April 18, 1979

Docket No. 50-263

•

Northern States Power Company

ATTN: Mr. Leo Wachter

Vice President

Power Production and System

Operation

414 Micollet Mall

Winneapolis, NW 55401

Gentlemen:

The enclosed IE Bullstin No. 79-06A Revision No. 1, is forwarded to you for information. No written response is required. If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

James G. Keppler Director

Enclosure: IE Bulletin
No. 79-06A Revision No. 1

cc w/encl:

Mr. L. R. Eliason,

Plant Manager

Central Files

Birecter, WRR/DPM

Director, MRR/DOR

PDR

Local PDR

NSIC

TIC

Anthony Roisman, Esq.,

Attorney

John W. Ferman, Ph.D.

Muclear Engineer

Jul 19258

CCD



OFFICE -	RIII RAW	BIII			
SURNAME -	Heishman/1s	Reppler	,	 	
DATE >	4/18/79	4/18		 	 -
				 	

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

April 18, 1979

IE Bulletin No. 79-06A (Revision No. 1)

REVIEW OF OPERATIONAL ERRORS AND SYSTEM MISALIGNMENTS IDENTIFIED DURING THE THREE MILE ISLAND INCIDENT

IE Bulletin 79-06A identified sctions to be taken by the licensees of all pressurized water reactors designed by Westinghouse.

Item No. 3 of the actions to be taken, as stated in the original bulletin, was:

"3. For your facilities that use pressurizer water level coincident with pressurizer pressure for automatic initiation of safety injection into the reactor coolant system, trip the low pressurizer level setpoint bistables such that, when the pressurizer pressure reaches the low setpoint, safety injection would be initiated regardless of the pressurizer level. In addition, instruct operators to manually initiate safety injection when the pressurizer pressure indication reaches the actuation setpoint whether or not the level indication has dropped to the actuation setpoint."

Information from licensees and Westinghouse has identified that implementation of this action would preclude the performance of surveillance testing of the pressurizer pressure bistables without initisting a safety injection.

In order to permit surveillance testing of the pressurizer pressure bistables, the low pressurizer level bistables that must operate in coincidence with the low pressurizer pressure bistables may be restored to normal operation for the duration of the surveillance test of that coincident pressurizer pressure channel. At the conclusion of the surveillance test of each pressurizer pressure channel, the coincident pressurizer level channel must be raturned to the tripped mode defined in Action Item 3 of IE Bulletin 79-06A.

As a result, Item 3 should be revised as follows:

IE Bulletin No. 79-06A - 2 - April 18, 1979
(Revision No. 1)

"3. For your facilities that use pressurizer water level coincident with pressurizer pressure for automatic initiation of safety injection into the reactor coolent system, trip the low pressurizer level setpoint bistables such that,

tion of safety injection into the reactor coolent system, trip the low pressurizer level setpoint bistables such that when the pressurizer pressure reaches the low setpoint, safety injection would be initiated regardless of the pressurizer level. The pressurizer level bistables may be returned to their normal operating positions during the pressurizer pressure channel functional surveillance tests. In addition, instruct operators to manually initiate safety injection when the pressurizer pressure indication reaches the actuation setpoint whether or not the level indication has dropped to the sctuation setpoint."

Item 13 of the actions to be taken, as stated in the original bulletin, was:

"13. Propose changes, as required, to those technical specifications which must be modified as a result of your implementing the above items."

Long term resolutions of some of these required actions may require design changes. Therefore, Item 13 of actions to be taken should be revised as follows:

"13. Propose changes, as required, to those technical specifications which must be modified as a result of your implementing the above items and identify design changes necessary in order to effect long term resolutions of these items."

For all light water reactor facilities designed by Westinghouse with an operating license, respond to Items 1-12 within 10 days of the receipt of this Bulletin. Respond to Item 13 (Technical Specification Change proposals and identification of design changes in 30 days.)

The other requirements of IE Bulletin 79-06A remain in effect.

Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7-31-80. Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.

Enclosure: Listing of IE Bulletins Issued in Last Twelve Months

IE Bulletin No. 79-06A (Revision No. 1) April 18, 1979

LISTING OF IE BULLETINS ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS

79- 05	Nuclear Incident st Three Mile Island	4/2/79	Facilities with an OL and CP
79-05A	Nuclear Incident st Three Mile Island	4/ 5/79	All B&W Power Reactor Fecilities with an OL
79-06	Review of Operational Errors and System Mis- elignments Identified During the Three Mile Island Incident	4/11/79	All Pressurized Water Power Reactors with an OL except B&W fscilities
79-06A	Review of Operational Errors and System Mis- alignments Identified During the Three Mile Island Incident	4/14/79	All Pressurized Water Power Reactor Facilities of Westinghouse Design with an OL
79-06в	Review of Operational Errors and System Mis- alignments Identified During the Three Mile Island Incident	4/14/79	All Combustion Engineer- ing Designed Pressurized Water Power Reactor Facilities with an Operating Licensee
79- 07	Seismic Stress Analysis of Safety-Related Piping	4/14/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
79- 08	Events Relevant to BWR Reactors Identified During Three Mile Island Incident	4/14/79	All BWR Power Reactor Facilities with an OL
79- 09	Failure of GE Type AK-2 Circuit Breaker In Safety Related Systems	4/17/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL
Bulletin No.	Subject	Date Issued	Issued To

Enclosure Page 1 of 3

IE Bulletin No. 79-06A (Revision No. 1) April 18, 1979

LISTING OF IE BULLETINS ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS

Bulletin No.	Subject	Date Issued	Issued To
79- 04	Incorrect Weights for Swing Check Valves Manufactured by Velan Engineering Corporation	3 /30/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
79-03	Longitudinsl Weld Defects in ASME SA-312 Type 304 Stainless Steel Pipe Spools Manufactured by Youngstown Welding and Engineering Co.	3/12/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
79- 02	Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts	3/2/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
79- 01	Environmental Qualifica- tion of Class IE Equipment	2/8/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
78-14	Deterioration of BUNA-N Components in ASCO	12/19/78	All GE BWR facilities with an OL or CP
78-13	Failures In Source Heads of Kay-Ray, Inc., Gauges Models 7950, 7050B, 7051, 7051B, 7060B, 7061 and 7061B	10/27/78	All general and specific licensees with the subject Kay-Ray, Inc. gauges
78-12B	Atypical Weld Material in Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds	3/19/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
78-12A	Atypical Weld Material in Reactor Pressure Vassel Walds		Facilities with an OL or CP
78- 12	Atypical Weld Material in Resctor Pressure Vessel Welds	9/29/78	All Power Reactor Pacilities with an OL or CP

IE Bulletin No. 79-06A (Revision No. 1)
April 18, 1979

LISTING OF IE BULLETINS ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS

Bulletin No.	Subject	Date Issued	Issued To
78-11	Examination of Mark I Containment Torus Welds	7/21/78	BWR Power Reactor Facilities for action: Peach Bottom 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, Hatch 1, Monticello and Vermont Yankee
78-10	Bergen-Paterson Hydraulic Shock Suppressor Accumulator Spring Coils	6/27/78	All BWR Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
78 -09	BWR Drywell Leakage Paths Associated with Inadequate Drywell Closures	6/14/79	All BWR Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
78 -08	Radiation Levels from Fuel Element Transfer Tubes	6/12/78	All Power and Research Reactor Facilities with a Fuel Element transfer tube and an OL
78-07	Protection afforded by Air-Line Respirators and Supplied-Air Hoods	6/12/78	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL, all class E and F Research Reactors with an OL, all Fuel Cycle Facilities with an OL, and all Priority 1 Material Licensees
78-06	Defective Cutler-Hammer Type M Relays with DC Coils	5/31/78	All Fower Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP

Enclosure Page 3 of 3