



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

REGION III
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LISLE, IL 60532-4352

September 1, 2011

Mr. Larry Meyer
Site Vice President
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC
6610 Nuclear Road
Two Rivers, WI 54241

**SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2,
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT
05000266/2011008; 05000301/2011008**

Dear Mr. Meyer:

On July 21, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) team inspection at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 21 with Mr. T. Vehec and other members of your staff.

The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

On the basis of the samples selected for review, there were no findings identified during this inspection. The team concluded that your staff was effective at identifying problems and incorporating them into the corrective action program. In general, issues were appropriately prioritized, evaluated, and corrected, audits and self-assessments were thorough and probing, and operating experience was appropriately screened and disseminated. Your staff was aware of the importance of having a strong safety-conscious work environment and expressed a willingness to raise safety issues.

However, the inspection did identify weaknesses in the identification of trends and performance deficiencies pertaining to the initiation and quality of operability determinations and reportability evaluations. Additionally, the inspection identified that extensive changes made to plant systems and structures for the power uprate modifications should be considered for their effect on previous issues and corrective actions identified in the corrective action program.

L. Meyer

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Sincerely,

/RA/

Michael A Kunowski, Chief
Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301
License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000266/2011008; 05000301/2011008
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket Nos: 50-266; 50-301
License Nos: DPR-24; DPR-27

Report No: 05000266/2011008; 05000301/2011008

Licensee: NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC

Facility: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 and Unit 2

Location: Two Rivers, Wisconsin

Dates: June 27 – July 21, 2011

Inspectors: J. Jandovitz, Project Engineer, Team Leader
M. Thorpe-Kavanaugh, Resident Inspector, Point Beach
S. Sheldon, Senior Reactor Inspector
M. Munir, Reactor Inspector

Approved by: Michael A. Kunowski, Chief
Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000266/2011008; 05000301/2011008; NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC; on 06/27/2011 - 07/21/2011; Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 and Unit 2; Problem Identification and Resolution biennial inspection.

This report covers a 2-week, baseline inspection of problem identification and resolution (Inspection Procedures 71152 and 71004). This inspection was conducted by three regional inspectors and the Point Beach resident inspector. Based on the results of this inspection, there were no findings or violations identified during this inspection.

Identification and Resolution of Problems

The inspection generally concluded that implementation of the corrective action program (CAP) was adequate to identify, evaluate, and correct issues. A sufficiently low threshold for identifying issues and entering them in the CAP existed. The plant's safety culture is generally healthy and workers at the site expressed willingness to raise safety concerns. Operating experience was entered into the CAP and appropriately evaluated. Self-assessments are being conducted at appropriate frequencies for all departments and resulting deficiencies and enhancements included in the CAP. Quality assurance (Nuclear Oversight (NOS)) oversight of the CAP and work performance was considered good.

The inspection did identify weaknesses in the plant programs for trending long-standing and repetitious issues. Adverse trends in reject rates for Apparent Cause Evaluations and with equipment problems associated with radiation monitors and services water valves were not identified by the respective trend programs.

Additional deficiencies were identified with the conduct and quality of operability determinations and reportability evaluations. Similar issues had been previously identified by NRC resident staff and NOS and represented a weakness of the CAP to improve this area and CAP oversight groups, such as the Issue Screening Team (IST) and the Management Review Committee (MRC), to monitor and enforce adequate standards.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings

No findings were identified.

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

No violations were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152B)

The activities documented in Sections .1 through .4 constituted one biennial sample of Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) as defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71152.

.1 Assessment of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's CAP implementing procedures and attended selected CAP program meetings to assess the implementation of the CAP by site personnel.

The inspectors reviewed risk and safety-significant issues in the licensee's CAP since the last NRC PI&R inspection in April 2009. The items selected ensured an adequate review of issues across the NRC cornerstones. The inspectors used issues identified through NRC generic communications, department self-assessments, licensee audits, operating experience reports, and NRC-documented findings as sources to select issues. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed CAP items generated that had resulted from performance of daily plant activities. The inspectors also reviewed CAP items and a selection of completed investigations from the licensee's various investigation methods, including root, apparent, and common cause evaluations.

