Exhibit B

License Amendment Request dated April 29, 1985

Docket No. 50-263
License No. DPR-22

Exhibit B consists of revised pages for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Technical Specifications as listed below:

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3.0 LIMITING GAS CONTROL SYSTEM	4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
E. Combustible Gas Control System	E. Combustible Gas Control System
1. Two separate and independent Combustible Gas Control System trains shall be operable at all times whenever the reactor is in the run mode except as specified in Section 3.7.E.2 below.	1. At least once an operating cycle, perform the following:
2. After one or both of the Combustible Gas Control System train(s) are made or found to be inoperable for any reason, restore the inoperable train(s) to operable status within 30 days or submit a special report to the Commission within the next 30 days which includes the following information: 1) Identification of the inoperable equipment or subsystems and the reason for inoperability, 2) Action(s) to be taken to restore equipment to operable status, and 3) Summary description of action(s) taken to prevent recurrence.	a. Verify the recombiner reaction chamber operability by verifying that the outlet temperature exceeds 600°F within one hour and that heater current is within 3% of rated current when the power setting is increased to maximum. b. Calibrate the following instrumentation and control circuits. 1. Inlet flow indicator 2. Total flow indicator 3. Return gas high temperature 4. High reaction chamber temperature c. Perform a resistance to ground test on all heater electrical circuits.

TABLE 3.7.1, continued
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION

Isolation Group	Valve Identification	Number of Valves		Maximum Operating Time (Sec)	Normal Position
		Inboard	Outboard		
2	Shutdown Cooling System		1	120	Closed
2	Shutdown Cooling System		1	120	Closed
2	Reactor Head Cooling Line	1	1	120	Closed
2	Combustible Gas Control		8	60	Closed
3	Cleanup Demineralizer System	1	1	40	Open
3	Cleanup Demineralizer System		1	40	Open
4	HPCI Turbine Steam Supply	1	1	40	Open
5	RCIC Turbine Steam Supply	1	1	30	Open

NOTE: Isolation Groupings are as follows:

Group 1: The valves in Group 1 are closed upon any of the following conditions:
1. Reactor low low water level
2. Main steam line high radiation
3. Main steam line high flow
4. Main steam line tunnel high temperature
5. Main steam line low pressure (RUN mode only)

Group 2: The actions in Group 2 are initiated by any one of the following conditions:
1. Reactor low water level
2. High Drywell pressure

NOTE: Manual override is provided to permit CGCS operation during Group II isolation.

Bases Continued:

While only a small amount of particulates are released from the primary containment as a result of the loss of coolant accident, high-efficiency particulate filters before and after the charcoal filters are specified to minimize potential particulate release to the environment and to prevent clogging of the charcoal adsorbers. The charcoal adsorbers are installed to reduce the potential release of radioiodine to the environment. The in-place test results should indicate a system leak tightness of less than 1% bypass leakage for the charcoal adsorbers using halogenated hydrocarbon and a HEPA filter efficiency of at least 99% removal of DOP particulates. Laboratory carbon sample test results indicate a radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiency for expected accident conditions. Operation of the standby gas treatment circuits significantly different from the design flow will change the removal efficiency of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers. If the performance requirements are met as specified, the calculated doses would be less than the guidelines stated in 10 CFR 100 for the accidents analyzed.

D. Primary Containment Isolation Valves

Double isolation valves are provided on lines penetrating the primary containment. Closure of one of the valves in each line would be sufficient to maintain the integrity of the pressure suppression system. Automatic initiation is required to minimize the potential leakage paths from the containment in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident. Details of the isolation valves are discussed in Sections 5.2 and 7.2 of the FSAR.

E. Combustible Gas Control System

The function of the Combustible Control System (CGCS) is to maintain oxygen concentrations in the post-accident containment atmosphere below combustible concentrations. Oxygen may be generated in the hours following a loss of coolant accident from radioalysis of reactor coolant.

The Technical Specifications limit oxygen concentrations during operation to less than five percent by weight during operation. The maintenance of an inert atmosphere during operation precludes the build-up of a combustible mixture due to a fuel metal-water reaction. The other potential mechanism for generation of combustible mixtures is radioalysis of coolant which has been found to be small. Therefore, continued plant operation with an inoperable CGCS train has little effect on plant safety.

Efforts will be made to restore inoperable CGCS equipment to service. A special report is required to be submitted to the Commission to outline CGCS equipment failures and corrective actions to be taken if inoperability exceeds thrity days.

Bases Continued:

The containment is penetrated by a large number of small diameter instrument lines. A program for the periodic testing (see Specification 4.7.D) and examination of the valves in these lines has been developed and a report covering this program was submitted to the AEC on July 27, 1983.

The main steam line isolation valves are functionally tested on a more frequent interval to establish a high degree of reliability.

E. Combustible Gas Control System

The Combustible Gas Control System, CGCS, is functionally tested once each operating cycle to ensure that the recombiner trains will be available if required.