLOSE pushbutton, and checks the following: A. 21HSD is OPEN. B. 2AHGD is CLOSED. C. 2H 4KV Group Bus voltage is from 4.22 - 4.36KV. D. Console bezel 2AHGD MIMIC BUS INTLK CLOSE SELECTION is extinguished.		
	5.1.1	ENSURE all Overhead Annunciators for 2 APT are clear.	Checks OHA Windows and determines all Overhead Annunciators for 2 APT are clear.		
	5.1.2	ENSURE 2B APT voltage is 4.22 - 4.36KV.	Checks 2B APT reading on 2CC3 and determines 2B APT voltage is 4.22 - 4.36KV.		
	5.1.3	IF Auxiliary Power Unit Isolation Transfer is tripped, THEN RESET Auxiliary Power Unit Isolation Transfer (UIT).	Determines Auxiliary Power Unit Isolation Transfer is not tripped from control console indication.		
*	5.1.4	PRESS Mimic Bus 2E GROUP BUS INFEED 2AEGD BREAKER pushbutton, AND ENSURE console bezel 2AEGD MIMIC BUS INTLK CLOSE SELECTION illuminates.	Depresses Mimic Bus 2E GROUP BUS INFEED 2AEGD BREAKER pushbutton, AND checks console bezel 2AEGD MIMIC BUS INTLK CLOSE SELECTION illuminates.		-

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

NAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM:

Electrical

TASK: Transfer A 4 Kv Group Bus To The Alternate Power Supply (SPT to APT)

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
*	5.1.5	PRESS control console 2AEGD CLOSE pushbutton, AND ENSURE the following: A. 21ESD is OPEN. B. 2AEGD is CLOSED. C. 2E 4KV Group Bus voltage is 4.22 - 4.36KV. D. Console bezel 2AEGD MIMIC BUS INTLK CLOSE SELECTION is extinguished.	Determines 2E Group bus did not transfer and recognizes a Rx trip demand signal is present. Recognizes the Rx did not trip. Announces ATWT. Trips the Rx using either trip handle. Terminate the JPM when a Rx trip has been initiated.		

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST

NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.

91	_ 1. Task description and number, JPM description	n and number are identified.
ar	2. Knowledge and Abilities (K/A) references are	included.
ar_	_ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, cont	rol room, or simulator)
an	4. Initial setup conditions are identified.	
- QUL	5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly ide	entified.
<u> </u>	6. Task standards identified and verified by SME	review.
an	7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps	and are identified with an asterisk (*).
gn	8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM methat procedure: Procedure Rev.35/12 Date	
<u>An</u>	9. Pilot test the JPM: a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free b. ensure performance time is accurate.	e of conflict, and
	_ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written wi	th proper responses, then revise the JPM.
	11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor	sign and date JPM cover page.
	•	
SME/Instr	ructor: OKlein	Date: 6-30 (1)
SME/Instr	ructor:	Date:
SME/Instr	ructor:	Date

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

19.2% power, BOL.
The Main Turbine was synchronized 10 minutes ago.
Steam Dumps are in Tavg Mode-Auto.
Rod Control is in Auto.
Group buses are powered from the Station Power Transformers.

INITIATING CUE:

You are the NCO assigned to transfer the 4KV Group Buses. The CRS directs you to transfer all 4KV Group buses from their respective Station Power Transformers to the Aux Power Transformers, starting with H Group Bus, IAW S2.OP-SO.4KV-0008, 4KV Group Buses Power Supply Transfer. All pre-requisites are complete SAT.

The CRS directs you to transfer the buses in this order: H, E, F, G

STATION:	SALEM				
SYSTEM:	Emergency Procedures				
TASK:	Take Corrective Action For A (Energize Source Range NIS channel)		,		
TASK NUMBER:	N1140230401				
JPM NUMBER:	09-01 NRC Sim g				
ALTERNATE PATH:	X	K/A NUMBER: _ORTANCE FACTOR:	EPE 007 EA1.05 4.0 4.1		
APPLICABILITY: EO R	O X STA	SRO X	RO SRO		
EVALUATION SETTING/	METHOD: Simulator /	Perform			
REFERENCES: 2-EG	OP-TRIP-2, Rev. 27 Reactor	Trip Response (rev che	ecked 6-17-11)		
TOOLS AND EQUIPMEN	IT: None				
VALIDATED JPM COMP	LETION TIME: 10	Minutes			
TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIE	ED FOR TIME CRITICAL ST	EPS: N	/A		
Developed By:	G Gauding Instructor	Date:	05-04-2011		
Validated By:	K Reidmuller SME or Instructor	Date:	06-30-11		
Approved By:	Fraining Department	Date:	7-21-11		
Approved By:	Operations Department	Date:	7/8/11		
ACTUAL JPM COMPLET	TION TIME:				
ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME:					
PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT UNSAT					
REASON, IF UNSATISFA	REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY:				
EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE:			DATE:		

NAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM:

Emergency Procedures

TASK:

Take Corrective Action For A Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction

(Energize Source Range NIS IAW TRIP-2 One under compensated IR channel)

TASK NUMBER:

1150030501

SIMULATOR SETUP:

IC-257 on 2011 Flash Drive

MALF: NI0195D IR CH N36 Compensating Volts Lo - TRUE

IC setup by tripping both SGFP's and initiating a MANUAL Rx trip

Perform EOP's through Step 15 of TRIP-2

Ensure audio count rate monitor selected to 10K scale

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

A MANUAL reactor trip was initiated 15 minutes ago when both SGFP's tripped automatically. Operators performed the immediate actions of EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transitioned to 2-EOP-TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response. Operators have performed TRIP-2 up to Step 19, Steam Dump Mode Shift.

INITIATING CUE:

You are the board operator. Starting at Step 19, perform 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response

Successful Completion Criteria:

- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Task Performance for Successful Completion:

- 1. Transfers Main Steam Dumps to MS Pressure Control Auto
- 2. Energizes BOTH SRNI Channels
- 3. Adjusts audio count rate monitor to 1K scale

NAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM: Emergency Procedures

TASK: Take Corrective Action For A Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) (#Denotes a Sequential Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
	19	Are Condenser Steam Dumps Available?	Checks Condenser Steam Dumps are reports they are available based on circulators in service and condenser vacuum established.		
*		Place Steam Dumps in "Manual"	Depresses Steam Dumps Manual PB on control console and verifies Manual light illuminates and Auto light extinguishes.		
*		Align Steam Dump Valve demand "Press %" and "Tavg %"	Uses Increase Demand (Open VIv) PB on to align Steam Dump Valve demand "Press %" and "Tavg %".		
*		Place Steam Dumps in "MS Pressure Control"	Depresses "MS Pressure Control" PB on control console and verifies light illuminates and Tavg Control light extinguishes.		
*	-	Place Steam Dumps in "Auto"	Depresses Steam Dumps Auto PB on control console and verifies Auto light illuminates and Manual light extinguishes.		
		Adjust Steam Pressure Valve Demand to maintain SG Pressure at 1005 psig.	Adjusts Steam Pressure Valve Demand to maintain SG Pressure at 1005 psig. Note: Steam dumps may be placed in Manual for adjustment then returned to auto.		

IAME:		
DATE:		

SYSTEM:

Emergency Procedures

TASK:

Take Corrective Action For A Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) (#Denotes a Sequential Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
	20	Is any RCP running	Checks RCP status and determines all RCP's are running.		
	22	Are <u>both</u> IR Channels less than 7E-11 Amps	Checks IRNI Channel 1 and Channel II indication and determines 2N36 reads >7E-11 Amps.		
		Is undercompensation preventing proper IR operation?	Determines undercompensation of channel 2N36 is preventing proper IR operation by: - Elapsed time since trip - SUR 0 on affected channel with power above minimum display		
*	22.1	Energize Source Range Channels	Energizes Source Range Channel I by depressing RESET SOURC RANGE A		
*			Energizes Source Range Channel II by depressing RESET SOURC RANGE B		

NAME:			
DATE:			

SYSTEM:

Emergency Procedures

TASK:

Take Corrective Action For A Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) (#Denotes a Sequential Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
	22.2	Transfer NR-45 (Nuclear Power Recorder) to Source Range Channels	Transfers NR-45 (Nuclear Power Recorder) to Source Range Channels by selecting Source Range Channel I on Pen 1 or 2, and selecting Source Range Channel II on the other Pen.		
			Terminate JPM after audio count rate scale adjustment has been verified in the control room.		

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST

NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.

tor	1. Task description and number, JPM description	n and number are identified.
Lo	2. Knowledge and Abilities (K/A) references are	included.
16	3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, con	trol room, or simulator)
140	4. Initial setup conditions are identified.	
Ka	5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly id	entified.
160	6. Task standards identified and verified by SME	review.
\v-	7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps	s and are identified with an asterisk (*).
160	_8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM r that procedure: Procedure Rev. <u>17</u> Date _	
100	9. Pilot test the JPM: a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free b. ensure performance time is accurate.	e of conflict, and
	_ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written w	ith proper responses, then revise the JPM
	_ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor	sign and date JPM cover page.
SME/Instr	ructor: 1 (eui). Rudmulle	Date: 6 · 3 • · 11
SME/Instr	ructor:	Date:
SME/Instr	ructor:	Date:

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

A MANUAL reactor trip was initiated 15 minutes ago when both SGFP's tripped automatically. Operators performed the immediate actions of EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transitioned to 2-EOP-TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response. Operators have performed TRIP-2 up to Step 19, Steam Dump Mode Shift.

INITIATING CUE:

You are the board operator. Starting at Step 19, perform 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response.

	JOB PERFORMANCE ME	ASURE
STATION:	SALEM	
SYSTEM:	Component Cooling System	
TASK:	Take Corrective Action For A Com	nponent Cooling Water System Abnormality
TASK NUMBER:	N1140080401	
JPM NUMBER:	09-01 NRC Sim h	
ALTERNATE PATH:	X	K/A NUMBER: 008 A4.01 .NCE FACTOR: 3.3 3.1
APPLICABILITY: EO F		RO SRO
EVALUATION SETTING	S/METHOD: Simulator - Perfor	rm
	OP-AB.CC-0001, Rev. 14 Compone	
	OP-AB.RCP-0001, Rev. 21 Reacto OP-AR.ZZ-0004, Rev. 26, Overhea	r Coolant Pump Abnormality ad Window D (all rev checked 6-22-11)
TOOLS AND EQUIPME	NT: None	
VALIDATED JPM COM	PLETION TIME: 10 minut	es
TIME PERIOD IDENTIFI	ED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS:	N/A
Developed By:	G Gauding Instructor	Date: 06-17-11
Validated By:	K Reidmuller SME or Instructor	Date: 06-30-11
Approved By:	Training Department	Date: 8-2-11
Approved By:	Operations Department	Date: 8/1/11 8/1/11
ACTUAL JPM COMPLE	TION TIME:	
ACTUAL TIME CRITICA	AL COMPLETION TIME:	
PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT	UNSAT	
REASON, IF UNSATISF	ACTORY:	
EVALUATOR'S SIGNA	TURE:	DATE:

NAME:	 	
DATE:		

SYSTEM:

Component Cooling System

TASK:

Take Corrective Action For A Component Cooling Water System Abnormality

TASK NUMBER:

N1140080401

SIMULATOR SETUP

IC-258 100% power EOL.

Remote: CC29D 23 CCW pump control power OFF.

RT-1

MALF CC0172B 22 Component Cooling Water Pump Trip

RT-2

MALF CC0172A 21 Component Cooling Water Pump Trip

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

100% power, EOL. 23 CCW pump is C/T for oil leak repair. TSAS 3.7.3 was entered 6 hours ago.

INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Respond to all alarms and indications.

Successful Completion Criteria:

- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

- 1. Trip the Reactor.
- 2. Trip 21-24 RCPs.
- 3. Isolate Letdown and swap Charging Pump suction to the RWST.

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

NAME:				
DATE:				

SYSTEM: Component Cooling System

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
		Note for Simulator Operator: The remaining CCW pump must be tripped PRIOR to the determination that the Rx must be tripped and RCPs stopped in either the Reactor Coolant Pump or Component Cooling System Abnormal Procedures.	Note to Evaluator: The end result of this JPM will be the same whether the Component Cooling or Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Procedure is used. The Attachment in each procedure for Stopping RCPs is the same. \$2.0P-AB.RCP-0001 steps start on page 8 \$2.0P-AB.CC-0001 steps start on page 13		

NAME:		
DATE:		

SYSTEM:

Component Cooling System

TASK:

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
		Simulator Operator: Insert RT-1 after candidate assumes the watch. MALF CC0172B 22 Component Cooling Water Pump Trip	Reports 22 CCW pump has tripped. The following alarms will annunciate: OHAS D20-D23 21/22/23/24 RCP BRG CLG WTR FLO LO. RCP Thermal Barrier Return Lo Flow. 1 and 22 CCW Header Lo Pressure Console alarms. Note: Each of the Alarm Response actions is contained here, as well as the actions contained in both S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormality, and S2.OP-AB.CC-0001, Component Cooling Abnormality. Either of the Abnormal Procedures may be entered directly, or through the Alarm Response Procedure to get to ABs.		
	ARP D20-23		Refers to S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0004, Overhead Window D.		
	ARP D20-23 2.0		Determines there are no automatic actions associated with these alarms.		

NAME:	 		
DATE:			

SYSTEM:

Component Cooling System

TASK:

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
	ARP D20-23 3.1	CHECK OPEN the following Component Cooling Water valves: A. 2CC117, RCP CC MOT OP INLET V. B. 2CC118, RCP CC MOT OP INLET VALVE C. 2CC136, RCP BRG MOT OP OUTLET VALVE D. 2CC187, RCP MOTOR CC MOTOR OPERATED OUTLET VALVE.	Determines the following Component Cooling Water valves are open on CC1: A. 2CC117, RCP CC MOT OP INLET V. B. 2CC118, RCP CC MOT OP INLET VALVE C. 2CC136, RCP BRG MOT OP OUTLET VALVE D. 2CC187, RCP MOTOR CC MOTOR OPERATED OUTLET VALVE.		
	ARP D20-23 3.2	MONITOR 21 RCP Motor Bearing temperatures. (T0413A, T0414A T0415A, and T0416A)	Monitors 21 RCP Motor Bearing temperatures. (T0413A, T0414A T0415A, and T0416A) using P-250 computer on the Reactor Coolant Pumps screen, which has 21-24 RCP bearing temperatures. Note: OHA D20-23 are identical except for bearing temperature instrument numbers. Only OHA D-20 for 21 RCP is listed here, but all RCP bearing temperatures should be monitored.		

NAME:				
DATE:				

SYSTEM: Component Cooling System

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
	ARP D20-23 3.3	 IF either of the following conditions exist, GO TO S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001(Q) Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormality: 21 RCP Motor Bearing Temperature reaches 175°F, or CCW flow can NOT be established within 5 minutes AND 21 RCP Motor Bearing temperatures are trending up. 	Determines 21 RCP Motor Bearing Temperature has not reached 175° (will reach maximum of ~ 157 °F) Determines that RCP Motor Bearing temperatures are not trending up. (The temps will rise from ~141 to 157 quickly, within 3 minutes, and the curve of the line flattens out quickly. There IS still CCW flow going to the RCPs, and it WILL keep them from reaching required pump trip temperatures. IF pace of JPM performance results in it being determined that temperatures are trending up, THEN will go to S2.OP-AB.RCP-001 here.		
	ARP D20-23 3.4	MONITOR CC Surge Tank and Containment Sump Pump runs for leakage indication.	Determines CC Surge Tank and Containment Sump Pump runs do not indicate leakage.		
	ARP D20-23 3.5	IF CC Console alarms header pressure low, OR Surge Tank Level High Low, THEN INITIATE S2.OP-AB.CC-0001, Component Cooling Abnormality.	Initiates S2.OP-AB.CC-0001, Component Cooling Abnormality based on CC header Pressure low console alarms.		
	ARP CC1 2.0	21 (22) CC HDR PRESSURE LO	Determines there are no automatic actions associated with these alarms.		

NAME:		 	
DATE:			

SYSTEM:

Component Cooling System

TASK:

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
	ARP CC1 3.1	ENSURE Seal Injection Flow to each RCP is between 6-12 gpm NOT to exceed 40 gpm total seal injection.	Checks seal injection to each RCP between 6-12 gpm, and total seal injection flow less than 40 gpm.		
	ARP CC1 3.2	IF 2CC131 closed due to momentary high flow while balancing CC flow or pump shifting	Determines 2CC131 did not close on high flow while balancing CC flow or pump shifting.		
	ARP CC1 3.3	<u>IF</u> the <u>High</u> flow alarm also occurs	Determines the High flow alarm is not alarmed.		
	ARP CC1 3.4	 ENSURE OPEN: 2CC190, RCP THERM BAR CC OUTLET V. 2CC117, RCP CC MOT OP INLET V. 2CC118, RCP CC MOT OP INLET VALVE. 2CC131, RCP THERM BAR CC CONT VALVE. 	Determines the following valves are open on 2CC1: • 2CC190, RCP THERM BAR CC OUTLET V. • 2CC117, RCP CC MOT OP INLET V. • 2CC118, RCP CC MOT OP INLET VALVE. • 2CC131, RCP THERM BAR CC CONT VALVE.		

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

NAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM: Component Cooling System

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
	ARP CC1	<u>IF</u> the low flow alarm does <u>NOT</u> clear, <u>THEN:</u>			
	3.5	A. SEND an operator to:			
		 MONITOR CC flow from each RCP seal locally. 			
		 ENSURE CC valve positions to/from each RCP. 			
		B. GO TO S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormality.			
	AB RCP 3.1	INITIATE Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary.	Initiates Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary.		
			Note: The first 2 bulleted CAS actions for 1) losing CCW flow to ALL RCPs		
			not restoring CCW flow within 5 minutes of initial loss		
			are based on a loss of ALL CCW flow. However, if a conservative decision is made that the actions of Attachment 2, Stopping Reactor Coolant Pumps are applicable, then Simulator Operator action will be required to insert RT-2 so that the intiating condition for stopping RCPs is total loss of CCW flow when that decision is made.		

NAME:		
DATE:		

SYSTEM: Component Cooling System

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
	AB RCP 3.2	MONITOR AND COMPARE RCP parameters in Attachment 3 to determine affected RCP(s) until malfunction is corrected or as directed by SM/CRS.	Monitors and compares RCP parameters in Attachment 3 on the Plant Computer, Control Console, and RP Panels, and determines that all RCPs are affected.		
	AB RCP 3.3	IF Component Cooling Water supply is causing the RCP(s) abnormal condition, THEN: A. ENSURE the following automatic CC valves supplying RCP(s) are OPEN. • 2CC117 AND 2CC118, RCP COOLING INLET • 2CC131 AND 2CC190, RCP THERMAL BARRIER VALVE • 2CC136 AND 2CC187, RCP BEARING OUTLET B. ENSURE CCW Heat exchanger(s) in service IAW S2.OP-SO.CC-0002(Q), 21 & 22 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Operation.	Determines 2CC117 AND 2CC118, RCP COOLING INLET, 2CC131 AND 2CC190, RCP THERMAL BARRIER VALVE, and 2CC136 AND 2CC187, RCP BEARING OUTLET valves are all open on control console. Determines that CCW system operation prior to the event was normal, and CCW HX(s) are in service. Cue if required: IF verification of CCW HX operation is begun using S2.OP-SO.CC-0002, THEN cue: "21 & 22 CCW HX's are in service."		

VAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM: Component Cooling System

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
		C. ENSURE RCP Seal Injection flows are 6-12 gpm per pump, <u>NOT</u> to exceed 40 gpm total RCP Seal Injection Flow.	Checks RCP Seal Injection flows are 6-12 gpm per pump, total RCP Seal Injection Flow adds up to ≤ 40 gpm.		
	AB RCP 3.4	IF any RCP Motor winding temperature, indicated on 2RP4 recoder, is >235°F for Hot Loop Conditions (Modes 1-4), <u>OR</u> >248°F for Cold Loop Conditions (Mode 5) <u>THEN:</u>	Determines all RCP Motor winding temperatures, indicated on 2RP4 recoder, are <235° for Hot Loop Conditions (Modes 1-4). Note: 2RP4 Motor winding temperature recorder is broken, so the following cue is required. Cue: All RCP Motor winding temperatures, indicated an 2RPA recoder are \$225°.		
	AB RCP 3.5	IF Loss of Seal Injection is causing RCP(s) abnormal condition, AND RCP Seal Leakoff is <2.5 gpm on any RCP, THEN:	indicated on 2RP4 recoder, are <235° Determines Loss of Seal Injection flow is not causing RCS(s) abnormal condition.		
	AB RCP 3.6	IF affected RCP Seal Water Leakoff is <0.8 gpm or is slowly appraoching 6 gpm, AND affected Pump bearing/sea inlet temperatures are stable or lowqering, THEN:	Determines affected RCP Seal Water Leakoff is >0.8 gpm and is not slowly approaching 6 gpm from console indications.		

NAME:			
DATE:			

SYSTEM: Component Cooling System

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
		Simulator Operator: Insert RT-2	Determines last remaining Component Cooling water has tripped.		
		MALF CC0172A 21 Component Cooling Water Pump Trip			
	AB RCP CAS 1.0	IF AT ANY TIME, any of the validated RCP conditions exist, THEN GO TO Attachment 2, Stopping Reactor Coolant Pumps:	Determines Component Cooling Water flow has been lost to all RCPs and goes to Attachment 2, Stopping Reactor Coolant pumps.		

