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 re the limited emergency potential of the interstate plan, and the inadequacy of the state, with no investigative funds, staff limitations, etc., making the new unable to cope with an emergency should it occur - requests federal aid operating license until limitations are removed.

REMARKS
 50-263

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Memphis 1/cation Scam: Memphis	3/10/70
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is not transfer to the SCAS
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OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

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For information: GM _____ Commissioners _____ DR _____

Remarks _____

Julius H. Rubin
For the Chairman

March 9, 1970

Glenn T. Seaborg
Chairman
Atomic Energy Commission
1717 "H" Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20545

Dear Dr. Seaborg:

Since the Atomic Energy Commission requires a program of public safety before granting an operating license for a nuclear reactor, we must tell you there is no such program that can protect the people of Minnesota in event of a nuclear accident at Monticello.

On the advice of Governor Harold LeVander, we have discussed the matter of public safety with both the Minnesota Department of Civil Defense and the Minnesota Department of Health. We have found that while the state is aware of the highly specialized problems that are created by this energy source, little or nothing has been done because of staff limitations, inadequate funds, and splitting of responsibilities. Several other serious basic inadequacies make what planning has been done completely and obviously unworkable.

1. No single authority exists to act or dictate public action in event of an accident.
2. The critical function of monitoring of radioactive releases has been fallaciously delegated to the utility because of lack of state funds and personnel. (Obviously since one can't see, hear, feel, taste, or smell radioactivity, people are entirely dependent on a monitoring system for assessing the extent of accident. We fail to see how the state and the Atomic Energy Commission can disengage itself from this monitoring responsibility.)
3. No provision has been made for specific education of the public in case of a serious radiological accident. A public safety program must obviously depend on an informed public. But public education has been limited to making radiological training available through home study. The program can only be called hopeless. People do not know about it. Even if they did, it is doubtful they would voluntarily attend school, even to save their lives, when they have never been told that any risk exists. The public not only does not know what to do in event of an accident -- they do not know even that an accident could happen.

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An effective educational undertaking would take months and require a great number of qualified public information people. Such a program not only has not yet been started -- there are no state resources for starting it.

There are other problems: lack of emergency transportation and communications -- inadequate medical facilities to handle the number of victims of radiological exposure -- not enough doctors, nurses, firemen, and policemen specially trained for radiological accidents.

Perhaps the most serious matter that came up in our discussions had to do with evacuation. Both state departments at this time appear to be resigned to the fact that it would be an impossible task to evacuate the area. Neither is there any certainty that shelters would provide an effective means of protection.

One point all agreed on was that the Monticello reactor does represent a hazard of catastrophic potential -- and that if a major accident did occur, the only real protection for the public would be to be somewhere else. As desirable as evacuation would appear to be, the fear was expressed that the task of evacuation might be impossible and that as many people might be killed and injured through confusion and panic as from radiation exposure.

One can only conclude from this that if there is no way to evacuate the people from the area in event of a nuclear disaster, the reactor site was obviously a mistake and cannot be acceptable to the people of Minnesota.

These are but some of the difficulties making the Twin Cities and surrounding areas totally unable to cope with an emergency should it occur. No operation of this reactor must be allowed until the health and safety of the public is assured. We ask that you deny Northern States Power Company an operating license for Monticello until such time as these difficulties are resolved.

Yours truly,



Russell Hatling
Director of Public Information

RJH:ah

copies: Governor Harold LeVander, Attorney General Douglas Head, Minnesota State Legislature, Minnesota Department of Public Health, Minnesota Department of Civil Defense, Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, Members of U.S. Congress, Members of the Press

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