

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

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 Region 2, Atlanta, Office of the Director (81/03/01)

SUBJECT: LER 81-009/03L-0: on 810427, during refueling outage, 416 KV
 breaker was racked out under load. Caused by operator
 error. Undervoltage relaying modified to allow overcurrent
 relaying to isolate faulted bus from total network.

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	A/D SFTY ASSE12	1	1	ACC EVAL BR 14	1	1
	AEOD	3	3	AEOD/DMU	3	3
	ASLBP/J, HARD	1	1	AUX SYS BR 15	1	1
	CHEM ENG BR 16	1	1	CONT SYS BR 17	1	1
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	DIR, HUM FAC S21	1	1	DIR, SYS INTEG22	1	1
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	SFTY PROG EVA42	1	1	STRUCT ENG BR44	1	1
EXTERNAL:	ACRS 46	16	16	INPO, J. STEARNS	1	1
	LPDR 03	1	1	NSIC 05	1	1

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7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T
 0 1 | L | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 7 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 7 | 8 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 9
7 8 50 61 65 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | During refueling outage, bus fault on essential bus caused momentary loss of entire
 0 3 | 4.16KV bus network. Diesel generator provided power to redundant essential bus.
 0 4 | Reportable under Tech. Spec. 6.7.B.2.c. No similar occurrences. No affect on
 0 5 | public health and safety.

0 6 |
 0 7 |
 0 8 |

0 9 | E | B | A | B | C | K | T | B | R | K | A | Z | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 20

17 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 3 | L | 0
21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

A | H | Z | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Y | N | A | G | 0 | 8 | 0
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | Operator error caused initial bus fault. Undervoltage relaying system resulted
 1 1 | in the loss of all 4.16KV buses. Undervoltage relaying modified to allow over-
 1 2 | current relaying to isolate faulted bus from total 4.16KV network. Operator
 1 3 | annual retraining program will include proper breaker operations.

1 4 |

1 5 | H | 0 | 0 | 0 | NA | A | Operator Observation
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80

1 6 | Z | Z | NA | NA
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

1 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Z | NA
7 8 9 10 11 13 80

1 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | NA
7 8 9 10 11 13 80

1 9 | D | Breaker, Breaker Cubicle, Bus Stabs
7 8 9 10 11 12 80

2 0 | N | NA
7 8 9 10 80

NAME OF PREPARER Lawrence Pudlick

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810600 1441

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES ATTACHMENT

During refueling outage, an energized 4.16KV breaker was racked out under load. Subsequent bus fault on No. 16 essential bus caused the instantaneous undervoltage relays associated with 1R transformer to trip prior to the over-current relays on the faulted bus. A momentary loss of entire 4.16KV bus network was experienced as system relaying exposed the alternative sources of power to the fault. 1AR transformer and No. 12 diesel generator closed into the faulted bus and subsequently tripped on undervoltage and overcurrent, respectively. No. 11 diesel generator automatically supplied power to No. 15 essential bus. Subsequent operator actions restored power to the unfaulted buses through transformer 1R. The faulted essential bus and damaged breaker were automatically isolated.