

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8705180459 DOC. DATE: 87/05/12 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: 50-263 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Northern States 05000263
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 SHIREY, S. I. Northern States Power Co.
 MUSOLF, D. Northern States Power Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 86-003-01: on B60123, standby gas treatment initiation occurred due to insufficient procedures to verify as built internal wiring for primary isolation valves. Caused by blown fuse. Fuse replaced & relay reset. W/870512 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 3
 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL		RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL	
	PD3-3 LA	1	1	PD3-3 PD	1	1
	SCALETTI, D	1	1			
INTERNAL:	ACRS MICHELSON	1	1	ACRS MOELLER	2	2
	AEOD/DOA	1	1	AEOD/DSP/ROAB	2	2
	AEOD/DSP/TPAB	1	1	DEDRO	1	1
	NRR/DEST/ADE	1	0	NRR/DEST/ADS	1	0
	NRR/DEST/CEB	1	1	NRR/DEST/ELB	1	1
	NRR/DEST/ICSB	1	1	NRR/DEST/MEB	1	1
	NRR/DEST/MTB	1	1	NRR/DEST/PSB	1	1
	NRR/DEST/RSB	1	1	NRR/DEST/SCB	1	1
	NRR/DLPQ/HFB	1	1	NRR/DLPQ/QAB	1	1
	NRR/DOEA/EAB	1	1	NRR/DREP/EPB	1	1
	NRR/DREP/RAB	1	1	NRR/DREP/RPB	2	2
	NRR/PMAS/ILRB	1	1	NRR/PMAS/PTSB	1	1
	REG FILE 02	1	1	RES DEPY GI	1	1
	RGN3 FILE 01	1	1			
EXTERNAL:	EG&G GROH, M	5	5	H ST LOBBY WARD	1	1
	LPDR	1	1	NRC PDR	1	1
	NSIC HARRIS, J	1	1	NSIC MAYS, G	1	1

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 43 ENCL 41

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Expires 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) Monticello DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 3 PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4) Standby Gas Treatment Initiation Due to Electrical Fault

EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBERS

0 1 2 3 8 6 8 6 - 0 0 3 - 0 1 0 5 1 2 8 7 0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following)(11)

POWER LEVEL (10) 20.402(b) 20.405(a)(1)(i) 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 20.405(c) 50.38(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(ix) 73.71(b) 73.71(c) OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Samuel I. Shirey, Senior Production Engineer TELEPHONE NUMBER 6 1 2 2 9 5 - 5 1 5 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

Table with columns: CAUSE, SYSTEM, COMPONENT, MANUFAC Turer, REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

Insufficient procedural guidance for verifying the as built internal wiring configuration of a post accident sampling system primary containment isolation valve resulted in grounding the control power circuit for the isolation valve and a normally energized Group II primary containment control logic relay. The control power fuse opened to isolate the grounded circuit. This action resulted in a Group II Isolation, Standby Gas Treatment Initiation, and Secondary Containment Isolation. The cause of the event was recognized immediately. The blown fuse was replaced. The relay was reset and standby gas treatment was returned to standby. The work control process has been revised to require consideration of de-energizing control logic or starting safety systems to avoid unplanned system challenges.

8705180459 870512 PDR ADOCK 05000263 S PDR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Monticello	05000263	86-	003-	01	02 OF 02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

During power operation on January 23, 1986, at approximately 1115, insufficient procedural guidance for verifying the as-built internal wiring configuration for a post accident sampling system primary containment isolation valve (ISV), SV4082, resulted in grounding the control power circuit for the isolation valve and a normally energized Group II (JC) primary containment control logic relay (RLY). The control power fuse (FU) opened to isolate the grounded circuit. This action resulted in a Group II Isolation, Standby Gas Treatment (BH) Initiation and Secondary Containment (NH) isolation. The cause of the event was recognized immediately. The blown fuse was replaced. The relay was reset and standby gas treatment was returned to standby condition by approximately 1136.

The cause of the event was insufficient procedural guidance that resulted in the utility electrician working on an energized primary containment isolation solenoid valve. The work control process has been revised to require consideration of de-energizing control logic, or starting safety systems to avoid unplanned system challenges.

This event had no effect on public health and safety. All systems performed as designed.

There have been no previous similar reportable events.



Northern States Power Company

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Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401
Telephone (612) 330-5500

May 12, 1987

Report Required by
10 CFR Part 50, Section 50.73

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington DC 20555

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22

Licensee Event Report 86-003
Standby Gas Treatment Initiation Due to Electrical Fault

A revised Licensee Event Report for this occurrence is attached.

This event was reported via the Emergency Notification System in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Section 50.72 on January 23, 1986.

for Monica Vik
David Musolf
Manager - Nuclear Support Services

c: Regional Administrator-III, NRC
NRR Project Manager, NRC
Resident Inspector, NRC
MPCA
Attn: J W Ferman

Attachment

*IR22
/1*