EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG)

SITE: DAEC

RESET RCIC MECHANICAL TRIP, REACTOR POWER ADJUSTMENT, WELL WATER PUMP TRIP, RECIRC FLOW CTRL UPSCALE FAILURE, RPS EPA BKR TRIP, ESG NRC 11-03 REV 0 UNISOLABLE HPCI LEAK, RCIC AUTO START FAILURE, ONE ADS SRV FAILS TO OPEN

OPERATIONS	#:
	OPERATIONS

COURSE: INITIAL LICENSED OPERATOR

TOTAL TIME: 90 MINUTES

#:

Developed by:		
	Instructor	Date
Validated by:		
Decisioned have	SME/Instructor	Date
Reviewed by:		
	Operations Manager	Date
Approved by:		
	Training Supervisor-Operations	Date

GUIDE REQUIREMENTS

Goal of Training:	The goal of this scenario is to evaluate ILT students during the NRC Exam with 3 man crew.			
Learning Objectives:	There are no formal learning objectives			
Prerequisites:	None			
Training Resources:	Simulator Simulator Booth Instructor Phone Talker Simulator Floor Instructor			
References:	None			
Commitments:	None			
Evaluation Method:	Dynamic Simulator			
Operating Experience:	None			
	Initiating Event with Core Damage Frequency: N/A due to exam security			
Related PRA Information:	Important Components: N/A due to exam security			
	Important Operator Actions with Task Number: N/A due to exam security			

SCENARIO SUMMARY

The scenario begins with reactor power at 90%. RCIC was operating in CST-CST for baseline vibration testing. An Engineer accidently bumped the Mechanical Trip arm and RCIC tripped. A visual inspection determined no damage to RCIC and the trip is ready to be reset and placed in standby IAW OI-150, Section 3.3.

Once RCIC is placed in standby, the crew will continue the Power adjustment. Then the "B" Recirc Pump flow controller will fail upscale and the operators will lock up the scoop tube IAW the AOP. The SRO will address Technical Specifications (TS) for the speed mismatch.

An EPA breaker will trip on "A" RPS resulting in ½ scram. The crew will enter the AOP, transfer RPS to the alternate supply and the ½ scram will be reset. The SRO will address TS for the EPA trip.

A leak will develop on the HPCI steam line in Secondary Containment and will not be isolable. Area temperatures will rise requiring EOP entry and a reactor scram (CRITICAL TASK 1.0).

Additionally, as RPV level lowers RCIC will fail to initiate at its auto setpoint and must be placed in service manually for RPV level control. As area temperatures continue to rise, an Emergency Depressurization(ED) must be performed when the max safe operating limit is exceeded in more than one area (CRITICAL TASK 2.0). During the ED, one ADS SRV will fail to open and another SRV must be opened.

The scenario ends with the ED completed and RPV level at >170 inches.

SCENARIO OUTLINE:

BOOTH INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS

1 SIMULATOR SET UP: (perform set up per the "Simulator Setup Checklist", including entering actions items per the "Simulator Input Summary.")

Start Sim View / Data Capture Program for EXAM ONLY

- 1.1 General Instructions
 - a. Restore the IC for ILT Scenario 3 from the "Thumb Drive" that it is stored on.
 - b. If the thumb drive is not available, then reset to IC **20** and set the Malfunctions, Remotes, Overrides, and Triggers as per the tables below.
 - c. Reduce power to 90% with Recirc
 - d. Set up RCIC in CST to CST mode and INSERT MALFUNCTION RC01
 - e. Verify Pull Sheet setup matches current step and rod position
 - f. Place SPMET1 on a computer terminal (IAW AOP 903). Use the terminal over by the MIDAS computer.

1.2 EVENT TRIGGER DEFINITIONS:

Trigger No.	Trigger Logic Statement	Trigger Word Description
15	RPDIS1SHUTDOWN(1) >= 1	Mode Switch Taken to shutdown
17	ZAOFWLI4561<=.03	GEMAC Level <160"
30	ZDITCPRSPTDECR >= 1	Pressure Set Decrease Push Button Depress

1.3 MALFUNCTIONS:

Time	Malf. No.	Malfunction Title	Delay	Ramp	ET	Initial Value	Final Value
Setup	SW13A	HPCI Room Cooler Flow Blockage				0	100
Setup	SW13B	HPCI Room Cooler Flow Blockage				0	100
Setup	RC01	RCIC Mechanical Overspeed Trip				Active	Active
Setup	STRC01	Trip OVRD-RCIC Fails to Auto Start				Active	Active
Setup	MS31C	Group 6 Isolation Fail to Close- MO-2238				Active	Active
Setup	MS31D	Group 6 Isolation Fail to Close- MO-2239				Active	active
Setup	STEHC02	Trip Override-B EHC Pump 1P97 Fails to Auto Start				active	active
As Dir	SW21D	Well Water Pump Trip – Pump D, 1P58D			1	Inactive	Active
As Dir	RR17B	Recirc MG Flow Controller Fails, Auto/Man Modes MG B			3	AS IS	100%
As Dir	RP02B	RPS EPA Breaker Trip- RPS B EPA Breaker	•		5	Inactive	Active
As Dir	HP05	IPCI Steam Supply Line 10 Break/HPCI Room minutes		13	0	15	
As Dir	HP08	HPCI Steam Supply Line10Break/Torus Roomminutes		15	0	10	
AUTO	ED06C	SU Transformer Loss			17	Inactive	Active
As Dir	TC02A	EHC Hydraulic Pump Trip-Pump A	EHC Hydraulic Pump Trip-Pump A 30 Inactiv		Inactive	Active	

1.4 OVERRIDES:

Time	Override No.	Override Title	Delay	Ramp	ET	Initial Value	Final Value
Setup	DI-AD-019	HS-4406 ADSPSV4406, DMSL,1140(Auto Open)				AUTO	AUTO
Setup	DI-HP-013	HS-2238STM LINE ISOL MOV-2238				AUTO	AUTO
Setup	DI-HP-014	HS-2238STM LINE ISOL MOV-2239				AUTO	AUTO

1.5 REMOTE FUNCTIONS:

Time	Remote No.	Remote Title	Delay	Ramp	ET	Initial Value	Final Value
Setup	RP04	RPS Alternate Power Supply 1Y16 or 1Y26				1Y26	1Y26
Setup	RP01C	RPS EPA Breaker (Trip/Reset)		TRIP	RESET		
Setup	FP09	IPCI Deluge Man Isolation Valve /-33-82(Open,Close)		CLOSE	CLOSE		

FLOOR INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS

Simulator Pre-brief:

- 2.1 Individual position assignments
- 2.2 Simulator training changes since last module (N/A)
- 2.3 Simulator hardware and software modifications/problems that may impact training

TURNOVER INFORMATION

- \Rightarrow Day of week and shift
 - Today
 - Day Shift
- \Rightarrow Weather conditions
 - Hot, Humid
 - A Severe Thunderstorm Watch is in effect for the next 3¹/₂ hours. All AOP 903 actions are complete.
- $\Rightarrow (Plant power levels) \approx 90\%$
 - ♦ MWT ≈ 1683
 - ◆ MWE ≈ 561
 - CORE FLOW ≈ 41.0
- \Rightarrow Thermal Limit Problems/Power Evolutions
- \Rightarrow Plant Risk Status
 - ◆ CDF <u>?????</u>
 - Color Yellow
- \Rightarrow Existing LCOs, date of next surveillance
 - RCIC TS 3.5.3.A. Day 1 of 14 day LCO
- ⇒ STPs in progress or major maintenance
 - None
- ⇒ Equipment to be taken out of or returned to service this shift/maintenance on major plant equipment
 - RCIC
 - Continuation of Load Line adjustment. Will need to pull all step 34 rods to position 20, then will need to stop there for
- \Rightarrow Comments, evolutions, problems, core damage frequency, etc.
 - RCIC was operating in CST-CST for baseline vibration testing. An Engineer accidently bumped the linkage for the Mechanical Overspeed Trip and RCIC tripped 40 minutes ago. A visual inspection determined no damage to RCIC and the trip is ready to be reset and placed in standby IAW OI-150, Section 3.3. The 2nd Assistant and the System Engineer are standing by in the RCIC room to observe the reset.

