Withdrawn:

Stricken:

09/27/2011

Admitted:

Rejected:



Presentation to the Commission

Combined License Application Review Vogtle Units 3 and 4

SER Panel 3

September 27 – 28, 2011



Presentation to the Commission

Combined License Application Review Vogtle Units 3 and 4

Chapter 19, Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Severe Accidents

September 27 – 28, 2011

Information Incorporated by Reference: Aircraft Impact Assessment (AIA)

- AP1000 AIA is reasonably formulated per the guidance in NEI 07-13
- Credited key design features are identified and their functional capabilities are described in the DCD – ensure that:
 - The reactor remains cooled and the containment remains intact
 - Spent fuel cooling and spent fuel pool integrity is maintained
 - Credited post-impact safe shutdown equipment is protected from fire damage

Information Incorporated by Reference: Aircraft Impact Assessment (AIA)


- Key Design Features:
 - Design
 - Shield Building design
 - Auxiliary Building design
 - Design and location
 - Turbine and Annex building walls
 - Spent fuel pool (Auxiliary Building)
 - Main control room
 - Remote shutdown station, and
 - Secondary diverse actuation system (DAS)

Overview of Vogtle COL FSAR Chapter 19

Sections	Content	Topics of Interest
Sections 19.1 through 19.54, 19.56 and 19.57; Appendices 19A-19F	Incorporated by reference (IBR)	
Section 19.55, Seismic Margin Analysis	Plant-Specific	Seismic Margin Analysis
Section 19.58, Winds, Floods, and Other External Events	Plant-Specific	External Events
Section 19.59, PRA Results and Insights	Standard	

GMRS vs. CSDRS

Comparisons of VEGP Horizontal Seismic Response Spectra to AP1000 CSDRS 5% Damping



VEGP AP1000 Horizontal Spectra Comparison

VEGP SUP 3.7-3

Seismic Margin Analysis: Vogtle COL FSAR Section 19.55

- Site-specific ground motion response spectra (GMRS) exceed the AP1000 certified seismic design response spectra (CSDRS).
- SNC performed site-specific analysis of six locations. These correspond to the locations for which in-structure response spectra (ISRS) had been developed for the DC amendment.
- Above 1 Hz, ISRS for all evaluated locations at Vogtle were bounded by the ISRS of the certified design. (A small exceedance at very low frequency was shown to have no impact on AP1000 seismic SSCs.)
- Adequate seismic margin was demonstrated for 1.67 times the GMRS.
- The staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated adequate seismic margin for Vogtle 3 & 4.

Vogtle External Events

	Screening Criteria Applied			
External Event	Bounded	Negligible Frequency	Negligible Consequence	Not Applicable
Tornado				
Hurricane				
External flood				Max flood < 220' (Vogtle Plant grade)
Aviation				
Marine				No barge traffic
Pipeline				No pipelines for 10 mi.
Railroad				D _{closest track} > D _{standoff}
Truck				D _{closest highway} > D _{standoff}
Major depots and storage areas				< NRC review standard
On-site storage tanks				< RG 1.78
External fires				
Radiological hazards				



Presentation to the Commission

Combined License Application Review Vogtle Units 3 and 4

Chapter 19A, Loss of Large Areas (LOLA) of the Plant Due to Explosions or Fires

September 27 – 28, 2011

Applicable Requirements

- Requirements for COL applicants pertaining to Loss of Large Areas (LOLAs) of the Plant Due to Explosions or Fires are covered in Section 52.80(d) and Section 50.54(hh)(2)
- Section 52.80(d) requires a COL applicant to describe its plans for meeting the requirements in Section 50.54(hh)(2)
- Section 50.54(hh)(2) requires licensees to address LOLA with strategies and guidance for restoring or maintaining:
 - Core cooling
 - Containment capability
 - Spent Fuel Pool Cooling
- Requirements are the same for current licensees, but COL applicants may credit unique design features, or those incorporated to meet the Aircraft Impact Assessment (AIA) rule (Section 50.150). Part 50 applicants are not subject to the AIA rule, but may credit any unique design features

Review Approach

- Staff reviewed applicant's description and plans for implementing strategies and guidance to address LOLA.
- Staff followed review guidance in Interim Staff Guidance document DC/COL-ISG-16, which:
 - Endorses industry guidance in NEI 06-12 Revision 3,
 - Incorporates by reference additional guidance issued to operating reactor licensees and not in NEI 06-12,
 - Includes guidance for addressing generic lessons learned from NRC inspections at operating reactors.
- Knowledgeable and experienced staff review team
 - Members of original Task Force for implementation of LOLA requirements in Interim Compensatory Measures Order,
 - Developed guidance in DC/COL-ISG-16.

