U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-263/86003(DRP)

Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22

Licensee: Northern States Power Company
414 Nicollet Mall
Minneapolis, MN 55401

Facility Name: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station

Inspection At: Monticello Site, Monticello, MN

Inspection Conducted: March 25 through May 27, 1986

Inspector: P. L. Hartmann

Approved By: D. C. Boyd, Chief
Reactor Projects Section 2D

6-6-86
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on March 25 through May 27, 1986 (Report No. 50-263/86003(DRP))
Areas Inspected: A routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of previous inspection findings; operational safety verification; maintenance; surveillance; Licensee Event Reports; and refueling activities.
Results: No violations or safety concerns were identified in the six areas inspected.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

*W. A. Shamla, Plant Manager
M. H. Clarity, Assistant to the Plant Manager
D. E. Nevinski, Plant Superintendent, Engineering & Radiation Protection
H. M. Kendall, Plant Office Manager
D. D. Antony, General Superintendent of Operations
R. L. Scheinost, Superintendent, Quality Engineering
J. R. Pasch, Superintendent, Security and Services
L. H. Waldinger, Superintendent, Radiation Protection
W. J. Hill, Superintendent, Technical Engineering
W. W. Albold, General Superintendent, Maintenance
B. D. Day, Superintendent, Operating Engineering
L. L. Nolan, Superintendent, Nuclear Technical Services

The inspector also contacted other licensee employees including members of the technical and engineering staffs, and reactor and auxiliary operators.

*Denotes the licensee representatives attending the management exit interviews.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Unresolved Item (263/84-11-09(DRS)): Control Room Ionization Chambers. NRR reviewed the licensee's position on this issue and found the proposed system acceptable by letter dated March 17, 1986.

(Closed) Deviation (263/84-11-10(DRS)): Commitment to Comply with NFPA 72D. The inspector verified the licensee has completed the design change required and revised the Updated Safety Analysis Report to reflect the installed system. This corrective action was stated as complete in a response to the deviation by letter dated August 16, 1984.

3. Operational Safety Verification

The unit operated in coastdown to refueling until April 30, 1986, when the unit was shut down for refueling.

The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection period. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the drywell, reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance, plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspector walked down the No. 11 Diesel Generator to verify operability.

On May 8, 1986, the licensee informed the inspector of a failure to leak rate (type "B") test five drywell penetrations. The penetrations are used for the Transversing Incore Probe (TIP) system. The penetrations are 1-1/2 inch in diameter, Schedule 80 pipe, with a 1-1/2 inch in diameter 150 pound weld flange which is double gasketed for containment boundary. The licensee, upon realization of the requirement to conduct local leak rate testing on these penetrations, added the five penetrations to the existing Test Procedure No. 0137 Primary Containment Double-Gasketed Seals Local Leak Rate Test, and immediately performed leak rate tests on the penetrations. The penetrations were tested at a pressure of at least 55 psig (drywell design pressure is 42 psig) for 10 minutes. All penetrations tested with zero leakage.

The licensee acknowledges that the penetrations are required to be tested by Technical Specification, Containment Systems Surveillance 4.7.A.2.e., which states in part, "Bolted and double-gasketed seals shall be tested... at least once each operating cycle." As stated above, the licensee has added these five penetrations to the required test procedure to prevent recurrence of the failure to test. The significance of failing to test these penetrations is minor since during the Containment Integrated Leak Rate Tests (CILRT) these penetrations were monitored with an ultrasonic detector (since treated as untestable flange), and no leakage has ever been detected. The root cause of this failure to test is not originally categorizing these five penetrations as double-gasketed. The test connection originally provided on these particular flanges had a plug insert rather than the usual swagelok test fitting. This contributed to system engineers not identifying the flange as being a testable double-gasketed fitting when inspecting these penetrations in the field. The realization that the flanges were double gasketed occurred during a detailed review of the TIPS system prints for a modification design review. In response to the event two system engineers independently reviewed containment penetration drawings to ensure all double-gasketed flanges are included in the LLRT program. No other penetrations were found not being tested as required.

Because this problem was identified by the licensee, fits Severity IV or V, was reported, was promptly corrected with measures to prevent recurrences, and was not a violation that was preventable by licensee corrective action for a previous violation, a notice of violation will not be issued.

4. Monthly Maintenance Observation

Station maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components listed below were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.

The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were

performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; and activities were accomplished by qualified personnel. Portions of the following maintenance activity were observed/reviewed during the inspection period:

- Annual Inspection of No. 11 Diesel Generator
- Replacement of Stub Shaft for No. 11 Diesel Generator
- Replacement of Hydraulic Control Unit 30-18

5. Monthly Surveillance Observation

The inspector observed surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

The inspector observed/reviewed the following test activities:

- 24-Volt Battery Capacity Test
- Evacuate/Fire Alarm Initiation Test
- Main Steam Isolation Valve Test from Alternate Shutdown Panel

6. Licensee Event Reports

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.

(Closed) LER 84-33: ESF Actuations Due to Transfer of Instrument AC

7. Refueling Activities

The inspector observed several shifts of fuel movement during the refueling outage from the control room and the refueling floor. Core monitoring was in accordance with technical specifications; reactor mode switch was in the required position; fuel accountability was conducted by approved procedure; required containment integrity was maintained during fuel movement; and adequate provisions were maintained to protect against the falling of foreign objects into the open reactor vessel.

8. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representative denoted in Section 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on May 28, 1986. The inspector discussed the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any documents/processes as proprietary.