U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report No. 50-263/81-12

Docket No. 40-263 License No. DPR-22

Licensee: Northern States Power Company
414 Nicollet Mall
Minneapolis, MN 55401

Facility Name: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station

Inspection At: Monticello, MN

Inspection Conducted: June 1-30, 1981

Inspectors: for C. H. Brown 8/4/81

for A. L. Madison 8/4/81

Approved By: W. S. Little, Chief 8/4/81
Reactor Projects Section 2C


Inspection Summary

Inspection on June 1-30, 1981 (Report No. 50-263/81-12)
Areas Inspected: Review of routine operations, administrative controls, logs and records, onsite review and audit, Safety Audit Committee, housekeeping, fire-door control, routine radiation protection, rad-waste shipment, maintenance, surveillance, and security. The inspection involved a total of 108 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors including 39 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified in 11 areas, and one item of noncompliance was identified under administrative controls; failure to review a design change. This item was identified by the licensee.

## DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

*W. A. Shamla, Plant Manager
D. D. Antony, Superintendent, Operations Engineering
*R. A. Goranson, Lead Production Engineer
*J. R. Pasch, Superintendent of Security and Services
*F. L. Fey, Superintendent Radiation Protection
*M. H. Clarity, Plant Superintendent Engineering and Radiation Protection
W. J. Hill, Superintendent Technical Engineering
H. M. Kendall, Plant Office Supervisor

The inspector also talked with, and interviewed members of the Operations, Operations Engineering and Technical Engineering organizations.

2. Operational Safety Verification

The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of June. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the Unit's reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. Areas in the turbine building were not meeting cleanliness requirements (cigarette butts and candy wrappers on the floor). The licensee took immediate corrective action and the problem appears to be under control. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.

The inspector observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspectors noted that fire doors in several areas of the plant were not being maintained in a closed position. The licensee took immediate action to make sure these doors were adequately controlled. During the month of June, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the RHR Shutdown Cooling System and the MSIV's to verify operability. The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.

These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.

No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.

3. Monthly Maintenance Observation

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.

The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented.

Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.

The following maintenance activities were observed/reviewed:

Scram Discharge Volume UT Sensor Repair.

Following completion of maintenance on the HPCI system, the inspector verified that this system had been returned to service properly.

No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.

4. Monthly Surveillance Observation

The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the "ECCS Pump Start Permissive," Surveillance Procedure No. 0032 and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

The inspector also witnessed portions of test No. 0006, "Scram Discharge Volume High Level Scram Calibration."

No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.

5. Review and Audits

On June 2 and 3, the inspector sat in on a safety review committee meeting. The inspector verified that provisions of technical specifications dealing with membership, review process, frequency, and qualifications were met. The inspector also verified that decisions made were reflected in the meeting minutes and that corrective actions proposed were taken.

No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.

6. Onsite Review Committee

The inspector attended selected onsite review functions conducted during the period of June 1981 to verify conformance with technical specifications and other regulatory requirements. This review included: changes since the previous inspection in the charter and/or administrative procedure governing review group activities; review group membership and qualifications; review group meeting frequency and quorum; and, activities reviewed including proposed technical specification changes, noncompliance items and corrective action, proposed facility and procedure changes and proposed tests and experiments conducted per 10 CFR 50.59, and others required by technical specifications. (See paragraph 7 for related noncompliance)

No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.

7. Design Change Control

On June 15, 1981, the licensee discovered that a 125 volt battery charger had been installed across the center tap of the 250 volt DC battery and had not been adequately controlled resulting in the battery being discharged to 90% of rated capacity. This event was reported by the licensee in Licensee Event Report 81-16 dated June 29, 1981.

The inspector found that the 125 volt battery charger was installed under Work Request Authorization (WRA) 81-1734 initiated on May 7, 1981. The WRA identified the work as being done on a critical system, however, it was not identified as a design change or as requiring QA involvement. The addition of the 125 volt battery charger is a change to the 250 volt DC battery system described in the FSAR and it was not reviewed by the Operations Committee (OC) as required by Technical Specification 6.2.A.4.b. The reactor started up on May 10, 1981, and operated with the 125 volt battery charger until it was discovered on June 15, 1981 and subsequently removed. During this time the 125 volt battery charger was inadvertently secured but left connected to the 250 volt battery, resulting in the 250 volt battery being discharged to 90% of rated capacity. The licensee's evaluation indicates that in the event of a loss of offsite power, the degraded 250 volt battery would provide power for approximately seven hours and therefore did not prevent its performing its intended safety function.

The 125 volt charger installation was a change in design from that in the FSAR which was not properly reviewed and is a Severity Level IV violation since it represents an "inadequate review or the failure to make a review in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59....that does not result in a Severity Level I, II or III violation..." A response to the item of noncompliance will be required even though it was discovered and reported by the licensee.

8. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on June 30, 1981, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the item of noncompliance in the area of work control procedures.