Summary of Staff Evaluation

- Over 90 Requests for Additional Information Issued:
 - Clarification of submitted information,
 - Documentation of commitments,
 - Technical concerns leading to significant changes to the strategies.
- Most technical details of staff's review are sensitive security-related information and accordingly are kept non-public.
- Key Issues
 - Connection of equipment walk-through, including electrical equipment, fire hoses (size and length), pumping capability;
 - Maintenance activities for mitigative strategies equipment;
 - Implementation schedule;
 - Deviation from guidance for spent fuel pool cooling.

Staff Conclusions

- Applicant followed NRC guidance; departures acceptable.
- Applicant addressed staff's questions acceptably with modifications to its application.
- Applicant's description of guidance and strategies meets Section 52.80(d) requirements.
- Staff has reasonable assurance that strategies and guidance will be developed and implemented in accordance with Section 50.54(hh)(2), and prior to fuel load.



Presentation to the Commission

Combined License Application Review Vogtle Units 3 and 4

Chapter 15, Accident Analysis

September 27 – 28, 2011

Overview of Vogtle COL FSAR Chapter 15

Section	Content	Topics of Interest
	Incorporated	Plant Calorimetric
15.0 Accident Analysis	by Reference	Uncertainty
	(IBR)/Standard	Methodology
15.1 Increase in Heat Removal from Primary System	IBR	
15.2 Decrease in Heat Removal by the Secondary System	IBR	
15.3 Decrease in Reactor Coolant System Flow Rate	IBR	
15.4 Reactivity and Power Distribution Anomalies	IBR	

Overview of Vogtle COL FSAR Chapter 15

Section	Content	Topics of Interest
15.5 Increase in Reactor Coolant Inventory	IBR	
15.6 Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory	IBR/ Plant-Specific	
15.7 Radioactive Release from a Subsystem or Component	Plant-Specific	
15.8 Anticipated Transients without SCRAM	IBR	
15A Evaluation Models and Parameters for Analysis of Radiological Consequences of Accidents	IBR/ Plant-Specific	DBA Radiological Consequences Analyses

Plant Calorimetric Uncertainty Methodology

- The staff required the applicant to provide an NRC approved method of measuring feedwater flow to produce a power uncertainty of 1 percent or lower assumed in Large Break LOCA analysis
- Applicant proposed the Caldon CheckPlusTM flow meter design and referenced topical reports ER-80P and ER-157P in the FSAR
- ITAAC will confirm installation and appropriate uncertainty measured
- License condition (prior to initial fuel load):
 - Availability of documented instrumentation uncertainties to calculate a power calorimetric uncertainty
 - Availability of administrative controls to implement maintenance and contingency activities related to the power calorimetric uncertainty instrumentation

Design Basis Radiological Consequences Analyses (cont'd)

Issue

- Vogtle COL incorporated by reference the DBA dose analyses from the AP1000 DCD by showing that the site-specific input to the analyses is bounded by the assumptions in the DCD.
 - Applicant needed to demonstrate compliance with offsite dose factors in 10 CFR 52.79(a)(1) and the control room dose criterion in GDC 19.
 - VEGP DEP 18.8-1 site-specific TSC design TSC habitability analysis was reviewed separately (SER 13.3).

Design Basis Radiological Consequences Analyses (cont'd)

Resolution

- Site characteristic accident atmospheric dispersion (χ /Q) values are the only site-related DBA dose analysis input.
- Site characteristic accident χ/Q values for offsite, control room and technical support center receptors were provided for staff review.
 - FSAR Tables 2.3-201 and 2.3-202.
 - Site characteristic χ/Q values were found acceptable (FSER 2.3).
- Vogtle χ /Q values are less than AP1000 χ /Q values.
- Dose is directly proportional to the χ /Q value; therefore, Vogtle DBA doses are less than AP1000 DBA doses.
- AP1000 DCD shows compliance with the offsite and control room dose factors for all DBAs; therefore, Vogtle also complies.



Presentation to the Commission

Combined License Application Review Vogtle Units 3 and 4

Chapter 7, Instrumentation and Controls
September 27 – 28, 2011

Protection and Safety Monitoring System Actuation System (PMS)

- Four divisions (each has own sensors)
- 2 out of 4 coincidence logic
- Common Q platform
- Actuates reactor trip
- Actuates engineered safeguards
- Provides post-accident monitoring

Diverse Actuation System (DAS)

- As protection from common-cause failure of the PMS, the original design required a DAS.
- The system has automatic and manual modes of operation, and the automatic system is 2-out-of-2 logic.
- DAS manual actuation is hard-wired to the final loads bypassing the PMS and DAS automatic logic.
- DAS can automatically:
 - Actuate a reactor and turbine trip
 - Initiate PRHR, CMTs
 - Trip RCPs.

Diverse Actuation System (DAS)

- Manual actuation capability is also provided for:
 - Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS)
 - Automatic depressurization system (ADS)
 - Some containment isolation
 - Hydrogen igniters
 - IRWST injection
 - Containment recirculation actuation.
- Manual mode is controlled by TS (30 day completion time).
 Automatic mode is controlled by availability controls (14 days).
- DAS functionality and architecture was part of the original design.
 The amendment provided design information to remove the DAS design acceptance criteria.

