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SUBJECT: Forwards response to six concerns re NUREG-0737,Item II.D.1, "Relief & Safety Valve Test Requirements," in response to NRC 830104 ltr.

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March 11, 1983

Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22

Additional Information Related to NUREG-0737, Item II.D.1,
Relief and Safety Valve Test Requirements

In a letter dated January 4, 1983 from Mr Domenic B Vassallo, Chief, Operating Reactors Branch #2, Division of Licensing, we were requested to provide our response to six Staff concerns related to the BWR Safety/Relief Valve Operability Test Program and their applicability to the Monticello plant.

Our response to each of the six items is provided in the attachment to this letter. Please contact us if you have any questions related to the information we have provided.

David Musolf
Manager - Nuclear Support Services

DMM/bd

cc: Regional Administartor-III, NRC
NRR Project Manager, NRC
Resident Inspector, NRC
G Charnoff

Attachment

A046

NUREG - 0737 ITEM II.D.1

"RELIEF AND SAFETY VALVE TEST REQUIREMENTS"

(RESPONSES)

NRC QUESTION 1

The test program utilized a "rams head" discharge pipe configuration. Monticello utilizes a "tee" quencher configuration at the end of the discharge line. Describe the discharge pipe configuration used at Monticello and compare the anticipated loads on valve internals in the Monticello configuration to the measured loads in the test program. Discuss the impact of any differences in loads on valve operability.

RESPONSE TO QUESTION 1

The safety/relief valve discharge piping configuration at Monticello utilizes a "tee" quencher at the discharge pipe exit. The average length of the eight SRV discharge lines (SRVDL) is 120' and the submergence length in the suppression pool is approximately 12.5'. The SRV test program utilized a ramshead at the discharge pipe exit, a pipe length of 112' and a submergence length of approximately 13'. Loads on valve internals during the test program are larger than loads on valve internals in the Monticello configuration for the following reasons:

1. No dynamic mechanical load originating at the "tee" quencher is transmitted to the valve in the Monticello configuration because there is at least one anchor point between the valve and the tee quencher.

2. The first length of the segment of piping downstream of the SRV in the test facility was longer than the Monticello piping, thereby resulting in a bounding dynamic mechanical load on the valve in the test program due to the larger moment arm between the SRV and the first elbow. The first segment length in the test facility is 12 ft. whereas this length is 5' ft. in the plant configuration.

3. Dynamic hydraulic loads (backpressure) are experienced by the valve internals in the Monticello configuration. The backpressure loads may be either (i) transient backpressures occurring during valve actuation, or (ii) steady-state backpressures occurring during steady-state flow following valve actuation.

(a) The key parameters affecting the transient backpressures are the fluid pressure upstream of the valve, the valve opening time, the fluid inertia in the submerged SRVDL and the SRVDL air volume. Transient backpressures increase with higher upstream pressure, shorter valve opening times, greater line submergence, and smaller SRVDL air volume. The transient backpressure in the test program was maximized by utilizing a submergence of 13', which is greater than Monticello and pipe length of 112' which is less than Monticello. The maximum transient backpressure occurs with high pressure steam flow conditions. The transient backpressure for the alternate shutdown cooling mode of operation is always much less than the design for steam flow conditions because of the lower upstream pressure and the longer valve opening time.

(b) The steady-state backpressure in the test program was maximized by utilizing an orifice plate in SRVDL above the water level and before the ramshead. The orifice was sized to produce a backpressure greater than that calculated for any of the Monticello SRVDL's.

The difference in the line configuration between the Monticello plant and the test program as discussed above result in the loads on the valve internals for the test facility which bound the actual Monticello loads. An additional consideration in the selection of the ramshead for the test facility was to allow more direct measurement of the thrust load in the final pipe segment. Utilization of a "tee" quencher in the test program would have required quencher supports that would unnecessarily obscure accurate measurement of the pipe thrust loads. For the reasons stated above, differences between the SRVDL configurations in Monticello and the test facility will not have any adverse effect on SRV operability at Monticello relative to the test facility.