The inspectors performed a more extensive review of the safety-related component cooling water (CCW) system. This review consisted of a five-year search of related issues identified in the CAP and discussions with appropriate licensee staff to assess the licensee's efforts in addressing identified concerns. The inspectors reviewed licensee's CAP and work management system procedures that provided guidance for trending. The inspectors selected the radiation monitoring and the service water systems as vertical slice samples based on input from the resident staff semi-annual trend review. The inspectors reviewed corrective action documents for the past two years, interviewed the system engineers, and performed a walk-down of these systems.

The inspectors reviewed issues related to the extended power uprate (EPU) project, since this involved large, construction-oriented organizations (such as Bechtel) performing significant modifications to the plant over the last several years. Specifically, Bechtel's use of the licensee's CAP was reviewed.

The inspectors attended meetings of the Issue Screening Team (IST) and Management Review Committee (MRC) to observe how issues were being screened and evaluated and to obtain insights into the licensee's oversight of the CAP program.

The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions for selected issue reports, completed investigations, and NRC findings, including non-cited violations (NCVs).

During the reviews, the inspectors evaluated whether the licensee's actions were in compliance with the facility's CAP and with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B requirements. Specifically, the inspectors evaluated if licensee personnel were identifying plant issues at the proper threshold, entering the issues into the CAP in a timely manner, and assigning the appropriate prioritization for resolution of the issues. The inspectors also assessed whether the licensee staff assigned the appropriate investigation method to ensure the proper determination of root, apparent, and contributing causes.

b. Assessment

(1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification

Issues were generally being identified at a low threshold, evaluated appropriately, and corrected in the CAP. Workers were familiar with the CAP and felt comfortable raising concerns. A large number of CAP items were generated annually; which were reasonably distributed across the various departments. A relatively new computer program was instituted that personnel interviewed described as easier to enter issues and also did automatic generation of a CAP issue when completing a work request. Although, it was also noted the system no longer had the capability to specifically identify which issues were initiated due to NRC concerns.

In 2009, a NOS (Nuclear Oversight—quality assurance) surveillance, PBN 10-003, "2009 4th Quarter Site Quarter Priority DQS Roll-up," (PBNP-QA-10-01), was conducted of the Bechtel CAP and concluded the Bechtel QA [Quality Assurance] Program for the EPU project during the Unit 2 refueling outage 30 was inadequate and did not prevent significant performance deficiencies from occurring and recurring. Resulting corrective actions included training, lowering the threshold for Bechtel personnel entering issues into the CAP, encouraging personnel to enter issues into CAP, thorough and timely resolution of CAP issues, and the use of the Point Beach CAP for all issues or events related to equipment problems within the scope of the Bechtel contract. Improvements were noted for Bechtel's use of the CAP but the licensee has continued to monitor and ensure the Point Beach CAP standards were met. Another NOS surveillance, PDN 11-04, was scheduled to assess the effectiveness of the corrective actions.

The inspectors noted that causal evaluations, in particular apparent cause evaluations (ACEs), were of good quality. Although as noted in the following sections, ACEs were found to have a significant reject rate by the corrective action review board (CARB), which was considered a contributing factor in achieving the quality noted.

There were instances found where issues were not put into the CAP because the issue had already been identified and entered. The inspectors noted, however, that the plant conditions had been modified significantly due to the EPU, and that issues previously identified (and prioritized or resolved) may now have different conditions warranting a new entry into the CAP. For instance:

A clogged drain in the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump room resulted in water spilling on the floor and was previously entered into the CAP. As a result of EPU, a new electrical panel was installed above the drain. During a system walkdown with a licensee individual, the drain was found clogged and the inspectors noted the individual had not planned to enter the issue into the CAP

since it had been previously entered, even though newly installed equipment may have affected the corrective actions or priority of the initial issue. This issue was captured in the CAP as Action Request (AR) 01670042.

The inspection also revealed a weakness in identifying trends in human performance and equipment issues. Procedure PI-AA-207, "Trend Coding and Analysis," was used for human performance trends and defined a potential trend as a change in frequency of occurrence of a given parameter or a change in the level of performance of a particular group, process, program, or procedure. It also defined an adverse trend as a negative change in performance that knowledge, experience, and judgment indicated an adverse impact on safety or reliability, or because a relative large number of performance problems pointed to more significant future problems. The team identified that from January through June 2011, there was a negative trend regarding ACE rejection rate that was not identified by the licensee. This issue was captured in the CAP as AR 01670053.

