

Industry Perspective on NRC Guidance for Dry Storage Confinement Boundary (ISG-25)

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Summary of Industry Perspective

- **ISG-25 represents a change in NRC's established regulatory position**
- **Industry does not understand the problem that the NRC seeks to solve with ISG-25, and is unable to propose alternatives to the guidance because:**
 - **NRC has not articulated a basis for its change in position on He leak testing (e.g., a safety concern or enhancement benefit)**
 - **Specific language used in the guidance implies that the new position is a requirement**
 - **NRC practice has been to impose the new position as requirement**
 - **Industry's data does not indicate change in position is necessary**
- **Revision to guidance is necessary to assure effective regulation**
- **Industry is prepared to respond to NRC's questions on our position (8/4/11 letter)**

ISG-25 established new NRC positions

■ Previous NRC position

- Many cask licensing bases do not leak test lids and some do not test shells (other testing, e.g. ASME used to satisfy 72.236 (j) and (l))
- NRC's did not express concern for leakage through base materials (neither in guidance, SER's nor RAI's)
- Storage confinement boundary not treated the same as transportation containment boundary

■ New NRC position

- Helium leak test is necessary to demonstrate base materials are leak tight (Shell, base plate, lid)
- Applying a standard for transportation containment to storage confinement
- NRC states that ANSI N14.5 includes base materials, but this is not explicitly stated and industry believes this was not the intent

Specific ISG-25 language implies guidance is a requirement

- **Introductory statement is important...**

“This ISG provides guidance to the staff and is not a regulatory requirement.”

- **...but is not consistent with specific language**

“A shop helium leakage test, using ANSI N14.5 [sic], must be performed...”

“...requirements for the helium leakage test should be specified in the CoC...”

- **NEI commented on this language in the draft ISG**

- **Similar concern with NUREG-1536**

“The canister shell has been helium leak tested prior to its loading as required by 10 CFR 72.236”(I)

– There is no requirement in 10 CFR 72 for this test

- **Multiple RAIs indicate ISG is being enforced as requirement**

- 1) RAI on HI-STORM 100, May 28, 2010, ML101480829
- 2) RAI on HI-STORM 100, June 11, 2011, ML111662010
- 3) RAI on MAGNASTOR, July 1, 2011, ML111890351

NRC has not articulated a basis for the new position

- **“Basis” articulates the rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.**
- **Is there a safety concern with existing practices or is this an enhancement?**
 - **If NRC is addressing a safety concern, what is the NRC’s technical basis for concluding that the concern exists? How would the proposed testing resolve the concern?**
 - **If NRC is proposing an enhancement, how would the proposed testing enhance safety?**
 - **How does NRC intend to reconcile new positions for casks fabricated/loaded under previous NRC positions?**

Required Ingredients for Effective Regulation

- **NRC must articulate a well-reasoned basis for regulatory actions that demonstrates a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.**
 - *See, e.g., Shieldalloy v. NRC; Honeywell v. NRC.*
- **This foundational principal of administrative law is appropriately infused throughout NRC's Principals of Good Regulation.**
 - **Clarity:** “Agency positions should be readily understood and easily applied.”
 - **Reliability:** “Regulations should be based on the best available knowledge from research and operational experience.”
 - **Efficiency:** “Regulatory activities should be consistent with the degree of risk reduction they achieve. Where several effective alternatives are available, the option which minimizes the use of resources should be adopted.”
 - **Independence:** “Final decisions must be based on objective, unbiased assessments of all information, and must be documented with reasons explicitly stated.”

Industry testing experience does not reveal concern with base materials

- **Industry experience with helium leakage testing of base materials**
 - **Over 1,000 canisters and casks tested**
 - Typically include shell, sometimes include baseplate or lid
 - **100% passed (i.e., met leak tight criterion)¹**
 - **Range of thickness (1/2 in. to 7 in.)**
 - **Location of testing (Fab. Shop or field depending on component)**
 - **Lids: either forged, made from plate or rolled**
 - **Shell : typically rolled with material working direction parallel to boundary**
 - **Baseplate: either made from plate, or forged with material working direction perpendicular to boundary**

Demonstration testing shows no concern

- Investigation of whether helium leakage through stainless steel base material can occur¹
 - Stainless steel tubes (austenitic, pearlite and nickel-base alloy)
 - Seamless tubing, and sleeves made of cast metal
 - Temperatures up to 800 C
 - He Pressures up to 100 atm
 - Thickness from 0.02in. to 0.14in. (0.5mm to 3.5mm)
- Concluded no helium leakage up to 800 C and 60 atm
 - Determined by leak detectors and indirect methods
 - Leakage in 3 cases determined to be caused by sub-microscopic defects (caused by high temperature and pressure)
 - No helium diffusion observed

Anecdotal evidence of leakage through base material is condition specific

- Savannah River bulk tritium shipping packages¹
 - CV Protective cap (bar stock, machined to 1/8 in. thick)
 - Material working direction perpendicular to containment boundary
 - Microscopic defects
 - Savannah River's recommended solutions in this case
 - Helium leak testing of bar stock, or
 - Use forging instead of bar stock, or
 - Bar stock with cold working (e.g. flow forming)
- This experience is not directly applicable to industry canisters
 - Industry can not identify any relevant experience elsewhere
- This unique case is an insufficient basis for requiring base metal tests

1) *Evaluation of material flaws identified during fabrication leak testing of 304L containment*, Blanton, et.al., Packaging, Transport, Storage & Security of Radioactive Material, 2011 Vol. 22 No. 1

Blanket application of ANSI N 14.5 to storage is problematic

- **ANSI N14.5 addresses transportation containments**
- **Guidance should recognize that individual sections of standards may be used in specific circumstances**
 - E.g. cask designer choice to use selected criteria from ANSI N14.5 for storage design does not imply that entire standard applies to storage
- **Accordingly, ANSI N14.5 should not be invoked in its entirety to storage confinement because there are:**
 - Differences between “confinement” and “containment” boundaries
 - Differences in service conditions
 - Differences in scope of Part 71 and Part 72 (e.g. Part 71 includes materials other than spent fuel, e.g. gaseous materials)
- **Current ISG-25 position both interprets and extends the applicability of ANSI N 14.5**

Industry's recommended path forward

- **Re-evaluate need for guidance on helium leak testing**
 - Address whether safety concern or enhancement benefit exists
 - Consider *relevant* experience (e.g. 1000 industry casks vs. Savannah River example)
- **If guidance is necessary, publish as a Regulatory Guide (the appropriate vehicle for guidance intended for industry)**
 - Articulate basis (i.e. explain the phenomenon of leakage through base materials)
 - Incorporate all aspects of confinement boundary leakage (e.g. ISG-18, SRP excerpts)
 - Base materials: Identify conditions under which NRC considers leak testing unnecessary (e.g. range of material properties, manufacturing processes, and thickness threshold)
 - Type of test: address the use of alternative tests to establish a maximum leakage rate (used when leak-tight is not part of the licensing basis)
 - ANSI N14.5: Avoid blanket use of standard, identify applicable sections/criteria
- **These actions will enable industry to understand and address the problem/NRC concern**