Torus Cooling and ESW were secured after RCIC tripped. A RCIC surveillance test will be run on the next shift.

A Load Line Adjustment is progress. When RCIC has been placed in Standby, continue the Load Line Adjustment. The directions are to pull step 34 rods to position 20 (symmetrical). Call the RE after all the step 34 rods are at position 20. He will provide further guidance then.

TIME/NOTES	INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY	EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE
Shift Turnover	 COMPLETE TURNOVER: Provide Shift Turnovers to the SRO and ROs. a. Review applicable current Plant Status b. Review relevant At-Power Risk status c. Review current LCOs not met and Action Requirements d. Verify crew performs walk down of control boards and reviews turnover checklists 	Get familiar with plant conditions. • SRO will provide beginning of shift brief to coordinate the tasks that were identified on the shift turnover.
EXAMINER NOT	ΓΕ: Continue to next event at examiners d	irection

TIME/NOTES	INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY	EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE
Event #1 Unisolate and Reset RCIC	Booth Instructor: There are no actions necessary to start this event. Booth Instructor respond as plant	SRO Directs that RCIC be reset and placed in standby IAW OI-150 RO
	personnel and respond as necessary:	Monitors reactor power, pressure and level during the RCIC return to service evolution BOP
		IAW OI-150, Section 3.3 resets RCIC and places in standby as follows:Verify Turbine Steam Supply, MO2404 is CLOSED.
		 Place and hold HS-2405 TURBINE STOP VALVE MOTOR CONTROL MO-2405 in CLOSE until the Motor Control indicates full closed.
		PROCEDURE NOTE If the RCIC Turbine Trip was due to a mechanical overspeed condition, neither the MO-2405 valve nor motor operator will open until reset locally at the RCIC Turbine. If the trip condition is not cleared, the valve for MO-2405 will not open, regardless of motor operator position.
		If the turbine trip was due to mechanical overspeed, perform the following to manually reset the mechanical trip linkage (see drawing in Appendix 2):
	Booth Instructor: When contacted to perform the steps to reset the mechanical overspeed on RCIC DELETE MALFUNCTION RC01 and report the steps are completed	Contacts 2 nd Assistant to perform the next two steps 1. Move the spring loaded emergency connecting rod against the spring force, moving the emergency head lever away from the emergency tappet and tappet nut.

TIME/NOTES	INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY	EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE
TIME/NOTES	INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY Role Play: If asked, the RCIC Drain Trap Bypass Valve V-24-62 is closed. EXAMINER NOTE: The operator continues in Section 3.4. The first step is to complete Att.4. The lineup is attached to the end of this scenario. Once the attachment is completed, the next event may begin.	 EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE 2. Ensure the emergency tappet moves in the downward direction and the tappet nut locates in the "trip reset" position on the head bracket to hold the emergency connecting rod in position under spring tension. Place and hold HS-2405 in the OPEN position until the Motor Operator Control indicates full open. Verify Turbine Stop Valve MO-2405 indicates full open. Verify RCIC MO-2405 TURBINE TRIP (1C04C, A-5) annunciator is clear. PROCEDURE NOTE Following a Turbine run, oil level may require an hour, after turbine shutdown, to return to standby/shutdown conditions. If the RCIC turbine trip is being reset during RCIC testing or other maintenance evolutions, the CRS may decide to mark the following step N/A. Unless directed by the CRS, continue with Section 3.4, FINAL RETURN TO STANDBY READINESS (otherwise, mark this step N/A). Complete the RCIC System Control Panel Lineup (Attachment 4).
EXAMINER NOT	E: Continue to next event at examiners d	irection

TIME/NOTES	INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY	EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE
Event #2	Booth Instructor: respond as plant personnel and respond as necessary:	SRO
Load Line Adjustment		Give crew Reactivity brief to withdraw control rods.
		RO
		• Withdraws control rods in Step 34 to position 20.
		Monitors Reactor Power, Pressure and Level during power change
		вор
		Provides Peer Check to RO during reactivity change
		Monitors Balance of plant equipment
EXAMINER NOT	E: Continue to next event at examiners	direction

Event #3	Booth Instructor: When directed by the	CREW
"D" Well Water	Chief Examiner:	Responds to Annunciator 1C23C (F-1) - "D" Well Water Pump High/Low
Pump trip	INSERT EVENT TRIGGER 1	Flow
	This inserts SW21D , the D Well Water trip.	
		SRO
	Booth Instructor: respond as plant	• Enters AOP 408 "WELL WATER SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATION"
	personnel and respond as necessary:	 Directs starting of additional Well Water pump and restores system parameters
	Role Play: When contacted by control	Directs monitoring of Drywell pressure & temperature
	room, acknowledge request to check out "D" well house. Report back after 5 minutes that nothing abnormal was	Notifies Duty Manager
	observed at the well house.	RO
		Monitors reactor power pressure and level
	Role Play: When directed to check the breaker for the "D" Well, report back after	Monitors Drywell pressure & temperature
	5 minutes that the breaker is tripped, but	BOP
	you have no indications why.	Per AOP 408 immediate actions:
		 Ensures an ESW pump is running to provide cooling to the Control Building Chillers and to reduce demand on the Well Water System.
	Examiner Note: May use QRC to start ESW pumps	 Starts a standby Well Water Pump, and adjusts flow at the back panel.

Event #4	Booth Instructor, at the direction of the	Crew			
"B" Reactor Recirc Pump	Chief Examiner: INSERT EVENT TRIGGER: 3	Diagnoses event: Lowering APRM power and "B" Recirc Pump speed			
speed controller fails downscale	 RR17A to 100 over 5 minutes 50 sec This will cause the "B" Recirc M-G speed controller to ramp up slowly Booth Instructor respond as plant personnel and respond as necessary: Respond that you will look at the MOORE controller logic for speed control and get back to them soon. Report that you will call in a licensed operator to take manual control of the locked up recirc scoop tube but it will be about an hour. Go along with what the crew wants to do, and tell them that ERT will take over the repairs of the "B" speed control problem. Examiner Note: Depending on when the scoop tube is locked up will determine whether or not the TS loop speed mismatch requirements for the Recirc Pumps will be exceeded 	 SRO Directs entry to AOP 255.2: Take any necessary steps to bring the reactor power/reactivity transient under control, including, but not limited to: Lockup of the Scoop Tube Lockup Determines IF the recirc pump speed mismatch will put them out of compliance with the LPCI Loop Select limits using STP 3.4.2-01, Daily Jet Pump Operability Test, Sect. 7.1, Recirc Pump Speed Mismatch Check. TS SR 3.4.1.1 states that the speed of the faster pump shall be ≤ 122% of the speed of the slower pump when operating at ≥ 69.4% RTP. Based on the calculation, the SRO will determine if he is in compliance with TS 3.4.1 Condition C. If not, then has 2 hours to restore the mismatch within limits, or Trip one of the recirc pumps. Plot the current position on the power to flow map. IF the Recirc Flow is outside of the Mismatch limits, crew will discuss how they will restore the mismatch to within it's limits. Either raise the speed of the unlocked Recirc Pump to match the locked Recirc Pump. OR Send a licensed operator to the Recirc M-G Set room and take manual control of the locked Recirc Pump and lower it to within the 			
Event #4 (cont)		limits. RO Determines that power is going up by itself, and that the "B" Recirc M-G speed controller is ramping up by itself. Takes the following actions to stop the run away:			