Additionally, procedure ER-AA-201-2001, "System and Program Health Reporting," was used to identify equipment trends and stated that "system health reporting is the sum of activities that enables the early identification of system or equipment failures and to determine actions required to ensure reliable equipment performance and the process shall monitor indirect measure and trends of system and component performance of critical equipment." Through the inspectors' interviews with staff, it was identified that upon the implementation of the system health reporting system nearly two years ago, certain systems were identified and given a higher priority to establish the direct system reporting system. The inspectors identified the following two examples of equipment trends that were not captured by the licensee's trending program.

One of the systems that had direct system monitoring was the service water (SW) system. The inspectors reviewed condition reports for the past 2 years and found 12 condition reports documenting the repetitive position indication and isolation issues for the SW North Header to South Header Crossconnect Valve, SW-2890. The inspectors reviewed the system health reports for SW and found that two trends were identified for pump operating life and increasing vibrations and for increasing numbers of mussels found in the system. However, the inspectors found no trend identified relative to the SW isolation valve issues. Based on the above described definitions, the inspectors observed that the repetitive issue met the definition of a trend. In response, the licensee initiated AR 1670071.

One system that utilized indirect system monitoring was the radiation monitoring system. The inspectors reviewed condition reports for the past 2 years (60 conditions reports) related to radiation monitoring equipment issues. The inspectors noted that a number of these conditions reports had been written for the clogging of flow indicators by lake grass and unknown mystery alarms which led to increasing out-of-service times for the equipment. Many of the ARs were closed to action taken without looking into the underlying cause that inspectors concluded represented a trend. In response, the licensee initiated AR 1670071 to evaluate the observation.

(2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

The inspectors found that issue resolutions established and monitored through the IST and the MRC were correctly assigned significance and priority in accordance with station procedures. However, vulnerabilities were identified in the licensee's prioritization of conditions, the licensee's evaluation of operability, and the licensee's implementation of interim barriers.

Modifications completed for the EPU resulted in many safety systems changing their risk profiles. Most notable, the addition of new auxiliary feedwater pumps (AFW) significantly reduced the risk ranking of the AFW system and components. Conversely, the standby gas turbine electrical, G-05, was now the most risk significant component in the plant's probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). Therefore, the inspectors noted that open corrective actions from previous issues with these and other systems and components whose risk changed, should be evaluated for changes to priority and completion dates.

The licensee entered this issue into the CAP as CR01668982 and took action prior to the inspection exit. The licensee determined that the risk rankings for several systems increased (such as CCW, the chemical and volume control, safety injection, residual heat removal, and emergency diesel generator ventilation) and several decreased (125-Volt direct current and AFW). For systems that increased, there were 44 open actions, of which 36 required ranking revisions. For systems that decreased, there were 35 open actions, of which 23 required ranking revisions. All ranking changes were made and the owners of the action items were notified to adjust the current priority and due dates if needed.

The inspectors also identified a number of deficiencies with operability and reportability determinations. Integrated inspection report 2011003 included an NCV for a failure to perform an operability determination in accordance with a procedure when a leak on the secondary side of the steam generator was identified in late 2010. The inspectors found a number of examples where operability determinations did not address the degraded or non-conforming condition described in the AR when concluding operability. Some of these examples included:

- AR 01653799 – Pitting and Corrosion on SW piping between SW-833 and SW-364 – The operability section stated that “EH [Electro-Hydraulic] system is not in service but this issue needs resolution prior to relying upon EH system.” The operability section did not address the pitting and corrosion of SW piping. It was not known why operations addressed the EH system.
- AR 01653323 – HELB Door 193 Held Open – The operability section stated that per the STA [shift technical advisor] walkdown the door is functional as a HELB [high energy line break] and fire door from both the auxiliary building and the fan room. The operability section did not address the door being held open, which impacted the operability of the door as a HELB and fire barrier.
- AR 01652446 – Unexpected D-08 Battery Charger Ground Fault Alarm – The operability section stated “No Tech Spec, EPlan, reportability, or TRM threshold exceeded. Operability is N/A.” The operability section did not address the degraded or non-conforming condition of the ground fault.