NRC QUESTION 2

The test configuration utilized no spring hangers as pipe supports. Plant specific configurations do use spring hangers in conjunction with snubber and rigid supports. Describe the safety relief valve pipe supports used at Monticello and compare the anticipated loads on valve internals for the Monticello pipe supports to the measured loads in the test program. Describe the impact of any differences in loads on valve operability.

RESPONSE TO QUESTION 2

The Monticello safety-relief valve discharge lines (SRVDL's) are supported by a combination of snubbers, rigid supports, and spring hangers. The locations of snubbers and rigid supports at Monticello are such that the location of such supports in the BWR generic test facility is prototypical, i.e., in each case (Monticello and the test facility) there are supports near each change of direction in the pipe routing. Additionally, each SRVDL at Monticello has only 3 spring hangers, all of which are located in the drywell. The spring hangers, snubbers, and rigid supports were designed to accommodate combinations of loads resulting from piping dead weight, thermal conditions, seismic and suppression pool hydrodynamic events, and a high pressure steam discharge transient.

The dynamic load effects on the piping and supports of the test facility due to the water discharge event (the alternate shutdown cooling mode) were found to be significantly lower than corresponding loads resulting from the high pressure steam discharge event. As stated in NEDE-24988-P, this finding is considered generic to all BWR's since the test facility was designed to be prototypical of the features pertinent to this issue. Furthermore, analysis of a typical Monticello SRVDL configuration has confirmed the applicability of this conclusion to Monticello.

During the water discharge transient there will be significantly lower dynamic loads acting on the snubbers and rigid supports than during the steam discharge transient. This will more than offset the small increase in the dead load on these supports due to the weight of the water during the alternate shutdown cooling mode of operation. Therefore, design adequacy of the snubbers and rigid supports is assured as they are designed for the larger steam discharge transient loads.

This question addresses the design adequacy of the spring hangers with respect to the increased dead load due to the weight of the water during the liquid discharge transient. As was discussed with respect to snubbers and rigid supports, the dynamic loads resulting from liquid discharge during the alternate shutdown cooling mode of operation are significantly lower than those from the high pressure steam discharge. Therefore, it is believed that sufficient margin exists in the Monticello piping system design to adequately offset the increased dead load on the spring hangers in an unpinned conditions due to a water filled condition. Furthermore, the effect of the water dead weight load does not affect the ability of SRVs to open to establish the alternate shutdown cooling path since the loads occur in the SRVDL only after valve opening.

NRC QUESTION 3

Report NEDE-24988-P did not identify any valve functional deficiencies or anomalies encountered during the test program. Describe the impact on valve safety function of any valve functional deficiencies or anomalies encountered during the program.

RESPONSE TO QUESTION 3

No functional deficiencies or anomalies of the safety relief or relief valves were experienced during the testing at Wyle Laboratories for compliance with the alternate shutdown cooling mode requirement. All of the valves subjected to test runs, valid and invalid, opened and closed without loss of pressure integrity or damage. Anomalies encountered during this test program were all due to failures of test facility instrumentation, equipment, data acquisition equipment, or deviation from the approved test procedure.

The test specification for each valve required six runs. Under the test procedure, any anomaly caused the test run to be judged invalid. All anomalies were reported in the test report. The Wyle Laboratories test log sheet for the 3-Stage Target Rock valve tests is attached. This valve is used in the Monticello Nuclear Power Station.

Each Wyle test report for the respective valves identifies each test run performed and documents whether or not the test run is valid or invalid and states the reason for considering the run invalid. No anomaly encountered during the required test program affects any valve safety or operability function.

All valid test runs are identified in Table 2.2-1 of NEDE-24988-P. The data presented in Table 4.2-1 for each valve were obtained from the Table 2.2-1 test runs and were based upon the selection criteria of:

(a) Presenting the maximum representative loading information obtained from the steam run data,

(b) Presenting the maximum representative water loading information obtained from the 15°F subcooled water test data,

(c) Presenting the data on the only test run performed for the 50°F subcooled water test condition.