IAME:		 	
DATE:			

SYSTEM: Compo

Component Cooling System

TASK:

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
*	AB.RCP Att. 2 1.0	IF Reactor Trip Breakers are CLOSED, THEN: 1.1 TRIP the Reactor. 1.2 STOP affected RCP(s). 1.3 IF RCP shutdown was due to RCP seal Leakoff flow > 6gpm, THEN simultaneously PERFORM the following: 1.4 IF RCP shutdown was due to a TOTAL LOSS of Component Cooling Water (including loss of CCW to the CVCS Letdown Heat Exchanger), THEN simultaneously PERFORM the following: ISOLATE RCS letdown AND SWAP charging pump suction to the RWST by performing the	Trips the Reactor using either trip handle. Depresses stop PBs for 21-24 RCPs. Determines RCP shutdown was not due to RCP seal Leakoff flow > 6gpm. Determines RCP shutdown was due to a TOTAL LOSS of Component Cooling Water and simultaneously performs the following:		
*		following: a) CLOSE 2CV2 <u>AND</u> 2CV277 to isolate letdown. b) OPEN 2SJ1 <u>AND</u> 2SJ2 to	Depresses the close PB for 2CV2 <u>AND</u> 2CV277 to isolate letdown. Depresses the open PB for 2SJ1 <u>AND</u>		
*		swap charging pump suction to the RWST. c) CLOSE 2CV40 AND 2CV41 to isolate the VCT. • GO TO 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection AND RETURN to this attachment, at the SM/CRS discretion.	2SJ2 to swap charging pump suction to the RWST. Depresses the close PB for 2CV40 AND 2CV41 to isolate the VCT. Goes to 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Terminate JPM when immediate actions begin to be performed.		

NAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM: Component Cooling System

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
	AB.CC 3.1	INITIATE Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary.	Initiates Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary.		
	AB.CC 3.2	Is CCW Surge Tank level >58% and rising?	Determines CCW Surge tank level is < 58% and stable from console indication, goes to Step 3.13.		
	AB.CC 313	Is CCW Surge Tank level <42% and dropping?	Determines CCW Surge tank level is >42% and stable from console indication, goes to Step 3.40.		
	AB.CC 3.40	Is either of the following annunciators in alarm? • 21 CC HDR PRESSURE LO • 22 CC HDR PRESSURE LO	Determines both 21 and 22 CC HDR PRESSURE LO annunciators are in alarm.		
	AB.CC 3.41	START available CC Pumps as necessary to clear CC HDR PRESSURE LO alarms(s).	Determines no CCW pumps are available to be started to clear CC HDR PRESSURE LO alarms(s).		
		Simulator Operator: Insert RT-2			
		MALF CC0172A 21 Component Cooling Water Pump Trip			
			Determines last remaining Component Cooling water has tripped.		

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

NAME:		
DATE:		

SYSTEM:

Component Cooling System

TASK.

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
	AB.CC CAS 1.0	IF AT ANY TIME, any of the <u>validated</u> conditions exist, <u>THEN</u> STOP RCP's IAW Attachment 2, Stopping Reactor Coolant Pumps:	Determines Component Cooling Water flow has been lost to all RCPs and goes to Attachment 2, Stopping Reactor Coolant pumps.		

IAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM: Component Cooling System

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
*		IF Reactor Trip Breakers are CLOSED, THEN: A. TRIP the Reactor. B. STOP affected RCP(s). C. Simultaneously PERFORM the following: IF a total loss of Component Cooling Water was the initiating event (including loss of CCW to the CVCS Letdown Heat Exchanger), THEN ISOLATE RCS letdown AND SWAP Charging Pump suction to the	Trips the Reactor using either trip handle. Depresses stop PBs for 21-24 RCPs.		
*		RWST as follows: a. CLOSE 2CV2 AND 2CV277 to isolate letdown. b. OPEN 2SJ1 AND 2SJ2 to swap charging pump suction to the RWST. c. CLOSE 2CV40 AND 2CV41 to isolate the VCT. IF a Component Cooling Water LEAK in Containment with 2CC113 AND 2CC215 closed was the initiating event, THEN CLOSE the following valves: GO TO 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.	Depresses the close PB for 2CV2 AND 2CV277 to isolate letdown. Depresses the open PB for 2SJ1 AND 2SJ2 to swap charging pump suction to the RWST. Depresses the close PB for 2CV40 AND 2CV41 to isolate the VCT. Determines CCW leak in containment was not the initiating event. Goes to 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Terminate JPM when immediate actions begin to be performed.		

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST

NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.

14Ch	1. Task description and number, JPM descr	iption and nun	nber are identified.	
KOR	2. Knowledge and Abilities (K/A) references	are included.		
Kar	3. Performance location specified. (in-plant,	control room,	or simulator)	
110	4. Initial setup conditions are identified.			
WIN	5. Initiating and terminating Cues are proper	rly identified.		
100	6. Task standards identified and verified by	SME review.		
1661	7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical	steps and are	identified with an asterisk (*).	
160-	8. Verify the procedure referenced by this Ji that procedure: Procedure Rev. 14 Da		ne most current revision of	
40	9. Pilot test the JPM: a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are b. ensure performance time is accurate		ct, and	
	_ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as writte	en with proper	responses, then revise the JPM.	
	_11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instru	ctor sign and	date JPM cover page.	
SME/Instructor: /wir Midmuller Date: 6.30-11				
SME/Instr	ructor:	Date: _		
SME/Instr	ructor:	Date: _		

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

100% power, EOL. 23 CCW pump is C/T for oil leak repair. TSAS 3.7.3 was entered 6 hours ago.

INITIATING CUE:

You are the Reactor Operator. Respond to all alarms and indications.

STATION:	SALEM		
SYSTEM:	Control Room Evacuation		
TASK:	Control charging flow after	Control Room evacuation	٦.
TASK NUMBER:	1130070501		
JPM NUMBER:	09-01 NRC IP-i		
ALTERNATE PATH:	IME	K/A NUMBER: _	APE 068 AA1.22 4.0 4.3
APPLICABILITY: EO F	RO X STA	SRO X	RO SRO
EVALUATION SETTING	METHOD: In Plant/Si	mulate	
REFERENCES: S2.	OP-AB.CR-0001, Rev. 22 A	tt. 5	
TOOLS AND EQUIPME	NT: JAM Key		
VALIDATED JPM COM	PLETION TIME:	10 min	
TIME PERIOD IDENTIFI	ED FOR TIME CRITICAL S	TEPS: N/	Α
Developed By:	G Gauding Instructor	Date:	06-30-11
Validated By:	J Pierce, Jr SME or Instructor	Date:	07-28-11
Approved By:	Training Departmen		8-2-11
Approved By:	Operations Departme	Date:	8/1/11
ACTUAL JPM COMPLE	ETION TIME:		
ACTUAL TIME CRITICA	AL COMPLETION TIME:		
PERFORMED BY:			
GRADE: SAT	UNSAT		
REASON, IF UNSATISE	FACTORY:		
EVALUATOR'S SIGNA	TURE:		DATE:

NAME:		
DATE:		

SYSTEM:

CVCS

TASK:

Control charging flow after Control Room evacuation.

TASK NUMBER:

1130070501

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

- The Control Room has been evacuated in accordance with S2.OP-AB.CR-0001, Control Room Evacuation.
- 2. A reactor trip from 100% was initiated prior to evacuating the Control Room.

INITIATING CUE:

You have been directed to take local control of charging flow per S2.OP-AB.CR-0001, Control Room Evacuation Att. 5, starting at Step 8.0. Steps 1.0-7.0 have been completed.

Successful Completion Criteria:

- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

- 1. Take local control of 2CV55.
- 2. Adjust air operator to change charging flow from current reading to 70 gpm.

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

NAME:	 	
DATE:		

SYSTEM: CVCS

TASK: Control charging flow after Control Room evacuation.

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
			,		
		Operator reviews a copy of S2.OP-AB.CR-0001, Att. 5, and proceeds to Charging Pump Alley, El. 84.	Evaluator provides copy of Attachment 5, and a JAM Key. Note: If operator inquires why steps 1.0-7.0 are not signed off, state that another operator performed those steps and still has the procedure with him in the field. Proceeds to Panel 216-2, Chg Pmps FL & PR Inst Pnl. Note: Panel 216-2 will alarm in the Control Room. The Control Room must be notified prior to opening this panel, and when it is secured.		
	8.0	TAKE local control of 2CV55, Cent Chg Pmp Flow Cont Valve, by performing the following:			
	8.1	RECORD the charging flow as indicated on 2FI-128A.	Records charging flow from 2FI-128A, Charging Pump Flow Indication.		
*	8.2	PLACE local E/P Bypass Line Selector Valve in Manual.	Locates local E/P Bypass Line Selector Valve and discusses turning valve to Manual.		

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

NAME:		
DATE:		

SYSTEM: CVCS

TASK: Control charging flow after Control Room evacuation.

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
	8.3	Using the MANUAL hand air operator, ENSURE that the flow rate as noted in Step 8.1 is being maintained with 2CV55.	Reads flowrate from 2FI-128A, Charging Pump Flow Indication to ensure the flow rate is maintained with 2CV55. Cue: Flow rate is the same as that recorded in Step 8.1.		
	8.4	OBSERVE local air pressure indicator to verify local control.	Points out local air pressure indicator. Cue: Air pressure on local air pressure indicator is 8 psig.		

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

NAME:		_	
DATE:			

SYSTEM: CVCS

TASK: Control charging flow after Control Room evacuation.

*	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
	9.0	NOTIFY the CRS and STA that Steps 1.0-8.0 of Att. 5 are completed.	Locates page or states that they would walk to HSD Panel, to inform CRS and STA that steps 1-8 of Attachment 5 are completed.		
			Note: May inform CRS and STA that Step 8 is completed, since they didn't perform Steps 1-7.		
			Cue: The CRS directs you to adjust charging flow to 70 gpm (Evaluator: or a value not currently read on FI-128A).		
*			Discusses adjusting flow using MANUAL hand air operator. Raises air pressure to lower flow or lowers air pressure to raise flow. (2CV55, Cent Chg Pmp Flow Cont Valve is fail open valve) Cue: If candidate states they would LOWER air pressure, then provide feedback that charging flow		
			indicated on FI-128A has risen to 5 gpm above that recorded in Step 8.1. When candidate RAISES air pressure, then provide feedback that charging flow indicated on FI-128A has lowered to 70 gpm.		

Terminating Cue: Adjusts air pressure to match new requested flow rate. State "this JPM is terminated".

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST

NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.

1. Task description and number, JPM description	on and number are identified.
2. Knowledge and Abilities (K/A) references ar	e included.
3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, con	ntrol room, or simulator)
4. Initial setup conditions are identified.	
5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly i	dentified.
6. Task standards identified and verified by SM	
7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical step	
8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM that procedure: Procedure Rev. 22 Date	
9. Pilot test the JPM: a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are f b. ensure performance time is accurate.	,
10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written w	with proper responses, then revise the JPM.
11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructo	r sign and date JPM cover page.
SME/Instructor: J. PIERCE	Date: 7/28/11
SME/Instructor:	Date:
SME/Instructor:	Date:

The Control Room has been evacuated in accordance with S2.OP-AB.CR-0001, Control Room Evacuation. A reactor trip from 100% was initiated prior to evacuating the Control Room.

INITIATING CUE:

You have been directed to take local control of charging flow per S2.OP-AB.CR-0001, Control Room Evacuation Att. 5, starting at Step 8.0. Steps 1.0-7.0 have been completed.

STATION:	SALEM							
SYSTEM:	YSTEM: Auxiliary Feedwater							
TASK: Reset Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Trip Valve MS52								
ASK NUMBER: 113 004 05 01								
JPM NUMBER:	09-01 NRC IP-j							
ALTERNATE PATH:		K/A NUMBER: _	APE 068 A					
APPLICABILITY: EO R	RO X STA	SRO \overline{X}	4.3 RO	4.5 SRO				
EVALUATION SETTING	/METHOD: In Plant							
REFERENCES: S2.	OP-AB.CR-0001, Control Ro	om Evacuation, Rev. 22	Att. 13					
TOOLS AND EQUIPMEN	NT: None							
VALIDATED JPM COMP	LETION TIME:	8 min						
TIME PERIOD IDENTIFI	ED FOR TIME CRITICAL ST	EPS: N/A	4					
Developed By:	G Gauding Instructor	Date:	06-24-11					
Validated By:	J Pierce, Jr. SME or Instructor	Date:	07-28-11					
Approved By:	Training Departmen	.1	8-2-11					
Approved By:	Operations Departme	Date:	8/1/11					
ACTUAL JPM COMPLE	TION TIME:							
ACTUAL TIME CRITICA	L COMPLETION TIME:							
PERFORMED BY:								
GRADE: SAT	UNSAT							
REASON, IF UNSATISF	ACTORY:							
EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE:								

NAME	
DATE	

SYSTEM:

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

TASK:

Reset an Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Trip Valve (MS52)

TASK NUMBER:

113 004 05 01

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The reactor has been tripped and the control room has been evacuated due

to a bomb threat. 23 AFW Pump has tripped on over speed.

INITIATING CUE:

You have been directed to reset 23 AFW Pump Turbine Trip Valve (2MS52) IAW S2.OP-AB.CR-0001, Control Room Evacuation, Attachment 13, Turbine - Driven AFW Pump Restoration. Maintenance has corrected the cause of the overspeed trip, and there are no AUTO start signals

present for 23 AFW pump.

SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION CRITERIA:

- 1. ALL critical steps completed
- 2. ALL sequential steps completed in order
- 3. ALL time-critical steps completed within the allotted time JPM completed within validated time. Completion may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Perform Attachment 13 in correct sequence.

NAME:		
DATE:		

SYSTEM: Auxiliary Feedwater

TASK: Reset MS52

# *	STEP No.	STEP (*Denotes Critical Step) (#Denotes Sequential Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS
		Provide operator with the correct procedure, S2.OP-AB.CR-0001, Rev. 22, Att.13.	Operator obtains procedure.		
			Contacts Control Room and reports that they will be entering 23 AFP Room. Note: 23 AFP Room is a High Energy Line Break (HELB) area, and the Control Room must be contacted prior to opening door or access panel to room.		
*	1.0	RESETTING 2MS52 SEAT tappet nut by slightly pulling Head Lever away from trip linkage AND CHECK that the Emergency Trip Lever is in its RESET position (horizontal).	Verifies tappet nut seated and EMERGENCY TRIP LEVER in reset position. Cue: Tappet nut seated and EMERGENCY TRIP LEVER is reset.		
*	1.2	ROTATE 2MS52 handwheel in the closed direction (clockwise). This will cause the Latch-Up Lever to move up toward the Trip Hook.	Simulates rotating 2MS52 23 AFW Pp Turbine Trip Valve handwheel clockwise and verifies Latch-Up Lever moving toward Trip Hook. Cue: Lever is moving towards trip hook.		

NAME:		
DATE:		

SYSTEM: Auxiliary Feedwater

TASK: Reset MS52

# *	STEP No.	STEP (*Denotes Critical Step) (#Denotes Sequential Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS
*	1.3	CHECK that the Latch-Up Lever moves up into position, that it moves to and engages the Trip Hook.	Verifies Trip Hook engages. Cue: Trip Hook is engaged.		
	1.4	PULL UP on the Hand Trip Lever to ensure full engagement of the Trip Hook and Latch-up Lever.	Points out Hand Trip Lever to ensure full engagement of the Trip Hook and Latch-up Lever.		
			Cue: Trip Hook and Latch-up Lever are fully engaged.		
		CAUTION: Leaving 2MS52 backseated may impose more reaction loading on the Trip hook than the Trip Linkage can overcome, thus rendering the 2MS52 trip function INOPERABLE. When resetting 2MS52, trapped steam pressure could spin turbine for short period of time (~2 seconds)			
*	1.5	Slowly ROTATE 2MS52 handwheel in the OPEN direction (<u>counter-clockwise</u>) until the Split Coupling raises and makes contact with the bottom of the Sliding Nut <u>OR</u> the valve comes to rest on the backseat.	Simulates rotating Handwheel counter-clockwise and verifies Split Coupling makes contact with Sliding Nut OR the valve comes to rest on the backseat. Cue: Split Coupling makes contact with Sliding Nut.		

NAME:	
DATE:	

SYSTEM: Auxiliary Feedwater

TASK: Reset MS52

# *	STEP No.	STEP (*Denotes Critical Step) (#Denotes Sequential Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS
*	1.6	ROTATE 2MS52 handwheel clockwise approximately one turn until handwheel moves freely AND Latch-up lever is in full contact with Trip Hook.	Simulates rotating Handwheel clockwise one turn and verifies Handwheel moves freely. Cue: Handwheel moves freely and Latch-up lever is in full contact with Trip Hook.		
	1.7	ENSURE turbine stops spinning (indicates 2MS132 is seated)	Determines shaft is not spinning.		
	1.8	ENSURE proper engagement of tappet nut and head lever IAW Att. 13, page 2, 23 AF Pump Trip/Throttle Valve & Overspeed Trip Mechanism, Overspeed Trip Mechanism Reset.	Ensures proper engagement of tappet nut and head lever IAW Att. 13, page 2.		

TERMINATING CUE: When report is made that 2MS52 is reset, state JPM is complete. Ensure Control Room is contacted after 23 AFW pump room access door/panel is shut.

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST

NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.

1. Task description and number, JPM descrip	tion and number are identified.
2. Knowledge and Abilities (K/A) references a	re included.
	ontrol room, or simulator)
4. Initial setup conditions are identified.	
5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly	dentified.
6. Task standards identified and verified by S	ME review.
7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical ste	eps and are identified with an asterisk (*).
8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPN that procedure: Procedure Rev. 22 Date	M matches the most current revision of e 1/28/92 7/28/11
9. Pilot test the JPM: a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are to b. ensure performance time is accurate.	
10. If the JPM cannot be performed as writter	with proper responses, then revise the JPM.
11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instruct	or sign and date JPM cover page.
CMENICATION AND INC.	2/2/1
SME/Instructor: J. PIERCE	Date:/\28/(1
SME/Instructor:	Date:
SME/Instructor:	Date:



The reactor has been tripped and the control room has been evacuated due to a bomb threat. 23 AFW Pump has tripped on over speed.

INITIATING CUE:

You have been directed to reset 23 AFW Pump Turbine Trip Valve (2MS52) IAW S2.OP-AB.CR-0001, Control Room Evacuation, Attachment 13, Turbine - Driven AFW Pump Restoration. Maintenance has corrected the cause of the overspeed trip, and there are no AUTO start signals present for 23 AFW pump.

STATION:	SALEM		
SYSTEM:	Control Room Evacuation		
TASK:	TCAF Control Room Evacuati Trip SGFP's)	ion (Trip Turbine, Ope	n Exciter Field Breaker,
TASK NUMBER:	1140130401		
JPM NUMBER:	09-01 NRC IP-k		
ALTERNATE PATH:		K/A NUMBER: _	APE 068 AA1.04, AA1.23, AA1.27
APPLICABILITY: EO F		RTANCE FACTOR: _	All >2.5 All >2.5 SRO
EVALUATION SETTING	/METHOD: In Plant/ Sim	ulate	
REFERENCES: S2.	OP-AB.CR-0001, Rev. 22 Att.	8 (checked 6-24-11)	
TOOLS AND EQUIPMEN	NT: None		
VALIDATED JPM COMP	LETION TIME: 10) min	
TIME PERIOD IDENTIFI	ED FOR TIME CRITICAL STE	PS: <u>N/</u>	<u>A</u>
Developed By:	G Gauding Lead Regulatory Exam Au	Date:	06-24-11
Validated By:	J. Pierce SME or Instructor	Date:	7.28.11
Approved By:	Training Department	Date:	8-2-11
Approved By:	Operations Department	Date:	8/1/11
ACTUAL JPM COMPLE	TION TIME:		
ACTUAL TIME CRITICA	L COMPLETION TIME:		
PERFORMED BY:			
GRADE: SAT	UNSAT		
REASON, IF UNSATISF	ACTORY:		
EVALUATOR'S SIGNAT	URE:		DATE:

	NAME:DATE:
SYSTEM:	Control Room Evacuation
TACK	TCAE Control Room Evacuation (Trin Turbing, Open Evoiter Field Breaker, Trin

TASK

1140130401

SGFP's)

NUMBER:

INITIAL

CONDITIONS:

The control room has been evacuated due to a bomb threat.

INITIATING CUE:

You are assigned to carry out the actions of S2.OP-AB.CR-001, Control Room Evacuation, Attachment 8, Steps 2.0-4.0: Trip the Main Turbine, open the Exciter Field Breaker, Trip both SGFP's. Assume you have the equipment required by the procedure.

Successful Completion Criteria:

- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

- 1. Locate and describe TRIP operation of Reset-Normal-Trip Lever at Turbine Front standard.
- 2. Locate and describe opening of Exciter Field Breaker.
- 3. At SGFP area, locate and describe at least one method of locally tripping SGFPs.

NAME:			
DATE:			

SYSTEM ABNORMAL PROCEDURES

TASK:

TCAF Control Room Evacuation: Trip MT, Open Exciter Field Breaker, Trip SGFP's

#	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) (#Denotes a Sequential Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT Evaluation)
	1	Operator reviews procedure.	Evaluator provides copy of S2.OP-AB.CR-1, Control Room Evacuation Att. 8.		
*	2	Proceed to Turbine Front Standard, and place the Reset-Normal-Trip Lever in the TRIP position.	Proceeds to turbine front standard, locates Reset-Normal-Trip lever and points out TRIP position.		
*	3	Proceed to Excitation System Control Cubicle and open Generator Exciter Field Breaker.	Proceeds to Turb. Bldg., El. 120, (North End) locates Generator Exciter Field Breaker and discusses opening.		

