JANUARY 7 1980

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Docket No. 50-263

Mr. L. O. Mayer
Nuclear Support Services
Northern States Power Company
414 Nicollet Mall - 8th Floor
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401

Dear Mr. Mayer:

By letter dated November 29, 1978, we requested your response to our concerns about containment purging or venting during normal plant operation. You responded by letters dated January 3 and June 7, 1979, and indicated that you intend to justify unlimited purging.

By letter dated September 27, 1979, we identified purge and vent valve operability requirements associated with the long-term resolution for containment purging or venting during normal plant operation. By letter dated October 22, 1979, we identified the staff's interim position on containment purging or venting pending a long-term resolution. You responded to both of these letters by letter dated November 14, 1979.

During the course of our review with respect to the long-term resolution of containment purging or venting, we identified several areas where additional information is necessary. We request the information identified in the enclosures. Please provide your response within 30 days of receipt of this letter.

Further, we are in the process of reviewing your response to the staff's interim position. Requests for additional information may be identified.

Sincerely,

Original Signed by
T. A. Ippolito

Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:
1. Request for Additional Information (Mechanical)
2. Request for Additional Information (Electrical)

Appls
w

cc w/enclosures:
see next page

OFFICE	ORB#3	ORB#3			
SURNAME	TKevern:acr	TIppolito	8002040 218		
DATE	1/7/80	1/7/80	P		

cc:

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Ms. Terry Hoffman
Executive Director
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
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917 15th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20005

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (MECHANICAL)

FOR CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM AND

CONTAINMENT VENTING SYSTEM FOR

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-263

With regard to the containment purge and venting system, provide the following information:

1. Discuss the provisions made to ensure that isolation valve closure will not be prevented by debris which could potentially become entrained in the escaping air and steam.

2. Quantify the amount of containment atmosphere released through the purge and vent isolation valves for a spectrum of break sizes during the maximum time allowed for them to close in your Technical Specifications.

3. Provide an analysis to demonstrate the acceptability of the provisions made to protect structures and safety-related equipment; e.g., fans, filters, and ductwork, located beyond the purge system isolation valves against loss of function.

4. For the containment purge isolation valves, specify the differential pressure across the valve for which the maximum leak rate occurs. Further, provide test results (e.g., from vendor tests of leakage rate versus valve differential pressure) which support the above information.

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (ELECTRICAL) FOR CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM AND CONTAINMENT VENTING SYSTEM FOR MONTICELLO UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-263

1. With the exception of the Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI) system, the docketed information as to the design of Engineered Safety Features (ESF) does not adequately address the following areas. Please discuss how your ESF design conforms with each:

   1 - The overriding* of one type of safety actuation signal (e.g., radiation) should not cause the blocking of any other type of safety actuation signal (e.g., pressure) to the isolation valves.

   2 - Sufficient physical features (e.g., key lock switches) should be provided to facilitate adequate administrative controls.

   3 - The system-level annunciation of the overridden status should be provided for the containment isolation system and for every safety system impacted when an override is active.

   4 - Diverse signals should be provided to initiate isolation of the containment ventilation system. Specifically, containment high radiation, safety injection actuation, and containment high pressure should automatically initiate Containment Ventilation Isolation.

   5 - The instrumentation and control systems provided to initiate ESF should be designed and qualified as safety-grade equipment.

   6 - The overriding or resetting* of the isolation actuation signal should not cause the automatic motion of any ESF valve.

*The following definitions are given for clarity of use in this issue: Override - the signal is still present, and it is blocked in order to perform a function contrary to the signal; Reset - the signal has come and gone, and the circuit is being cleared to return to the normal condition.

2. Provide the process and instrumentation (P&ID) and schematic drawings of your purge and vent system and high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system.

3. With regard to Criteria 2, 5 and 6 of question 1 above; please provide specific responses to the following:

   (a) Describe the CVI isolation signal bypass switch (e.g., is it a spring return to normal)?

   (b) Describe the response of all CVI valves upon reset of a CVI signal. Where administrative controls are relied upon to force a specific response, describe the administrative controls and the basis for assuring that they are properly applied.