	 Lock the scoop tube of the "B" recirc M-G speed controller Acknowledge/Respond to 1C04A, C-5, Enter AOP 255.2, "Power/Reactivity Abnormal Change." BOP Monitors balance of plant equipment and parameters 	
EXAMINER NOTE: Continue to next event at examiners direction		

Event #5 RPS EPA Breaker Trip	 Booth Instructor: When directed by the Chief Examiner: INSERT EVENT TRIGGER 5 This inserts RP02B, which will trip the "B" RPS MG Set. Booth Instructor: respond as plant personnel and respond as necessary: Role Play: When contacted by control room to investigate, wait 2 minutes and report that: The B RPS MG set is running. B1 EPA has tripped free – no lights, smells bad (acrid), no fire or smoke The electricians report that a fault is not suspected on the RPS bus. ROLE PLAY: If required, as the in-plant operator report that alternate RPS is aligned to 1B42 	 CREW Recognizes ½ scram on "B" side – Multiple Annunciators including, Annunciator 1C05B B2 – "B" RPS Auto Scram Diagnoses Loss of RPS SRO Enters AOP 358 "Loss of RPS AC Power" Directs operator to investigate the trip. Refers to TS 3.3.8.2. Condition A – 72 hours to remove in service power supply (condition met with EPA tripped) Enters TS 3.6.1.3 – 4 hr LCO for Primary Cont. Isolation Valves NOTE: The affected valves are already in their required (closed) position due to the loss off RPS. The action has been met. Enters TRM 3.3.4 Condition A – for Reactor Water conductivity monitoring Enters TS 3.4.5, Condition A – RCS Leak Detection Instrumentation, since all DW sumps are incapable of being pumped. Directs Inasferring RPS to alternate power supply Contacts Duty Manager Directs placing S583B, CV4371A Group 3 override switch in override open at 1C35.
Event #5 (cont)	Booth Instructor: Move to next event when the operator is addressing the RWCU isolation	 Transfers "B" RPS to alternate power supply per AOP 358 as follows: IF: an alternate RPS power supply is available as indicated by observing B-MG or ALT XFMR white light ON at 1C17 THEN: place handswitch C71B-S1B RPS ALTERNATE POWER TRANSFER switch to B-MG OR ALT position as required and verify selected position white light remains on.

	 May open the Cleanup Demin Bypass, MO-2723 due to the loss of RWCU Perform OI 358 RPS Appendix 4, RPS POWER SUPPLY TRANSFER HALF SCRAM RECOVERY CHECKLIST as follows. At Panel 1C36, reset the fuel pool exhaust radiation monitor RIS-4131A[B]. At Panel 1C36, reset the carbon bed vault radiation monitor RM-4138.
Booth Instructor: Move to next event when the operator is addressing the RWCU isolation	 RO Resets the ½ scram per ARP 1C-05B B2 – Step 4.1.b (OR P&L in OI 358) - Resets the half scram when the failure has been repaired and/or the trip signal has cleared. Turn the REACTOR SCRAM RESET switch C71A-S5 first to Group 1 and 4 [Group 2 and 3] then to Group 2 and 3 [Group 1 and 4] to reset the scram signal. Verify the following: The eight white SCRAM GROUP indicating lights are ON. "A" RPS MANUAL SCRAM (1C05A, A-3) annunciator is reset. "B" RPS MANUAL SCRAM (1C05B, A-3) annunciator is reset. Annunciator 1C05A, E-4 is reset. Annunciator 1C05B, E-4 is reset. Momentarily press the PCIS DIV 1 RESET and DIV 2 RESET pushbutton switches A71B-S32 and A71B-S33 and verify the following annunciators are reset: PCIS GROUP "1" ISOLATION INITIATED (1C05B, A-8) PCIS GROUP "2" ISOLATION INITIATED (1C05B, B-8) PCIS GROUP "5" ISOLATION INITIATED (1C05B, B-8) PCIS GROUP "5" ISOLATION INITIATED (1C05B, B-8)
EXAMINER NOTE: CONTINUE TO NEXT EVENT WHEN THE 1/2 SC	ram is reset and the operator is addressing the RWCU isolation

Events 6, 7 & 8	Booth Instructor: When directed by the	CREW
	Chief Examiner:	Respond to Annunciator:
Unisolable HPCI leak in	INSERT EVENT TRIGGER: 13	1C07A-A-11, HVAC Panel 1C23 Trouble
secondary	This starts the HPCI Steam Line leak and	1C04B-B-4, Steam Leak detection High Ambient temperature
containment,	subsequent failure to isolate	1C23A & B (C-2) HPCI Room Cooler Outlet Air HI/LO Temp
one ADS SRV fails to open	Verify Event Trigger 17 goes active when GEMAC level reaches bottom peg. This inserts a loss of the S/U XFMR.	Diagnoses HPCI failed to isolate on valid isolation signal
S/U XFMR	Booth Instructor: respond as plant	SRO
Lockout, RCIC	personnel and respond as necessary:	Directs ARP 1C23A & B (C-2) Actions
Auto-Start Failure		 Directs dispatching an operator to the HPCI room to check cooler
	Booth Instructor:	 Directs checking back panel indication to verify temperatures
	VERIFY EVENT TRIGGER 15 goes active	Directs closing HPCI Steam Isolation Valves MO-2238 and MO-2239
	3 minutes after the mode switch is placed in shutdown	 Enters EOP 3 – Secondary Containment – due to HPCI Rom Temperature exceeding Max Norm Value of 175°F
	VERIFY EVENT TRIGGER 30 goes active when the EHC Pressure Set PB is	Directs operating available coolers in affected area
	depressed	 Directs operating Main Plant Exhaust and Supply fans
	Booth Instructor:	Directs entry to EOP-1
	When HPCI Room achieves Max Safe	Directs reactor scram IAW EOP-3 (CRITICAL TASK #1)
	Temperature, STOP HP05 from getting	Directs entry to IPOI-5
	larger. Manual change HP05 to maintain HPCI above Max Safe.	 Directs an RPV level Band of 170 to 211 inches (RCIC will be required because of SU XFMR Loss)
	When Torus Room achieves Max Safe Temperature, STOP HP08 from getting larger. Manual change HP08 to maintain	 Directs Emergency Depressurization. Open 4 SRVs (CRITICAL TASK #2)
	Torus above Max Safe.	RO
		Monitors critical plant parameters
		As directed, Inserts manual scram (CRITICAL TASK #1)
Events #6 & 7		Takes IPOI 5 "Reactor Scram" Actions
(cont.)		Initiates a backup manual reactor scram.