- AR 01652104 – D-08 and D-07 Battery Charger Trouble Alarms – The operability section stated, “The ground alarms cleared prior to identification of ground location. All battery parameters with the exception of the ground alarms remained normal. The 125VDC system is operable and capable of satisfying its safety function.” The non-conforming condition was the existence of the ground and was not addressed in the operability section.
- AR 01653792 – AFW Pump Room Drain Plugged – The operability section stated, “No Tech Spec, EPlan, reportability, or TRM threshold exceeded. Operability is N/A.” The operability section did not address the operability of the AFW pumps due to internal flooding from the clogged drain. Also, the source of the water was not addressed.

These issues were entered into the CAP as AR 01666221 and the operability bases were revised for each condition noted by the NRC. With the new information added and all deficient aspects addressed in the operability determination, the inspectors agreed that in all the cases the equipment remained operable.

The conduct of reportability evaluations was also found to be weak. In one case, water seals were missing on the electrical conduit entering the electrical panel for the G-1 and G-02 emergency diesel generators. The basis of the technical assessment for reportability (TAR) contradicted the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The FSAR credited the seals for flood protection, while the engineering walkdown for the TAR concluded the flooding scenario discussed in the FSAR would not occur. Based on the inspectors’ questions, the TAR was revised to delete the contradiction with the FSAR. The inspectors also noted that in some instances reportability evaluations were not conducted until the NRC raised questions. One issue involved a non-seismic block wall that could fall on and rupture the nearby condensate storage tanks with a potential to for flooding safety-related components. Another issue described non-seismic water storage tanks in the auxiliary building that could fail during a seismic event causing flooding of the residual heat removal pumps. Several of these reportability evaluations were still being evaluated by the NRC.

The inspectors noted that similar observations had been made by the resident staff. Inspection Report (IR) 2011003 issued August 5, 2011, discussed an NCV associated with the failure to perform an immediate operability assessment for a Unit 1 secondary side leak in containment. The inspectors also noted that Nuclear Oversight had identified four instances where operability determinations were not prompt or initial determinations did not invoke more timely and rigorous documentation of the conditions and concluded that the quality of some of the operability notes could be improved and that training was being performed to address the issue. These observations were documented in AR 01652090.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee’s CAP and noted weaknesses in implementation of interim barriers. Procedure PI-AA-204 was reviewed and the inspectors found that it defined “an interim corrective action as an action taken to temporarily prevent the effects of a condition or make an event less likely to recur during the period when the condition is being evaluated and until final corrective actions are completed.” Also, the inspectors noted that procedure PI-AA-205 further clarified that “compensatory/interim actions are classified as interim actions designed to arrest or minimize recurrence until the corrective action to prevent recurrence or corrective action has been implemented.”

However, neither of these procedures discussed when and who should evaluate and implement interim or compensatory corrective actions and hence they may not be done. The most significant example of where better interim actions could have precluded a more significant issue is described below.

The inspectors found an issue concerning inappropriate breaching of HELB doors during plant modifications that was entered into the CAP in February 2010. Several interim corrective actions were established for the Operations department while the causal evaluation was conducted. In June 2010, the NRC identified that the control room door, a HELB barrier, was blocked open by maintenance, a violation of HELB requirements. This occurrence resulted in a licensee event report (LER) and several NCVs. More widespread interim corrective actions could have prevented the control room door issue.

(3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

The inspectors concluded that the corrective action program was generally effective in addressing identified issues. A licensee emphasis on corrective action due dates has resulted in no overdue CAP actions for over 550 days.

Corrective actions were generally appropriate for the identified issues. One exception is discussed below.

AR 01661717, Incorrect Noun Name on Instrument Face, was initiated on June 17, 2011, by Operations. The AR discusses "old" AFW pump instrumentation on the C01 main control room board still labeled AFW instead of its new system description as the "Standby Steam Generator Pumps." The AR actions did not try to determine why the labels were not corrected as part of the recent modification or determine the extent of condition. Instead, it assigned actions to fix the labels with a due data in October. As a result of inspectors' questions, AR 01668861 was initiated to perform a causal analysis and extent of condition. Through subsequent discussions with the modification engineer, the inspectors determined the labels had not been corrected yet since the modification was partially accepted and modification activities were still in progress to correct the labels. In effect, the issues in the CAP could have been addressed with no actions required by reference to the modification.