NAME:	_	
DATE:		

SYSTEM ABNORMAL PROCEDURES

TASK: TCAF Control Room Evacuation: Trip MT, Open Exciter Field Breaker, Trip SGFP's

* 4 Locally, trip the following: • 21 SGFP • 22 SGFP Proceeds to Turb. Bldg., El. 100, and discusses operation of at least one of the ways to locally trip the SGFPs. 1. Pulling out the OS trip plunger 2. Depressing the "Local Emergency TRIP" button under glass on side of SGFP. 3. Depressing the Emergency Stop PB on the Woodward 505	#	STEP NO.	STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) (#Denotes a Sequential Step)	STANDARD	EVAL S/U	COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT Evaluation)
Digital Control panel. 4. Opening Thrust Oil drain valves 21PL73 or 22PL73. (21 SGFP Trip Test Loading Oil ISLN VLV behind panel; same for 22) (If they select a different method such as de-energizing COPU, evaluate after JPM complete) CUE: JPM is complete	*	4	• 21 SGFP	discusses operation of at least one of the ways to locally trip the SGFPs. 1. Pulling out the OS trip plunger 2. Depressing the "Local Emergency TRIP" button under glass on side of SGFP. 3. Depressing the Emergency Stop PB on the Woodward 505 Digital Control panel. 4. Opening Thrust Oil drain valves 21PL73 or 22PL73. (21 SGFP Trip Test Loading Oil ISLN VLV behind panel; same for 22) (If they select a different method such as de-energizing COPU, evaluate after JPM complete)		

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST

NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.

1. Task description and number, JPM description	n and number are identified.
2. Knowledge and Abilities (K/A) references are	included.
3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, cont	
4. Initial setup conditions are identified.	
5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly id-	entified.
6. Task standards identified and verified by SME	review.
7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps	
8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM n that procedure: Procedure Rev. 22 Date 1	
9. Pilot test the JPM: a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free b. ensure performance time is accurate.	e of conflict, and
10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written wi	ith proper responses, then revise the JPM.
11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor	sign and date JPM cover page.
,	
SME/Instructor: J. PIERCE	Date: 7/28/11
SME/Instructor:	Date:
SME/Instructor:	Date:

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

INITIAL CONDITIONS:					
The control	I room has been	evacuated due t	o a bomb threat.		
	Evacuation, Atta	chment 8, Steps	2.0-4.0: Trip the Assume you ha	P-AB.CR-001, Co Main Turbine, open eve the equipment	en the Exciter

Appendix D	Scenario Outline	Form ES-D-

Facility: SAL	EM 1 & 2	Scenario No.:	ESG-1	Op-Test No.: <u>09-01 NRC</u>
Examiners:		Opera	ators:	

Initial Conditions: 100% power, BOL. 21 AFW pp C/T for oil leak repair. 21 CFCU is C/T. PZR Pressure channel II is O/S for calibration.

Turnover: Maintain 100% power.

Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*	Event Description
1	PR0017A	I CRS/RO	Controlling PZR level ch failure (TS)
2	RC0002	C ALL	RCS leak (TS)
3		N ALL	Power Reduction (directed based on RCS leak)
4	RC0002	M ALL	SBLOCA (~100 gpm)
5	RP0342 RP0343	C CRS/RO	Failure of automatic High Head injection
6	AF0182A RP318E2 O/R B606	C CRS/PO	AFW fails to automatically actuate
7	O/R C206	C CRS/PO	SEC fails to reset
8	RC0002	C CRS/RO	SBLOCA escalation (ECCS flow re-initiation in TRIP-3)
			CT's 1. Establish hi head ECCS. 2. Initiate AFW flow. 3.Re-start ECCS pps

^{* (}N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

O/R = Override

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE

SCENARIO TITLE:	RCS Leak, Escalating SBLOCA	
SCENARIO NUMBE	R: 09-01 NRC ESG-1	
EFFECTIVE DATE:	See Approval Date	
EXPECTED DURAT	TION: 77 minutes	
REVISION NUMBER	R: 00	
PROGRAM:	L.O. REQUAL	
	X INITIAL LICENSE	
	STA STA	
	OTHER	
Revision Summary		
New Issue for 09-01	NRC Exam	
	•	
PREPARED BY:	G Gauding	07-04-11
	Lead Regulatory Exam Author	Date
APPROVED BY:	offenz	8-2-1,
	Operations Fraining Manager	Date
APPROVED BY:	BM	8/1/11
	Facility Representative	Date

OBJECTIVES

- A. Given a situation with an OHA alarm, the crew will perform action(s) to investigate and correct the cause of the alarm, IAW approved station procedures.
- B. Given the unit with multiple OHAs in alarm, the crew will prioritize, validate and then determine a course of action when provided with additional information, IAW approved station procedures.
- C. Given the order or indications of a charging system malfunction, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the loss or malfunction of the charging system in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- D. Given indication of a loss or malfunction of the Charging system DIRECT corrective action for a Charging System malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- E. Given the indications of a reactor coolant system (RCS) malfunction or leak, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- F. Given the indications of a reactor coolant system (RCS) malfunction or leak, DIRECT the response to the malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- G. Given the unit at power with an RCS leak greater than the Tech. Spec. limit, take corrective action IAW AB.RC-0001.
- H. Given the order or indications of a reactor trip, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- I. Given indication of a reactor trip, DIRECT the response to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- J. Given the order or indications of a safety injection perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- K. Given indication of a safety injection DIRECT the response to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- L. Given the order or indications of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), complete actions as the nuclear control operator to PERFORM the immediate response to the LOCA in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- M. Given indication of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), DIRECT the immediate response to the LOCA in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- N. During performance of emergency operating procedures, monitor the critical safety function status trees in accordance the EOP in effect.

II. MAJOR EVENTS

- A. Controlling PZR level channel fails low
- B. 17 gpm RCS leak
- C. 100 gpm SBLOCA
- D. 1800 gpm SBLOCA

III. SCENARIO SUMMARY

- A. The crew takes the watch with the unit at 100% power, BOL. 21 AFW pump is C/T for oil bubbler repair. 21 CFCU is C/T after it tripped 1 hour ago. I&C is performing a channel calibration of PZR Pressure Channel II. 2PR7 is shut with power removed to comply with TSAS 3.4.5.b. All bistables associated with PZR Pressure Channel II are tripped IAW S2.IC.-CC.RCP-0018, 2PT-456 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel II. Orders for the shift are to maintain 100% power.
- B. Shortly after taking the watch the controlling PZR level channel will fail low, and a 17 gpm RCS leak will commence ramping in over 12 minutes. The CRS will enter S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging. The crew will respond and take manual control of the Master Flow Controller, swap to an operable level channel, restore letdown and PZR level, and return the system to auto. The CRS will enter the appropriate Tech Spec.
- C. The crew will diagnose the RCS leak based on indications and alarms. The CRS will enter S2.OP-AB.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant System Leak. The crew will swap to a centrifugal charging pump and quantify the leak. The CRS will identify that the Unidentified RCS leak rate exceeds Tech Spec limits, and a unit shutdown is required.
- D. During the power reduction, the RCS leak will worsen to a 100 gpm SBLOCA. The crew will identify that the RCS leak rate exceeds the capacity of the CVCS makeup system. The CRS will direct a Rx trip and Safety Injection be initiated.
- E. The High Head ECCS injection valves 2SJ12 and 2SJ13 fail to open on the Safety Injection signal. The crew opens the valves from the control room to establish High Head ECCS injection.
- F. AFW fails to initiate based on: 21 AFW pump C/T, 22 AFW pump fails to start on the SEC initiation signal, and 23 AFW pump governor fails to minimum speed. The crew establishes AFW flow by blocking and resetting 2B SEC and starting 22 AFW pump. 23 AFW pump remains unavailable for the remainder of the scenario.
- G. The crew performs diagnostics in EOP-TRIP-1, Rx Trip Response, and transitions to EOP-TRIP-3, Safety Injection Termination based on the size of the RCS LOCA. The 2C SEC cannot be reset, and will be deenergized to establish control over C bus equipment.
- H. Once ECCS equipment has been removed from service, the SBLOCA will increase in size. The crew will diagnose the inability to maintain PZR level, and start ECCS pumps to maintain PZR and RCS subcooling.
- I. The scenario will be terminated when the crew has started sufficient ECCS pumps to maintain PZR level and RCS subcooling.

IV.	INITIAL CONDITIONS
	IC-241 100% power, BOL
PRI	EP FOR TRAINING (i.e. computer setpoints, procedures, bezel covers ,tagged equipment)
Initial D	Description
1 F	RH1 and RH2 C/T
2 F	RH18s C/T
3 \	/C1and VC4 C/T
4 F	RCPs (SELF CHECK)
5 F	RTBs (SELF CHECK)
6 N	MS167s (SELF CHECK)
7 5	500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK)
8 \$	SGFP Trip (SELF CHECK)
9 2	23 CV PP (SELF CHECK)
10 2	21 AFW pump C/T.
11 2	21 CFCU C/T.
12 2	2PR7 shut and deenergized.
13 3	S2.IC-CC-RCP-0018, 2PT-456 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel II, Exhibit 1 signed and on NCO desk or provided to crew for turnover.
14 \$	SGBD directed to Condenser placard on 2CC3.
15 (Complete Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist."

Note: Tables with blue headings may be populated by external program, do not change column name without consulting Simulator Support group

	EVE	NT TRIGGERS:	
Initial	ET#	Description	
U		EVENT	MONP254 <10 // CONT ROD BANK C < 10 (RX TRIP)
		ACTION:	
	1	COMMAND:	<update as="" needed=""></update>
		PURPOSE:	

MA	ALFUNCTIONS:				10 mg (10 mg) 10 mg (10 mg) 10 mg (10 mg)	
SELF- CHECK	Description	Delay Time	Initial Value	Ramp Time	Trigger	Severity
01	PR0017A PZR LEVEL CH I (LT459) FAILS H/L	. N/A	N/A	N/A	RT-1	0
02	RC0002 RCS LEAK INTO CONTAINMENT (equiv to 0-4 inches)	N/A	0 ,	00:15:00	RT-1	17
03	RP0342 2SJ12 FAILS TO AUTO OPEN ON SEC	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
04	RP0343 2SJ13 FAILS TO AUTO OPEN ON SEC	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
05	RP318E2 Aux Feed Pump 22 Fails to Start on SEC	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
06	AN0302 SER 302 FAILS - :E35 2PR2 PROTECTION CH II LOOP UNSAFE/IN TEST	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	SER POINT FAILS/OVRD TO ON
07	AN0328 SER 328 FAILS - :A12 REACTOR PROT SYS CHANNEL II INSTRUMENT LOOP IN TEST	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	SER POINT FAILS/OVRD TO ON

RE	EMOTES:					
SELF- CHECK	Description	Delay Time	Initial Value	Ramp Time	Trigger	Condition
01	AF20D 21 AFW PUMP BKR CONTROL POWER	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	OFF
02	PR02D PZR HI PR RX TRP CH 2 PC456A BS	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	TRIP
03 -	PR13D PZR LO PR BLK SI CH 2 PC456B BS	N/A	N/A	N/A_	N/A	TRIP
04	PR06D PZR LO PR RX TRP CH 2 PC456C BS	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	TRIP
05	PR10D PZR LOW PRESS SI CH 2 PC456D BS	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	TRIP
06	RC02D OT DELTA T TRIP CH II BS (421C)	N/A	N/A	. N/A	N/A	TRIP
07	RC06D OT DELTA T R/BCK CH II BS (421D)	N/A	N/A	N/A	. N/A	TRIP
08	PR35D PORV STOP VALVE 2PR7 TAGGED	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	TAGGED
09	CT191-1D 21 CFCU BKR #1 High Speed 125VDC	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	OFF
10	CT191-2D 21 CFCU BKR #2 High Speed 125VDC	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	OFF
11	CT191-3D 21 CFCU BKR #3 Low Speed 125VDC	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	OFF
12	DG03D DEENERGIZE "C" SEC CABINET	N/A	N/A	. N/A	RT-3	YES

OVERRIDES:

SELF- CHECK	Description	Delay Time	Initial Value	Ramp Time	Trigger	Condition/ Severity
01	B606 F DI 23 AUX FEED PUMP-SPEED DECREASE	N/A	N/A	N/A	ET-1	ON
02	B606 E DI 23 AUX FEED PUMP-SPEED INCREASE	N/A	N/A	N/A	ET-1	OFF
03	C206 A DI 2C SFGD EMER OPR-EMERG LOADING RESET	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	OFF

OTHER CONDITIONS:

Description

1. None

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

- A. State shift job assignments and review scenario objectives.
- B. Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide crew members a copy of the shift turnover sheet).
- C. Inform the crew "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift".
- D. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel.

Comment

1. PZR Level Controlling Channel (LT459) Fails Lo

Simulator Operator: Insert RT-1 on direction from Lead Evaluator.

MALF: PR0017A PZR level CH 1 (LT459) Fails Low Final Value: 0

MALF: RC0002 RCS leak into containment Final Value: 17 Ramp: 15 minutes

RO announces OHA E-36, PZR HTR OFF LVL LO, and console alarm PZR LO LVL as unexpected, and diagnoses failure of PZR controlling level channel.

RO may place Master Flow Controller in manual and reduce flow to minimize level rise in PZR prior to Abnormal Procedure entry.

CRS enters S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging.

CRS directs initiation of Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary.

RO reports letdown is isolated.

RO reports 23 charging pump is running.

PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

SBT LOG

psig.

2CV18 in auto.

CRS directs RO to restore charging flow

- When selected orifice is open, place

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT LOG
	controller to auto when PZR level is restored to program.	
Note: Charging flow should not be lowered lower than ~65 gpm to ensure adequate cooling of letdown flow through the Regen HX and prevent flashing in the Letdown line.	RO manually lowers charging flow to restore PZR level is restored to program.	
iirie.	CRS directs PO to remove PZR level channel I from service IAW S2.OP-SO.RPS-0003.	
	CRS enters TSAS 3.3.1.1 action 6.	
	PO verifies PZR Level channel III selected for control, Channel II selected for alarm, and selects PZR level recorder to channel II or III.	
	PO informs CRS that IC support is required to perform remainder of procedure.	
Note: Crew may identify rising 2R11A prior to RMS alarm. CRS should enter S2.OP-AB.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant System Leak, or S2.OP-AB.RAD-0001, Abnormal Radiation upon indication that containment radiation level is rising.		

Comment

SBT LOG

2. RCS leak

Note: The 2R11A monitor, Containment Particulate, will go into warning at ~8 minutes from leak onset. Warning does not provide annunciation. 2R11A will go into Alarm ~ 11 minutes after leak onset, and will cause OHA A-6 to annunciate. RO announces unexpected OHA A-6, RMS Trouble.

Note: Master Flow Controller may be in auto or manual at this point.

RO reports 2R11A is in alarm.

CRS enters S2.OP-AB.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant System Leak, or S2.OP-AB.RAD-0001, Abnormal Radiation.

Note: OHA C-2 will annunciate ~13 minutes after RT-1 insertion.

RO reports unexpected OHA C-2, CNTMT SUMP PMP START.

CRS directs initiation of Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary.

RO reports RCS temperature is >350°F, and the unit is in MODE 1.

RO raises charging flow to determine if PZR level can be maintained stable or rising, and reports that with maximum charging flow, PZR level is dropping slowly.

RO reports a centrifugal charging pump is not running.

Comment

PO places 2 CFCUs in slow speed and 2 CFCUs in fast speed IAW CAS Step 4.0.

RO transfers to a centrifugal charging pump as follows:

- Ensures Master Flow Controller in auto.
- Shuts 2CV55.
- Starts a centrifugal charging pump
- Place 23 charging pump speed controller in manual and lowers 23 charging pump speed to minimum while adjusting 2CV55.
- Stops 23 charging pump when at minimum flow.
- Adjusts 2CV55 to stabilize PZR level.
- Maintains RCP seal injection flow 6-12 gpm per pump not to exceed 40 gpm total seal injection flow.

RO swaps to 45 gpm letdown orifice if required to stabilize PZR level.

Note: Alarm is due to the letdown HX CCW TCV 2CC71 opening due to the increased letdown flow, and will clear when 2nd orifice is shut.

RO reports 2CC131 Discharge Flow Lo console alarm when second letdown orifice is placed in service, and reports its clearing when 2nd orifice is removed from service.

Note: With RCS leak fully ramped in the leakrate is 20 gpm.

RO stabilizes PZR level and estimates RCS leak rate.

RO reports PZR level can be maintained stable or rising.

RO ensures CVCS makeup system in service.

SBT LOG Comment

CRS directs initiation of S2.OP-ST.RC-0008, RCS Water Inventory Balance.

CRS identifies Tech Spec 3.4.7.2.b for RCS unidentified leakage.

Role Play: When directed by Lead Evaluator, call the CRS as the Operations Director. State" This is John Garecht. The Shift Manager has just updated me on the status of the Unit 2 RCS leak rate. I want you to have Unit 2 Rx shutdown within the next 2 hours. Commence the Unit 2 shutdown expeditiously."

3. Power Reduction

CRS briefs crew on load reduction.

CRS enters S2.OP-AB.LOAD-0001, Rapid Load Reduction.

CRS directs initiation of Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary.

CRS directs RO and PO to coordinate and initiate a Turbine Load Reduction (at least 1% per minute.)

RO calculates boration required for load reduction.

			Page 15 of 30
Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT LOG	Comment
	RO initiates boration.		
Note: Digital EHC is set up for a SGFP trip to 66% turbine power at 15% per minute. PO must change rate to the rate directed by the CRS.	PO initiates load reduction at rate directed by CRS, and ensures load reduction starts.		
	RO maintains Tavg on program during load reduction by ensuring control rods automatically insert when Tavg-Tref deviation reaches +1.5°F.		
	RO energizes all PZR heaters.		
Proceed to next event after sufficient power reduction has been performed at direction of Lead Evaluator.			

4. SBLOCA

Simulator Operator: Modify MALF RC0002 from 17 to 100 with no ramp or delay on direction from Lead Evaluator.

RO reports OHAs E-28 PZR HTR ON PRESS LO and C-38 CFCU LK DET HI.

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT LOG	Comment
	RO reports PZR pressure lowering.		
	RO reports PZR level dropping faster than expected for the downpower.		
	RO reports PZR level cannot be maintained on program.		
5. Rx Trip, failure of High Head ECCS injection.	CRS directs RO to trip the Rx, confirm the trip, initiate Safety Injection, then perform immediate actions of EOP-TRIP-1.		
	RO trips the Rx using either Trip handle.		
	RO confirms the Rx trip and initiates Safety Injection with either key switch.		
Simulator Operator: Ensure ET-1 is True upon the Rx trip. This inserts the 23 AFW pump governor failure			
The control of the co	RO performs Immediate Actions for TRIP-1:		

CRS and RO verify performance of immediate

actions.

Expected Plant/Student Response Evaluator/Instructor Activity Comment SBT LOG PO reports AFW status: - 21 AFW pump not available. - 22 AFW pump not running. - 23 AFW pump coasting down with speed demand at zero. RO announces Unit 2 Rx trip, Safety Injection on plant page. PO reports SEC loading is not complete for energized vital buses, and determines 22 AFW pump did not start. Note: When the 2B SEC is reset, PO blocks and resets 2B SEC. 22 AFW pump will start due to the lo-lo SG NR signal which is present. CT #1: (E-O--F) PO reports 22 AFW pump is running. Establish the minimum required AFW flow rate (22E4 lbm/hr) to the SGs before transition out of EOP-TRIP-1. SAT UNSAT

PO throttles AFW flow to no less than 22E4 lbm/hr.

SBT

LOG

flow SI systems charging flowmeter.

Comment

RO reports RCS pressure is >1540 psig.

PO reports AFW flow is > 22E4 lbm/hr.

PO receives permission to throttle AFW flow < 22E4 lbm hr when at least one SG NR level is > 9%, and maintains intact SG NR levels between 9-33%.

RO reports all RCPs are running.

RO reports RCS Tavg is stable at or trending to 547°F.

RO reports both reactor trip breakers are open.

RO reports both PZR PORVs are shut and both PORV block valves are open.

RO reports all RCPs running and spray valves shut.

RO reports RCS pressure is > 1350 psig.

RO maintains seal injection flow to all RCPs.

PO reports no SGs are depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized.

RO reports no indications of any SGTR.

RO reports no radiation monitors in Table F are in warning, alarm, or rising.

PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

	RO reports containment pressure remains < 4 psig.
	RO reports containment sump is <46%.
	RO reports RCS subcooling is >0°F.
	PO reports AFW flow is either >22E4 lbm/hr or at least one SG NR level is >9%.
	RO reports RCS pressure is stable or rising.
Note: If PZR level is <11% at this point, it should be rising due to ECCS injection flow. CRS will loop back to step 29 until PZR level is > 11%.	RO reports PZR level is > 11%.
1170.	CRS transitions to EOP-TRIP-3, Safety Injection Termination.
	RO resets SI and Phase A isolation.
	RO opens 21/22CA330s.
	RO reports neither spray valve is failed open.
	PO resets A SEC, and reports C SEC will not reset.
Note : 2C SEC will not block because there is no SI present to block.	PO attempts to block 2C SEC, or reports that the block function is unavailable due to SI reset actions already performed.
	PO reports 2C SEC will not reset.

Expected Plant/Student Response

SBT LOG

Evaluator/Instructor Activity

SBT LOG

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response
	CRS dispatches an operator to deenergize 2C SEC.
Simulator Operator: 2 minutes after being dispatched, insert RT-3 to deenergize 2C SEC.	RO reports OHAs A-29 SEC 2A-2C TEST OR TRBL and A-41 AUX ALM SYS PRINTER as expected due to deenergizing 2C SEC.
REMOTE: DG03D Deenergize 2C SEC	
	PO reports all 230V control centers are reset.
	RO stops all but one centrifugal charging pump.
	RO reports RCS pressure is rising slowly.
	RO reports charging pump suction is aligned to the RWST.
	RO reports 2CV139 and 2CV140 are open.
	RO closes BIT isolation valves 2SJ4, 2SJ5, 2SJ12, and 2SJ13.
	RO closes Charging Flow Control Valve 2CV55.
	RO opens Charging Discharge Valves 2CV68 and 2CV69.
	RO maintains PZR level >25% by adjusting 2CV55, while maintaining RCP seal injection flow to RCPs.