 Informs SRO when 4 SRVs are open Monitors and controls RPV level as he depressurization occurs
When Directed attempts to open 4 ADS SRVs to emergency depressurize and recognizes that only 3 opened. Then takes action to open an additional LLS SRV (CRITICAL TASK #2)
 BOP Attempts to close HPCI valves MO-2238 and MO-2239 Reports to CRS that the valves failed to close Monitors reactor pressure and maintains in the band directed by the SRO
 RO/BOP Dispatches an operator to the HPCI room to check cooler Checks back panel indication to verify temperatures Maintains RPV level as directed using CRD and RCIC Diagnoses RCIC auto start failure and places RCIC in service manually
 Place THE MODE SWITCH in the SHUTDOWN position. Verify <u>all</u> control rods fully inserted by one or both of the following means: Verifies the Refuel One Rod Select Permissive: Position THE MODE SWITCH to REFUEL. Turn Rod Select Power off and then on. Verify the white Refuel Select Permissive light is lit. Return THE MODE SWITCH to SHUTDOWN. On the FULL CORE DISPLAY, verify the green FULL IN light for each rod is on.

Event Classification	SAE - FS1 – RCS Barrier Potential Loss and Primary Containment
	Barrier Loss

*** END OF SCENARIO ***

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- Correct IC or plant status identified.
- Shift turnover forms filled out (both CRS/OSM and NSOE) if required.
- Additional documents are prepared (STPs, Work Orders, LCO Paperwork).
- Tasks and Objectives have been verified to be correct.
- Plant PRA initiating events, important equipment and important tasks are identified.
- SOMS tags identified and included in setup instructions.
- Special setup instructions identified; handswitch manipulations, procedure markups, alarm borders, 3D case available, computer points substituted, etc.
- Setup files correctly called out.
- Malfunction list is accurate.
- Override list is accurate.
- Remote function list is accurate.
- Event triggers are accurate.
 -] Time/Notes section is accurate and includes all reasonable cues that may be given to initiate an action. Cues are unambiguous and provide a definitive moment to take action.

Instructor Activity section is accurate and complete:

- Actions are clearly defined for Booth or Floor instructor.
- Role-playing is clearly noted.
- The sequence of events is completely and concisely narrated even if it takes no instructor action.
- Automatic actions that require verification are noted.
- Reasonable alternate paths are considered and included.
- Event trigger activation is distinguished from narrative text (**Bold font**)
- Noun descriptions of actions that occur on event trigger initiation are complete, for example "...set **ET 3** to **TRUE** which activates malfunction **SW21C** resulting in a loss of the C Well Water Pump."
- Other simulator control actions are clearly distinguished from narrative text, for example "...after drywell temperature reaches 280 deg. F **SNAP** the simulator to **IC 0**."
- Student and Instructor copies of worksheets or other training activities are verified correct and electronically attached to the file if appropriate.

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Expected Student Response Section is accurate and complete:

	Critical tasks are accurate and clearly identified. Probable critical tasks are also listed with logical connection to the scenario; for example "If the crew fails to get all the rods inserted before ED the critical task becomes…" (N/A as appropriate) Tasks are clearly noted and properly numbered as appropriate.
	· · · · · ·
	Knowledge objectives are clearly noted and properly numbered as appropriate.
	Expected as well as probable student responses are listed with logical connection to the scenario. (N/A as appropriate)
	Actions are appropriately delineated by position(s); OSM, CRS, STA, RO, NSOE, Fire Brigade Leader, At the Controls Operator, etcetera. (N/A as appropriate)
	Success paths are procedurally driven unless specific training not requiring procedures is desired and delineated. Procedural discrepancies are identified and corrected before training is given.
	Responses for all communications to simulated personnel outside the Control Room are included, based on procedural guidance and standard operating practices.
	Actions are listed using a logical order; by position and chronology. (N/A as appropriate)
	Operating Experience, Human Performance Tools and Operator Fundamentals topics are included when appropriate.
	Crew Performance Criteria follow the same chronology as the student responses, are complete and accurate. (For ESGs only)
	For Walkthrough and Training Mode Scenarios with pre-planned pauses, sufficient information is presented to allow the instructor to meet the goal of the training.
Turnover info	rmation (as required) is correct:
	Day and shift are appropriate.
	Weather conditions do not conflict with malfunctions.
	Power levels are correct.
	Thermal limit problems and power evolutions are realistic and include a reason for any downpower.
	Existing LCOs include start date, remaining time and actions.
	Plant Risk Assessment (CDF and Color).
	STPs are appropriate for day and shift.
	Core Damage Frequency has been properly calculated and listed to 3 decimal places.
	Maintenance is realistic for plant conditions.
	Comments, evolutions, problems, etc, includes extra personnel (licensed/non-
	licensed if necessary), any condition that affects the flow of the scenario and any condition that does not fit in another category.

SME/Instructor

SME/Instructor

Date

Date

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<u>Crew:</u>	Instructors:
OSM	Booth
CRS	Floor
STA	- /
1C05	_
1C03	_
ВОР	_
Crew Comment:	
Resolution:	
Crew Comment:	
Resolution:	

NOTE: Following approval of SEGs, this page may be discarded.

2011 NRC Exam Scenario #3

Crew Comment:

Resolution:

Crew Comment:

Resolution:

Crew Comment:

Resolution:

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2011 NRC Exam Scenario #3

OI 150A4 RCIC SYSTEM CONTROL PANEL LINEUP

Attachment 4 Control Panel Lineup - Page 2 of 3

Device Number	Panel	Description	Discrep.	Wvd./ Rstr.	Init.	Req'd. Pos.
MO-2400	1C04	RCIC INBD STEAM LINE ISOL				AUTO/ OP
MO-2401	1C04	RCIC OUTBD STEAM LINE ISOL				AUTO/ OP
MO-2404	1C04	TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY				AUTO/ CL
MO-2405	1C04	TURBINE STOP VALVE MO-2405				OP
MO-2405	1C04	TURBINE STOP VALVE MOTOR CONTROL				NORM/ OP
HV-2406	1C04	TURBINE CONTROL VALVE HV2406				OP
CV-2410	1C04	RCIC STEAM LINE DRAIN ISOL				AUTO/ OP
CV-2411	1C04	RCIC STEAM LINE DRAIN ISOL				AUTO/ OP
MO-2516	1C04	INBD TORUS SUCTION				AUTO/ CL
MO-2517	1C04	OUTBD TORUS SUCTION				AUTO/ CL
MO-2500	1C04	CST SUCTION				AUTO/ OP
1P-228	1C04	CONDENSATE PUMP 1P-228 HS-2417				AUTO/ OFF
CV-2435	1C04	CLOSED RADWASTE DISCH ISOL				AUTO/ CL
CV-2436	1C04	CLOSED RADWASTE DISCH ISOL				AUTO/ OP
MO-2426	1C04	LUBE OIL COOLER SUPPLY				AUTO/ CL
1P-227	1C04	VACUUM PUMP 1P-227 HS-2415				AUTO/ OFF

