

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

Docket No. 50-263

REQUEST FOR AMENDMENT TO
OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-22

License Amendment Request Dated May 15, 1980

Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota corporation, requests authorization for changes to the Technical Specifications as shown on the attachments labeled Exhibit A, and Exhibit B. Exhibit A describes the proposed changes along with reasons for the change. Exhibit B is a set of Technical Specification pages incorporating the proposed changes.

This request contains no restricted or other defense information.

NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY


By

L O Mayer
L O Mayer

Manager of Nuclear Support Services

On this 15th day of May, 1980 before me a notary public in and for said County, personally appeared L O Mayer, Manager of Nuclear Support Services, and being first duly sworn acknowledged that he is authorized to execute this document on behalf of Northern States Power Company, that he knows the contents thereof and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, the statements made in it are true and that it is not interposed for delay.

Jeanne M Hacker



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EXHIBIT A

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

License Amendment Request dated May 15, 1980

Proposed Changes to the Technical Specifications
Appendix A of Operating License DPR-22

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59, the holders of Operating License DPR-22 hereby propose the following changes to Appendix A, Technical Specifications:

1. Safeguards Bus Voltage Protection

PROPOSED CHANGE

Add new Limiting Condition for Operation 3.2.G and new Table 3.2.6. Revise Table 4.2.1 to include test and calibration frequencies for degraded and loss of voltage protection circuitry. Revise Specification 4.9.B.1.c to include a demonstration of load shedding and voltage restoration. Refer to Exhibit B pages 49A, 55, 60B, 62, 62A, 183, and 184.

REASON FOR CHANGE

Modifications to provide automatic degraded voltage protection for the safeguards buses at Monticello were made during the Autumn 1978 refueling outage. The modifications substantially conform to the "Statement of Staff Positions Relative to Emergency Power Systems for Operating Reactors" provided to Northern States Power Company in a letter dated June 3, 1977 from Mr D K Davis, USNRC. These modifications were described in NSP letters dated April 21, 1978, September 14, 1979, and October 22, 1979.

Proposed Technical Specifications establishing operability and surveillance requirements for the degraded voltage protection circuitry, as well as for the loss of voltage protection circuitry included in the original plant design, are being submitted at the request of the NRC Staff.

SAFETY EVALUATION

The proposed changes establish Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements for safeguards bus voltage protection circuitry. The proposed setpoints have been justified in the correspondence referenced above. Operability and surveillance requirements conform to guidance provided by the Commission in Enclosure (2) of D K Davis's letter dated June 3, 1977. The proposed changes provide assurance that the bus protection circuitry will be operable when required.

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2. Table 4.1.2, Scram Instrument Calibration

PROPOSED CHANGE

Add calibration requirements for main steam isolation valve and turbine stop valve closure scram switches. Refer to Table 4.1.2, page 36, in Exhibit B.

REASON FOR CHANGE

Limit switches which provide a reactor scram signal on main steam isolation valve or turbine stop valve closure were omitted from Table 4.1.2. All other instrumentation providing a scram signal is listed on the table.

SAFETY EVALUATION

This change would add Technical Specification surveillance requirement for main steam isolation valve and turbine stop valve closure limit switches. Although not a Technical Specification requirement, operation of these switches has been checked in the past during each refueling outage. The change is therefore administrative in nature and has no safety significance.

3. Reactor Water Cleanup System Containment Isolation Valves

PROPOSED CHANGE

Revise Table 3.2.1 to include trip settings for high drywell pressure isolation of the reactor water cleanup system containment isolation valves. Refer to pages 51, 65, and 155.

REASON FOR CHANGE

Containment isolation on high drywell pressure was added to the reactor water cleanup valves to provide diverse actuation signals for this system. The original plant design provided for containment isolation only on low reactor water level.

SAFETY EVALUATION

This modification was performed in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR Part, 50 Section 50.59. A summary of the safety evaluation was provided to the NRC Staff in the Monticello Annual Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments dated February 28, 1980. The proposed Technical Specification change is administrative in nature and is intended to update the Technical Specifications to reflect this modification.

4. Minimum Temperature Versus Pressure for Core Operation

PROPOSED CHANGE

Revise Figure 3.6.1, "Change in Charpy V Transition Temperature Versus Neutron Fluence," and Figure 3.6.4, "Minimum Temperature Versus Pressure for Core Operation" as shown in Exhibit B, pages 122 and 122C. Revise Specification 3.6.B.1 to require insertion of all but one control rod during hydrostatic and leak tests when the reactor is water-solid. Refer to Exhibit B, page 116.

REASON FOR CHANGE

The proposed revision to Figure 3.6.1 adopts the upper limit curve of Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 1, April, 1977 for reactor vessel transition temperature shift versus neutron irradiation. As noted in Section 6 of NEDO-24197, "Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant information on Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program," the copper and phosphorus content of the reactor vessel weld filler metal are not known. This necessitates the use of the conservative temperature adjustment curve of Regulatory Guide 1.99. A copy of NEDO-24197 was submitted for NRC Staff review with a letter dated October 4, 1979 from L O Mayer, NSP.