OPERABILITY TEST REPORT

FOR

TARGET ROCK THREE STAGE SRV

FOR

LOW PRESSURE WATER TESTS

FOR

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY

175 Curtner Avenue
San Jose, California

TABLE I

TEST LOG FOR SRV TR-2

TEST NO.	TEST MEDIA	LOAD LINE CONFIGURATION	TEST DATE	REMARKS
201	Steam	I	3/10/81	Back pressure low. Test Unacceptable.
202	Steam	I	3/10/81	Installed 6.8" orifice. Test Acceptable.
203	Water	I	3/10/81	Test Acceptable.
204	Steam	I	3/11/81	Test Acceptable.
205	Water	I	3/11/81	Pipe loads high. See NOA # 5.
206	Steam	I	3/11/81	Test Acceptable.
207	Water	I	3/11/81	Not Acceptable. Low steam chest pressure.
208	Water	I	3/11/81	Test Acceptable. Water temperature low.
209	Water	I	3/30/81	Test Acceptable.
210	Water	I	3/30/81	Test Acceptable.
211	Water	I	3/30/81	Test Acceptable.

NOTICE OF ANOMALY

NOTICE NO. 5 P. O. NUMBER: 205-XH212 WYLE JOB NO. 17476-03

CONTRACT NUMBER: N/A

CATEGORY: ☐ SPECIMEN ☐ PROCEDURE ☒ TEST EQUIPMENT DATE: 3/14/81

TO: General Electric Company ATTN: Mr. R. Miller

PART NAME: Target Rock 3-Stage SRV PART NO. N/A

TEST: Low Pressure Water I. D. NO. TR-2

SPECIFICATION: WTP 17450-01 PARA. NO. N/A

NOTIFICATION MADE TO: J. Mross/A. Sallman DATE: 3/14/81

NOTIFICATION MADE BY: L. Millsaps VIA: Verbal

REQUIREMENTS:

N/A

DESCRIPTION OF ANOMALY:

When the water control valve was opened to initiate the test, the entire system was subjected to a shock wave similar to water hammer. As a result, loads of approximately 10,000 and 16,000 pounds were observed at Struts 1 and 2. Review of the recorded data showed no abnormal pressure in the discharge line, but did show sharply varying pressure in the steam chest and inlet water pipe.

DISPOSITION – COMMENTS – RECOMMENDATIONS:

The recorded data shows that the anomaly occurred in the inlet piping and/or steam chest and, therefore, was not caused by the SRV. The probable cause was the forming of vapor in the inlet pipe because of the higher water temperature (233°F) and the low pressure (8 to 10 psig). The vapor then compressed when subjected to the higher pressure water (300 psig), thus causing a shock wave in the water system. Since the discharge pipe loads were caused by the shock wave rather than the SRV, the data must be considered invalid.

The test was not repeated. However, three other water tests were conducted on this SRV, and all data was consistent. In addition, water tests were performed on a two-stage Target Rock SRV, and no anomalies occurred.

It is, therefore, recommended that the test not be repeated.

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TEST WITNESS –

–

REPRESENTING –

ENGINEER L. Millsaps LE7

QUALITY CONTROL C. Oakley

PROJECT MANAGER F. M. [illegible]

NRC QUESTION 4

The purpose of the test program was to determine valve performance under conditions anticipated to be encountered in the plants. Describe the events and anticipated conditions at Monticello for which the valves are required to operate and compare these plant conditions to the conditions in the test program. Describe the plant features assumed in the event evaluations used to scope the test program and compare them to plant features at Monticello. For example, describe high level trips to prevent water from entering the steam lines under high pressure operating conditions as assumed in the test event and compare them to trips used at Monticello.