Last to the	Evaluator/Instructor	Activity Expected	l Plant/Student Respo	nse SBT LOG	Commen ^t	
28			enthalter (New Art and Art and Art and Art and Art and Art and Art are and Art are	standarda attache White consume salenda ceresanne 25 s. " " salenda" de s.	Actividates a resident STP actividates and resident activities and activities and activities and resident a	and desired to the state of the

lower below the shutoff head of the pumps (~1560 psig).

RO starts the idle centrifugal charging pump and both SI pumps.

CT #3: (FSAR) Start ECCS pumps to restore/maintain RCS subcooling and PZR level.

SAT UNSAT

Terminate scenario when the idle centrifugal charging pump and both SI pumps have been started.

VI. SCENARIO REFERENCES

- A. Alarm Response Procedures (Various)
- B. Technical Specifications
- C. Emergency Plan (ECG)
- D. Salem FSAR
- E. OP-AA-101-111-1003, Use of Procedures
- F. S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging
- G. S2.OP-AB.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant System Leak
- H. 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Rx Trip or Safety Injection
- I. 2-EOP-TRIP-3, Safety Injection Termination

ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT TWO PLANT STATUS TODAY

MODE:

.

POWER:

100%

RCS BORON:

1150

MWe

1230

SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED):

NA

REACTIVITY PARAMETERS

MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION:

3.7.1.2.a action a for 21 AFW pump. 69 hours remain in LCO action time.

EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS:

S2.IC-CC-RCP-0018, 2PT-456 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel II.

ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:

2PR7 shut and power removed to comply with TSAS 3.4.5.b for PZR Pressure Channel II being out of service for channel calibration.

PZR Pressure Channel IV selected for Alarm.

CONTROL ROOM:

Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power. No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs.

PRIMARY:

21 CFCU C/T after its high speed breakers tripped 1 hour ago. TSAS 3.6.2.3 action a.

3.4.5.b for PZR Pressure Channel II calibration. 70 hours left in action time.

3.3.1.1 action 6 and 3.3.2.1 action 19 for PZR Pressure Channel II PT-456.

SECONDARY:

21 AFW pump C/T.

RADWASTE:

No discharges in progress

CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER:

None

SIMULATOR READY FOR TRAINING CHECKLIST

 1.	Verify simulator is in "TRAIN" Load
 2.	Simulator is in RUN
 3.	Overhead Annunciator Horns ON
 4.	All required computer terminals in operation
 5.	Simulator clocks synchronized
 6.	All tagged equipment properly secured and documented
 7.	TSAS Status Board up-to-date
 8.	Shift manning sheet available
 9.	Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step
 10.	All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test) and burned out lamps replaced
 11.	Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
 12.	All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon
13.	Required procedures clean
 14.	Multiple color procedure pens available
 15.	Required keys available
 16.	Simulator cleared of unauthorized material/personnel
 17.	All charts advanced to clean traces and chart recorders are on.
 18.	Rod step counters correct (channel check) and reset as necessary
 19.	Exam security set for simulator
 20.	Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter
	with Baseline Data filled out
 21.	Shift logs available if required
 22.	Recording Media available (if applicable)
 23.	Ensure ECG classification is correct
 24.	Reference verification performed with required documents available
25.	Verify phones disconnected from plant after drill.

CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY

In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.

- I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents...
 - degradation of any barrier to fission product release
 - degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity
 - a violation of a safety limit
 - a violation of the facility license condition
 - incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)
 - a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario
- II. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to...
 - effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
 - recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
 - take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
 - prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.

SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST

Note: Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios.

SCENARIO IDENTIFIER:

09-01 NRC ESG-1

REVIEWER

Initials

Qualitative Attributes

1.

The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario.

 The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events.

3. The scenario consists mostly of related events.

Each event description consists of:

- the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated
- the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event
- the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
- the expected operator actions (by shift position)

the event termination point

No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.

6. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.

7. Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.

8. The simulator modeling is not altered.

- 9. All crew competencies can be evaluated.
- 10. The scenario has been validated.

11. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario.

2. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility.

SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST

Note: The quantitative attribute target ranges that are specified on the form are not absolute limitations; some scenarios may be an excellent evaluation tool, but may not fit within the ranges. A scenario that does not fit into these ranges shall be evaluated to ensure that the level of difficulty is appropriate. (ES-301 Section D.5.d)

Initial		Quantitative Attributes (as per ES-301-4, and ES-301 Section D.5.d)
	6	Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8
	2	Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2
	2	Abnormal Events: 2-4
	1	Major Transients: 1-2
	2	EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions: 1-2
	0	EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions: 0-2
	3	Crew Critical Tasks: 2-3
		COMMENTS:

ATTACHMENT 5 ESG CRITICAL TASKS

09-01 NRC ESG-1

CT #1: (E-O--F) Establish the minimum required AFW flow rate (22E4 lbm/hr) to the SGs before transition out of EOP-TRIP-1.

BASIS: Failure to establish the minimum required AFW flow rate, under the postulated plant conditions, results in "adverse consequence(s) or a significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant."

CT #2: (E-O--I) Establish flow from at least one High Head ECCS pump before transition out of EOP-TRIP-1

BASIS: Failure to manually start at least one high head ECCS pump under the postulated conditions constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded ECCS capacity.

CT #3: (FSAR) Start ECCS pumps to restore/maintain RCS subcooling and PZR level.

BASIS: Salem FSAR assumes a minimum of one train of ECCS pumps available for a SBLOCA. When ECCS pumps are secured in EOP-TRIP-3 and a subsequent SBLOCA causes a loss of PZR level (and eventually subcooling), operator action to start ECCS pumps is required to restore the minimum complement of ECCS pumps assumed in the Accident Analysis.

ESG-PSA RELATIONSHIP EVALUATION

EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE

Y/N	Event	<u>Y/N</u>	<u>Event</u>
Ν	TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable	_ N	Loss of Service Water
N	Steam Generator Tube Rupture	N	Loss of CCW
Ν	Loss of Offsite Power	N	Loss of Control Air
N	Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation	N	Station Black Out
Υ	LOCA		

COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY

	<u>Y/N</u>	COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN	Y/N	COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN
	N	Containment Sump Strainers	Ν	Gas Turbine
	N	SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area	N	Any Diesel Generator
	N	RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg	Y	Auxiliary Feed Pump
_	N	CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Valves	N	SBO Air Compressor
-				

OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE

Y/N	OPERATOR ACTION	
Ν	Restore AC power during SBO	
N	Connect to gas turbine	
N	Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system	
N	Re-align RHR system for re-circulation	
N	Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger	
N	Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST	
Ν	Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system	
Ν	Isolate the affected Steam Generator that has the tube rupture(s)	
Ν	Early depressurize the RCS	
Ν	Initiate feed and bleed	
Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.		

Appendix D	Scenario Outline	Form ES-D-

Facility: SAL	EM 1 & 2	Scenario No.:	ESG-2	Op-Test No.: <u>09-01 NRC</u>
Examiners:		Opera	ators:	

Initial Conditions: 70% power, MOL. 25 Service Water pump is C/T for strainer work.

Turnover: Raise power to 75% at 10% per hour, place $3^{\rm rd}$ Condensate pump I/S, continue power ascension to 90% power.

Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*	Event Description	
1		N ALL	Raise Power	
2	O/R AG04	C CRS/PO	In service ABV Exhaust fan trip (TS)	
3	NI0193A	l ALL	PR NI Channel fails (TS)	
4	BF0105A	С	21 SGFP oil leak	
5	EH0327 O/R B433	R ALL	21 SGFP trip, MT fails to auto runback (PO manually initiates turbine runback, RO uses manual rod control)	
6	SG0078B	M ALL	22 SG Tube leak / tube rupture	
7	RP0058 RP0059A RP0059B O/R B440 O/R B441 O/R C310 O/R C510	C ALL	ATWT/FRSM	
8	CN0086 MS0093	C CRS/PO	Loss of condenser vacuum during SGTR cooldown	
			3 CT, insert neg reactivity, isolate rupt SG, cooldown to target temp	

⁽N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE

SCENARIO TITLE:	SGFP trip, ATWT/FRSM, SGTR				
SCENARIO NUMBER:	09-01 NRC ESG-2 (Modified ESG-	-905)			
EFFECTIVE DATE:	See Approval Date				
EXPECTED DURATION:	75 minutes				
REVISION NUMBER:	01				
PROGRAM:	L.O. REQUAL				
	X INITIAL LICENSE				
	STA				
	OTHER				
Revision Summary Modified ESG-0905 as follows: Initial power level is now 69.5% vs. 90%. Changed initial conditions so that only 22 Condensate pump is O/S. Added additional Tech Spec component failure. Added Main turbine runback failure. Added 25 SW C/T.					
PREPARED BY:	G Gauding	07-04-11			
Lead Rec	gulatory Exam Author	Date			
APPROVED BY: 11 1 2 1 8					
Operation	ns Training Manager	Date . /			
APPROVED BY:		8/1/11			
Facili	tyRepresentative	Date			

OBJECTIVES

- A. Given a situation with an OHA alarm, the crew will perform action(s) to investigate and correct the cause of the alarm, IAW approved station procedures.
- B. Given the unit with multiple OHAs in alarm, the crew will prioritize, validate and then determine a course of action when provided with additional information, IAW approved station procedures.
- C. Given the unit at power with the generator synchronized to the grid, the crew will perform a power increase to 100% at 10%/hr, IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004(Q).
- D. Given a failure of a power range detector, take corrective action for a power range instrument failure IAW AB.NIS-0001.
- E. Given the unit at power and a trip of an operating main feedwater pump, take corrective action IAW AB.CN-0001.
- F. Given the order or indications of a feedwater or condensate system malfunction, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- G. Given indication of a feedwater or condensate system malfunction, DIRECT the response to the malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- H. Given a steam generator tube leak, take corrective action, IAW S2.OP-AB.SG-0001.
- Given the order or indications of a steam generator tube leak (SGTL), perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the tube leak in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- J. Given the order or indications of a steam generator tube leak (SGTL), DIRECT the response to the tube leak, in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- K. Given the order or indications of an anticipated transient without trip (ATWT), complete actions as the nuclear control operator to PERFORM the immediate response to the ATWT in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- L. Given indication of an anticipated transient without trip (ATWT), DIRECT the immediate response to the ATWT in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- M. Given the order or indications of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the tube rupture in accordance with the approved station procedures. Given indication of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), DIRECT the response to the SGTR in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- N. Given the order or indications of a reactor trip, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- O. Given indication of a reactor trip, DIRECT the response to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- P. During performance of emergency operating procedures, monitor the critical safety function status trees in accordance the EOP in effect.

II. MAJOR EVENTS

- A. Raise power
- B. PRNI fails high
- C. 21 SGFP oil leak/ trip
- D. MT fails to auto runback
- E. 22 SG Tube leak / rupture
- F. ATWT/FRSM
- G. Loss of Condenser vacuum during cooldown

III. SCENARIO SUMMARY

- A. The crew takes the watch with the unit at 70% power, MOL. 25 SW pump is C/T for strainer work. A Tech Spec 3.0.3 required power reduction was in progress due to declaring both ECCS trains inoperable based on discovery of non 1E rated bearings installed on both Safety Injection pumps during the last refueling outage. The correct documentation paperwork showing that the bearings were actually qualified was found, and the load reduction stopped at 70%.
- B. Shortly after the crew assumes the watch, 22 Auxiliary Building Exhaust fan will trip. The crew will start the standby exhaust fan, and the CRS will identify the appropriate Tech Spec.
- C. Power Range Nuclear Instrument 2N42 fails high. The crew will determine a load rejection has not occurred and place rod control in manual. The crew will perform actions to remove the failed channel from service. The CRS will identify the appropriate Tech Specs.
- D. After the PRNI failure has been addressed, 21 SGFP will develop an oil leak which will lead to its tripping. The Main Turbine will fail to automatically runback, and the crew will manually lower Main Turbine load.
- E. A large SGTR will ramp in over 10 minutes following a six minute delay from 21 SGFP trip. The crew will diagnose the tube rupture, and the CRS will order a Rx trip and Safety Injection.
- F. The Rx will not trip from the control room, and the crew will enter and perform 2-EOPFRSM-1, response to Nuclear Power Generation. The crew will establish rapid boration and the Rx will be tripped locally.
- G. The crew will transition to 2-EOP-TRIP-1, and initiate a Safety Injection if an automatic SI has not yet occurred. The crew will transition to 2-EOP-SGTR-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
- H. The crew will identify and isolate the 22 SG. The crew will perform a cooldown to target temperature. During the cooldown, Main Condenser vacuum will be lost, and steam dumping will be shifted from the Main Steam Dumps to the intact SG MS10's.
- I. The scenario will be terminated when the crew has demonstrated the ability to maintain RCS temperature below the target temperature.

IV. INITIAL CONDITIONS
IC-242 69.5% power, MOL
PREP FOR TRAINING (i.e. computer setpoints, procedures, bezel covers ,tagged equipment)
Initial Description
1 RH1 and RH2 C/T
2 RH18s C/T
3 VC1and VC4 C/T
4 RCPs (SELF CHECK)
5 RTBs (SELF CHECK)
6 MS167s (SELF CHECK)
7 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK)
8 SGFP Trip (SELF CHECK)
9 23 CV PP (SELF CHECK)
10 25 SW pump C/T
11 SGBD directed to Condenser placard on 2CC3.
12 Complete Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist."

Note: Tables with blue headings may be populated by external program, do not change column name without consulting Simulator Support group

	200 3 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	CONTRACTOR (CC)		
FVEN	No. of Contract of		~~	
SP3/FD	C C 133323			

Initial	ET#	Description		
		EVENT ACTION:	monp187 < 540 // HOTTEST INCORE T/C TEMP.0	
	4	COMMAND:	<update as="" needed=""></update>	
		PURPOSE:	- Supuate as fieeded-	
	EVENT		kb433wad // ROD BANK SELECTOR SW-MAN	
	5	ACTION:		
		COMMAND:	<update as="" needed=""></update>	
		PURPOSE:		
		EVENT	monp187 < 518 // HOTTEST INCORE T/C TEMP.0	
	6	ACTION:		
	0	0	COMMAND:	<update as="" needed=""></update>
		PURPOSE:		
		EVENT	monp299 < 2500 // 21 SGFP SPEED	
	7	ACTION:		
	/	COMMAND:	<update as="" needed=""></update>	
		PURPOSE:		

MALFUNCTIONS:

SELF- CHECK	Description	Delay Time	Initial Value	Ramp Time	Trigger	Severity
01	RP318G4 22 Aux Bldg Exhaust Fan Fails to Start on SEC	. N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
02	BF0105A 21 STM GEN FEED PUMP TRIP	N/A	N/A	N/A	RT-5	CONTROL OIL PRESSURE LOW
03	EH0327 TURBINE FAILS TO RUNBACK ON SGFP TRIP	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
04	SG0078B 22 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE	00:06:00	0 -	00:10:00	ET-7	900
05	AN3735 AAS 735 FAILS - :21 TGA SUMP LEVEL HIGH	N/A	N/A	N/A	RT-10	AAS POINT FAILS/OVRD TO ON
06	AN3736 AAS 736 FAILS - :22 TGA SUMP LEVEL HIGH	00:00:10	N/A	N/A	RT-10	AAS POINT FAILS/OVRD TO ON
07	AN3737 AAS 737 FAILS - :23 TGA SUMP LEVEL HIGH	00:00:17	N/A	N/A	RT-10	AAS POINT FAILS/OVRD TO ON

TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 7 of 36

08	AN3738 AAS 738 FAILS - :24 TGA SUMP LEVEL HIGH	00:00:27	N/A	N/A	RT-10	AAS POINT FAILS/OVRD TO ON
09	AN3739 AAS 739 FAILS - :25 TGA SUMP LEVEL HIGH	00:00:35	N/A	N/A	RT-10	AAS POINT FAILS/OVRD TO ON
10	MS0093 LOSS OF STM DMP VAC PERMISSIVE	N/A_	N/A	N/A	ET-6	
11	CN0086 LOSS OF MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM	N/A	N/A	N/A	ET-4	100
12	RP0058 FAILURE OF AUTOMATIC RX TRIP	N/A_	N/A	N/A	N/A	
13	RP0059A FAILURE OF MANUAL RX TRIP	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
14	RP0059B FAILURE OF MANUAL SI/RX TRIP	N/A	N/A_	N/A	N/A	
15	NI0193B PR CH N42 FAILS HI/LO	N/A	N/A	N/A	RT-3	200

REMOTES:

SELF- CHECK	Description	Delay Time	Initial Value	Ramp Time	Trigger	Condition
01	RP07D 21 MG SET MOTOR BKR	N/A	N/A	N/A	RT-13	STOP
02	RP08D 22 MG SET MOTOR BKR	N/A	N/A	N/A	RT-13	STOP
03	SW39D 25 SW PUMP BKR CONTROL POWER	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	OFF
04	SW40D 25 SW PUMP RACK OUT	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	TAGGED

35%	\neg	88936		000 M	100		Ç.
84.40	26 6	97.0	- 65		 E E .	2000	

SELF- CHECK	Description	Delay Time	Initial Value	Ramp Time	Trigger	Condition/ Severity
01	AG04 F DI 22 AUX BLDG EXHAUST FAN STOP	N/A	N/A	N/A	RT-1	ON
02	B440 F DI REACTOR TRIP BREAKER 'A'-TRIP	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	OFF
03	B441 F DI REACTOR TRIP BREAKER 'B'-TRIP	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	OFF
04	C310 F DI 2E6D PRESSURE HEATER BUS 480V- OPEN	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	OFF
05	C510 F DI 2G6D PRESSURE HEATER BUS 480V- OPEN	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	OFF
06	B433 5 DI ROD BANK SELECTOR SW-AUTO	N/A	N/A	N/A	ET-5	OFF

ОТ	HER CONDITIONS:
	Description

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

- A. State shift job assignments and review scenario objectives.
- B. Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide crew members a copy of the shift turnover sheet).
- C. Inform the crew "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift".
- D. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel.

1. Raise Power

Note: RCS Tavg-Tref when simulator is taken out of freeze is ~+0.2 degrees. The rate at which Tavg is lowering is .07°F/min.

Note: ~ 60 pcm will be added per 700 gallons of dilution. Xenon is building in at 60 pcm/hr. An additional 1,185 gallons is required for 10% per hour load ascension, assuming ½ from dilution and ½ from control rods.

CRS briefs crew on power ascension.

RO initiates a 900 gallon dilution.

RO reports console alarm VCT Pressure Hi-Lo when it alarms.

RO operates 2CV243 DEGAS as necessary to lower VCT pressure < 50 psig and maintain < 50 psig.

PO sets up Digital EHC for 10% per hour load change.

PO initiates turbine load ascension and verifies turbine load rises.

RO monitors Tavg and announces expected control rod movement when it occurs.

SBT LOG Comment

2. 22 ABV Exhaust Fan stops

Simulator Operator: Insert <u>RT-1</u> on direction from Lead Evaluator during power change.

OVERRIDE: AG04 F DI 22 AUX BLDG EXHAUST FAN STOP

RO reports AIR FLOW LO for 22 ABV Exhaust fan.

RO reports 22 ABV Exhaust fan was running, but is now stopped.

CRS dispatches an operator to check the status of 22 ABV Exhaust Fan breaker 2BX1AX12X.

Role Play: 2 minutes after being dispatched, report as the NEO that breaker 2BX1AX12X is open, and there is nothing abnormal with the breaker, and there is no indication that the breaker tripped.

Note: CRS may direct PO to attempt to restart 22 ABV Exhaust Fan since no apparent reason for it to stop running is present, but it will not start.

twill

Note: P&L 3.6 identifies that TSAS 3.7.7 is applicable.

CRS directs PO to start 23 ABV Exhaust Fan IAW S2.OP-SO.ABV-0001, Auxiliary Building Ventilation System Operation.

RO starts 23 ABV Exhaust fan and ensures

Comment

AIR FLOW LO alarm clears.

CRS enters TSAS 3.7.7 action a for not having all three ABV exhaust fans operable.

Proceed to next event on direction from Lead Evaluator.

3. PRNI channel fails

Simulator Operator: Insert <u>RT-3</u> on direction from Lead Evaluator.

MALF: NI0193B PR CH II FAILS

HI/LO

Final Value: 200

RO announces control rods inserting at 72 steps per minute with no load rejection in progress, requests permission and places Rod Control in manual, and reports rod motion stopped.

Simulator Operator: Ensure <u>ET-5</u> is true when rod control is placed in manual. This inserts the AUTO rod control failure.

CRS directs PO to place the load ascension on hold.

PO depresses Hold PB on digital EHC and ensures the load ascension stops.

SBT LOG

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response
	RO announces OHA E-28 PZR HTRS ON PRESS LO (if it alarms depending on how much rod insertion) as expected due to rod insertion and acknowledges bezel indication of 22 B/U htr group energizing in auto.
Direct entry into S2.OP-AB.NIS- 0001 may be performed. Steps are below.	CRS enters S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003, Continuous Rod Motion or S2.OP-AB.NIS-0001, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction.
	CRS verifies with RO that placing rod control in manual stopped rod movement.
	RO reports PRNI channel I has failed high.
Note: There is no direction in S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003 to lower	RO reports outward rod motion is blocked by the Overpower Rod Stop.
turbine load to restore Tavg.	RO reports rod motion was in the inward direction.
	RO reports PRNI channel I has failed high.
S2.OP-AB.NIS-0001 steps	CRS enters S2.OP-AB.NIS-0001, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction.
	CRS ensures rod control is in manual.
	If not performed earlier, CRS directs PO to place the turbine load change on hold.
	RO reports indications of 2N42 PRNI failed high.