The proposed revision to Figure 3.6.4 changes the criticality pressure-temperature curve by deleting the limit based on the minimum permissible temperature for the inservice hydrotest. This eliminates unnecessary restrictions on plant heatup by nuclear means until the temperature for the hydrostatic test pressure is reached. The basis for this change is contained in NEDO-21778, "Transient Pressure Rises Affecting Fracture Toughness Requirements for Boiling Water Reactors." NEDO-21778 has been reviewed by the NRC Staff and found to provide an adequate basis for the proposed change. The results of this review are contained in a letter dated November 13, 1978 from O D Parr, Chief, LWR Branch No. 3, Division of Project Management, USNRC, to G G Sherwood, Manager - Safety and Licensing, General Electric Company. The requirement for all but one rod to be fully inserted during hydrostatic and leak tests has been included to preclude criticality in a solid water condition. Allowing one rod to be withdrawn will permit CRD testing to be accomplished at the end of each refueling outage with the vessel pressurized.

Issuance of this Technical Specification change will require the granting of an Exemption from the requirements of paragraph IV.A.2.c of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50.

SAFETY EVALUATION

The proposed change to Figure 3.6.1 results in a more conservative value for the adjustment of the temperature - pressure limitation curves over plant life. The revised figure conforms to Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 1.

The proposed revision to Figure 3.6.4 has been evaluated by General Electric in NEDO-21778. The General Electric evaluation has been found acceptable by the NRC Staff as a basis for removing the limit based on hydrostatic test temperature.

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5. Secondary Containment Ventilation Damper Operability

PROPOSED CHANGE

Change Specification 3.7.C to address inoperable secondary containment ventilation dampers. Refer to pages 150 and 151 in Exhibit B.

REASON FOR CHANGE

The proposed change provides clarification on the status of inoperable secondary containment ventilation dampers. The proposed wording is consistent with NUREG-0123, Section 3.6.5.2.

SAFETY EVALUATION

The proposed change revises the limiting conditions for operation of secondary containment to permit operation for a short period of time in a degraded mode with an inoperable isolation damper. The period of time is consistent with NRC Staff requirements.

6. Miscellaneous Corrections and Clarifications

PROPOSED CHANGE

Make the following changes in the Technical Specifications to correct errors or provide additional clarification. These changes are shown in Exhibit B:

- a. On Table of Contents page ii, correct the title of Section 3.6 and 4.6.H to read, "Shock Suppressors (Snubbers)."
- b. On List of Figures page v, delete entries for obsolete Figures 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. Add an entry for Figure 3.7.1, "Differential Pressure Decay Between the Drywell and Wetwell with a Shim Holding Each Vacuum Breaker 1/16 inch Open at the Bottom."
- c. On List of Tables page vi, correct the title of Table 3.11.1 to read, "Maximum Average Planar Linear Heat Generating Rate vs. Exposure."
- d. On the bottom of page 17 remove the obsolete phrase, "Reference (1)."
- e. On page 79, Specification 3.3.C, change "operation cycle" to "Operating Cycle." Operating Cycle is defined in Section 1 of the Monticello Technical Specifications, while operation cycle is not.
- f. On page 86, section 3.3/4.3 Bases, change "refueling outage" to "operating cycle" in line 1. The requirement for scram time testing is once per cycle.

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- g. On page 116, Specifications 3.6.B.2 and 3.6.B.3, change the phrase "...temperatures specified in 3.6.A..." to "...temperatures specified in 4.6.A..." This corrects a typographical error.
- h. On page 121A, Specification 4.6.H.3, change "refueling cycle" to "Operating Cycle." Operating cycle is defined in Section 1 of the Monticello Technical Specifications.
- i. On page 134, 3.6.D and 4.6.D Bases, change "comning" in line two to "coming." This corrects a typographical error.
- j. On page 138A, 3.6.H and 4.6.H Bases, change "refueling cycle" to "operating cycle" in the first line of the second paragraph. "Operating cycle" is the correct terminology.
- k. On page 203, Specification 6.5.B.1.b, change the wording as shown in Exhibit B to conform to current security practices of doors being locked or attended and the use of keys or key devices for locking doors.

REASON FOR CHANGE

The changes described above correct typographical errors, correct terminology, or provide additional clarification of Technical Specification requirements. No change in the substance of any requirement is proposed.

SAFETY EVALUATION

This is an administrative change having no effect on existing Technical Specification requirements.

7. Organizational Changes

PROPOSED CHANGE

On pages 193-195 and 197-201, make the title and minor wording changes as shown in Exhibit B.

REASON FOR CHANGE

A change in corporate organization involving electric generating plant responsibilities on January 1, 1980 and a change in Power Production Department organization involving nuclear plant activities on April 1, 1980, requires revision of organization charts and titles contained in sections 6.1, 6.2 and 6.4 of the Appendix A Technical Specifications.

SAFETY EVALUATION

The organization changes provide greater headquarters participation in, and technical support for, nuclear plant activities. The Safety Audit Committee retains its independence from line responsibility for plant operation. The proposed changes are of an administrative nature only.