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Device Number	Panel	Description	Discrep.	Wvd./ Rstr.	Init.	Req'd. Pos.
MO-2510	1C04	MIN FLOW BYPASS				AUTO/ CL
HS-2462C	1C04	TURBINE SPEED TEST SELECT				NORMAL
HS-2462B	1C04	AC POWER TO TURBINE SPEED TEST CKT				OFF
HS-2483	1C04	TEST MODE TURBINE SPEED ADJUST				FULLY CCW
FIC-2509	1C04	FLOW CONTROL				AUTO/ ≥ 415
MO-2511	1C04	PUMP DISCHARGE				AUTO/ OP
MO-2512	1C04	RCIC INJECT				AUTO/ CL
MO-2515	1C04	TEST BYPASS				AUTO/ CL
MO-2290A	1C03	HPCI/RCIC TURB EXHAUST VACUUM BKR.				OP
MO-2290B	1C03	HPCI/RCIC TURB EXHAUST VACUUM BKR.				OP
MO-2316	1C03	REDUNDANT SHUTOFF				AUTO/ CL
HS-7122A	1C23	RCIC ROOM CLG. UNIT 1V-AC-15A				AUTO or START
HS-7122B	1C23	RCIC ROOM CLG. UNIT 1V-AC-15B				AUTO or START
HS-2518	1C39	MO2516/MO2517 SUCTION SWAP BYPASS ON CST LO LEVEL				NORMAL

EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG)

SITE: DAEC

MSIV TRIP/CLOSE FUNCTIONAL TEST, MSIV FAILS CLOSED, LOWER POWER WITH CONTROL RODS, APRM UPSCALE, RHR PUMP START/FAILS TO TRIP ON OVERCURRENT, LOSS OF 4160V BUS 1A1, LOSS OF CONDENSATE, RPS PB FAILURE, LOOP, SBDG FAIL TO START, SMALL RECIRC LEAK, HPCI/RCIC FAILURES	SG NRC 11-04 REV	0

PROGRAM:	OPERATIONS	#

COURSE: INITIAL LICENSED OPERATOR

TOTAL TIME: 90 MINUTES

#:

Developed by:		
	Instructor	Date
Validated by:		
	SME/Instructor	Date
Reviewed by:		
	Operations Manager	Date
Approved by:		
	Training Supervisor-Operations	Date

GUIDE REQUIREMENTS

Goal of Training:	The goal of this scenario is to evaluate ILT students during the NRC Exam with 3 man crew.			
Learning Objectives:	There are no formal learning objectives			
Prerequisites:	None			
Training Resources:	Simulator Simulator Booth Instructor Phone Talker Simulator Floor Instructor			
References:	None			
Commitments:	None			
Evaluation Method:	Dynamic Simulator			
Operating Experience:	None			
	Initiating Event with Core Damage Frequency: N/A due to exam security			
Related PRA Information:	Important Components: N/A due to exam security			
	Important Operator Actions with Task Number: N/A due to exam security			

SCENARIO SUMMARY

The scenario begins with the reactor at ~60% power and a shutdown in progress. The crew will perform the MSIV Trip/Close Functional Test. During the test, one MSIV will fail closed. The SRO will address Technical Specifications (TS) for the valve failure.

The crew will continue the shutdown by inserting control rods. While moving control rods, an APRM will fail upscale and the crew will take procedural actions to bypass the APRM and reset the ½ scram. Then, a RHR pump will spuriously start, with indications of pump overload on the motor ammeter. The pump will fail to trip. The SRO will address TS and direct removing the pump from service. Once TS are addressed, a loss of Non Essential 4160v Bus 1A1 will occur. The crew will take actions IAW the AOP and address the resultant Recirc Pump trip and also swap bus power supplies. The SRO will address TS for single loop operation.

Then, the condensate pumps will trip causing a loss of Feedwater. The crew will insert a manual scram and the SRO will enter IPOI-5 due to the scram and EOP-1 due to low RPV level. After the initial scram actions are performed, a LOOP will occur with a small drywell leak. The output breaker on the "A" SBDG will fail to close and cannot be closed. The "B" SBDG will fail to start and must be started manually to power an Essential Bus (CRITICAL TASK 1.0). As the operators attempt to recover RPV level, RCIC inverter will fail, which prevents RCIC from injecting and the HPCI flow controller will fail in AUTOMATIC, so it must be operated in manual to permit level recovery BEFORE an Emergency Depressurization is required (CRITICAL TASK 2.0).

The scenario may be terminated when the "B" essential bus is recovered and RPV level is >170inches.

SCENARIO OUTLINE:

BOOTH INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS

1 SIMULATOR SET UP: (perform set up per the "Simulator Setup Checklist", including entering actions items per the "Simulator Input Summary.")

Start Sim View / Data Capture Program for EXAM ONLY

- 1.1 General Instructions
 - a. Restore the IC for ILT Scenario 4 from the "Thumb Drive" that it is stored on.
 - b. If the thumb drive is not available, then reset to IC 13, Raise power using control rods to approx. 59% and set the Malfunctions, Remotes, Overrides, and Triggers as per the tables below.
 - c. Verify Pull Sheet setup matches current step and rod position (BOL pull sheet)
 - d. Place SPMET1 on a computer terminal (IAW AOP 903).
 - e. Mark up the following procedures:
 - AOP 903, marked up so all actions are complete for sever
 - IPOI-3, Section 5.0 Step (8)
 - OI 646, marked up to where the plant is...
 - STP 3.3.1.1-17 MSIV Trip/Close Functional Test

1.2 EVENT TRIGGER DEFINITIONS:

Trigger No.	Trigger Logic Statement	Trigger Word Description
1	ZDIMSHS4418B(1) >= 1	When CV 4418 is taken to test
10	RPDIS1SHUTDOWN(1) >= 1 When Mode Switch taken t	
12	ZDIDGDG2(4) >= 1	When B SBDG started
14	RCNT >= 400	RCIC Turbine at 400 rpm
16	6 HPNT >= 400 HPCI Turbine at 400 rpm	
22	ZDIRHHS2014(1) >= 1	A RHR Hand Switch Taken to Stop

Schedule Files Needed:

Setup schedule file to Delete:

- Malfunction AN1C03B(2) (A-02) 'A' RHR Pump 1P229A Trip OR Motor Overload
- Override AO-RH-01 1P-229A RHR Pump Ammeter

when EVENT TRIGGER 22 goes TRUE.

1.3 MALFUNCTIONS:

Time	Malf. No.	Malfunction Title	Delay	Ramp	ET	Initial Value	Final Value
Setup	DG02A	1G31 A Diesel Gen Breaker Auto- Close Circuit Failure in Auto-DG A				Active	Active
Setup	STDG02	Trip Override-B SBDG 1G21 Fails to start				Active	Active
As Dir	ED08A	4.16kv/480V Bus Fault-Bus-1A1			5	Inactive	Active
As Dir	NM08C	APRM Channel Fails-APRM C		8 seconds	3	AS IS	100
As Dir	FW02B	Condensate Pump Trip- Pump B			7	Inactive	Active
As Dir	RP05A	RPS Scram Circuit (ATWS) Auto Scram Failure			9	Inactive	Active
As Dir	ED01A	Loss of Off Site Power Sources – BKR M	1 minute		10	Inactive	Active
As Dir	ED01B	Loss of Off Site Power Sources – BKR J	1 minute		10	Inactive	Active
As Dir	ED01C	Loss of Off Site Power Sources – BKR K	1 minute		10	Inactive	Active
As Dir	RR15B	Recirc Loop RUPT Design Basis LOCA-LOOP B		4 minutes	12	0	10
As Dir	RC05	RCIC Inverter trouble	1 minute		14	Inactive	Active
As Dir	HP03	HPCI Flow Controller fails	1 minute		16	0	0
As Dir	AN1C03B(2)	(A-02) 'A' RHR Pump 1P229A Trip OR Motor Overload			18	Crywolf	ON
		NOTE: Delete this on schedule file when ET 22 True					