The inspectors noted that the licensee has self-identified many instances where corrective actions were closed inappropriately. The inspectors verified that plant staff do get feedback, or feedback was available to them, on how their issues were addressed. However, the area that most personnel interviewed would like to see more improvement was to have more input for their issues that were dispositioned as closed to actions taken to ensure the issue was properly understood and addressed. For instance:

A licensee individual initiated AR 01654217 when the small article monitor (SAM) was found out-of-service due to high background. Subsequent investigation found that some high activity smears were thrown in the nearby trash, causing the high background. Further, the smears were there because they had been used in the iSOLO instrument, which was considered by the individual inappropriate for this high level of activity. The corrective action desired was to

prevent radiation protection (RP) personnel from using the iSOLO for that high contamination level. The AR was closed to action taken which was to remove the swipes from the trash and returning the SAM to service. The AR initiator was not consulted or satisfied with this closure.

The inspectors found that additional actions were completed but not documented in the AR, including discussions with RP personnel on use of the iSOLO and putting new equipment in service to use for the high contamination smears. The AR initiator would probably have been satisfied closing the AR to these actions.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience (OE)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the facility's OE program. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed OE program implementing procedures, observed meetings for the use of OE information, and reviewed completed evaluations of OE issues and events. The intent was to determine if the licensee was effectively integrating OE experience into the performance of daily activities, whether evaluations of issues were proper and conducted by qualified personnel, whether the licensee's program was sufficient to prevent future occurrences of previous industry events, and whether the licensee effectively used the information in developing departmental assessments and facility audits. The inspectors also assessed if corrective actions, as a result of OE experience, were identified and implemented effectively and in a timely manner.

b. Assessment

In general, OE was effectively used at the station. The inspectors observed that OE was discussed as part of the daily station and pre-job briefings. Industry OE was effectively disseminated across the various plant departments and no issues were identified during the inspectors' review of licensee OE evaluations. However, during the review of corrective actions associated with an NCV, the following instance was found where operating experience was not incorporated into site guidance and, if it had been, the event may have been prevented.

The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions related to NCV 2010005-03, "Failure to Submit LER related to breach of HELB Barrier," including the licensee's root cause evaluation (RCE) 01616620, "4Q10 Potential NCV on Failure to Submit LER on HELB Issues." The licensee's RCE concluded that the root cause was inadequate evaluation of NRC RIS 2001-009, "Control of Hazard Barriers." The inspectors noted that even though the initial event occurred in 2001, the licensee's evaluation limited the scope of revalidation to 10 regulatory information summaries, all from 2010. The inspectors considered this a missed opportunity to use operating experience from the same timeframe as the initial

issue. The licensee acknowledged that a more rigorous review was needed based on this example.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensee staff's ability to identify and enter issues into the CAP program, prioritize and evaluate issues, and implement effective corrective actions through efforts from departmental assessments and audits. The inspectors reviewed recent self-assessments of the CAP, all self-assessments from operations and emergency planning, and assessments of Bechtel engineering and maintenance and audits conducted by NOS.

b. Assessment

The inspectors concluded that, overall, the licensee's use of self-assessments and audits was appropriate for the identification, evaluation, and correction of issues. The programs for self-assessments and audits were scheduled at an appropriate frequency and included a broad cross-section of performance areas. For the audits and assessments reviewed, observations were documented and ARs written for deficiencies as well as enhancements. NOS assessments and observations were found to be thorough and challenging as evidenced by conclusions and insights related to reviews performed on Bechtel work practices and programs discussed in other sections of this report. Overall, self-assessments were adequately performed.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment (SCWE)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensee's SCWE through reviews of safety culture surveys and assessments conducted in 2010 and of the employee concerns program (ECP) implementing procedures, discussions with the corporate ECP manager, and reviews of issue reports. Approximately 19 personnel were interviewed (including Bechtel personnel): 6 supervisors and 13 workers.

The inspectors reviewed a sample of ECP case files involving potential cases of harassment and intimidation for raising safety issues or discrimination concerns.

b. Assessment

The inspectors found that personnel interviewed had a reasonable knowledge of the basic definition of a safety-conscious work environment and what it meant to them.

Most have received some training, either in annual site access or initial site access, and were aware of general discussions on the subject by the management. All personnel expressed a strong willingness to raise safety issues, without fear. No one knew of any retaliation against an individual for raising a concern.