SBT LOG

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response
	CRS directs PO to remove failed channel from service IAW S2.OP-SO.RPS-0001, Nuclear Instrumentation Channel Trip/Restoration.
S2.OP-SO.RPS-0001 Steps	PO verifies tripping of associated bistables will not result in an ESF or RPS actuation.
	PO ensures 2N42 is not selected on 2N45 recorder.
	CRS enters 3.3.1.1, Action 2 and 6 if not entered previously.
	PO informs crew prior to taking any action that will cause alarm status change.
	PO places Detector Current Comparator, Upper Section, switch in PRN42 and ensures the Channel Defeat light illuminates and OHA E-38 is clear.
	PO places Detector Current Comparator, Lower Section, switch in PRN42 position and verifies Channel Defeat light illuminates and OHA E-46 is clear.
	PO places Power Mismatch Bypass switch in Bypass PRN42.
	PO places Rod Stop Bypass switch in Bypass PRN42 and ensures the overpower rod stop for channel I on 2RP4 is illuminated and OHA E-31 is clear.
	PO places Comparator Channel Defeat switch in N42 and ensures the Comparator Defeat

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response lamp illuminates and OHA E-39 is clear.	SBT LOG	Comment
	PO reports to CRS that S2.OP-SO.RPS-001 is complete with the exception of actions required to be taken by I&C technician to trip the associated bistables.		
Note: CRS may elect to leave rods in manual due to step 3.6 of S2.OP-AB.NIS-0001 not being complete until I&C trips bistables. Continue to next event if this is the case.	CRS directs RO to withdraw control rods to restore Tavg to within +/- 1.5 degrees of Tref.		
case.	RO withdraws control bank D rods in a slow and deliberate manner, and places rod control in Auto when Tavg is within +/- 1.5 degrees of Tref.		
Proceed to next event after rods are restored to auto or at direction of Lead Evaluator.	Crew updates AFD penalty minutes acquired if AFD went out of target band.		

Comment

4. 21 SGFP Trip on Low Control Oil Pressure

Simulator Operator: Insert <u>RT-5</u> on cue from the Lead Evaluator.

MALF: BF0105A 21 SGFP trip Final Val = 4

(It will take ~ 90 seconds for reservoir lo level alarm to come in)

PO announces unexpected 21 SGFP Turb Oil Res Lvl HI-LO alarm and refers to ARP.

No report from the field will be made prior to 21 SGFP trip.

CRS dispatches an NEO to investigate the SGFP low oil pressure.

CRS briefs crew on required actions for a SGFP trip with Rods in manual.

Note: This alarm will occur approx 5 min after RT-5 insertion.

PO reports OHA G-23, 21/22 SGFP Deviation and 21 SGFP speed decreasing

CRS directs trip of 21 SGFP to initiate auto runback.

Simulator Operator: Ensure ET-7 is true when 21 SGFP speed lowers to <2500 rpm. This inserts the SGTR on a 10 minute ramp after a 6 minute delay.

PO trips 21 SGFP.

Note: If Crew trips Reactor

proceed to Event 7.

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT	Comment
	CRS enters S2.OP-AB.CN-0001, Main Feedwater/Condensate System Abnormality.	LOG	
	PO reports the automatic Main Turbine runback has not occurred.		
	PO performs immediate actions by initiating Main Turbine runback by: - Adjusting ramp rate to ≤15%/MIN - Adjusting SETTER-SETTER: ≤66% - Selecting SETTER GO		
Note: Auto rod control is failed.	RO performs immediate actions by manually inserting rods to maintain Tavg on program IAW Attachment 2, Section 3.0.		
	CRS initiates Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary for S2.OP-AB.CN-0001.		
	PO reports 21 SGFP tripped.		
	RO reports power is > P-10.		
	RO initiates boration as required to maintain control rods above the RIL and restore AFD.		
	PO verifies 22 SGFP speed has risen and is maintaining SG levels.		
	PO reports the Polisher Bypass valves, 21-23CN108s, are open.		
	PO opens the CN47, Heater String Bypass Valve, opens, and shuts 21-24GB4 SG Blowdown Isolation Valves, and 21-24GB185 Blowdown Throttle Valves.		

PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

SBT LOG Comment

PO presses 21 SGFP trip PB if not performed previously and ensures AFP AUTO ARMED bezel lit for 21 SGFP.

RO energizes PZR heaters.

Note: Proceed to next event on RMS alarm for 22 Steam Generator Tube Leak.

6. 22 Steam Generator Tube Leak

RO reports 2R53B for 22 SG in warning, followed shortly by 2R15 alarm.

Note: CRS will order Rx trip and SI when it is apparent that the tube leak is larger than the capacity of the RCS makeup system.

CRS enters S2.OP-AB.SG-0001, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

CRS initiates Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary.

RO reports 2R19B when it alarms.

Simulator Operator: 3 minutes after being dispatched, insert RT-10 to deenergize TGA sumps.

CRS directs NEO to deenergize the Turbine-Generator Area and Condensate Polishing Sumps.

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response SBT Comment LOG
	CRS directs swapping to a centrifugal charging pump, but orders Manual Rx Trip and SI when PZR level cannot be maintained IAW CAS.
Note: Proceed to next event when CRS orders a reactor trip.	CRS direct RO to trip the Rx, confirm the Rx trip, then initiate SI IAW CAS of S2.OP-AB.SG-0001.

7. ATWT / FRSM

RO attempts to trip the Rx and reports the Rx did not trip.

Crew identifies ATWT.

RO attempts to trip the Rx with the other trip handle and reports the Rx did not trip.

RO attempts to trip the Rx by opening both Rx trip breaker PBs and reports the Rx did not trip.

RO attempts to trip the Rx by opening PZR heater bus infeed breakers and reports the Rx did not trip.

Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response SBT Comment LOG RO reports trip not confirmed. RO trips the Main Turbine. Note: If the RO attempts to attain a RO initiates rod insertion in manual. faster rod speed by placing rods in auto, rod motion will stop and rods must be returned to manual and inserted. CRS/RO verify immediate actions of EOP-TRIP-1 are complete. CT #1 (FR-S.1-C) Insert negative CRS enters EOP-FRSM-1, Response to reactivity into to the core by at Nuclear Power Generation. least one of the following methods prior to completing step 4 of FRSM-1: Insert control rods Initiate Emergency **Boration** UNSAT SAT

PO starts/ensures 21 and 22 AFW Pumps running.

Note: The earliest AFW should be isolated to 22 SG is at Step 10 of FRSM-1, and then only if at least 1 SG NR level is >9%.

PO reports AFW flow <44E04 lb/hr.

Selfor Compactives	Exila under calabeletistis costi		Acoustic co. Comment of the	
1 1 m 32 y 2 m	3	A	\$6.00 KS, 365	5~74 (MHSS), Brit. 1904
FC	LIGHAR	PHOPPIT	ctor A	~ # 11 / 1 # 1 #
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SBT LOG Comment

PO starts 23 AFW pump. RO starts 21 and 22 charging pumps.

RO reports no SI has occurred.

RO initiates Rapid Boration by:

- Starting both Boric Acid Pumps in Fast Speed;
- Opening 2CV175 Rapid borate Stop Valve;
- Closing 21/22CV160 BAT Recirc Valves;
- Verifies Rapid Boration flow indicated on Rapid Borate flowmeter;
- Maintaining charging flow >87 gpm.

RO reports PORVs operating as expected for current RCS pressure, and that both PORV block valves are open.

RO reports containment isolation valves 2VC5 and 2VC6 are shut.

PO performs APPX-3 SI verification when SI occurs.

Comment

Simulator Operator: Open the reactor trip breakers 3 minutes after the order is given but no sooner than completion of the Rapid Boration decision step in FRSM-1.

Delete MALFs: RP0058, RP0059A, and RP0059B. Modify I/O Overrides B440 and B441 to ON (opens RTBs)

De-energize Rod Drive MG Sets using RT-13:

RP07D = Stop RP08D = Stop CRS sends NEO to open RTBs, Rod Drive MG Motor and Generator breakers.

PO reports all Turbine Stop Valves closed.

RO reports when the Reactor is tripped.

PO maintains AFW flow >44E4 lbm/hr until at least one SG NR level is > 9%, then throttle AFW flow to maintain SG NR levels 9-33%.

CRS sends NEO to isolate dilution paths and PO checks no primary water flow on FI111A.

PO reports no faulted SG or uncontrolled cooldown.

RO reports no CETs are >1200°F.

Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response SBT Comment LOG RO confirms reactor trip by 3 PRNIs <5% and IRNIs SUR negative. CRS directs Chemistry to sample RCS for boron. CRS directs performance of Shutdown Margin. CRS transitions back to TRIP-1 after completing FRSM-1. Note: Proceed to next event after transition back to TRIP-1 5. Steam Generator Tube Rupture **Evaluators**: Log reentry time RO verifies reactor and turbine trip. into TRIP-1 to start clock for critical tasks: TIME: ___:__: RO reports all 4kV Vital Buses energized. RO reports either: - SI has actuated OR - SI has not actuated, and SI is required by plant conditions. RO initiates SI if auto SI has not occurred. RO announces Unit 2 Reactor Trip, Safety PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

Comment

Injection (twice) on PA.

CT #2 (E-3-A): Isolate AFW to the ruptured SG within 10 minutes of reentry into TRIP-1 and subsequently close 22MS167, 22MS18, 22MS7 AND 22GB4 to isolate the ruptured SG prior to transition to SGTR-3.

PO closes 22AF11 and 22AF21 to isolate AFW flow into 22 SG.

TIME: : :

SAT

UNSAT

PO identifies all SG NR levels >9% and throttles AFW to SGs.

PO verifies SEC loading complete for all available equipment on energized 4kV Vital Buses.

PO reports proper safeguards valve alignments.

PO reports MSLI not required.

PO reports all 4KV vital buses are energized.

RO reports Control Room Ventilation in Accident Pressurized Mode.

RO runs 2 Switchgear Room Supply fans and one exhaust fan.

SBT

Comment

RO reports 2 CCW pumps running.

RO reports cold leg recirc has not been established.

RO reports greater than 100 gpm charging flow SI systems charging flowmeter.

RO reports RCS pressure is >1540 psig.

RO/PO verifies AFW flow >22E04 lb/hr or SG level > 9%.

RO reports all RCPs are running.

RO reports RCS Tavg is stable at or trending to 547°F.

RO reports both reactor trip breakers are open.

RO reports both PZR PORVs are shut and PORV block valves status.

RO reports all RCPs running and spray valves shut.

IF RCS pressure is < 1350 psig and ECCS flow is established, then RO stops all RCPs.

RO maintains seal injection flow to all RCPs.

RO reports no faulted SGs.

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT	Comment
	PO reports 22 SG NR level is rising in an uncontrolled manner.	LOG	
	CRS transitions to EOP-SGTR-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.		
	PO reports 22 SG NR level is rising in an uncontrolled manner.		
	PO sets 22MS10 to 1045 psig, and reports 22MS10 is shut.		
SEE CT#2 PREVIOUS PAGE	PO shuts 22MS167, and reports 22MS18, 22MS7, and 22GB4 are shut		
	PO reports 21 or 23 is not the ruptured SG.		
Role Play: 5 minutes after requested, report 2SS327 closed.	CRS dispatches an operator to close 2SS327.		
requested, report 200027 01036d.	PO reports 22 SG is isolated from intact SGs.		
	PO reports 22 SG NR level >9% and that all feedwater flow is isolated to 22 SG.		
	RO reports power is available to 2PR6, and power is deenergized to 2PR7.		
	CRS leaves power deenergized to 2PR7.		
	RO verifies PORV status is correct for current RCS pressure.		
	RO reports 2PR6 is open and 2PR7 is shut.		
	PO reports no SGs are faulted.		

SBT LOG Comment

PO adjusts AFW flow to maintain at least 1 SG NR level > 9%, and all SG NR levels 9-33%.

RO/PO reset Safeguards Actuations:

- Resets SI
- Resets Phase A
- Opens 21 & 22CA330
- Resets each SEC
- Resets each 230V Control Center.

RO stops 21 & 22 RHR pumps.

PO reports 22 SG is isolated and >375 psig.

CRS dispatches NEO to shift Gland Sealing Steam to Unit 1.

PO notifies CRS when 22MS10 starts to open.

Simulator Operator: Ensure ET-4 inserts when highest incore thermocouple is less than 540°.

MALF: CN0086 Loss Of Cond. Vacuum CREW commences RCS cooldown with the Steam Dumps using intact SGs to value determined from Table D (503 deg)

PO places Steam Dumps in manual.

PO adjusts steam pressure valve demand to zero.

PO places steam dumps to MS Pressure Control.

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT LOG	Comment	
ander, en l'imperieur, van de la van de van de Pereir de La Van de de van de van de van de van de van de van d	PO adjusts steam pressure valve demand to 25%.			
Proceed to next event when highest incore thermocouple is less than 540°.	When Tavg low-low is reached, PO bypasses Tavg and verifies steam dumps reopen.			
8. Loss of Condenser Vacuum/ Steam Dumps	RO reports "DO HI" in alarm as not expected.			
Note: Crew should monitor steam dumps but not swap to MS10s early as this is an increased release to the public.	PO reports OHA G-5 Condenser Vac Lo.			
Note: CRS may implement S2.OP-AB-COND-1 for loss of vacuum.	CRS briefs crew on potential loss of steam dumps with degrading vacuum.			
	CRS dispatches an NEO to look for vacuum leaks.			
Simulator Operator: Insure <u>ET-6</u> inserts when CET is <518. MALF: MS0093 Loss of Stm Dump Vac Permissive	PO reports Steam Dump valves have closed.			

SBT LOG Comment

CRS returns to step 15.2 and answers "Steam Dumps not available"

PO re-commences cooldown by fully opening 21,23, and 24MS10.

CT #3 (E-3-B): Establish/ maintain RCS temperature to maintain minimum requiredsubcooling.

SAT UNSAT

Terminate scenario when crew has demonstrated the ability to maintain temperature at target temperature.

RO reports hottest CET is < 503°F.

PO stops the cooldown and dumps steam as required to maintain temperature < target temperature.

VI. SCENARIO REFERENCES

- A. Alarm Response Procedures (Various)
- B. Technical Specifications
- C. Emergency Plan (ECG)
- D. OP-AA-101-111-1003, Use of Procedures
- E. S2.OP-AB.ROD-0001, Continuous Rod Motion
- F. S2.OP-AB.NIS-0001, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction
- G. S2.OP-AB.CN-0001, Main Feedwater/Condensate System Abnormality
- H. 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Rx Trip or Safety Injection
- I. 2-EOP-FRSM-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation
- J. 2-EOP-SGTR-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture

ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT TWO PLANT STATUS TODAY

MODE:

1

POWER:

69.5% F

RCS BORON:

937

MWe

840

SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED):

NA

REACTIVITY PARAMETERS

Power reduction from 100% to 70% at 1% per minute was completed 30 minutes ago.

Power ascension to 100% power will be performed at 10% per hour.

Xenon is building in at 60 pcm per hour.

Reactivity plan for the power ascension is to perform 900 gallon batch dilutions every 30 minutes, while using rod control to maintain AFD and Tavg on program.

Rx fuel is conditioned to 100% power.

MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION:

EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS:

IOP-4, Power Operation Step 5.1.19 is complete.

ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:

CONTROL ROOM:

Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power.

No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs.

PRIMARY:

SECONDARY:

Main Turbine power is 71% (PT-505/506 ~537 psig)

RADWASTE:

No discharges in progress

CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER:

25 SW pump C/T for strainer work.

SIMULATOR READY FOR TRAINING CHECKLIST

 1.	Verify simulator is in "TRAIN" Load
 2.	Simulator is in RUN
 3.	Overhead Annunciator Horns ON
 4.	All required computer terminals in operation
 5.	Simulator clocks synchronized
 6.	All tagged equipment properly secured and documented
 7.	TSAS Status Board up-to-date
 8.	Shift manning sheet available
 9.	Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step
 10.	All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test) and burned out lamps replaced
 11.	Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
 12.	All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon
13.	Required procedures clean
 14.	Multiple color procedure pens available
 15.	Required keys available
 16.	Simulator cleared of unauthorized material/personnel
 17.	All charts advanced to clean traces and chart recorders are on.
 18.	Rod step counters correct (channel check) and reset as necessary
 19.	Exam security set for simulator
20.	Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter
	with Baseline Data filled out
21.	Shift logs available if required
 22.	Recording Media available (if applicable)
 23.	Ensure ECG classification is correct
24.	Reference verification performed with required documents available
25.	Verify phones disconnected from plant after drill.

CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY

In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.

- I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents...
 - · degradation of any barrier to fission product release
 - degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity
 - a violation of a safety limit
 - a violation of the facility license condition
 - incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)
 - a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario
- II. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to...
 - effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
 - recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
 - take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
 - prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.

SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST

Note: Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios.

SCENARIO IDENTIFIER:

09-01 NRC ESG-2

Initials

Qualitative Attributes

The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario.

The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events.

The scenario consists mostly of related events.

Each event description consists of:

the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated

• the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event

the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew

the expected operator actions (by shift position)

the event termination point

No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.

The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.

Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.

The simulator modeling is not altered.

All crew competencies can be evaluated.

10. The scenario has been validated.

If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario.

ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility.

SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST

Note: The quantitative attribute target ranges that are specified on the form are not absolute limitations; some scenarios may be an excellent evaluation tool, but may not fit within the ranges. A scenario that does not fit into these ranges shall be evaluated to ensure that the level of difficulty is appropriate. (ES-301 Section D.5.d)

Initial		Quantitative Attributes (as per ES-301-4, and ES-301 Section D.5.d)
	7	Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8
	1	Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2
	2	Abnormal Events: 2-4
_	1	Major Transients: 1-2
	2	EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions: 1-2
	1	EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions: 0-2
	3	Crew Critical Tasks: 2-3
		COMMENTS:
		COMMENTO.

ATTACHMENT 5 ESG CRITICAL TASKS

09-01 NRC ESG-2

CT #1: (FR-S.1-C) Insert negative reactivity into the core by at least one of the following methods prior to completing the immediate actions of FR-S.1 (FRSM)

BASIS: Failure to insert negative reactivity under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of this critical task would make the reactor subcritical and provide sufficient shutdown margin to prevent (or at least minimize the power excursion associated with) any subsequent return to criticality. Since Salem employs flow charts vice the standard Westinghouse two-column format, there are no immediate actions associated with FRSM. The immediate actions of FRSM are contained in step 2 of EOP-TRIP-1 and steps 1-4 of FRSM. Thus the time limit of this critical task is extended to step 4 of FRSM to maintain alignment.

CT #2: (E-3-A) Isolate AFW to the ruptured SG within 10 minutes of entry into TRIP-1 and subsequently close 22MS167, 22MS18, 22MS7 and 22GB4 in SGTR-1.

BASIS: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. Upon a loss of differential pressure, the crew must transition to a contingency procedure that constitutes an incorrect performance that "…necessitates the crew taking compensating actions which complicates the event mitigation strategy…"

CT #3: (E-3-B) Establish/Maintain RCS temperature so a transition from SGTR-1 does not occur because Tave is too high to maintain minimum subcooling, OR below the RCS temperature that causes an extreme challenge (Red) or severe (Purple) challenge to the subcriticality and/or the integrity CSF.

BASIS: Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure, which constitutes an incorrect performance that "...necessitates the crew taking compensating actions which complicates the event mitigation strategy..."

ESG-PSA RELATIONSHIP EVALUATION

EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE

<u>Y/N</u>	Event	Y/N	<u>Event</u>
Ν	TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable	N	Loss of Service Water
Υ	Steam Generator Tube Rupture	N	Loss of CCW
N	Loss of Offsite Power	Ν	Loss of Control Air
N	Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation	N	Station Black Out
NI	LOCA		

COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY

Y/N	COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN	Y/N	COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN
Ν	Containment Sump Strainers	N	Gas Turbine
N	SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area	N	Any Diesel Generator
N	RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg	N	Auxiliary Feed Pump
N	CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Valves	N	SBO Air Compressor

OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE

<u>Y/N</u>	OPERATOR ACTION
Ν	Restore AC power during SBO
N	Connect to gas turbine
N	Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system
N	Re-align RHR system for re-circulation
N	Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger
N	Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST
Y	Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system
Υ	Isolate the affected Steam Generator that has the tube rupture(s)
N	Early depressurize the RCS
N	Initiate feed and bleed
Comp	blete this evaluation form for each ESG.

Appendix D	Scenario Outline	Form ES-D-

Facility: SA	LEM 1 & 2	Scenario No.:	ESG-3	Op-Test No.: <u>09-01 NRC</u>
Examiners:		Opera	itors:	

Initial Conditions: 100%, EOL. 21 CFCU is C/T. Turnover: Maintain current power.

Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*	Event Description	
1	CC0172B	C CRS/RO	CCW pump trip (TS) (standby pp fails to auto start)	
2	O/R C808 O/R C805	C ALL	Loss of 2B 4KV bus (TS)	
3		R ALL	Power reduction to <100%.	
4	MS0088Cr	M	Steam Leak in containment.	
5	RP0058	C RO	ATWT, (auto demand-no trip-manual trip works)	
6	MS0090Cr VL0420- 423	M ALL	MSLI fails, Multiple SG depressurization,	
7	RP0276A,B RP0277A,B	C CRS RO	Auto CS & Phase B isolation fails.	
			Recovery of single SG in LOSC-2.	
			CTs man init trip, man inti phase B, lower AFW flow to nlt 1E4 lbm/hr	

⁽N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE

SCENARIO TITLE:	Loss of 2B 4KV/460V, Steam lea	Loss of 2B 4KV/460V, Steam leak in containment		
SCENARIO NUMBE	ER: 09-01 NRC ESG-3			
EFFECTIVE DATE:	See Approval Date			
EXPECTED DURAT	FION: 80 minutes			
REVISION NUMBER	R : 00			
PROGRAM:	L.O. REQUAL			
	X INITIAL LICENSE			
	STA			
	OTHER			
Revision Summary				
New Issue for 09-01	NRC Exam			
PREPARED BY:	G Gauding	07-10-11		
	Lead Regulatory Exam Author	Date		
APPROVED BY:	My	8-2-11		
	Operations Training Manager	Date / /		
APPROVED BY:	ENV	8/1/11		
	Facility Representative	Date		

OBJECTIVES

- A. Given a situation with an OHA alarm, the crew will perform action(s) to investigate and correct the cause of the alarm, IAW approved station procedures.
- B. Given the unit with multiple OHAs in alarm, the crew will prioritize, validate and then determine a course of action when provided with additional information, IAW approved station procedures.
- C. Given the order or indications of a loss or malfunction of a safety related plant cooling water system, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the loss or malfunction of the safety related plant cooling water system in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- D. Given indication of a loss or malfunction of a safety related plant cooling water system, DIRECT the response to the loss or malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- E. Given a loss of a 4 Kv vital bus, take corrective action, IAW S2.OP-AB.4KV-0002.
- F. Given the order or indications of a loss or malfunction of a safety related electrical distribution system, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the loss or malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- G. Given indications of a loss or malfunction of a safety related electrical distribution system, DIRECT the response to the loss or malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- H. Given the unit at 100% power with a steam leak, the crew will take corrective action for a steam leak, IAW S2.OP-AB.STM-0001
- I. Given the indication of excessive steam flow, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to excessive flow in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- J. Given the indication of excessive steam flow, DIRECT the response to excessive flow in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- K. Given the order or indications of a reactor trip, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- L. Given indication of a reactor trip, DIRECT the response to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- M. Given the order or indications of a safety injection perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- N. Given indication of a safety injection DIRECT the response to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- O. Given the order or indications of a loss of secondary coolant, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the coolant loss in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- P. Given indication of a loss of secondary coolant, DIRECT the response to the loss of secondary coolant, in accordance with the approved station procedures.

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- Q. Given the order or indications of a multiple steam generator depressurization, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the generator depressurization in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- R. Given indication of a multiple steam generator depressurization, DIRECT the response to the generator depressurization in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- S. Given the order or indications of excessive containment pressure, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the excessive pressure in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- T. Given indication of excessive containment pressure, DIRECT the response to the excessive pressure in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- U. During performance of emergency operating procedures, monitor the critical safety function status trees in accordance the EOP in effect.

II. MAJOR EVENTS

- A. 22 CCW pump trip
- B. Loss of 2B 4KV/460V bus (EDG energizes)
- C. Steam leak in containment
- D. Steam rupture in containment with failure of MSLI.
- E. Recovery of single SG in LOSC-2

III. SCENARIO SUMMARY

- A. The crew takes the watch with the unit at 100% power, EOL. 21 CFCU is C/T after it tripped 1 hour ago. Orders for the shift are to maintain 100% power.
- B. Shortly after assuming the watch, 22 CCW pump will trip, with no auto start of the standby pump. Operators will take manual control and start 23 CCW pump. The CRS will enter TSAS 3.7.3 for less than 2 operable CCW loops.
- C. Once the CCW pump Tech Spec has been identified, 2B 4KV vital bus infeed breakers will open, along with the 4KV-460V tie breaker. 2B EDG will start and load 2B Vital bus in SEC MODE II*, Single Vital Bus Undervoltage. The crew will respond to stabilze the plant IAW S2.OP-AB.4KV-0002, Loss of 2B 4KV Vital Bus. 22 AFW pump will start, and Rx power will rise above 100% power. 22 AFW pump will not be able to be stopped from the control room, nor will the 21 or 22 AF21 valves respond if AFW flow from 22 AFW pump is attempted to be lowered. The crew will perform a power reduction to less than 100% power. The CRS will identify the appropriate Tech Spec.
- D. Once power has been reduced to < 100% power, a small steam leak in containment will ramp in over 5 minutes. The crew will identify changing containment conditions, and respond IAW S2.OP-AB.STM-0001, Excessive Steam Flow. Once the need for a unit shutdown is made, the steam line will rupture in containment.
- E. The Rx will not automatically trip, and will be tripped by the crew. Auto and manual MSLI fails to shut the MSIV's. Containment Spray and Phase B isolation fail to actuate and will be manually initiated.
- F. The crew will transition to 2-EOP-LOSC-1, Steam Generator Depressurization, then 2-EOP-LOSC-2 for Multiple Steam Generator Depressurization.
- G. The crew will perform 2-EOP-FRCE-1, Response to Excessive Containment Pressure to ensure containment cooling systems are in correct lineup.
- H. While in 2-EOP-LOSC-2, a single SG MS167 will be locally shut, and the crew will take the CAS action to transition to EOP-LOSC-1.
- I. The scenario will be terminated when the crew has transitioned back to 2-EOP-LOSC-1.

IV. INITIAL CONDITIONS
IC-243 100% power, EOL
PREP FOR TRAINING (i.e. computer setpoints, procedures, bezel covers ,tagged equipment)
Initial Description
1 RH1 and RH2 C/T
2 RH18s C/T
3 VC1and VC4 C/T
4 RCPs (SELF CHECK)
5 RTBs (SELF CHECK)
6 MS167s (SELF CHECK)
7 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK)
8 SGFP Trip (SELF CHECK)
9 23 CV PP (SELF CHECK)
10 21 CFCU C/T.
11 SGBD directed to Condenser placard on 2CC3.
12 Complete Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist."

Note: Tables with blue headings may be populated by external program, do not change column name without consulting Simulator Support group

EVENT TRIGGERS:

Initial	ET#	Description	
:	3	EVENT ACTION: COMMAND: PURPOSE:	
	5	EVENT ACTION: COMMAND: PURPOSE:	
:	7	EVENT ACTION: COMMAND: PURPOSE:	
	9	EVENT ACTION: COMMAND: PURPOSE:	() ()
	11	EVENT ACTION: COMMAND: PURPOSE:	() ()

			200
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SELF- CHECK	Description	Delay Time	Initial Value	Ramp Time	Trigger	Severity
01	CC0172B 22 COMPONENT COOLING PUMP TRIP	.N/A	N/A	N/A	RT-1	
02	EL0156 LOSS OF 460/230V INFD BKR 2B4D	N/A	N/A	N/A	RT-3	
03	MS0088Cr 23 Main Steam Line Leak Inside Cont BEFORE orifice	N/A	0	00:05:00	RT-5	1.5
04	MS0090Cr 23 Main Steam Line Leak Inside Cont AFTER orifice	N/A	N/A	N/A	RT-7	80
05	RP0058 FAILURE OF AUTOMATIC RX TRIP	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
06	VL0420 21MS167 Fails to Position (0-100%)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	95.211
07	VL0421 22MS167 Fails to Position (0-100%)	N/A	N/A	N/A_	N/A	95.211
08	VL0422 23MS167 Fails to Position (0-100%)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	95.211
09	VL0423 24MS167 Fails to Position (0-100%)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	95.211

TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 8 of 34

10	RP0276A AUTO PHASE B FAILS TO ACT, TRN	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
11	RP0276B AUTO PHASE B FAILS TO ACT, TRN	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
12	RP0277A AUTO CNT SPRY FAILS TO ACT,TRN	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
13	RP0277B AUTO CNT SPRY FAILS TO ACT,TRN	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
14	AF0181B 22 AUX FEEDWATER PUMP TRIP	N/A	N/A	N/A	ET-9	

REMOTES:

SELF- CHECK	Description	Delay Time	Initial Value	Ramp Time	Trigger	Condition
01	CT191-1D 21 CFCU BKR #1 High Speed 125VDC	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	OFF
02	CT191-2D 21 CFCU BKR #2 High Speed 125VDC	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	OFF
03	CT191-3D 21 CFCU BKR #3 Low Speed 125VDC	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	OFF

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~	ľΕ		2800	8 2007	6	CJ.

SELF-	Description	Delay	Initial	Ramp	Trigger	Condition/
CHECK		Time	Value	Time	990	Severity
01	C808 F DI 24BSD 2B VITAL BUS FEEDER-OPEN	N/A	N/A	N/A	RT-3	ON
02	C805 F DI 23BSD 2B VITAL BUS FEEDER-OPEN	N/A	N/A	N/A	RT-3	ON
03	B512 F DI 22 AUX FEED PUMP-STOP	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	OFF
04	A604 A LO 23 CC PUMP - AUTO	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	ON
05	A604 B LO 23 CC PUMP - MANUAL	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	OFF
06	A604 E DI 23 CC PUMP - START	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	OFF
07	B515 D DI 21AF21 CLOSE	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	OFF
08	B515 F DI 22AF21 CLOSE	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	OFF

OTHER CONDITIONS:

— • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Description
Description

1. None

. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

- A. State shift job assignments and review scenario objectives.
- B. Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide crew members a copy of the shift turnover sheet).
- C. Inform the crew "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift".
- D. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel.

SBT LOG Comment

1. 22 CCW pump Trip

Simulator Operator: Insert <u>RT-1</u> on direction from Lead Evaluator.

MALF: CC0172B 22 Component Cooling Pump Trip

RO announces unexpected alarms:

- 22 CCW pump trip
- Thermal Barrier Discharge Flow Low
- 21/22CC header pressures low
- OHA's D20-23 RCP BRG CLG WTR FLO LO

PO reports standby CCW pump did not auto start.

CRS directs PO to manually start 23 CCW pump.

Simulator Operator:
Ensure ET's 3, 5, & 7 are TRUE
when 23 CCW pump manual PB is
depressed. This deletes the
overrides which made 23 CCW
pump look like it was in Auto when
it was in Manual.

PO places 23 CCW pump in manual, and starts 23 CCW pump.

PO reports all alarms associated with 22 CC pump trip have cleared.

	Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT LOG	Comment	
4		CRS dispatches personnel to investigate 22 CCW pump trip.		表示的时间,如果是一种的时间,可以是一种的特殊的。	f tost.
	Note: An entry condition for S2.OP-AB.CC-001 is CC header low pressure. Starting the standby pump will restore CCW header	CRS enters S2.OP-AB.CC-001, Component Cooling Abnormality, and directs initiation of Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary.			
	pressure, and entry into AB.CC is not required. The steps for AB.CC are listed here if the CRS enters	PO reports Surge Tank level is neither rising nor lowering.			
	the procedure. Step 3.44 is a procedural loop that directs CRS to return to step 3.2 for rediagnosis after CCW header pressure is restored or confirmed.	PO reports CCW header low pressure alarm status.			
	IF dispatched to remove control power from 22 CCW pump, call control room 2 minutes after being dispatched for a first check, then use REMOTE CC25D to OFF to deenergize 22 CCW pump control	If CCW pump not started previously, then PO will start 23 CCW pump.			
	power.	PO reports CC HDR PRESSURE LO alarms are clear			
	Role Play: 2 minutes after being dispatched to breaker, report overcurrent flags are tripped for 22 CCW pump 4KV breaker.	PO reports CCW HX temps not high or rising.			
	Role Play: 3 minutes after being dispatched to 22 CCW pump, report that there is nothing obviously wrong with 22 CCW pp.	CRS enters TSAS 3.7.3 for only one operable CCW loop.			

Comment

Continue to next event on direction from Lead Evaluator.

2. UV on 2B 4KV vital bus with loss of 2B 460/230V vital bus.

Simulator Operator: Insert <u>RT-3</u> on direction from Lead Evaluator.

MALF: EL0156 Loss of 460/230V Infeed Bkr 2B4D

O/R: C808 OVDI 24BSD 2B Vital

Bus Feeder-Open Final Value: ON

O/R: C805 OVDI 23BSD 2B Vital

Bus Feeder-Open Final Value: ON

RO/PO announce multiple OHA and Console alarms.

Note: The Full Core Display Rod Bottom lights will all illuminate and IRPI indication will go to zero.

Crew diagnoses the loss of 2B 4KV vital bus, and 2B EDG is loading in MODE II* (Single Vital Bus UV).

Note: The 2B4D 460V breaker open bezel and 22 CCW pump stop bezel will flash continuously,

SBT LOG

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response
and are unable to be silenced until control power is removed from the breakers.	
Note: The 2B4D 460V breaker should have remained shut during the SEC loading sequence, but has tripped open.	
	CRS enters S2.OP-AB.4KV-0002, Loss of 2B 4KV Vital Bus.
Note: Rx power rises above 100% with the addition of cold AFW. When the crew determines a power reduction must be performed, go to steps on page 16 of this guide.	
ctope on page to of the galact	CRS directs initiation of Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary.
	CRS dispatches an operator to monitor 2B EDG.
	RO reports 2SW26 is open based on having no power to close it, and Main Turbine and TGA parameters related to SW cooling water are stable, and dispatches an operator to locally check position.
IF dispatched to remove control power from 22 CCW pump, call control room 2 minutes after being dispatched for a first check, then use REMOTE CC25D to OFF to deenergize 22 CCW pump control	

power.

SBT LOG

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response
IF dispatched to remove control power from breaker 2B4D, call control room 2 minutes after being dispatched for a first check, then use REMOTE ED53D to OFF to deenergize breaker 2B4D control power.	
power.	RO reports 21 charging pump was not supplying seal injection and charging flow.
	RO reports 22 RHR pump was not providing core cooling.
	PO reports 2B vital bus is energized from 2B EDG.
	RO reports OHA E-20 PZR HTR ON LVL HI when it annunciates due to 21 charging pump running.
	PO resets emergency loading for 2B EDG.
	PO resets 2B 230V control center.
	PO reports 2SW26 is open based on having no power to close it, and Main Turbine and TGA parameters related to SW cooling water are stable.
	CRS directs stopping of loads being powered from 2B EDG:
	PO stops 24 SW pump based on 4 SW pumps in service.
	RO stops 21 charging pump based on 23

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Evalı	uator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT LOG
a		charging pump in service.	
	narging flow will lower to m when 21 charging pump ed.	RO adjusts charging flow as required to maintain 6-12 gpm seal injection flow to each RCP, and not exceed 40 gpm total seal injection flow.	
		RO reports letdown did not isolate.	
		PO reports stable SG levels.	
		PO depresses 22 AFW pump start PB.	
		RO opens 21-24SS94s.	
		CRS determines if SGBD is to be restored.	
		PO restores SGBD to service if required.	
		RO/PO depresses 22 AFW pump stop PB and reports 22 AFW pump remains in service.	
		If CRS directs PO to close 21AF21 and 22AF22, PO reports 21AF21 and 22AF22 remain open.	
pump br unless the been pe reduction been pe locally of given, the	ed to locally open 22 AFW eaker, do NOT open it ne power reduction has rformed. <u>IF</u> power n to < 100% power has rformed, <u>AND</u> direction to pen breaker has been en: Delete I/O B512 for 22 AFW	CRS dispatches personnel to 22 AFW pump breaker.	

pump Stop PB.

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SBT LOG

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response
Open 22 AFW pump breaker with REMOTE AF28D to TRIP.	
3. Power Reduction to less than 100% power.	CRS directs PO to initiate a power reduction.
100 % power.	RO calculates boration required for power reduction, and initiates boration.
	PO initiate turbine load reduction to power specified by CRS at directed rate, and ensures load reduction starts.
	PO ensures load reduction stops at the specified level, and sets digital EHC up for the SGFP runback (66% @15%/minute).
Note: Time considerations may preclude identification of all Tech Specs associated with the B Bus probable. Post scenario query may be necessary for all Tech Spec identifications.	CRS enters TSAS 3.6.2.3 action b for 3 CFCUs inoperable (21 C/T, 22 and 24 have no power.) CRS enters TSAS 3.6.1.1 for Containment Integrity based on 2SW26 being inoperable. CRS enters TSAS 3.8.1.1 for off-site power to 4KV vital bus. CRS enters TSAS 3.8.2.1 for loss of power to 4KV/460V vital buses. CRS enters TSAS 3.9.12 for less than full complement of FHV fans operable. CRS enters TSAS 3.4.5 for loss of power to PORV Block valve 2PR7. CRS enters 3.8.2.3 and 3.8.2.5 for 125V and 28VDC battery chargers.

Continue to next event at lead Evaluators direction.

Comment

4. Steam Leak in Containment

Simulator Operator: Insert <u>RT-5</u> on direction from Lead Evaluator.

MALF: MS0088Cr Main Steam Line Leak Inside Containment Ramp: 5 minutes

Final Value: 1.5

RO reports CFCU leak detection HI, as unexpected.

RO reports rising level on 23 and 25 CFCU leak detection.

RO reports rising containment pressure, and Containment Pressure High console alarm.

PO determines no rise in CNTMT radiation and that a steam leak is inside containment based on rising containment pressure.

CRS enters S2.OP.AB.STM-0001, Excessive Steam Flow.

Simulator Operator: Based on rate of containment pressure rise CRS may decide to trip reactor.

IF CRS announces his intention of tripping the Rx, insert RT-7 prior to trip direction with

concurrence of Lead Evaluator.

CRS directs initiation of Attachment 1 Continuous Action summary.

Evaluator/Instructor Activity

Expected Plant/Student Response

SBT LOG Comment

Malf: MS0090Cr 23 Main Stm

Line Leak Final Value: 80

PO verifies EHC system operating correctly, and MS10s and Steam Dumps are closed.

Simulator Operator: Once a rate and plan is determined by the CRS, or at Lead Evaluators direction, then enter RT-7.

CRS determines a shutdown is required and plans rate and reactivity management.

RO calculates boration required.

Malf: MS0090Cr 23 Main Stm

Line Leak Final Value: 80

Note: It takes ~ 8 seconds from the insertion of RT-7 for the automatic Rx trip signal to be generated.

RO reports demand for RX trip F Window annunciates, and initiates a manual reactor trip and informs CRS of ATWT.

CT#1 (E-0-A) Manually trip the reactor from the control room prior to SG dryout

SAT UNSAT

CRS directs MSLI and verification of Safety Injection when RX trip is confirmed.

RO reports MSLI failed and reports SI has auto initiated, and backs up SI initiation.

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT LOG
	RO continues with Immediate Actions of EOP-TRIP-1, Rx Trip or Safety Injection:	LOG
	Trips TurbineReports all Vital AC buses energizedReports SI actuated	
	After Immediate Actions of EOP-TRIP-1 are completed, CRS may order PO to attempt MSLI isolation at 2CC3 and 2CC2 controls (fast and slow close).	
	CRS/RO verify immediate actions of EOP- TRIP-1 are complete by performing verification of immediate action steps.	
Note: STA will arrive in the control room 10 minutes after being called to initiate monitoring of CFSTs.	RO announces Rx trip and Safety injection.	
Note: With <u>all</u> SGs faulted, AFW flow should not be isolated to <u>any</u> SG.	PO throttles AFW flow to no less than 22E4 lbm/hr with CRS concurrence.	
30.	PO reports SEC loading is not complete for A and B vital buses. Reports A bus is 21 AFW pump and 21 CFCU which are both C/T. Reports B bus is 2B4D breaker and 22 ABV Supply fan.	
	PO reports all available equipment started.	
	PO reports 21 and 23 AFW pumps are operating.	
	RO reports numerous safeguards valves have failed to realign due to no power available from	
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Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response SBT LOG 2B 460/230V buses, but reports that all valves have a redundant valve in the flowpath that has shut. CRS dispatches personnel to realign safeguards valves which have not aligned to their safeguards positions. RO reports 21 and 22CA330s are shut. CT#2 (E-0-E) Manually initiate RO reports containment pressure is > 15 Phase B and Spray Actuation psig. before transition from Step 11 of RO reports Phase B and Containment Spray 2-EOP-TRIP-1. have not automatically initiated. UNSAT RO manually initiates CS and Phase B, stops SAT RCPs, and verifies Phase B valve alignments. RO reports High Steam Flow SI status and failure of MSLL to shut MS167s. Role Play: Respond when CRS contacts WCC to assist in closing contacted that you will assemble a MS167s locally. team of operators and mechanics and attempt to shut the valves you were directed to shut. If CRS dispatches an NEO directly to attempt closure of any MS167, state that you will report to the WCC to pick up a Safety Man.

PO reports all 4KV vital busses are energized.

SBT LOG

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response
PREPARENTE CONTINUE CO	RO reports CAV is in Accident Pressurized mode.
Note: The 2C SEC must be blocked and reset to allow start	RO runs 2 switchgear room supply fans and 1 exhaust fan.
of 23 switchgear supply fan.	RO reports 2 CCW pumps are running.
	RO reports correct ECCS pump alignment and expected flows for RCS conditions.
Note: PO should have lowered AFW flow to as close to 22E4	PO reports AFW flow is >22E4 lbm/hr, and maintains total AFW flow >22E4 lbm/hr.
lbm/hr as possible.	RO reports all RCPs are stopped.
	PO reports RCS temperature is not being controlled, and MSLI has failed to close any MS167.
	RO reports both reactor trip breakers are open.
	RO reports both PZR PORVs are shut and both Block valves are open.
	PO reports all SG pressures lowering in an uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized.
	CRS transitions to EOP-LOSC-1, Loss of Secondary Coolant.
Timing of scenario will determine when FRCE Red or Purple path is	STA reports Red or Purple path on Containment environment.

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Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT
reported by the STA. When FRCE transition is made, go to FRCE steps on page 24.		LOG
	CRS transitions to EOP-FRCE-1, Response to Excessive Containment Pressure.	
LOSC-1 steps begin here.	PO reports all MS167s are open.	
Role Play if not previously performed: Respond when contacted that you will assemble a team of operators and mechanics and attempt to shut the valves you were directed to shut. If CRS dispatches an NEO directly to attempt closure of any MS167, state that you will report to the WCC to pick up a Safety Man.	CRS dispatches personnel to shut 21-24MS167s if not previously performed.	
vice to pick up a dalety Man.	PO reports all SG pressures lowering in an uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized.	
	CRS transitions to EOP-LOSC-2, Multiple Steam Generator Depressurization.	
LOSC-2 steps begin here	PO ensures all BF19s, BF40s, BF13s, MS10's, MS7s, MS18s, and GB4s are shut, and reports all MS167s remain open.	
	CRS dispatches operators to close MS167s one loop at a time if not previously dispatched.	
Note: When SGs are completely depressurized, 23 AFW pump will slow down due to inadequate	CRS determines 23 AFW pump is needed to maintain SG levels.	