OVERRIDES:

Time	Override No.	Override Title	Delay	Ramp	ET	Initial Value	Final Value
Setup	DI-DG-002	152-311 DSL GEN 1G31 Output Breaker				NAT	NAT
Setup	DI-RP-029	C71AS3B Reactor manual Scram System B				OFF	OFF
Setup	DI-RP-028	C71AS3A Reactor manual Scram System A			OFF	OFF	
As Dir	DI-MS-058	HS-4418B C INBD MSIV TST CV-4418			1	NORM	TEST
As Dir	DI-RH-092	HS-2014 RHR Pump 1P-229A NOTE: Delete 2 seconds after inserting			18	NASP	START
As Dir	AO-RH-01	1P-229A RHR Pump Ammeter NOTE: Delete this on schedule file when ET 22 True		1 sec	18	0	100

1.5 REMOTE FUNCTIONS:

Time	Remote No.	Remote Title	Delay	Ramp	ET	Initial Value	Final Value

FLOOR INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS

Simulator Pre-brief:

- 2.1 Individual position assignments
- 2.2 Simulator training changes since last module (N/A)
- 2.3 Simulator hardware and software modifications/problems that may impact training

TURNOVER INFORMATION

- \Rightarrow Day of week and shift
 - Today
 - Day Shift
- \Rightarrow Weather conditions
 - Hot, Humid
 - A Severe Thunderstorm Watch is in effect for the next 3¹/₂ hours. All AOP 903 actions are complete.
- \Rightarrow (Plant power levels) $\approx 60\%$
 - ♦ MWT ≈ 1153
 - ♦ MWE ≈ 358
 - ◆ CORE FLOW ≈ 38.2 mlbm/hr
- \Rightarrow Thermal Limit Problems/Power Evolutions
- \Rightarrow Plant Risk Status
 - CDF Baseline
 - Color Green
- \Rightarrow Existing LCOs, date of next surveillance
- \Rightarrow STPs in progress or major maintenance
- \Rightarrow
- ⇒ Equipment to be taken out of or returned to service this shift/maintenance on major plant equipment
 - ٠
- \Rightarrow Comments, evolutions, problems, core damage frequency, etc.
 - Plant shutdown for refueling outage in progress
 - Currently in IPOI-3, Section 5.0 Step (8)
 - Step 31 of the Pull Sheet, with Rods at position 30
 - Perform STP 3.3.1.1-17 MSIV Function Test
 - Continue lowering power as directed with control rods
 - Secure the first Feedwater and Condensate pumps at 50% power
 - Containment purge will be commenced after the first condensate and feed pump are secured

TIME/NOTES	INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY	EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE
TIME/NOTES Shift Turnover	INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY COMPLETE TURNOVER: • Provide Shift Turnovers to the SRO and ROs. a. Review applicable current Plant Status b. Review relevant At-Power Risk status c. Review current LCOs not met and Action Requirements d. Verify crew performs walk down of control boards and reviews turnover checklists	EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Get familiar with plant conditions. • SRO will provide beginning of shift brief to coordinate the tasks that were identified on the shift turnover.
	ΓΕ: Continue to next event at examiners d	irection

TIME/NOTES	INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY	EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE
MSIV trip closure functional test STP 3.3.1.1-17 INBD MSIV Failure Boo If as prop	oth Operator: sked whether the relays operated perly for the "C" INBD MSIV, state that relays did operate properly.	 SRO Briefs Crew and verifies the prerequisites are met Directs the BOP to perform STP 3.3.1.1-17 MSIV trip closure functional test BOP Reviews STP, then performs the following: FUNCTIONAL TEST OF A MSL MSIVs (CV-4412 and CV-4413) Verifies RPS Trip channel A1 – B Line MSIV 90% open relay is energized at 1C15 Verifies RPS Trip channel B1 – C Line MSIV 90% open relay is energized at 1C17 At 1C15, verify relay C71A-K11A contacts are open Ensures station personal are stationed at 1C15 and 1C17 for the STP. At 1C03, take A INBD MSIV TEST CV-4412 handswitch HS-4412B to TEST and release. Verifies CV-4412 goes partially closed, and then opens Contacts 1C15 person, and verifies: Relay coil de-energized and then closed At 1C04, take A OUTBD MSIV CV-4413 handswitch HS-4413B to TEST and release. Notices the "A" OUTBD MSIV goes closed (slowly) Verifies CV-4413 goes partially closed, and then opens

TIME/NOTES	INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY	EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE
TIME/NOTES Events 1 & 2 (cont)	Role Play: As Duty Manager, Acknowledge problem with MSIV and tell SRO to continue with the power reduction and Event Response Team will investigate.	 EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Relay coil de-energized and then re-energized FUNCTIONAL TEST OF C MSL MSIVs (CV-4418 and CV-4419) Verifies RPS Trip channel A2 – D Line MSIV 90% open relay is energized at 1C15 Verifies RPS Trip channel B1 – A Line MSIV 90% open relay is energized at 1C17 At 1C17, verify relay C71A-K11B contacts are open Ensures station personal are stationed at 1C15 and 1C17 for the STP. At 1C03, take C INBD MSIV TEST CV-4418 handswitch HS-4418E to TEST and release. Verifies CV-4418 goes partially closed, and then opens Notifies the CRS the "C" INBD MSIV is SHUT CRS Halts the STP Refers to TS and determines: TS 3.6.1.3 condition A (isolate affected flowpath, verify isolated) and an 8 hour LCO, re-verify 31 days May order the INBD MSIV CLOSED, may decide to wait for management guidance. Refers to IPOI-3 Section 6.0 for operation with one main steam line isolated (or OI 683)
		May enter AOP 255.2Contacts Duty Manager

Event #3 Insert control rods to continue shutdown	Booth Instructor: respond as plant personnel and respond as necessary: Examiner Note: One individual will stand in as a Reactivity Management SRO. This individual will provide NO specific direction	 SRO Directs RO to lower reactor power with control rods per RE guidance RO Using RE guidance and Pull Sheet at Step 31, inserts control rods Monitors NI indications for response Monitors reactor level and pressure BOP Monitors balance of plant equipment
EXAMINER NOT	FE: Continue to next event at examiners di	

