

FROM: Northern States Power Company
 Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401
 R. O. Duncanson, Jr.

DATE OF DOCUMENT: 5-19-71	DATE RECEIVED: 5-22-71	NO.: 131
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TO: Dr. Peter A. Morris

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
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DESCRIPTION: (Must Be Unclassified)
 Ltr reporting three conditions of unusual occurrences on 4-20, 4-26 and 5-2-71.....

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NSP

NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY

Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401

May 19, 1971

Dr. Peter A. Morris, Director
Division of Reactor Licensing
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D.C. 20545

Dear Dr. Morris:

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22

Reporting of Unusual Occurrences



Regulatory File Cy.

Three conditions have occurred recently at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant which we interpret to be reportable to your office in accordance with Section 6.6.C of Appendix A, Technical Specifications, of the Provisional Operating License DPR-22. The three occurrences are:

1. Isolation of Condenser Low Vacuum Scram Pressure Switch PS-5-11A. (4-20-71)
2. Slow Closure of Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-86B. (4-26-71)
3. Automatic Pressure Relief System Backup Power Supply Fuses Missing. (5-2-71)

Occurrences 1 and 3 are being reported under Section 6.6.C.4 of the Technical Specifications and occurrence 2 is being reported under Section 6.6.C.1 of the Technical Specifications. The Region III Compliance Office has been previously notified of the occurrences.


On-site investigations of the occurrences have been completed and the Operations Committee has reviewed each occurrence. The attached reports describe the occurrences and summarize the actions taken to prevent future similar occurrences.

Yours very truly,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "R.O. Duncanson, Jr."

R.O. Duncanson, Jr. P.E.
Gen. Supt. of Power Plants-Mechanical
Chairman-Monticello Safety Audit Committee

ROD/CEL/caf



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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

May 18, 1971

Subject: Isolation of Condenser Low Vacuum Scram Pressure Switch PS-5-11A.

1. Summary Description and Analysis of the Occurrence

On April 20, 1971, during a plant restart following a turbine trip from 20% power, the condenser low vacuum trip in trip system A did not immediately reset when condenser vacuum was established. It was then discovered that the manual isolation valve for the low condenser vacuum scram pressure switch PS-5-11A was seal wired closed, making the switch inoperable. The isolation valve was apparently erroneously seal wired closed after the completion of surveillance testing on the vacuum scram switches on April 16th.

As a result of this occurrence, switch PS-5-11A was not operable for a period of April 16 to April 20th. Surveillance testing performed on April 16 and April 20th demonstrated that the B, C, and D switches were operable and that a reactor scram would have resulted if a condenser low vacuum condition occurred.

2. Corrective Actions

On April 20, 1971, following the discovery of the inoperable low condenser vacuum scram pressure switch, a surveillance test of all four vacuum scram switches was performed. All switches were found in calibration and verified to be in an operable condition after the completion of the surveillance testing.

3. Actions Taken to Prevent Future Similar Occurrences

The occurrence was reviewed with all members of the instrumentation crew to further explain to them the significance and importance of properly performing calibration and surveillance testing.

Also, the importance of a previously initiated program to revise the applicable surveillance procedures has been re-emphasized and a higher priority for the completion of this work has been established. Applicable surveillance procedures will be revised to include instrument system checks to assure that each system has been returned to its normal operating condition following the completion of surveillance testing.

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

May 18, 1971

Subject: Slow Closure of Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-86B

1. Summary Description of the Occurrence

On April 26, 1971, while performing a test at 25% power involving the simultaneous closure of all Main Steam Isolation Valves, MSIV 2-86B closed in approximately 6 seconds. The allowable closure times of the MSIVs is 3 to 5 seconds.

2. Account and Analysis of the Occurrence

On April 26, 1971, at 0809 hours, a full MSIV isolation test was performed while operating at 25% power. All of the valve closure times were within the allowable 3 to 5 seconds except for the outboard valve, MSIV 2-86B, on the B steam line, which took 6.1 seconds to close. The inboard valve, MSIV 2-80B, on the same steam line closed in 3.8 seconds. After the full isolation test and resultant scram, MSIV 2-86B was tested and had a closure time of 5.3 seconds.

Prior to the full isolation test, each of the MSIVs was closed individually. The closure times for the B steam line isolation valves were 3.3 seconds for the inboard valve, MSIV 2-80B, and 5.0 seconds for the outboard valve, MSIV 2-86B.

The main steam line isolation valves are designed such that steam flow assists in closing the valves. It is believed that the rapid closure of the B steam line inboard MSIV resulted in the slower closure of the outboard MSIV due to the sudden stoppage of steam flow. The difference in closure times between the two individual closures for MSIV 2-86B measured before and after the full MSIV isolation is attributed to the absence of steam flow after the full isolation was performed.

3. Corrective Action

The closure time for MSIV 2-86B was adjusted using the flow control valve on the MSIV oil dashpot. The valve was cycled two times after the adjustment was made and times of 3.6 and 3.8 seconds were recorded (no steam flow). The valve was subsequently timed at the 25 and 50 percent reactor power levels and the closure times were found to be 3.5 and 3.24 seconds, respectively.

The present surveillance testing of the MSIVs requires individual MSIV closure tests monthly. The results of the MSIV closure testing performed at 25 percent power indicate that it takes longer to isolate a steam line when the inboard and outboard MSIVs are simultaneously closed than it does if a single MSIV is closed. It is therefore planned that if relatively slower single valve closure times are measured during the monthly surveillance testing, simultaneous closure testing of the inboard and outboard MSIVs will be conducted to determine that the MSIVs close in 5 seconds or less under any condition.

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

May 18, 1971

Subject: Automatic Pressure Relief System Backup Power Supply Fuses Missing

1. Summary Description of the Occurrence

On May 2, 1971, it was discovered that the backup power supply fuses for the Auto Pressure Relief System were missing. The backup power supply is required to supply power to the ARS if the normal power source is not available.

2. Account of the Occurrence

On May 2, 1971, during a startup after a maintenance outage, a station battery ground existed. During the investigation to locate the ground, two fuses (2E-F9) and 2E-F10) in panel C-32 in the cable spreading room were found to be missing.

An inspection for missing fuses conducted on August 30, 1970 prior to the initial fuel loading had verified that the fuses were installed at that time. Plant records do not show any documentation or possible reason for the removal of the fuses since that time and the plant electricians cannot recall any time when the fuses were removed. It cannot be determined when or why the fuses were removed.

3. Corrective Action

The missing fuses were immediately replaced and the backup power source for the ARS system was verified to be functional. An inspection for missing fuses in the cable spreading room and the control room was completed and a couple of additional non-essential utility circuit fuses were found missing.

The administrative requirement to record the removal of fuses in the Jumper and Bypass Log has been reviewed with the plant and construction electricians.