Comment

steam supply. If 23AF21 and 24AF21 were shut earlier in scenario, they will have to be opened to establish AFW flow.

CRS directs performance of Shutdown Margin monitoring.

RO reports RCS cooldown rate is > 100°F/hr.

CT#3 (FRCE Bases) Reduce AFW to no less than 1E4 lbm/hr per SG prior to exiting FRCE-1. PO minimizes AFW flow to all SGs while maintaining a minimum of 1E4 lbm/hr to each SG.

Note: Can be performed in LOSC-2 or FRCE-1, but must be completed prior to exiting FRCE-1.

SAT

UNSAT

RO reports RCS Thot status.

Note: Once the SGs have completely depressurized, RCS pressure will rapidly rise to the PZR PORV setpoint.

RO reports all RCPs stopped.

Simulator Operator: Modify the MALF associated with the MS167 the CRS has directed be closed first from 95.1 to 0, or if no specific loop has been selected, delete the MALF associated with the loop which has the highest SG pressure. MALFS:

RO reports when RCS pressure is being controlled by automatic PZR PORV cycling.

			r Q-A <i>F</i> Pag
Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT LOG	Comment
VL0420 21MS167 fails to position VL0421 22MS167 fails to position VL0422 23MS167 fails to position VL0423 24MS167 fails to position			
	PO reports selected MS167 valve is shut.		
Note: IF step 8 is reached prior to identification of MS167 shut and SG pressure rising, the crew will perform SI reduction steps 8-20 before transitioning to LOSC-1.	PO reports selected SG pressure is rising.		
before transitioning to 2000 1.	CRS transitions to LOSC-1 based on a single SG pressure rise.		
FRCE-1 Steps begin here.	PO verifies Phase A isolation valve shut and 2VC5 and 2VC6 shut.		
	RO reports: - Containment pressure > 15 psig - LOCA-5 not in effect - Containment Spray in service - Phase B isolation valves shut - RCPs stopped.		

- 21 CFCU C/T.

RO reports CFCU status:

- 22 and 24 CFCU have no power to fans, but SEC shut the respective 460V Low Speed breakers, and SW is being supplied to CFCUs.
- 23 and 25 CFCU running normally in Low Speed.

RO reports MSIVs remain open.

PO minimizes AFW to all SGs while maintaining at least 1E4 lbm/hr per SG.

Simulator Operator: Once AFW flow has been minimized, Modify the MALF associated with the MS167 the CRS has directed be closed first from 95.1 to 0, or if no specific loop has been selected, delete the MALF associated with the loop which has the highest SG pressure.

MALFS:

VL0420 21MS167 fails to position VL0421 22MS167 fails to position VL0422 23MS167 fails to position VL0423 24MS167 fails to position PO verifies all BF19s, BF40s, and BF13s are shut or dispatches operators to locally shut them.

PO reports selected MS167 valve is shut.

PO reports selected SG pressure is rising.

PO maintains at least 1E4 lbm/hr to each SG.

CRS transitions to procedure in effect (LOSC-1 or 2)

STA reports RED path on Heat Sink CSF after PO reduces AFW flow.

Expected Plant/Student Response

SBT LOG Comment

CRS transitions to EOP-FRHS-1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, and verifies it was operator action that lowered AFW flow less than 22E4 lbm/hr, and returns to procedure in effect (LOSC-1 or LOSC-2).

Terminate scenario after the transition to LOSC-1 on rising SG pressure has been made.

VI. SCENARIO REFERENCES

- A. Alarm Response Procedures (Various)
- B. Technical Specifications
- C. Emergency Plan (ECG)
- D. Salem FSAR
- E. OP-AA-101-111-1003, Use of Procedures
- F. S2.OP-AB.CC-0001, Component Cooling Abnormality
- G. S2.OP-AB.4KV-0002, Loss of 2B 4KV Vital Bus
- H. S2.OP-AB.STM-0001, Excessive Steam Flow
- I. 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Rx Trip or Safety Injection
- J. 2-EOP-LOSC-1, Loss of Secondary Coolant
- K. 2-EOP-LOSC-2, Multiple Steam Generator Depressurization
- L. 2-EOP-FRCE-1, Response to Excessive Containment Pressure
- M. 2-EOP-FRHS-1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink

ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT TWO PLANT STATUS TODAY

MODE	: 1	POWER:	100%	RCS BORON:	19	MWe	1230
SHUT	DOWN SAF NA	ETY SYSTE	EM STATI	JS (5, 6 & DEFUE	LED):		
REACT	FIVITY PAF	RAMETERS					
MOST				OF EXPIRATION of breakers tripped		TSAS 3.6.2.3 ac	tion a.
EVOLU	JTIONS/PF	ROCEDURES	S/SURVE	ILLANCES IN PRO	OGRESS:		
ABNOI	RMAL PLA	NT CONFIG	URATION	IS:			
CONTI	ROL ROOM	Л :					
		Hope Creek minutes in t					
PRIMA	ARY:						
SECO	NDARY:						
RADW	ASTE:						
	No discha	rges in progr	ess				
CIRCL	ILATING W	/ATER/SER\	/ICE WAT	ΓER:			
	None						

ATTACHMENT 2

SIMULATOR READY FOR TRAINING CHECKLIST

 1.	Verity simulator is in "I RAIN" Load
 2.	Simulator is in RUN
 3.	Overhead Annunciator Horns ON
 4.	All required computer terminals in operation
 5.	Simulator clocks synchronized
 6.	All tagged equipment properly secured and documented
 7.	TSAS Status Board up-to-date
 8.	Shift manning sheet available
 9.	Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step
 10.	All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test) and burned out lamps replaced
 11.	Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
 12.	All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon
13.	Required procedures clean
 14.	Multiple color procedure pens available
 15.	Required keys available
 16.	Simulator cleared of unauthorized material/personnel
 17.	All charts advanced to clean traces and chart recorders are on.
 18.	Rod step counters correct (channel check) and reset as necessary
 19.	Exam security set for simulator
 20.	Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter
	with Baseline Data filled out
 21.	Shift logs available if required
 22.	Recording Media available (if applicable)
 23.	Ensure ECG classification is correct
24.	Reference verification performed with required documents available
25.	Verify phones disconnected from plant after drill.

ATTACHMENT 3

CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY

In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.

- I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents...
 - degradation of any barrier to fission product release
 - degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity
 - a violation of a safety limit
 - a violation of the facility license condition
 - incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)
 - a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario
- II. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to...
 - effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
 - recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
 - take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
 - prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.

noment Bloss

ATTACHMENT 4

SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST

Note: Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios.

SCENARIO IDENTIFIER:

09-01 NRC ESG-3

Initials

Qualitative Attributes

The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario.

The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events.

The scenario consists mostly of related events.

Each event description consists of:

the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated

- the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event
- the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
- the expected operator actions (by shift position)
- the event termination point

No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.

The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.

Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.

The simulator modeling is not altered.

All crew competencies can be evaluated.

The scenario has been validated.

If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the regualification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario.

ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility.

ATTACHMENT 4 SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST

Note: The quantitative attribute target ranges that are specified on the form are not absolute limitations; some scenarios may be an excellent evaluation tool, but may not fit within the ranges. A scenario that does not fit into these ranges shall be evaluated to ensure that the level of difficulty is appropriate. (ES-301 Section D.5.d)

itial		Quantitative Attributes (as per ES-301-4, and ES-301 Section D.5.d)
}	6	Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8
y	1	Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2
	3	Abnormal Events: 2-4
	2	Major Transients: 1-2
)	1	EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions: 1-2
	1	EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions: 0-2
	3	Crew Critical Tasks: 2-3
		COMMENTS:

ATTACHMENT 5 ESG CRITICAL TASKS

09-01 NRC ESG-3

CT#1 (E-0-A) Manually trip the reactor from the control room prior to SG dryout

Basis: Failure to manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, it constitutes an "incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates the inability of the crew to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS."

For a specific scenario, select a parameter that is related to the initial trip initiation signal and that is supported by analysis as being safety significant... a candidate for a safety-significant parameter that can be developed into a performance standard is SG widerange water level. (Footnote 3.d)

CT#2 (E-0-E) Manually initiate Phase B and Spray Actuation before transition from Step 11 of 2-EOP-TRIP-1.

Basis Failure to actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment under the postulated conditions constitutes a "demonstrated inability by the crew to recognize a failure/incorrect auto actuation of an EFS system or component." In this case, the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment can be manually actuated from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment also represents a "demonstrated inability by the crew to effectively direct/manipulate ESF controls that would lead to violation of the facility license condition."

CT#3 (FRCE Basis) Reduce AFW to no less than 1E4 lbm/hr per SG prior to exiting FRCE-1.

Basis Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable severe challenge to the integrity CSF. Also failure to perform the critical task increases the challenges to the subcriticality and the containment CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated plant conditions. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes "demonstrated inability by the crew to take an action or combination of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety" (con't next page)

ATTACHMENT 5

ESG CRITICAL TASKS

The standard which has been applied to this CT in this scenario encompasses the reason for minimizing AFW flow to 1E4 lbm/hr in FRCE with multiple faulted SGs. The reason this is done is to prevent thermal shock conditions to SG components if the SG was allowed to dry out, and then subsequently have AFW flow reinitiated. This meets the definition given on Attachment 2 of Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents...

degradation of any barrier to fission product release.

Not maintaining verifiable minimum AFW flow (1E4th) when it is possible to do so could result in a SGTR when cold feedwater is subsequently reinitiated.

ATTACHMENT 6

ESG-PSA RELATIONSHIP EVALUATION

EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE

<u>Y/N</u>	Event	<u>Y/N</u>	<u>Event</u>
Ν	TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable	N	Loss of Service Water
N	Steam Generator Tube Rupture	Υ	Loss of CCW
N	Loss of Offsite Power	N	Loss of Control Air
N	Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation	Ν	Station Black Out
N	LOCA		

COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY

Y/N	COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN	Y/N	COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN
Ν	Containment Sump Strainers	_ N	Gas Turbine
N	SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area	N	Any Diesel Generator
N	RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg	Y	Auxiliary Feed Pump
N	CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Valves	N	SBO Air Compressor

OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE

<u>Y/N</u>	OPERATOR ACTION
Ν	Restore AC power during SBO
N	Connect to gas turbine
N	Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system
N	Re-align RHR system for re-circulation
N	Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger
N	Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST
N	Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system
N	Isolate the affected Steam Generator that has the tube rupture(s)
N	Early depressurize the RCS
N	Initiate feed and bleed
Comp	blete this evaluation form for each ESG.

Appendix D	Scenario Outline	Form ES-D-

Facility: SALEM 1 & 2	Scenario No.: ESG-4 (Spare) Op-Test No.: 09-01 NRC
Examiners:	Operators:
Initial Conditions: 100% power EC	N 21 AFW pp C/T for oil leak repair 21 CFCII is C/T PZR

Pressure channel II is O/S for calibration.

Turnover: Maintain current power.

Event No.	Maif. No.	Event Type*	Event Description
1	SG0095A	l CRS/PO	SG NR Ch failure (TS)
2	TA0314	R ALL	Stator Water runback (AFD TS)
3	RC0002	C CRS/RO	RCS leak
4	RC0001	M CRS/RO	LBLOCA
5	RP0277A,B	C CRS RO	CS fails to actuate
6	RP318A1,2	C ALL	Lo Head ECCS fails to actuate
7	CV62B	C RO	Charging pump cavitation
			CT's: Init Cont Spray, initiate Lo head ECCS, xfer to CLR, trip cavitating charging pp.

^{* (}N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE

SCENARIO TITLE:	LOCA		
SCENARIO NUMBER:	09-01 NRC ESG-4 (909)		
EFFECTIVE DATE:	See Approval Dates below		
EXPECTED DURATION:	70 minutes		
REVISION NUMBER:	01		
PROGRAM:	L.O. REQUAL		
	X INITIAL LICENSE		
	STA		
	OTHER		
Revision Summary			
Rev. 1- Removed the steady sta Added OHA G-20 to IC.			
PREPARED BY:	G Gauding	07-22-11	
Lead I	Regulatory Exam Author	Date	
APPROVED BY:	flery	8-2-11	
Opera	ations Training Manager	Date	
APPROVED BY:	M	8/./11	
Fla	cility Representative	Date	

OBJECTIVES

- A. Given the unit with a condition requiring a stator water runback, the crew will take action to verify or perform the actions needed for the runback, IAW approved station procedures.
- B. Given a situation requiring rapid boration, the crew will initiate a rapid boration and terminate when required IAW approved station procedures.
- C. Given the unit at power with an RCS leak greater than the Tech. Spec. limit, take corrective action IAW AB.RC-0001.
- D. Given the indications of a reactor coolant system (RCS) malfunction or leak DIRECT the response to the malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- E. Given the indications of a reactor coolant system (RCS) malfunction or leak perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- F. Given indication of a reactor trip, DIRECT the response to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- G. Given the order or indications of a reactor trip perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- H. Given indication of a safety injection DIRECT the response to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- Given the order or indications of a safety injection perform actions as the nuclear control
 operator to RESPOND to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station
 procedures.
- J. Given a safety injection has occurred and equipment has failed to START equipment that has failed to automatically start in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- K. Given indication of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) DIRECT the immediate response to the LOCA in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- L. Given the order or indications of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), complete actions as the nuclear control operator to PERFORM the immediate response to the LOCA in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- M. Given a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and plant conditions to support cold leg recirculation DIRECT actions to transfer to cold leg recirculation DIRECT actions to transfer to cold leg recirculation.
- N. Given the order or a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and plant conditions to support cold leg recirculation perform actions as the nuclear control operator to TRANSFER to cold leg recirculation in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- O. Given indication of excessive containment pressure DIRECT the response to the excessive pressure in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- R. Given the order or indications of excessive containment pressure perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the excessive pressure in accordance with the approved station procedures.
- S. Given the unit in the EOPs and an excessive containment pressure the crew will reduce containment pressure IAW approve station procedures.

MAJOR EVENTS

- A. 21 SG Ch II NR level fails high.
- B. Automatic Stator Water Runback
- C. RCS leak/SBLOCA
- D. LBLOCA

11.

III. SCENARIO SUMMARY

- A. The crew will take the turnover at 100% power, EOL. I&C is performing a channel calibration of PZR Pressure Channel II. 2PR7 is shut with power removed to comply with TSAS 3.4.5.b. All bistables associated with PZR Pressure Channel II are tripped IAW S2.IC.-CC.RCP-0018, 2PT-456 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel II. Orders for the shift are to maintain 100% power.
- B. Shortly after assuming the watch, 21 SG NR level Ch. II fails high. The crew will verify no ADFCS malfunction and the CRS will enter the appropriate Tech Spec.
- C. A Stator Water Main Turbine runback will initiate due to Low Rectifier Flow, and the runback will terminate at ~900 Mwe when the condition clears. Operators will ensure positive control of the Main Turbine and borate the RCS to restore control rods above the RIL.
- D. Due to the rod insertion AFD will go out of the target band, and the CRS will identify entry into the appropriate Tech Spec.
- E. Once control rods have been restored above the RIL a RCS leak will begin ramping in, and operators will enter S2.OP-AB.RC-0001. The crew will attempt swap to a centrifugal charging pump and quantify the leak, but the crew will diagnose that the leak is larger than the capacity of the CVCS make up system. Operators will trip the Rx and initiate a Safety Injection.
- F. 2C 4KV Vital bus will deenergize upon the Rx trip, and the SEC will load 2C vital bus on its EDG. 21 CCW pump will trip, and 23 CCW pump control will transfer and remain in manual. 22 charging pump will not start on SEC initiation, and operators will block the SEC and start 22 charging pump. The RCS leak will turn into a LBLOCA. Automatic Phase B and Containment Spray will not occur, and operators will manually initiate Cont Spray and manually start Containment Spray pumps. Operators will perform diagnostics in TRIP-1 and transition to LOCA-1.
- G. The crew will transition to LOCA-3 when RWST level reaches 15.2 ft. The crew will perform the transfer to CL Recirc with all 4KV vital busses energized and 2C bus energized from its EDG. During the transfer, 22 charging pump will cavitate when 2SJ1 and 2SJ2 are shut, and operators will stop the pump. If the pump is not stopped, it will fail, and a LOCA outside containment will occur.
- H. The scenario will terminate when 22 charging pump is tripped, or after indications of CVCS system piping failure have occurred if the pump was not secured.

IV.	INITIAL CONDITIONS
	IC-244
P	REP FOR TRAINING (i.e. computer setpoints, procedures, bezel covers stagged equipment)
Initial	Description
1	RH1 and RH2 C/T
2	RH18s C/T
3	VC1and VC4 C/T
4	RCPs (SELF CHECK)
5	RTBs (SELF CHECK)
6	MS167s (SELF CHECK)
7	500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK)
8	SGFP Trip (SELF CHECK)
9	23 CV PP (SELF CHECK)
10	OHA G-20 in alarm.
11	2PR7 shut and deenergized.
12	S2.IC-CC-RCP-0018, 2PT-456 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel II, Exhibit 1 signed and on NCO desk or provided to crew for turnover.
13	SGBD directed to Condenser placard on 2CC3.
14	Complete Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist."

Note: Tables with blue headings may be populated by external program, do not change column name without consulting Simulator Support group

EVENT TRIGGERS:

Initial	ET#	Description	
W		EVENT ACTION:	MONP254 <10 // CONT ROD BANK C < 10 (RX TRIP)
	1	COMMAND:	
		PURPOSE:	<update as="" needed=""></update>
		EVENT ACTION:	gbc18axd < 0.851 // (2D5) CONTROL ROD POSITION
	3	COMMAND:	DMF TA0314
		PURPOSE:	
		EVENT ACTION:	kb117lck // 2SJ2 RWST TO CHG PUMP CLOSE
	5	COMMAND:	
		PURPOSE:	<up><update as="" needed=""></update></up>
		EVENT ACTION:	MONP254 <10 // CONT ROD BANK C < 10 (RX TRIP)
	7	COMMAND:	
		PURPOSE:	<update as="" needed=""></update>

MALFUNCTIONS:

SELF- CHECK	Description	Delay Time	Initial Value	Ramp Time	Trigger	Severity
01	AN0302 SER 302 FAILS - :E35 2PR2 PROTECTION CH II LOOP UNSAFE/IN TEST	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	SER POINT FAILS/OVRD TO ON
02	AN0328 SER 328 FAILS - :A12 REACTOR PROT SYS CHANNEL II INSTRUMENT LOOP IN TEST	Ñ/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	SER POINT FAILS/OVRD TO ON
03	TA0314 STATOR WATER FLOW SIGNAL FAIL	N/A .	N/A	N/A	RT-3	
04	SG0095A 21 SG LVL XMTR (519) CH II FAIL	N/A	N/A	N/A	RT-1	120
05	RC0002 RCS LEAK INTO CONTAINMENT (equiv to 0-4 inches)	NA	100	00:05:00	RT-5	1000
06	RC0001A RCS RUPTURE OF RC LOOP 21	00:05:00	N/A	N/A	ET-7	,
07	RP318S2 22 CHRG PMP FAILS TO STRT ON SEC	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
08	CV0208A 21 CHARGING PUMP TRIP	00:15:00	N/A	N/A	ET-7	
09	RP0277A AUTO CNT SPRY FAILS TO ACT,TRN	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	_
10	RP0277B AUTO CNT SPRY FAILS TO ACT,TRN	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
11	CV0043 CHARGING LINE LEAK IN AUX BLDG	N/A	N/A	N/A	RT-9	550
12	CV0208B 22 CHARGING PUMP TRIP	00:02:00	N/A	N/A	RT-9	
13	AN0289 SER 289 FAILS - :H45 GENERATOR STATOR COOLING SYSTEM TROUBLE	N/A	N/A	N/A	RT-11	SER POINT FAILS/OVRD TO OFF
14	RM0210B1 AREA RAD MONITOR 2R4 FAILS ANYWHERE	00:00:30	N/A	N/A	RT-9	15
15	AN0737 SER 737 FAILS - :A6 RMS HI RAD OR TRBL- CHG PUMPROOM CH 2R4	00:00:30	N/A	N/A	RT-9	SER POINT FAILS/OVRD TO ON
16	CC0172A 21 COMPONENT COOLING PUMP TRIP	00:00:30	N/A	N/A	ET-1	
17	RP318A1 RHR PUMP 21 Fails to Start on SEC	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
18	RP318A2 RHR PUMP 22 Fails to Start on SEC	N/A	- N/A	N/A	N/A	
19	AN0269 SER 269 FAILS - :G20 SEAL & CYLINDER HEATING STEAM SYSTEM TROUBLE	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	SER POINT FAILS/OVRD TO ON

REMOTES:

SELF- CHECK	Description	Delay Time	Initial Value	Ramp Time	Trigger	Condition
01	PR02D PZR HI PR RX TRP CH 2 PC456A BS	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	TRIP
02	PR13D PZR LO PR BLK SI CH 2 PC456B BS	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	TRIP
03	PR06D PZR LO PR RX TRP CH 2 PC456C BS	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	TRIP
04	PR10D PZR LOW PRESS SI CH 2 PC456D BS	N/A	. N/A	N/A	N/A	TRIP
05	RC02D OT DELTA T TRIP CH II BS (421C)	N/A	N/A	N/A_	N/A	TRIP
06	RC06D OT DELTA T R/BCK CH II BS (421D)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	TRIP
07	PR35D PORV STOP VALVE 2PR7 TAGGED	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	TAGGED
08	CV62B 22 CHG PUMP SUCTION VALVE 2CV49	N/A	N/A	N/A	ET-5	.000045

OVERRIDES:

SELF- CHECK	Description	Delay Time	Initial Value	Ramp Time	Trigger	Condition/ Severity
01	A604 B DI 23 CC PUMP - MANUAL	N/A	N/A	N/A	ET-7	ON
02	A604 A DI 23 CC PUMP - AUTO	N/A	N/A	N/A	ET-7	OFF
03	C812 F DI 24CSD 2C VITAL BUS FEEDER-OPEN	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	ON
04	C809 F DI 23CSD 2C VITAL BUS FEEDER-OPEN	N/A	N/A	N/A	ET-7	ON
05	A604 E DI 23 CC PUMP - START	N/A	N/A	N/A	ET-7	OFF

OTHER CONDITIONS:

Description

1. PZR Pressure Channel IV selected for Alarm

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

- A. State shift job assignments and review scenario objectives.
- B. Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide crew members a copy of the shift turnover sheet).
- C. Inform the crew "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift".
- D. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel.

