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 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Director

SUBJECT: Responds to GE 800221 ltr re list of concerns from ACRS consultant, HCPI & reactor core isolation cooling described. Completes commitment re NUREG-0660, Item II.K.3.46.

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NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY

MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA 55401

June 30, 1980

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22
Response to List of Concerns from ACRS Consultant

This letter completes our commitment related to NUREG 0660 item II.K.3.46.

The February 21, 1980, letter from R. H. Bucholz (GE) to D. F. Ross (NRC), concerning Response to Questions Posed by Mr. C. Michelson, has been reviewed and found to be adequate and applicable to the Monticello Plant with the following minor exceptions and clarifications:

- Question 2 - The Response states "Automatic isolation only occurs for breaks outside containment." Assuming that this statement refers to high pressure systems (HPCI and RCIC), it is true for small breaks which do not initiate a high steam flow isolation. High steam flow isolation of HPCI and RCIC could be initiated by larger breaks anywhere downstream of the flow sensors located inside containment.
- Question 7 - The response statements concerning sharing of suction piping are true for the normal standby valve configuration. It is physically possible to have HPCI and RCIC take suction from the torus ring header which also supplies LPCI and CS. However, system characteristics and design preclude simultaneous high flow operation of the high pressure and low pressure systems.

We are not aware of any preoperational or startup tests at Monticello that demonstrated simultaneous full flow operation of RCIC and HPCI or LPCI and Core Spray (CS). RCIC flow is a small increment of rated HPCI flow (~ 13%) and no problems with simultaneous operation are expected. We intend to verify this during regular scheduled surveillance testing.


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An extensive and conservative analysis of post accident LPCI operation was reported in our letters of June 7, July 30 and September 27, 1976, in response to NRC letters of May 20 and August 23, 1976. This analysis, which concerned evaluation of possible operation in excess of design flow, considered simultaneous CS and LPCI operation. It provides a basis for concluding that adequate NPSH is available for LPCI. An evaluation of the data used in that analysis and the CS pump NPSH requirements has been performed and it was found that adequate NPSH is also available for the CS pumps.

Question 12 - Individual room sump alarms exist for the RHR/CS rooms. HPCI and RCIC leakage could be detected by reactor building sump alarms.

Question 15 - We are not aware of procedures or training which would make it "unlikely" that an operator would manually initiate drywell sprays following a LOCA, if necessary. It should be noted that the new procedure guidelines provide criteria for operation of containment spray systems.



L. O. Mayer, PE
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LOM/MHC/kik

cc: J G Keppler
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