RESPONSE TO NRC QUESTION 4

The purpose of the S/RV test program was to demonstrate that the Safety Relief Valve (S/RV) will open and reclose under all expected flow conditions. The expected valve operating conditions were determined through the use of analyses of accidents and anticipated operational occurrences referenced in Regulatory Guide 1.70, Revision 2. Single failures were applied to these analyses so that the dynamic forces on the safety and relief valves would be maximized. Test pressures were the highest predicted by conventional safety analysis procedures. The BWR Owners Group, in their enclosure to the September 17, 1980 letter form D. B. Waters to R.H. Vollmer, identified 13 events which may result in liquid or two-phase S/RV inlet flow that would maximize the dynamic forces on the safety and relief valve. These events were identified by evaluating the initial events described in Regulatory Guide 1.70, Revision 2, with and without the additional conservatism of a single active component failure or operator error postulated in the event sequence. It was concluded from this evaluation that the alternate shutdown cooling mode is the only expected event which will result in liquid at the valve inlet. Consequently, this was the event simulated in the S/RV program. This conclusion and the test results applicable to Monticello are discussed below. The alternate shutdown cooling mode of operation has been described in the response to NRC Question 5.

The S/RV inlet fluid conditions tested in the BWR Owners Group S/RV test program, as documented in NEDE-24988-P, are 15° to 50° subcooled liquid at

20 psig to 250 psig. These fluid conditions envelope the conditions expected to occur at Monticello in the alternate shutdown cooling mode of operation.

The BWR Owners Group identified 13 events by evaluating the initiating events described in Regulatory Guide 1.70, Revision 2, with the additional conservatism of single active component failure or operator error postulated in the events sequence. These events and the plant-specific features that mitigate these events, are summarized in Table 1. Of these 13 events, only 10 are applicable to the Monticello plant because of its design and specific plant configuration. Three events, namely 5, 6, and 10 are not applicable to the Monticello plant for the reasons listed below:

a. Events 5 and 10 are not applicable, because Monticello does not have a HPCS System.

b. Event 6 is not applicable because Monticello does not have a RCIC head spray.

For the 10 remaining events, the Monticello specific features, such as trip logic, power supplies, instrument line configuration, alarms and operator actions, have been compared to the base case analysis presented in the BWR Owners group submittal of September 17, 1980. The comparison has demonstrated that in each case, the base case analysis is applicable to Monticello because the base case analysis does not include any plant features which are not already present in the Monticello design. For these events, Table 1 demonstrates that the Monticello specific features are included in the base case analyses presented in the BWR Owners Group submittal of September 17, 1980. It is seen from Table 1, that all plant features assumed in the event evaluation are also existing features in the Monticello plant. All features included in this base case analysis are similar to plant features in the Monticello design. Furthermore, the time available for operator action is expected to be longer in the Monticello plant than in the base case analysis for each case where operator action is required.

Event 7, the alternate shutdown cooling mode of operation, is the only expected event which will result in liquid or two-phase fluid at the S/RV inlet. Consequently, this event was simulated in the BWR S/RV test program. In

Monticello, this event involves flow of subcooled water (approximately 34°F subcooled) at a pressure of approximately 50 psig. The test conditions clearly envelope these plant conditions.

As discussed above, the BWR Owners Group evaluated transients including single active failures that would maximize the dynamic forces on the safety relief valves. As a result of this evaluation, the alternate shutdown cooling mode is the only expected event involving liquid or two-phase flow. Consequently this event was tested in the BWR S/RV test program. The fluid conditions and flow conditions tested in the BWR Owners Group test program conservatively envelope the Monticello plant specific fluid conditions expected for the alternate shutdown cooling mode of operation.

