



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

TELEPHONE
(312) 858-2660

September 7, 1972

Northern States Power Company
ATTN: Mr. Leo Wachter, Vice President
Power Production and System
Operation
414 Nicollet Mall
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401

Docket No. 50-263

Gentlemen:

Thank you for your letter dated August 22, 1972, informing us of the steps you have taken to correct the item of apparent noncompliance which we brought to your attention in our letter dated July 31, 1972. We will review this matter during our next inspection.

Your cooperation with us is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Boyce H. Grier
Regional Director

bcc w/ltr dtd 8-22-72:

J. G. Keppler, RO
R. H. Engelken, RO
H. D. Thornburg, RO
P. A. Morris, RO
A. Giambusso, L
RO Files

DR Central Files

PDR
Local PDR
NSIC
DTIE



NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401

August 22, 1972

Mr. Boyce Grier, Regional Director
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region III
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Grier:

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22

In your letter of July 31, 1972, you identified an item that appeared to be in noncompliance with AEC license requirements. A copy of the item is attached for your reference. As requested, the following information is hereby submitted.

As discussed with Messrs. Maura and Johnson during their recent inspection and as reported to the AEC-Directorate of Licensing in the July 20, 1972 letter from Mr. L. O. Mayer to Mr. Giambusso, the tape found covering two of the drywell pressure sensing lines was removed and all drywell and torus pressure sensing and sampling lines were inspected for flow restrictions. The inspections were performed prior to the resumption of power operation on July 16, 1972. As shown on the attached table, all sensing lines were verified free of restriction.

It is believed that the sensing lines were taped during plant construction and that it is unlikely that an external restriction would again be placed in the lines. However, to prevent the unlikely recurrence of this event, warning tags will be placed on the sensing line taps in the drywell and torus. These tags will be placed during a future outage.

Yours very truly,

L. J. Wachter, Vice President
Power Production and System Operations

LJW/kik

attachment

AUG 25 1972

RESULTS OF EXAMINATION
OF TORUS AND DRYWELL PENETRATIONS

(July 15, 1972)

Penetration	Description	Condition	Examination Method
X-50F & X-50E	Drywell Pressure Tap	Taped *	Visual inspection and verification of back flow from pressure switch calibration tap into drywell.
X-29E & X-29F	Drywell Pressure Tap	Clear	Visual inspection and verification of flow from pressure switch calibration tap into drywell. (After establishing flow, shut penetration root valve and noted pressure increase at calibration tap.)
X-27D, X-27E, and X-27F	Drywell Sampling Tap	Clear	Verification of flow from pressure switch calibration tap into drywell. (After establishing flow, shut penetration root valve and noted pressure increase at calibration tap.)
X-209A	Torus Pressure Tap	Clear	Verification of flow from pressure switch calibration tap into torus. (After establishing flow, shut penetration root valve and noted pressure increase at calibration tap.)
X-220	Torus Sampling Tap	Clear	Verification of flow from pressure switch calibration tap into torus. (After establishing flow, shut penetration root valve and noted pressure increase at calibration tap.)

* Tape removed at time of discovery.

ENCLOSURE

Northern States Power Company
Monticello
Docket No. 50-263

Certain of the activities under your license appears to be in noncompliance with AEC license requirements as indicated below:

Sections 3.1A, 3.2A, 3.2B, and 3.2E.3, of the Technical Specifications require that four drywell pressure instrument channels be operable or operating when irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and the reactor water temperature is above 212°F. Section 1.0 of the Technical Specifications defines a component to be operable when it is capable of performing its intended function in its required manner.

Contrary to the above, two of the four drywell pressure sensing taps were found on July 11, 1972, to have been covered with tape. Although emergency core cooling system operation was properly initiated by redundant channels, failure of one of these redundant channels could have resulted in a delay in the actuation of required safeguards. This is evidenced by the fact that the pressure indicated by the drywell pressure recorder, to which one of the taped sensing taps is connected, increased to 0.8 psig prior to commencing to decrease, even though drywell pressure had increased to approximately 2 psig, as evidenced by the operation of pressure switches connected to the untaped sensing lines.