Diverse Actuation System (DAS)

- ACRS raised a concern that there is no explicit limitation on having both the automatic and manual modes of DAS unavailable at the same time. Staff noted that the likelihood of event, DAS and PMS design features, and operational programs address the concern.
- Follow-up ACRS letter in May 2011 repeated the concern and also stated that the 30 days technical specifications completion time is too long.
- Staff response of July 6, 2011, noted that technical specifications completion time was consistent with regulatory practice.



Presentation to the Commission

Combined License Application Review Vogtle Units 3 and 4

Chapter 8, Electric Power

September 27 – 28, 2011


Overview of Vogtle COL FSAR Chapter 8

Section	Content	Topics of Interest
8.1 Introduction	Plant-Specific	
8.2 Offsite Power System	Plant-Specific	Offsite Power Condition Monitoring Program for Under Ground and Inaccessible Cables
8.2.A Site-Specific ITAAC for Offsite Power System	Standard/Plant-Specific	ITAAC for Offsite Power System
8.3.1 AC Power System	Standard	
8.3.2 DC Power System	Standard	Departure Related Testing of Voltage Regulating Transformers

Offsite Power

- Unit 3 is connected to the 230/500 kilovolt (kV) switchyard, which is supplied by five 230kV overhead transmission lines and one 500 kV overhead transmission line coming from other substations.
- Unit 4 is connected to a different 500 kV switchyard, which is supplied by two 500kV overhead transmission lines coming from other substations.
- Grid stability analysis was performed by the applicant to satisfy the DCD interface requirement for maintaining adequate reactor coolant pump voltage for 3 seconds after a turbine trip, which was accepted by the staff.

Vogtle Switchyard Configuration



Condition Monitoring Program for Underground or Inaccessible Cables

Issue:

 The application did not initially include a monitoring program to detect degradation of inaccessible or underground control or power cables that support systems which are within the scope of 10 CFR 50.65, the Maintenance Rule.

Resolution:

 The applicant incorporated a condition monitoring program for underground or inaccessible cables into the maintenance rule program.

ITAAC for Site-Specific Offsite Power System

Issue:

- 10 CFR 52.79(d) and 10 CFR 52.80(a) requires that ITAAC be provided for a site-specific system.
- Applicant did not initially provide any ITAAC for the site-specific offsite power system.

Resolution:

 The applicant included ITAAC for the offsite power system so that the as-built offsite portion of the power supply from the transmission network that interfaces with the plant onsite ac power will be verified to perform as designed.

Periodic Testing of Voltage Regulating Transformers (AP1000 Departure)

Issue:

- The AP1000 DCD states that Class 1E regulating transformers are designed to limit the input current to an acceptable value under faulted conditions on the output side.
- However, the applicant indicated that the voltage regulating transformers do not have active components to limit fault current.
- The applicant proposed the use of the breakers/fuses for regulating transformers for isolation function in lieu of current limiting feature.

Resolution:

 Staff concluded that this departure is acceptable because the isolation function provided by the use of the breakers/fuses for regulating transformers is consistent with the criteria for independence of electrical safety systems.

Acronyms

ACRS	 Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards 	kV	 unit measuring electric potential in kilovolts
ADS	Automatic Depressurization System	NEI	Nuclear Energy Institute
AIA	Aircraft Impact Assessment	NSIR	 Office of Nuclear Security and Incident
CMT	- Core Makeup Tank		Response
COL	- Combined License	PCS	 Passive Containment Cooling System
CSDRS	 Certified Seismic Design Response 	PMS	 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Actuation System
DAG	Spectra	PRHR	 Passive Residual Heat Removal
DAS	Diverse Actuation System	QA	 Quality Assurance
DBA	Design Basis Accident	RCOL	 Reference Combined License
DCD	 Design Control Document 	RCP	 Reactor Coolant Pump
ER	Engineering Report	RCS	- Reactor Coolant System
ESP	 Early Site Permit 	RG	- Regulatory Guide
FSAR	 Final Safety Analysis Report 	SCOL	 Subsequent Combined License
FSEIS	 Final Supplemental Environmental 	SSC	 structures, systems, and components
	Impact Statement	(F)SER	 (Final) Safety Evaluation Report
GDC	 General Design Criteria 	SNC	 Southern Nuclear Operating Company
GMRS	 Ground Motion Response Spectra 	TS	 technical specifications
Hz	 unit measuring frequency in cycles per 	TSC	 Technical Support Center
	second	VEGP	 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
IBR	 Incorporated by Reference 	WEC	Westinghouse Electric Company
IDLH	 Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health 	10 CFR	- Title10 of the Code of Federal
ISRS	 In-Structure Response Spectra 		Regulations
ITAAC	- Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and		3
	Acceptance Criteria		
LOLA	 Loss of Large Areas of the Plant Due to 		
	Explosions or Fires		
LWA	Limited Work Authorization		
			20