TABLE 1 - EVENTS EVALUATED

PLANT FEATURES	#1 FW Cont. Fail., FW L8 Trip Failure	#2 Press. Reg. Fail.	#3 Transient HPCI, HPCI L8 Trip Failure	#4 Transient RCIC, RCIC L8 Trip Failure	#5 Transient HPCS, HPCS L8 Trip Failure	#6 Transient RCIC Hd. Spr.	#7 Alt. Shutdown Cooling, Shutdown Suction Unavailable	#8 MSL Brk OSC	#9 SBA, RCIC, RCIC L8 Trip Failure	#10 SBA, HPCS, HPCS L8 Trip Failure	#11 SBA, HPCI, HPCI L8 Trip Failure	#12 SBA, Depress. & ECCS Over., Operator Error	#13 LBA, ECCS Overf Brk Isol
High Water Level 7 Alarm	X / S		X / S	X / S	X / NA				X / S	X / NA	X / S	X / S	X / S
High Drywell Pressure Alarm													
FW Level 8 Trip	X / S	X / S											
RCIC Level 8 Trip			X / S	X / S	X / NA				X / S	X / NA	X / S		X / S
HPCS Level 8 Trip				X / NA	X / NA				X / NA	X / NA			X / NA
HPCI Level 8 Trip			X / S	X / S					X / S		X / S		X / S
HPCI/S and RCIC Initiation on Low Water Level	X / S	X / S	X / S	X / S	X / NA	X / NA		X / S	X / S				X / S
HPCI/S initiation on High Drywell Pressure			X / S	X / S					X / S	X / NA	X / S	X / S	X / S
RCIC Initiation on High Drywell Pressure													X / S

TABLE 1 - EVENTS EVALUATED

PLANT FEATURES	#1 FW Cont. Fail., FW L8 Trip Failure	#2 Press. Reg. Fail.	#3 Transient HPCI, HPCI L8 Trip Failure	#4 Transient RCIC, RCIC L8 Trip Failure	#5 Transient HPCS, HPCS L8 Trip Failure	#6 Transient RCIC Hd. Spr.	#7 Alt. Shutdown Cooling, Shutdown Suction Unavailable	#8 MSL Brk OSC	#9 SBA, RCIC, RCIC L8 Trip Failure	#10 SBA, HPCS, HPCS L8 Trip Failure	#11 SBA, HPCI, HPCI L8 Trip Failure	#12 SBA, Depress. & ECCS Over., Operator Error	#13 LBA, ECCS Overf Brk Isol
Low Pressure ECCS Initiation on High Drywell Pressure												X / S	X / S
Low Pressure Initiation on Low Water Level													X / S
FW Pumps Trip on Low Suction Pressure	X / S												
HPCS Trip on High Backpressure			X / NA								X / NA		
RCIC Trip on High Backpressure				X / S					X / S				
Turbine Trip on Vessel High Level	X / S	X / S											
MSIVs Closure on Low Turbine Inlet Pressure	X / S	X / S						X / S					
MSIVs Closure on High Steam Flow		X / S						X / S					
MSIVs Closure on High Steam Tunnel Temperature								X / S					

TABLE 1 - EVENTS EVALUATED

PLANT FEATURES	#1 FW Cont. Fail., FW L8 Trip Failure	#2 Press. Reg. Fail.	#3 Transient HPCI, HPCI L8 Trip Failure	#4 Transient RCIC, RCIC L8 Trip Failure	#5 Transient HPCS, HPCS L8 Trip Failure	#6 Transient RCIC Hd. Spr.	#7 Alt. Shutdown Cooling, Shutdown Suction Unavailable	#8 MSL Brk OSC	#9 SBA, RCIC, RCIC L8 Trip Failure	#10 SBA, HPCS, HPCS L8 Trip Failure	#11 SBA, HPCI, HPCI L8 Trip Failure	#12 SBA, Depress. & ECCS Over., Operator Error	#13 LBA, ECCS Overf Brk Isol
MSIV Closure on High Radiation								X / S					
Reactor Scram on Turbine Trip	X / S	X / S											
Reactor Scram on Neutron Flux Monitor		X / S											
Reactor Scram on MSIVs Closure		X / S											
Reactor Scram on High Radiation								X / S					
Reactor Scram on High Drywell Pressure									X / S	X / NA	X / S	X / S	X / S
Reactor Scram on Low Water Level													X / S
Reactor Isolation on Low Water Level													X / S

KEY: X - Feature considered in Base Case Analysis
S - Feature in Plant Specific Design
NA - Not Applicable

NRC QUESTION 5

The valves are likely to be extensively cycled in a controlled depressurization mode in a plant specific application. Was this mode simulated in the test program? What is the effect of this valve cycling on valve performance and probability of the valve to fail open or to fail closed.

