

FROM: Northern States Power Company
 Minneapolis, Minn. 55
 L.O. Mayer

DATE OF DOCUMENT:
 Dec. 21, 1971

DATE RECEIVED
 Dec 27, 1971

NO.:

LTR. MEMO: REPORT: OTHER:
 X

TO: Dr. Peter A. Morris

ORIG.: CC: OTHER:
 1 signed & 2 conf'd

ACTION NECESSARY CONCURRENCE DATE ANSWERED:
 NO ACTION NECESSARY COMMENT BY:

CLASSIF: POST OFFICE
 U REG. NO:

FILE CODE:
 50-263

DESCRIPTION: (Must Be Unclassified)
 Ltr reporting a failure of ECCS valve
 opening permissive switch during a
 test on 11-24-71.....

REFERRED TO	DATE	RECEIVED BY	DATE
Knuth w/9 cys for ACTION	12-28-71		

ENCLOSURES:

DISTRIBUTION:

Reg File Cy AEC PDR	Ross V. Stello Dr. Hanauer
OGC-Rm-P-506-A Compliance (2)	Rosen N. Lauben
Muntzing & Staff D. Thompson	B. Colmar
Morris/Schroeder Skovholt	DO NOT REMOVE

REMARKS:
 LOCAL PDR

Boyd E.G. Case	ACKNOWLEDGED
DTIE (Laughlin) NSIC (Buchanan) Novak	

DL

NSP

Regulatory

File Cy.

NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY

MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA 55401

December 21, 1971

Dr. Peter A Morris, Director
Division of Reactor Licensing
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D C 20545

Dear Dr. Morris:

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
Docket No. 50263 License No. DPR-22

Failure of ECCS Valve Opening Permissive Switch

A condition has occurred recently at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant which we interpret to be reportable in accordance with Section 6.6.C.1 of the Technical Specifications. The Region III Compliance office has been notified of this event.

Summary of Occurrence

On November 24, 1971, while performing a regularly scheduled surveillance test, the trip setting of ECCS Valve Opening permissive switch PS 2-3-52B, switch #1, was found to be at 407.5 psig, 42.5 psi below the required setting of ≥ 450 psig.

An investigation revealed that the instrument lacked a setpoint "locking" device, a modification recommended by the instrument manufacturer. The locking device was immediately installed, and the instrument calibrated to trip at 460 psig. Similar modifications will be completed for all switches lacking the setpoint "locking" device.

Surveillance testing will be performed for all modified switches at twice the normal frequency until we gain confidence that the instruments are performing properly. The increased frequency of testing is a recently initiated plant operating policy used to evaluate instrument performance following replacement, setpoint change, or other problems detected during testing. This policy applies to all instruments related to protection systems and engineered safeguards.


A Significant Operating Event report has been written for this occurrence and will be made available to the Region III Compliance Inspector for review during his next visit.

Yours very truly,

L. O. Mayer

L O Mayer
Director of Nuclear Support Services

LOM/br



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Amesbury



THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR LAND AND WATER RESOURCES
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20250



It has been an established practice to operate the No. 13 M-G set weekly to demonstrate its availability to the essential systems. To prevent recurrence of this type of incident, the strainer in question will be inspected and cleaned approximately two months from the date of this incident, at which time an appropriate inspection interval for the strainer will be determined based on the results of that inspection.

This incident is not significant from a safety point of view since Unit No. 1 had been in the cold, refueling configuration at the time and the station batteries were capable of supplying all essential loads for eight hours, which would have provided more than ample time to effect the corrective measures outlined previously in the event off-site power had not been available.

Our Nuclear Facilities Safety Committee has reviewed the circumstances related to this incident and concurs in the remedial measures described herein.

Very truly yours,

William C. Caldwell Jr.
Jh.

The first part of the document discusses the general principles of the proposed system. It outlines the objectives and the scope of the project, emphasizing the need for a comprehensive and integrated approach to the problem at hand. The text highlights the importance of collaboration and communication among all stakeholders involved in the process.

The second part of the document provides a detailed description of the system's architecture and components. It explains how the various elements are interconnected and how they work together to achieve the desired outcomes. The text also discusses the challenges faced during the development phase and the strategies used to overcome them.

The third part of the document focuses on the implementation and deployment of the system. It details the steps taken to ensure a smooth transition from development to a live environment. The text also includes information about the training provided to users and the ongoing support and maintenance of the system.

The final part of the document concludes with a summary of the project's achievements and a look towards the future. It reflects on the lessons learned and the potential for further improvements and innovations. The text expresses confidence in the long-term success of the system and the commitment to continuous growth and development.