bcc: Central File AEOD RF AEOD SF C. Michelson C. Heltemes E. Imbro

## DEC 17 1981

Mr. L. B. Russell Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Lusby Post Office Lusby, MD 20657

Dear Mr. Russell:

We have written a case study (Enclosure) of the event at Calvert Cliffs Unit 1. The study was undertaken because the event, which was precipitated by the leakage of a tube in an instrument air compressor aftercooler, resulted in the disablement of both redundant trains of the safety-related service water system.

Although the consequences of this event were minor, it was nonetheless significant since it involved two fundamental aspects considered in the design of safety-related systems:

1. Interaction between safety and non-safety related systems and components; and

2. Common caused failure of redundant safety systems.

The recommendations from this case study are under review within the NRC, and no licensee actions are being requested at this time. The report is being forwarded for your information and use as you deem appropriate.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact Eugene Imbro of my staff. Mr. Imbro can be reached at 301/492-4495.

Sincerely,

Original signed by: C. J. Heltemes, Jre

Carlyle Michelson, Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data

Enc	losure:	
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## DEC 17 1981

Mr. David Rossin Director Nuclear Safety Analysis Center 3412 Hillview Avenue P.O. Box 10412 Palo Alto, CA 94303

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Carlyle Michelson, Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data

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