

From: Halter, Mandy
Sent: Monday, June 20, 2011 1:33 PM
To: 'pbode@entergy.com'
Subject: Part 21 - KASI MOV and AOV Software
Attachments: EN46955.pdf; KVAP-Software-for-AOV-&-MOV-design-basis-margin-calculations-for-JOG-Program-Implementation-GL-96-05-Periodic-Verification-margin-improvement.pdf

Paul,

Attached is the Part 21 that came out of Oconee.(attached above EN 46955). The defect is related to errors in the Kalsi Engineering Valve and Actuator Program (KVAP) software that provide default flow and torque coefficients for ball and plug valves which can affect margin predictions.

Please confirm whether or not Indian Point has reviewed this issue for applicability.

Thanks and kind regards,

Mandy

Mandy Halter
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Resident Inspector
Indian Point Energy Center - Unit 3
(914) 739-8565

AB1

NRC Event Notification Worksheet

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NRC Event Notification Worksheet				
Notification Time	Facility or Organization	Unit	Caller's Name	Call Back #
	Oconee Nuclear Station	1, 2, 3	Sandra Severance	ENS 256-9931 (864) 873-3466

NRC Operations Officer Contacted:	NRC Event Number:

Event Time/Zone	Event Date	Power/Mode Before	Power/Mode After
1152 EST	6/7/2011	Unit 1: Mode 6 Unit 2: 100% Unit 3: 100%	Unit 1: 100% Unit 2: 100% Unit 3: 100%

Event Classifications

- General Emergency
 Site Area Emergency
 Alert

 Unusual Event
 50.72 Non-emergency (see other columns)
 72.75 Spent Fuel (ISFSI)
 73.71 Physical Security
 Transportation
 20.2202 Material/Exposure
 26.73 Fitness for Duty
 Other: 21.21(d)(3)(i)

1-Hour Non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(1)

- Deviation from TS per 50.54(x)

4-Hour Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)

- (i) TS Required Shutdown
 (iv) (A) ECCS Discharge into RCS
 (iv) (B) RPS Actuation (while critical)
 (xi) News release/notification to other government agencies

8-Hour Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (3)

- (ii) (A) Degraded Condition
 (ii) (B) Unanalyzed Condition
 (xiii) Loss of emergency assessment capability/offsite communications
 (iv) (A) System Actuation
 - RPS
 - Containment isolation
 - ECCS
 - EFW
 - Containment spray/coolers
 - Emergency AC (Keowee Hydro) (v) (A) Safe Shutdown Capability
 (v) (B) Residual Heat Removal Capability
 (v) (C) Control of radiological material
 (v) (D) Accident Mitigation
 (xii) Transport contaminated person to offsite medical facility

Event Description
(Include systems affected, actuations and their initiating signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions taken or planned, etc.)
Event: In KVAP Error Report 2011-02, Kalsi Engineering identified an error in the Kalsi Engineering Valve and Actuator Program (KVAP) software that provides default flow and torque coefficients for ball and plug valves which can affect margin predictions. Communication between Kalsi and Duke Energy personnel confirmed that non-conservative torque values were calculated for select ball valves used at Oconee for containment isolation. As a result of the Kalsi error, the non-conservatively calculated torque values resulted in negative actuator margins, calling into question the actuators' capability to close the valves under all design conditions. Therefore, it has been determined that the KVAP software program error constitutes a defect, reportable under 10CFR21.
Initial Safety Significance: Four safety-related containment isolation valves in the High Pressure Injection system were impacted, requiring entry into TS 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, on two Oconee units.
Corrective Action(s): 1. Upon further calculation, two of the containment isolation valves were determined to have adequate margin and were declared operable. 2. Two other containment isolation valves required modifications to restore operability.

Anything unusual or not understood?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (Explain above)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
Did all systems function as required?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No (Explain above)
Mode of operations until corrected:	Estimated restart date:	

Does event result in a radiological release, RCS leak, or steam generator tube leak?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (complete page 3)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
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Does the event result in any of the units experiencing a transient?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (complete Oconee Plant Status sheet)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
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Notifications			
NRC Resident: <i>Andy Sebusch</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Y/N/will be	Plant Manager:	Y/N/will be
Notified By: <i>Kent Alter</i>	Time: <i>1540</i>	Notified By:	Time:
State(s): <i>N/A</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Y/N/will be	Operations Superintendent:	Y/N/will be
Notified By:	Time:	Notified By:	Time:
Local: <i>N/A</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Y/N/will be	Other Government Agencies:	Y/N/will be
Notified By:	Time:	Notified By:	Time:
Media/Press Release: <i>N/A</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Y/N/will be	Other: <i>Preston Gullaspi</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Y/N/will be
Notified By:	Time:	Notified By: <i>S N Swamy</i>	Time: <i>1235</i>

Operations Shift Manager/Emergency Coordinator Approval:	Date/Time:
<i>Imba S. Plaster</i>	<i>06-13-11 1556</i>
NRC Notification Complete by Caller/NRC Communicator:	Date/Time: