DR Central Files

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
DIVISION OF COMPLIANCE
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

TELEPHONE
(312) 858-2660

January 17, 1972

JAN 20 1972
U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
REGULATORY
MAIL SECTION

Northern States Power Company
ATTN: Leo Wachter, Vice President
Power Production
419 Nicollet Avenue
Minneapolis, Minnesota 53401

Docket No. 50-263

Gentlemen:

Thank you for your letter dated December 17, 1971, in which you provided information on the installation of the main steam line safety valves and headers at your Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant in response to the matter brought to your attention in our letter dated December 10, 1971.

We have no further questions on this matter at this time.

Sincerely yours,

Boyce H. Grier
Regional Director

bcc w/ltr dtd 12-17-71:
J. G. Keppler, CO
L. Kornblith, CO
R. H. Engelken, CO
P. A. Morris, DRL
CO Files
DR Central Files
PDR
Local PDR
NSIC
R. L. Shannon, DTIE

NSP

NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY

MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA 55401

December 17, 1971

Boyce H Grier, Regional Director
Region III Compliance Office
United States Atomic Energy Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Grier:

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
DOCKET NO. 50-263 LICENSE NO. DPR-22

In your telegram of December 10, 1971, you transmitted information from another nuclear power facility describing the circumstance in which three main steam relief valves were ejected from their headers during a hot functional test of that system. You requested that we provide you within ten days in writing as to whether headers as described are installed in the steam lines of our facility. The following description of the headers was given.

> "The failed header assemblies each consist of two valves mounted vertically in a dead end, 12-inch diameter pipe projecting 90 degree horizontal angle from the main steam line. The two headers are mounted at 180 degrees to each other on the opposite sides of the main steam line. The headers were designed to meet Section 1 of the ASME Code by the Bechtel Corporation."

Headers as described above are not installed at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. Each of the four main steam lines have their respective safety valve and safety/relief valve attached directly to the 18 inch, schedule 80 steam line as opposed to being located on a dead end header described above. Our piping was designed by the Bechtel Corporation to meet Class I criteria for nuclear power plants.

Yours very truly,

L. J. Wachter

L J Wachter, Vice President
Power Production and System
Operation

LJW/br

cc: R O Duncanson
C E Larson

DEC 21 1971

December 10, 1971

Northern States Power Company
ATTN: Leo Wachter, Vice President
Power Productiou
419 Nicollet Avenue
Minneapolis, Minnesota 53401

Docket No. 50-263

Gentlemen:

The following was sent to you by telegram on December 9, 1971.

We recently received information from the Florida Power and Light Company of an occurrence during preoperational testing of the Turkey Point 3 Westinghouse pressurized water reactor that may relate to performance of the steam supply system at your facility. The information is as follows:

> During hot functional testing of the unfueled reactor, three of four relief valves were catastrophically ejected from two main steam line headers, to which they were mounted. The failed headers were 12-inch diameter, spool pieces fabricated by the Dravo Corporation, Marietta, Ohio, from Schedule 60 (.562-inch wall thickness) A106, Grade B carbon steel pipe manufactured by U. S. Steel, Lorain Works, Lorain, Ohio, mounted horizontally, 180° from each other, on the two sides of the main steam line. The headers were hydrostatically tested at 1356 psig under cold conditions prior to hot functional testing. On one side of the main steam line, the failure occurred in the vicinity of the heat affected zone of the weld which joins the riser to the header and appears to be largely confined to the 12-inch header. On the other side of the main steam line, the failure apparently originated in a similar manner and propagated through the pipe header causing catastrophic damage to the header assembly. The secondary system was at 990 psig and 545°F and the primary system at 2232 psig and 546.6°F at

the time of the header failure. These systems had been at their respective pressures and temperatures for nine days. No transient conditions were reported to have existed in these systems at the time of failure.

The failed header assemblies each consist of two valves mounted vertically in a dead-end, 12-inch diameter pipe projecting at a 90° horizontal angle from the main steam line. The two headers are mounted at 180° to each other on the opposite sides of the main steam line. The headers were designed to meet Section 1 of the ASME Code by the Bechtel Corporation.

For your reactors which are licensed to operate, it is requested that you provide this office within ten days, in writing, as to whether headers as described above are installed in the steam lines of your facility.

Should you have any questions concerning this matter, we will discuss them with you.

Sincerely yours,

Boyce H. Grier
Regional Director

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