

FROM: Northern States Power Company
 Minneapolis, Minn. 55401
 L.O. Mayer

DATE OF DOCUMENT: Dec. 20, 1971	DATE RECEIVED: Dec. 27, 1971	NO.: 5
LTR. X	MEMO:	REPORT:
OTHER:		

TO: **Dr. Peter A. Morris**

ORIG.: CC: OTHER:

1 signed & 2 conf'd

CLASSIF: POST OFFICE

U REG. NO:

ACTION NECESSARY <input type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRENCE <input type="checkbox"/>	DATE ANSWERED:
NO ACTION NECESSARY <input type="checkbox"/>	COMMENT <input type="checkbox"/>	BY:

DESCRIPTION: (Must Be Unclassified)
**Ltr reporting a condition on 11-20-71
 involving failure of ECCS pump start
 permissive switch & relay....**

FILE CODE: **50-263**

ENCLOSURES:

REFERRED TO	DATE	RECEIVED BY	DATE
Knuth w/9 cys for ACTION	12-28-71	Ross	
DISTRIBUTION:		V. Stello	
Reg File Cy		Dr. Hanauer	
AEC PDR		Rosen	
OGC-Rm-P-506-A		N. Lauben	
Compliance (2)		B. Colmar	
Muntzing & Staff			
D. Thompson			
Morris/Schroeder			
Skovholt			
DYIE (Laughlin)			
NDIC (Buchanan)			
Boyd			
E.G. Case			
Novak			

REMARKS:
LOCAL PDR

**DO NOT REMOVE
 ACKNOWLEDGED**

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DL

NSP

Regulatory

File Cy.

NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY

Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401

December 20, 1971

Dr. Peter A. Morris, Director
Division of Reactor Licensing
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Dr. Morris:

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
Docket No. 50263 License No. DPR-22

Failure of ECCS Pump Start Permissive Switch and Relay

A condition has occurred recently at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant which we interpret to be reportable in accordance with Section 6.6.C.1 of the Technical Specifications. The Region III Compliance office has been notified of this event.



Summary of Occurrence

On November 20, 1971, while performing a regularly scheduled surveillance test, the trip setting of ECCS pump start permissive switch PS 2-3-53A, switch #2, was found to be 438 psig, 12 psi below the required trip setting of ≥ 450 psig. During this surveillance test it was also discovered that a relay in the ECCS pump start permissive logic failed to energize with the pump start permissive switch PS 2-3-53A, switch #1, closed.

An investigation of this occurrence revealed that the two switches contained in PS 2-3-53A were not designed for the 125V DC application for which they were being used. This investigation also revealed that the air gap on the failed relay was too large requiring a high pull-in voltage to energize the relay.

New switches designed for 125V DC use will be purchased and installed for all instruments of this type. The pump permissive switches have been calibrated to trip at 460 psig, to allow for setpoint drift. The relay air gap was reduced and the pull-in voltage was adjusted to less than 80% of rated voltage. The relay was tested and found to operate satisfactorily.

Surveillance testing of this instrument will be performed more frequently until the drift problems have been corrected. The correct relay pick up voltage setting will be verified with the manufacturer and the settings adjusted as necessary on this and all similar relays.



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A Significant Operating Event report has been written for this occurrence and will be available to the Region III Compliance Inspector for review during his next visit.

Yours very truly,



L. O. Mayer
Director of Nuclear Support Services

LOM/GHJ/mmm

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