RESPONSE TO NRC QUESTION 5

The BWR safety/relief valve (SRV) operability test program was designed to simulate the alternate shutdown cooling mode, which is the only expected liquid discharge event for Monticello. Although the alternate shutdown cooling mode has not been formalized at Monticello, procedures are presently being prepared. The sequence of events leading to the alternate shutdown cooling mode is given below.

Following normal reactor shutdown, the reactor operator depressurizes the reactor vessel by opening the turbine bypass valves and removing heat through the main condenser. If the main condenser is unavailable, the operator could depressurize the reactor vessel by using the SRV's to discharge steam to the suppression pool. If SRV operation is required, the operator cycles the valves in order to assure that the cooldown rate is maintained within the technical specifications limit of 100°F per hour. When the vessel is depressurized, the operator initiates normal shutdown cooling by use of the RHR system. If that system is unavailable because the valve on the RHR shutdown cooling suction line fails to open, the operator initiates the alternate shutdown cooling mode.

For alternate shutdown cooling, the operator opens one SRV and initiates either an RHR or core spray pump utilizing the suppression pool as the suction source. The reactor vessel is filled such that water is allowed to flow into the main steam lines and out of the SRV and back to the suppression pool. Cooling of the system is provided by use of an RHR heat exchanger. As a result, an alternate cooling mode is maintained.

In order to assure continuous long term heat removal, the SRV is kept open and no cycling of the valve is performed. In order to control the reactor vessel cooldown rate, the operator will be instructed to control the flow rate into the vessel. Consequently, no cyling of the SRV is required for the alternate shutdown cooling mode, and no cycling of the SRV was performed for the generic BWR SRV operability test program.

The ability of the Monticello SRV to be extensively cycled for steam discharge conditions has been confirmed during steam discharge qualification testing of the valve by the valve vendor. Based on the qualification testing of the SRV's, the cycling of the valves in a controlled depressurization mode for steam discharge conditions will not adversely affect valve performance and the probability of the valve to fail open or closed is extremely low.

NRC QUESTION 6

Describe how the values of valve C_v's in report NEDE-24988-P will be used at Monticello. Show that the methodology used in the test program to determine the valve C_v will be consistent with the application at Monticello.

RESPONSE TO NRC QUESTION 6

The flow coefficient, Cv, for the 3-stage Target Rock safety relief valve (SRV) utilized in Monticello was determined in the generic SRV test program (NEDE-24988-P). The average flow coefficient calculated from the test results for the 3-Stage Target Rock, is reported in Table 5.2-1 of NEDE-24988-P. This test value has been used by Northern States Power Co. to confirm that the liquid discharge flow capacity of the Monticello SRV's will be sufficient to remove core decay heat when injecting into the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) in the alternate shutdown cooling mode. The C_v value determined in the SRV test demonstrates that the Monticello SRV's are capable of returning the flow injected by the RHR or CS pump to the suppression pool.

If it were necessary for the operator to place the Monticello plant in the alternate shutdown cooling mode, he would assure that adequate core cooling was being provided by monitoring the following parameters: RHR or CS flow rate, reactor vessel pressure and reactor vessel temperature.

The flow coefficient for the 3-Stage Target Rock valve reported in NEDE-24988-P was determined from the SRV flow rate when the valve inlet was pressurized to approximately 250 psig. The valve flow rate was measured with the supply line flow venturi upstream of the steam chest. The C_v for the valve was calculated using the nominal measured pressure differential between the valve inlet (steam chest) and 3' downstream of the valve and the corresponding measured flowrate. Furthermore, the test conditions and test configuration were representative of Monticello plant conditions for the alternate shutdown cooling mode, e.g. pressure upstream of the valve, fluid temperature, friction losses and liquid flowrate. Therefore, the reported C_v values are appropriate for application to the Monticello plant.