Event #4	Booth Instructor: At the direction of	CREW
"C" APRM	evaluator:	Responds to the following Annunciators:
Upscale, 1/2	INSERT EVENT TRIGGER 3.	1C05A-A-2, A RPS AUTO SCRAM
Scram	This inserts the "C" APRM Upscale.	1C05A-B-2, APRM UPSCALE TRIP OR INOP
		1C05A-C-2, APRM UPSCALE
	Booth Instructor: respond as plant	
	personnel and respond as necessary:	SRO
		Directs bypassing APRM
	Booth Instructor:	Directs reset of 1/2 scram
	After the ¹ / ₂ scram is reset::	Discusses Technical Specifications – Briefly in TS 3.3.1.1. Condition A
	INSERT EVENT TRIGGER 9.	(RPS Instrumentation) and TRM 3.3.2. Condition A (Control Rod Block
	This inserts the Auto Scram Failure	Instrumentation) while unbypassing "A" APRM until "C" APRM is bypassed.
		RO/BOP
		Bypasses the APRM IAW OI 878.4 as follows:
		(1) If an APRM is currently bypassed, perform the following for the bypassed APRM, otherwise N/A this step:
		(a) Verify the APRM channel Mode Selector Switch on Panel 1C37 is in OPERATE.
		(b) Verify the APRM upscale, inoperative, and if greater than 5% reactor power, downscale trips on Panel 1C37 are reset.
		(c) Verify the IRM/APRM recorders on Panel 1C05 indicate approximately the same average power for the bypassed APRM as they do for the other APRM channels in operation.
Event #4 (cont)		(d) Place the APRM BYPASS switch C51B-S3 or C51B-S6 on Panel 1C05 in the neutral (unbypassed) position.
		RO (cont)

(e) Observe that the bypass light on Panel 1C05 and/or that the bypass light on Panel 1C37 is/are OFF.
(2) Verify the two remaining APRM channels in the RPS trip system are operable and not BYPASSED, otherwise comply with Tech Specs for inoperable RPS instrumentation.
(3) Place the APRM BYPASS switch C51B-S3 (C51B-S6) on Panel 1C05 in the A, C, or E (B, D, or F) position for the channel to be bypassed.
(4) Observe that the bypass lights for the bypassed channel on Panel 1C37 and/or Panel 1C05 is/are ON.
Resets the ½ scram IAW OI 358 as follows:
(1) Turn the REACTOR SCRAM RESET switch C71A-S5 first to Group 1 and 4 [Group 2 and 3] then to Group 2 and 3 [Group 1 and 4] to reset the scram signal.
Verify the following:
(2) The eight white SCRAM GROUP indicating lights are ON.
(3) "A" RPS MANUAL SCRAM (1C05A, A-3) annunciator is reset.
(4) "B" RPS MANUAL SCRAM (1C05B, A-3) annunciator is reset.
(5) Annunciator 1C05A, E-4 is reset.
(6) Annunciator 1C05B, E-4 is reset.
ВОР
Monitors balance of plant equipment

Event #5 A RHR Pump Spurious start / Fails to trip on overcurrent	Role Play: When contacted to investigate, acknowledge request as 2 nd Assistant and Aux Operator. SE Corner Room – nothing abnormal, no one in the room	 Crew Diagnoses A RHR Pump start. Ann: 1C03A (B-6) ADS Core Spray RHR Pump Running Permissive Ann: 1C03B (A-2) A RHR Pump 1P-229A Trip Or Motor Overload SRO When informed of RHR pump start and after assessing the situation, directs the BOP to stop the pump Directs contacting 2nd Assistant and Aux Operator to investigate Enters TS LCO 3.5.1 Condition A. – 30 days to restore RHR pump to operable status RO Monitors reactor power, level and pressure
EXAMINER NO	TE: Continue to next event at examiners d	 BOP Recognizes the A RHR pump is running and amps are high and pump should have tripped Reports condition to SRO As directed, secures the RHR pump

Event #6	Booth Instructor: When directed by the	CREW
LOSS OF	Chief Examiner:	
4160V BUS	INSERT EVENT TRIGGER 5	
1A1	This inserts the Bus 1A1 Lockout.	1C08A A2 - BUS 1A1 LOCKOUT TRIP OR LOSS OF VOLTAGE
		SRO
	Role Play: When contacted to investigate	Directs actions IAW ARP
	1A1 loss, Report back in 5 minutes that	 Enters AOP 304.1 – Loss of Non essential Bus
	the bus has a lockout and BKR 1A102 has	Enters AOP 255.2 – Power/reactivity Abnormal Power Change
	an overcurrent flag	 Reviews Power/Flow Map and determines NOT in the Buffer or Exclusion Region
	Booth Instructor: respond as plant	May Enter AOP 264 – Loss of Recirc Pump
	personnel and respond as necessary:	Contacts Duty Manager
		• Refers to TS 3.4.1 Condition D – single loop surveillance within 24 hours
		RO
		Monitors critical plant parameters
		Responds to the Recirc Pump trip IAW AOP 264
		• For the Recirc Pump that tripped, performs the following:
		• Verify open A[B] RECIRC PUMP DISCH BYP valve MO-4629[4630].
		Close A[B] RECIRC PUMP DISCHARGE valve MO-4627[4628].
		 After 5 minutes, reopen A[B] RECIRC PUMP DISCHARGE valve MO-4627[4628] (unless the A[B] Pump has to be isolated).
		BOP
		For LOSS of 1A1 ONLY, perform the following:
		Crosstie 1B1 and 1B2 by performing the following:
		 Momentarily place control switch FEEDER BREAKER 1B101 XFMR 1X11 to LC 1B1 to the TRIP position.

	Momentarily place control switch TIE BREAKER 1B107 LC 1B1/1B2 in the CLOSE position.
	Crosstie 1B5 and 1B6 by performing the following:
	 Momentarily place control switch FEEDER BREAKER 1B501 XFMR 1X51 to LC 1B5 to the TRIP position.
	Momentarily place control switch TIE BREAKER 1B505 LC 1B5/1B6 in the CLOSE position.
	Place BUS 1A1 TRANSFER switch in MANUAL.
	• Verify Offgas Closed Cooling Water Pump 1P-105A[B] in service.
	Start Offgas Glycol Pump 1P-243A[B].
EXAMINER NOTE: When Duty Manager is contacted to discuss event, go to next event	

Event #7 Condensate Pumps Trip, Reactor Scram (RPS PBs Fail)	Booth Instructor: When directed by the Chief Examiner: Insert Event Trigger 7 This will trip the only running condensate pump Booth Instructor: When the Mode Switch is taken to shutdown and after a 1 minute delay, Event Trigger 10 will become active. This results in a LOOP Examiner Note: 1 minute after the Mode switch is placed in Shutdown, a LOOP will occur. Actions for the LOOP are described in the next event.	 SRO: Identifies the loss of FW Orders manual reactor scram Enters EOP 1 due to <170" RPV water level Orders RPV level and pressure be controlled IAW EOP 1 Directs Defeat 11 to maximize drywell cooling RO: Identifies the loss of FW SCRAMS the reactor when directed and carries out IPOI-5 actions Scrams the reactor using both RPS Pushbuttons Places Mode Switch to Shutdown Verifies <u>all</u> control rods fully inserted by one or both of the following means: I. Verify the Refuel One Rod Select Permissive: Position THE MODE SWITCH to REFUEL. Turn Rod Select Power off and then on. Verify the white Refuel Select Permissive light is lit. Return THE MODE SWITCH to SHUTDOWN. 2. On the FULL CORE DISPLAY, verify the green FULL IN light for each rod is on.
Event #7 (cont)		 BOP: Sends field operator to investigate condensate pump trips Verifies Turbine Trip and Generator Lockout Monitors BOP equipment and containment parameters If Directed, Implements Defeat 11 to maximize drywell cooling as follows:

	 At Panel 1C35, place CV-4371A GROUP 3 OVERRIDE keylock switch S583B in OVERRIDE OPEN position and confirm amber light is ON.
	 Confirm CV-4371A opens by observing valve position indicating lights on 1C35 (red light is ON and the green light is OFF).
EXAMINER NOTE: LOOP with SBDG Co	omplications / LOCA actions are in next section