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT LOG
21 SG NR level Channel II fails high		
Simulator Operator: Insert RT-1 on direction from Lead Evaluator		
MALF: SG0095A 21 SG IvI xmtr (519) CH II fails Final Value: 120		
	PO announces OHA G-15 ADFCS Trouble, and 21 SG Isolation Level Hi-Hi console alarms as unexpected.	
	PO refers to ARP.	
	PO identifies 21 SG NR level CH II has failed high.	
	PO verifies all ADFCS parameters are normal and still being controlled in automatic.	
	CRS contacts I&C or WCC and informs them of channel failure.	
Proceed to next event after Tech Spec call at direction of Lead Evaluator.	CRS enters TSAS 3.3.1.1 Action 6, and 3.3.2.1 action b 19.	

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT LOG	Comment
2. Stator Water Runback			
Simulator Operator: Insert RT-3 on direction from Lead Evaluator.			
MALF: TA0314 Stator Water Flow Signal Fail Final Value: True			
	PO announces OHA's H-38 GEN STAT RUNBACK, and H-45 GEN STAT CLG SYS TRBL as unexpected.		
Simulator Operator: Ensure ET-3 is True when control bank D lowers to 192 steps or at lead evaluators direction. This deletes the Main Turbine runback.			
	PO reports the Main Turbine is running back.		
Note: The runback was initiated at 30% per minute, but the Main Turbine Governor valves respond slower than that. When the load reduction signal clears, the DEHC reference will stop changing, but the turbine governor valves will still be closing, and Mwe will lower another ~100 before reference equals actual.	RO monitors primary plant and ensures control rods start stepping inward in auto when demanded due to power mismatch and Tref-Tavg deviation OR inserts rods if in Manual.		
	PO starts standby Stator Cooling Water pump IAW ARP.		
	RO/PO initiates boration.		
Role Play: 5 minutes after being	CRS dispatches an operator to the Stator		

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT LOG
dispatched, insert RT-11 which will clear OHA H-45. Then call control room as NEO and report: Panel 968 alarm A-1L, Inlet Flow Low was flashing, but cleared when I acknowledged it. Inlet flow is reading 600 gpm. There are currently NO alarms on the panel.	Water Panel 968 to investigate and determine panel alarm status IAW ARP for OHA H-38.	
	PO verifies that when OHA H-38 clears, the DEHC reference stops lowering.	
Note: Emergency Boration is to continue until control rods are at least 2 steps higher than the RIL, and OHA E-16 clears.	 WHEN OHA E-16 ROD INSERT LMT LO-LO annunciates, THEN RO/PO initiates Emergency Boration IAW S2.OP-SO.CVC-0008 as directed by ARP by: Determining that there is no set time duration for the boration per step 5.1.1. Starts at least one Boric Acid Transfer pump in FAST speed. Ensures charging flow is > 75 gpm. Opens 2CV175 Rapid Borate Stop Valve Closes 21 and 22CV160, Recirc VIvs Ensures boric acid flow is >36 gpm on 2FI-113A. OR Ensures charging flow is >75 gpm on 2FI-128B Starts at least one Boric Acid Transfer pump in FAST speed. Ensures the 2CV179 and 2CV181 are shut. Manually open 2CV172. Open 2CV185. 	

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT LOG
	- Close 2CV160 and 2CV161. - Ensure Boric Acid flow >36gpm on 2FI-110A.	
	PO ensures generator MVARs within band.	
	CRS enters S2.OP-AB.LOAD-0001, Rapid Load Reduction.	
	IF emergency boration was initiated, THEN WHEN OHA E-16 clears, RO stops the emergency boration by: - Stopping the Boric Acid Transfer pump started above - Closing the 2CV175 - Throttling open 21 and 22CV160 as required. OR - Place the running Boric Acid pump in Slow Speed. - Close the 2CV172 and 2CV185. - Return the CVCS Makeup system to AUTO. - Throttle open 2CV160 and 2CV161.	
	CRS enters TSAS 3.2.1 Action a.2 for AFD	

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT LOG
3. RCS leak / LOCA		
Simulator Operator: Insert RT-5 at direction of Lead Evaluator.		
MALF: RC0002 RCS leak into containment Initial Value: 100 gpm Final Value: 1000 gpm Ramp: 5 minutes		
	RO announces OHA C-2, CNTMT SUMP PUMP START as unexpected.	
	CREW identifies 2R11A indication rising, and PZR pressure and level slowly lowering.	
	CRS enters AB.RC-001.	
	RO announces OHA C-38 CFCU LK DET HI, and OHA C-30 CFCU LK DET HI-HI when alarmed as unexpected.	
	CRS directs PO to initiate CAS.	
	RO reports PZR level is NOT stable or rising.	
	RO begins transfer to centrifugal charging pump by: - Ensuring Master Flow Controller is in AUTO - Closing 2CV55 - Starting 21 or 22 charging pump - Lower 23 charging pump speed to minimum in Manual while adjusting 2CV55 - Stopping 23 charging pump when speed demand is at minimum.	

Expected Plant/Student Response

SBT

Evaluator/Instructor Activity

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT LOG
4. LBLOCA		
Simulator Operator: Ensure <u>ET-7</u> is TRUE upon the Rx trip. This will:		
Initiate the LBLOCA after 5 min, delay. Swap 23 CCW pump to manual to prevent it from auto starting.		
Trip 21 CCW pump after 30 sec delay.		
Open both infeed bkrs to 2C 4KV vital bus and cause EDG to load.		
Trip 21 charging pump after a 15 minute delay.		
	RO performs TRIP-1 immediate actions from memory:	
	 Verifies Rx tripped Verifies Rx trip confirmed Trips the Main Turbine Verifies at least one 4KV vital bus energized. Verifies Safety Injection actuated. 	
	CRS reads immediate action steps to RO and RO verifies performance.	
	RO/PO reports 2C 4KV vital bus is energized from 2C EDG.	

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT LOG
The state of the s	RO reports 22 charging pump, 21 and 22 RHR pumps failed to start.	22.11.110
	Crew blocks ALL SECs on 2RP1.	
	Crew resets Emergency loading on ALL SECs.	
	RO starts 22 Charging pump, 21 RHR pump, and 22 RHR pump.	
CT #1 (E-0—H) Manually start at least one RHR pump prior to transition out of EOP-TRIP-1.		
SAT UNSAT	RO makes pager announcement Unit 2 Rx trip, Safety Injection.	
	PO reports all AFW pumps running, and requests permission to throttle AFW flow while maintaining 22E4 lbm/hr or 9% level in at least one SG NR level.	
	CRS directs PO to throttle AFW flow.	
	PO lowers 23 AFW pump speed to minimum, and throttles 21-24AF21's to maintain AFW flow ~ 22E4 lbm/hr.	
	RO/PO identifies that the RCS leak has turned into a LBLOCA by control board indications.	
	RO reports control console indication of Containment Spray and Phase B actuation, but no Containment Spray system components have actuated.	

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT LOG
Note: The PO should NOT attempt to start 23 CCW pump here, since 2C vital 4kv bus is powered from the EDG and there is no direction in TRIP-1 to start the second CCW pump. IF the PO attempts to start 23 CCW pump, it will neither start nor backflash due to scenario setup override.	PO reports only 22 CCW pump is running.	
	CRS dispatches an operator to shut 2CC37 and 2CC48.	
	CREW performs ECCS flow evaluation and determines all ECCS pumps are injecting to RCS as expected for LBLOCA and cont press.	
	PO reports AFW status and is maintaining 22E4 lbm/hr or 15% (adverse cont numbers in effect) level in at least one SG NR level, then maintaining 15-33%.	
	RO reports all RCPs are stopped and MSLI actuated.	
	RO reports both RTBs open.	
	RO reports both PORVs shut with 2PR6 open and 2PR7 shut with power removed.	
	RO reports all RCPs are stopped.	
	RO ensures seal injection flow is maintained to all RCPs.	

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT LOG
Note: All SG pressures will be dropping due to the LBLOCA with 21 SG pressure lower than the remaining 3 SGs due to the RCS rupture being on that loop.	PO reports there are no faulted or ruptured SGs.	
	CRS transitions to LOCA-1 on containment radiation levels.	
Note: 21 charging pump will trip 15 minutes after the Rx trip.	RO reports 21 charging pump has tripped.	
Note: Upon the transition out of TRIP-1, CFST monitoring becomes active.		
	Crew identifies that a PURPLE path exists on both the Thermal Shock and Containment Environment Critical Function Status Trees.	
	CRS transitions to FRTS-1 based on RCS cool down rate and Table A conditions.	
	RO reports RCS pressure is less than 420 psig (adverse).	
	CRS transitions back to LOCA-1.	
	Crew identifies a PURPLE path still exists for Containment Environment (if containment pressure remains above 15 psig).	
	CRS transitions to FRCE-1 based on PURPLE path for containment Environment.	

Expected Plant/Student Response

Evaluator/Instructor Activity

SBT

Expected Plant/Student Response

Evaluator/Instructor Activity

SBT

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT LOG	Comment
If the crew arrives at Step 18.2 prior to RWST level of 15.2', they will enter a "do loop" with return to step 16. When RWST lo level alarm actuates, continue below.	RO reports RWST level.		and the second section of the second
LOG TIME OF RWST LO-LO LEVEL ALARM for CT#2 EVALUATION:::	RO reports RWST lo level alarm as expected alarm.		
	CRS transitions to LOCA-3.		
Simulator Operator: Upon entry into LOCA-3, DELETE I/O A604 OVDI for the START PB for 23 CCW pump and ENSURE it does NOT start. Be prepared to remotely STOP 23 CCW pump if required, as it affects scenario outcome and must NOT be running but capable of starting when crew arrives at step 28.2			
	RO reports both Cont Sump Level >62% are lit.		
	RO depresses Sump Auto Armed PBs for 21 and 22SJ44.		
	PO removes lockouts for 2SJ67, 2SJ68 and 2SJ69.		

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT
	RO reports 21 and 22SJ44 are open.	LOG~
CT# 3: (ES-1.3—A) Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation such that at least one train of ECCS is in operation in the recirculation	RO reports both RHR pumps are running and shuts 2SJ69.	
mode within the following time frames. 1. From RWST lo level alarm to initiating closed on 2SJ69 - ≤3.7	LOG TIME 2SJ69 Close is initiated:	
minutes 2. From RWST lo level alarm to one containment spray pump	LOG TIME Containment Spray pump stopped:	
stop ≤5.5 minutes 3. From RWST lo level alarm to switchover completion (includes restarting ECCS pumps if stopped on RWST lo-lo level) - ≤ 11.2 minutes.	::	
SAT UNSAT		
	RO reports SI is reset, and all SECs are reset.	
	PO reports 230V load centers are reset.	
	RO reports 2SJ69 is closed.	
	RO reports both CS pumps are operating and stops 22 CS pump.	
	RO shuts 21 and 22RH19s, and stops 23 charging pump if running.	
	CRS selects step 11 as the correct flowpath transition.	
	PO reports C bus is energized from its EDG.	

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT
	Section 1997 And 1997 April 1997	LOG
	RO reports 3 SW pumps are running.	
	RO reports both CCHXs are in service.	
	RO reports 23 CCW pump is NOT running.	
	RO reports 22 CS pump is NOT running.	
	RO starts 23 CCW pump.	
	RO reports 21 and 22CC16s are open.	
	RO shuts 2SJ67 and 2SJ68.	
	RO reports RH1 and RH2 are shut.	
	RO reports both RHR pumps are running and opens 21 and 22SJ45s.	
	RO reports 21 and 22SJ113s are open.	
LOG TIME ECCS Pumps verified running:	RO reports 22 charging pump and 21 and 22 SI pumps are running.	
·	PO removes lockout from 2SJ30.	
Simulator Operator: Ensure ET-5 is TRUE when the close PB for 2SJ2 is depressed. This inserts the closure of 22 charging pump suction isolation valve 22CV49 and will cause 22 charging pump to cavitate. During validation,	RO shuts 2SJ30, 2SJ1, and 2SJ2.	
oscillations between 48-90 Amps were observed, and the pump did NOT trip on OC.		

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT LOG
	RO/PO recognizes 22 charging pump is cavitating by amperage indication, discharge flow and BIT flow, and discharge pressure oscillations.	
CT#4 Trip the cavitating charging pump prior to pump/system piping damage. SAT UNSAT	RO trips 22 charging pump.	
Simulator Operator: IF the crew does NOT trip 22 charging pump within 3 minutes of the initiation of cavitation, THEN insert RT-9. This simulates a failure of the charging system piping in the Aux Building resulting in a LOCA outside containment, then trips 22 charging pump after an additional 2 minute delay. MALF: CV0043 Charging Line Leak in Aux Bldg Final Value: 550 MALF: CV0208B 22 Chg Pump trip Delay: 2 minutes Final Value: True MALF: RM0210B1 Area Rad Monitor 2R4 fails anywhere Delay: 30 sec Final Value:15 MALF: AN0737 SER 737 Fails -: A6 RMS Hi Rad or Trouble		

Evaluator/Instructor Activity	Expected Plant/Student Response	SBT
TERMINATE the scenario when 22 charging pump has been secured, whether by operator action or when it trips 5 minutes after cavitating starts.		LOG
Note : Some of the following steps may be performed depending on when, or if, the crew recognizes the 22 charging pump cavitation, and should be evaluated accordingly.	RO places 21 and 22RH29 controllers in Manual and ensures valves are shut.	
,	CRS implements FRPs as necessary.	
	CRS dispatches operator to tag SJ44 breakers open.	
	RO verifies Phase A and Phase B are reset, and CA330s are open.	
	PO stops 2A and 2B EDGs.	
Evaluator Note: The correct classification is an <u>ALERT</u> under EAL 3.2.2.b. (<u>If</u> the 22 charging pump is NOT stopped by the operators and the charging system failure occurs as described on the previous page, <u>then</u> the correct ECG classification will be a <u>SAE</u> based on 3.2.2.b AND 3.3.3.b		

VI. **SCENARIO REFERENCES**

- Α. Alarm Response Procedures (Various)
- **Technical Specifications** B.
- C. Emergency Plan (ECG)
- D. OP-AA-101-111-1003, Use of Procedures
- E. 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Rx Trip or Safety Injection
- F. 2-EOP-LOCA-1 Loss of Coolant Accident
- G. 2-EOP-LOCA-3 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation
- H. S2.OP-AB.LOAD-0001 Rapid Load Reduction
- S2.OP-AB.RC-0001 Reactor Coolant System Leak

ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT TWO PLANT STATUS TODAY

MODE:

1

POWER:

RCS BORON:

18

MWe

1230

SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED):

100

NA

REACTIVITY PARAMETERS

Core Burnup: 12,600 EFPH

MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION:

3.4.5.b for PZR Pressure Channel II calibration. 70 hours left in action time.

EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS:

S2.IC-CC-RCP-0018, 2PT-456 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel II.

ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:

2PR7 shut and power removed to comply with TSAS 3.4.5.b for PZR Pressure Channel II being out of service for channel calibration. PZR Pressure Channel IV selected for Alarm.

CONTROL ROOM:

Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power. No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs.

PRIMARY:

3.3.1.1 action 6 and 3.3.2.1 action 19 for PZR Pressure Channel II PT-456.

SECONDARY:

OHA G-20 SEAL CVL HTG STM SYS TRBL is in alarm due to Gland Sealing Steam high pressure. NEO is investigating. Heating steam is aligned to Unit 1.

RADWASTE:

No discharges in progress

CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER:

None

SIMULATOR READY FOR TRAINING CHECKLIST

 1.	Verify simulator is in "TRAIN" Load
 2.	Simulator is in RUN
 3.	Overhead Annunciator Horns ON
 4.	All required computer terminals in operation
 5.	Simulator clocks synchronized
 6.	All tagged equipment properly secured and documented
 7.	TSAS Status Board up-to-date
 8.	Shift manning sheet available
 9.	Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step
 10.	All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test) and burned out lamps replaced
 11.	Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
 12.	All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon
13.	Required procedures clean
 14.	Multiple color procedure pens available
 15.	Required keys available
 16.	Simulator cleared of unauthorized material/personnel
 17.	All charts advanced to clean traces and chart recorders are on.
 18.	Rod step counters correct (channel check) and reset as necessary
 19.	Exam security set for simulator
 20.	Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter
	with Baseline Data filled out
21.	Shift logs available if required
 22.	Recording Media available (if applicable)
23.	Ensure ECG classification is correct
24.	Reference verification performed with required documents available
25.	Verify phones disconnected from plant after drill.

CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY

In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.

- Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents...
 - degradation of any barrier to fission product release
 - degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity
 - a violation of a safety limit
 - a violation of the facility license condition
 - incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)
 - a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario
- II. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to...
 - effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
 - recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
 - take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
 - prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.

SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST

Note: This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios. (PRIOR TO SBT TESTING COMPLETE/TRANSCRIBE THIS FORM (Reviewer Name, Initials and Comments) ELECTRONICALLY HERE)

SCENARIO IDENTIFIER:

09-01 NRC-ESG-4

Robert Bloss

Initials

Qualitative Attributes

The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario.

The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events.

The scenario consists mostly of related events.

Each event description consists of:

· the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated

- the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event
- the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
- the expected operator actions (by shift position)

· the event termination point

No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.

The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.

Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.

The simulator modeling is not altered.

All crew competencies can be evaluated.

The scenario has been validated.

If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario.

ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility.

SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST

Note: The quantitative attribute target ranges that are specified on the form are not absolute limitations; some scenarios may be an excellent evaluation tool, but may not fit within the ranges. A scenario that does not fit into these ranges shall be evaluated to ensure that the level of difficulty is appropriate. (ES-301 Section D.5.d)

Initial		Quantitative Attributes (as per ES-301-4, and ES-301 Section D.5.d)
	8	Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8
	4	Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2
	2	Abnormal Events: 2-4
	1	Major Transients: 1-2
	2	EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions: 1-2
	1	EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions: 0-2
	3	Crew Critical Tasks: 2-3
		COMMENTS:

ESG CRITICAL TASKS

09-01 NRC ESG-4 (Spare)

CT#1 (E-0—H) Manually start at least one RHR pump prior to transition out of EOP-TRIP-1.

Basis- Failure to manually start at least on low-head ECCS pump under the postulated conditions constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded...capacity."

CT#2 (E-0--E) Manually actuate at least the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment before exiting TRIP-1.

Basis- Failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment under the postulated conditions constitutes a "demonstrated inability by the crew to recognize a failure/incorrect auto actuation of an ESF system or component." Failure to manually actuate containment spray represents a "demonstrated inability of the crew to effectively direct/manipulate ESF controls that would lead to a violation of the facility license condition."

CT# 3: (ES-1.3—A) Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation such that at least one train of ECCS is in operation in the recirculation mode within the following time frames:

- 1. From RWST lo level alarm to initiating closed on 2SJ69 <3.7 minutes.
- 2. From RWST lo level alarm to one containment spray pump stop- <5.5 minutes.
- From RWST lo level alarm to switchover completion (includes restarting ECCS) pumps if stopped on RWST lo-lo level) - < 11.2 minutes.

Basis: Failure to establish cold leg recirculation within the time frame specified in the FSAR is a "demonstrated inability of the crew to effectively direct/manipulate ESF controls that would lead to a violation of the facility license condition."

CT#4: Trip the cavitating Charging Pump prior to pump/system piping damage.

Basis: Failure to trip a cavitating charging pump during the transfer to cold leg recirculation when indications of cavitation are present, leads to the possibility of system damage and the advent of a loss of coolant outside the containment building. (As is the case in this scenario.)

ESG-PSA RELATIONSHIP EVALUATION

EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE

Y/N	<u>Event</u>	Y/N	<u>Event</u>
Ν	TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable	Ν	Loss of Service Water
N	Steam Generator Tube Rupture	N	Loss of CCW
Ν	Loss of Offsite Power	Ν	Loss of Control Air
N	Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation	N	Station Black Out
Υ	LOCA		

COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY

<u>Y/N</u>	COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN	Y/N	COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN
Ν	Containment Sump Strainers	N	Gas Turbine
N	SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area	N	Any Diesel Generator
N	RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg	N	Auxiliary Feed Pump
N	CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Valves	N	SBO Air Compressor

OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE

Y/N	OPERATOR ACTION
Ν	Restore AC power during SBO
N	Connect to gas turbine
N	Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system
Y	Re-align RHR system for re-circulation
N	Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger
N	Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST
N	Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system
N	Isolate the affected Steam Generator that has the tube rupture(s)
N	Early depressurize the RCS
N	Initiate feed and bleed
Comp	blete this evaluation form for each ESG.