REGULATORY NFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYMMEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8106010441 DOC.DATE: 81/05/22 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET # FACIL:50-263 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Northern States 05000263

AUTHOR AFFILIATION

PUBLICK, L. Northern States Power Co. RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

Region 2, Atlanta, Office of the Director (81/03/01)

SUBJECT: LER 81-009/03L-0:on 810427, during refueling outage, 416 KV breaker was racked out under load. Caused by operator error. Undervoltage relaying modified to allow overcurrent relaying to isolate faulted bus from total network.

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TITLE: Incident Reports

NOTES:


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ACTION:	IPPOLITO,T.	0 4	3	3				
INTERNAL:	A/D COMP&STRU		1	1 .	A/D ENV TECH 07	7 1	1	
	A/D MATL & QL	108	1	1	A/D OP REACTOOS		1	
	A/D PLANT SYS	310	1	1	A/D RAD PROT 11	1	1	
	A/D SFTY ASSE	12	1	1	ACC EVAL BR 14	1 1	1	
	AEOD		3	3	AEOD/DMU	3	3.	
	ASLBP/J.HARD		1	1	AUX SYS BR 15	5 1	1	
	CHEM ENG BR	16	1	1	CONT SYS BR 17	7 1	1	
	CORE PERF BR	18	1	1	DIR, ENGINEERIZ	1	1	
	DIR, HUM FAC S	158	1	1	DIR, SYS INTEG22	2 1	1	
	EFF TR SYS BE	123	1	1	EQUIP QUAL BRZS	5 1	1	
	GEOSCIENCES	26	1	1	I&C SYS BR 29	9 1	1	
	I&E	05	1	1	JORDAN, E./IE	1.	1	
	LIC GUID BR	30	1	1	MATL ENG BR 32	2 1	1	
	MECH ENG BR	33	1	1	NRC PDR 02	2 1	1	
	OR ASSESS BR	35	1	1	POWER SYS BR 36	5 1	1	
	RAD SSESS BA	₹39	ī	1	REACT SYS BR 40	1	1	
Ø	REG FILE	01	ī	1	REL & RISK A 41	1	1	
	SELY PROG EVA		1	1	STRUCT ENG BR44		1	
EXTERNAL:	ACRS	46	16	16	INPO, J. STEARNS	1	1	
	LPDR	03	1	1	NSIC 05	5 1	1	

JUN 12 1987



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
0 1 MN N P 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 57 CAT 58
CON'T O 1 SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 3 7 0 4 2 7 8 1 8 0 5 2 2 8 1 9 O CON'T O 1 O 1 O 1 O 1 O 1 O 1 O 1 O
EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) [0 2 During refueling outage, bus fault on essential bus caused momentary loss of entire
0 3 4.16KV bus network. Diesel generator provided power to redundant essential bus.
[0 4 Reportable under Tech. Spec. 6.7.B.2.c. No similar occurrences. No affect on
0 5 public health and safety.
0 6
7 8 9 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE
CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE
LER/RO EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION NO. 17 REPORT 8 1 0 0 9 0 3 L 0
ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT METHOD HOURS 22 SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT MANUFACTURER A 18 H 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 0 Y 23 N 24 A 25 G 0 8 0 25
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) [10] Operator error caused initial bus fault. Undervoltage relaying system resulted
in the loss of all 4.16KV buses. Undervoltage relaying modified to allow over-
[1] current relaying to isolate faulted bus from total 4.16KV network. Operator
annual retraining program will include proper breaker operations.
11 4 L
FACILITY STATUS OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 1 5
ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 NA LOCATION OF RELEASE 36
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 39 1 7 0 0 0 0 37 Z 38 NA
7 8 9 PERSONNEL INJURIES 13 SO NUMBER DESCRIPTION 41 NA
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 43 TYPE DESCRIPTION Description 1 9 D 42 Breaker, Breaker Cubicle, Bus Stabs
PUBLICITY SSUED DESCRIPTION 45 NRC USE ONLY
7 8 9 10 68 69 80 5
NAME OF PREPARER Lawrence Pudlick PHONE: (612)295-5151
8106001441



EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES ATTACHMENT

During refueling outage, an energized 4.16KV breaker was racked out under load. Subsequent bus fault on No. 16 essential bus caused the instantaneous undervoltage relays associated with 1R transformer to trip prior to the overcurrent relays on the faulted bus. A momentary loss of entire 4.16KV bus network was experienced as system relaying exposed the alternative sources of power to the fault. 1AR transformer and No. 12 diesel generator closed into the faulted bus and subsequently tripped on undervoltage and overcurrent, respectively. No. 11 diesel generator automatically supplied power to No. 15 essential bus. Subsequent operator actions restored power to the unfaulted buses through transformer 1R. The faulted essential bus and damaged breaker were automatically isolated.