Event #8 & 9	Booth Instructor:	LOSS OF POWER EVENT
LOOP, A DG Output BKR FAILS and will	Event Trigger 10 will be active 1 minute after the mode switch was taken to shutdown in the previous event	Crew Responds to Loss of Offsite Power Indications
not close. B DG Fails To Start but CAN be manually started. Small Recirc Leak RCIC Inverter Failure, HPCI Ctrl Failure in	This will result in a LOOP Booth Instructor: After the "B" EDG is started, Event Trigger 12 will go Active. This will cause the Recirc leak to begin to ramp in on a 4 minute ramp. Examiner Note: The Recirc Leak will begin to occur after the "B" EDG is started.	 SRO Directs Reactor pressure control using SRVs Enters AOP 304.1 "LOSS OF 4160V NON-ESSENTIAL ELECTRICAL POWER" Enters AOP 301 "LOSS OF ESSENTIAL ELECTRICAL POWER" Directs starting the B DG and verifying it loads the Bus (CRITICAL TASK #1) Directs RPV level band 170" to 211" using available systems RO
Auto	Role Play: If directed, acknowledge request to close the A DG output breaker locally (you will not be able to close the A SBDG output breaker.)	 Provides RPV level and pressure status BOP May report MSIV closure (Group I Isolation) Diagnoses that the "A" DG started but did not pick up the bus Diagnoses that the "A" DG is running with no ESW flow and places the "A" DG in P-T-L. Diagnoses that the B DG failed to start STARTS B DG and verifies it loads BUS 1A4 (CRITICAL TASK #1) RECIRC LEAK EVENT and RPV LEVEL RECOVERY CREW: Responds to annunciator 1C05B-B1 – Primary Containment Pressure Hi/Lo
		SRO:

	Enters AOP 573 – Primary Containment Control
	•
	Directs operators to monitor containment parameters
	• Enters EOP-1 – RPV Control due to RPV low level (was enetered earlier
	when the scram occurred)
	Directs Reactor Water level band of 170" to 211" using available
	systems – (HPCI) (CRITICAL TASK #2)
	 Directs Defeat 4 - This results DW Cooling Fans in FAST
	 Enters EOP-2 - Primary Containment Control when containment
	pressure reaches 2 psig.
	 Directs initiation of Torus Spray prior to Torus Pressure exceeding 11
	psig
	 IF Torus Pressure exceeds 11 psig, directs initiation of Drywell Spray.
	RO:
	 Assists BOP in controlling RPV level and monitoring other critical primary
	containment plant parameters
	BOP:
	 If directed, performs Defeat 4 to maximize drywell cooling
	Places Torus Spray in service as follows:
	1. Place keylock HS-2005[HS-1932] Outboard Torus Cooling/Spray
	Valve handswitch in OPEN and verify valve opening
	Throttle open MO-2006[MO-1933], Torus Spray Valve
	Deservices DOIO Feilure and reserve status to ODO
	 Recognizes RCIC Failure and reports status to CRS
	Disanasas HDCI controllar failure and takes manual control of
	Diagnoses HPCI controller failure and takes manual control of
	HPCI to restore RPV level to >170" (CRITICAL TASK #2)

Scenario Termination Criteria	RPV level recovered to >170"
	Alert - FA1 – Drywell pressure 2.0 psig, SA5.1 – single AC Power Source

*** END OF SCENARIO ***

- Correct IC or plant status identified.
- Shift turnover forms filled out (both CRS/OSM and NSOE) if required.
- Additional documents are prepared (STPs, Work Orders, LCO Paperwork).
- Tasks and Objectives have been verified to be correct.
- Plant PRA initiating events, important equipment and important tasks are identified.
- SOMS tags identified and included in setup instructions.
- Special setup instructions identified; handswitch manipulations, procedure markups, alarm borders, 3D case available, computer points substituted, etc.
- Setup files correctly called out.
- Malfunction list is accurate.
- Override list is accurate.

- Remote function list is accurate.
- Event triggers are accurate.
 - Time/Notes section is accurate and includes all reasonable cues that may be given to initiate an action. Cues are unambiguous and provide a definitive moment to take action.

Instructor Activity section is accurate and complete:

- Actions are clearly defined for Booth or Floor instructor.
- Role-playing is clearly noted.
- The sequence of events is completely and concisely narrated even if it takes no instructor action.
- Automatic actions that require verification are noted.
- Reasonable alternate paths are considered and included.
- Event trigger activation is distinguished from narrative text (**Bold font**)
- Noun descriptions of actions that occur on event trigger initiation are complete, for example "...set **ET 3** to **TRUE** which activates malfunction **SW21C** resulting in a loss of the C Well Water Pump."
- Other simulator control actions are clearly distinguished from narrative text, for example "...after drywell temperature reaches 280 deg. F **SNAP** the simulator to **IC 0**."
- Student and Instructor copies of worksheets or other training activities are verified correct and electronically attached to the file if appropriate.

Expected Student Response Section is accurate and complete:

	tent response section is abounded and complete.
	Critical tasks are accurate and clearly identified. Probable critical tasks are also listed with logical connection to the scenario; for example "If the crew fails to get all the rods inserted before ED the critical task becomes…" (N/A as appropriate) Tasks are clearly noted and properly numbered as appropriate.
	Knowledge objectives are clearly noted and properly numbered as appropriate.
	Expected as well as probable student responses are listed with logical connection to the scenario. (N/A as appropriate)
	Actions are appropriately delineated by position(s); OSM, CRS, STA, RO, NSOE, Fire Brigade Leader, At the Controls Operator, etcetera. (N/A as appropriate)
	Success paths are procedurally driven unless specific training not requiring procedures is desired and delineated. Procedural discrepancies are identified and corrected before training is given.
	Responses for all communications to simulated personnel outside the Control Room are included, based on procedural guidance and standard operating practices.
	Actions are listed using a logical order; by position and chronology. (N/A as appropriate)
	Operating Experience, Human Performance Tools and Operator Fundamentals topics are included when appropriate.
	Crew Performance Criteria follow the same chronology as the student responses, are complete and accurate. (For ESGs only)
	For Walkthrough and Training Mode Scenarios with pre-planned pauses, sufficient information is presented to allow the instructor to meet the goal of the training.
Turnover info	rmation (as required) is correct:
	Day and shift are appropriate.
	Weather conditions do not conflict with malfunctions.
	Power levels are correct.
	Thermal limit problems and power evolutions are realistic and include a reason for any downpower.
	Existing LCOs include start date, remaining time and actions.
	Plant Risk Assessment (CDF and Color).
	STPs are appropriate for day and shift.
	Core Damage Frequency has been properly calculated and listed to 3 decimal places.
	Maintenance is realistic for plant conditions.
	Comments, evolutions, problems, etc, includes extra personnel (licensed/non- licensed if necessary), any condition that affects the flow of the scenario and any condition that does not fit in another category.
	SME/Instructor Date

SME/Instructor

Date

<u>Crew:</u>	Instructors:
OSM	Booth
CRS	Floor
STA	Extra
1C05	
1C03	
BOP	
Crew Comment:	
Desclution	
Resolution:	
Crew Comment:	
Resolution:	

NOTE: Following approval of SEGs, this page may be discarded.

Crew Comment:

Resolution:

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