The inspectors reviewed the results of licensee quick hit assessment report, PBS_PBNP_10_02, "Aggregate Review of 2010 Safety Culture Learnings." This assessment provided a summary and assessment of the results and corrective actions for all the safety culture surveys conducted in 2010. Surveys included in the assessment were the Fleet Safety Culture Survey conducted in June 2010, the Fleet Engagement Survey conducted in spring 2010, the Fleet NEM survey in July 2010, and the Safety Culture Improvement Team (SCIT) results. The inspectors considered the number of surveys and assessments conducted were higher than normal for a year and would provide the licensee plentiful data to formulate effective corrective actions for weaknesses and enhancements identified for safety culture sustainability and improvements.

Although many surveys were conducted, results evaluated for various levels and groups, and actions developed, most personnel interviewed could not provide any details on the safety culture assessments in their specific departments or actions to address department weaknesses. Additionally, most individuals were not aware of the purpose, actions or results of the site's SCIT. This team was initiated by the site prior to the last NRC PI&R inspection (March 2009) and evaluated department safety culture through discussions with plant staff on a periodic basis and reports the results to management. The NRC team noted that additional feedback to plant personnel on safety culture efforts and results, including department results and corrective actions, may enhance the effectiveness of the SCIT.

The inspectors noted that one of the weaknesses identified in the above assessments was communications around decision-making processes and more effectively sharing information with the workforce. During discussions with the plant personnel, there were examples of good communications provided, such as the decision to take the generator off-line in July 2010 to fix a hydrogen leak. Also, more written communications and video messages by the plant manager on plant issues were apparent. However, during the interviews, the inspectors noted that most of the individuals, especially those not associated with operations, were not aware of the existing steam leak on the secondary side of the Unit 1 'A' steam generator or plant management's basis to conclude it was acceptable to continue to operate the Unit rather than shutdown to fix the leak. In response to the inspectors' observation, a Point Beach Newsflash was issued on July 14, 2010, describing the steam generator leakage and operating basis.

The inspectors reviewed 2011 Daily Quality Summary reports for observations determined by the NOS evaluator to be unsatisfactory. Included in the daily reports were insights of possible reasons the evaluator concluded the activity was unsatisfactory. In five observations from March 7 through April 27, 2011, NOS insights included a production-over-safety theme, including schedule pressure. Some of these issues were put into the CAP and resolved as procedure interpretation differences. However, the inspectors noted that the licensee had not performed an overall evaluation of these insights, and any other inputs received from the CAP or ECP regarding possible safety culture concerns, to ensure safety culture degradation was not occurring.

The licensee did enter this issue into the CAP as AR 01670098 and will perform a causal evaluation to evaluate all the identified safety culture issues.

The inspectors determined that the ECP process was being effectively implemented. The program was included in site access training and most personnel remembered the site ECP manager discussing the program at divisional or plant meetings. All personnel stated they would know how to use the system if needed. The inspectors noted through a review of ECP cases that the licensee had appropriately investigated and taken constructive actions to address potential safety culture issues.

The team assessed whether the organization's characteristics and attitudes established, as an overriding priority, that nuclear plant safety issues received the attention warranted by their significance. As a result of the review of the above information, the inspectors concluded the plant's safety culture was adequate. This was similar to the conclusions of the 2010 licensee assessments. The inspectors did note that a significant number of issues with safety culture aspects were contained in the CAP, ECP program, self-assessments, observations, and other sources of information. Therefore, organizational decisions and actions at all levels of the organization should emphasize that production, cost, and schedule goals were developed, communicated, and implemented in a manner that reinforced the importance of nuclear safety.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA5 Other

- .1 This inspection also counted as a Problem Identification and Resolution sample required by IR 71004, Extended Power Uprate, for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Refer to specific sections of the report for additional details.

4OA6 Management Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

On July 21, 2011, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. T. Vehec and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that they returned any proprietary documents.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

| | |
|----------------|--|
| L. Meyer | Site Vice-President |
| J. Costedio | Regulatory Affairs Manager |
| F. Flentje | Regulatory Affairs Supervisor |
| A. Mitchell | Performance Improvement Manager |
| R. Farrell | Radiation Protection Manager |
| R. Harrsch | Operations Manager |
| J. Voorhess | Manager, Nuclear Division, Employee Concerns Program |
| T. Vehec | Plant Manager |
| S. Pfaff | Performance Improvement Supervisor |
| R. Flessner | Engineering, Performance Improvement |
| S. Burnett | Operations, Performance Improvement |
| B. Scherwinski | Regulatory Affairs |
| C. Ford | Maintenance Programs Department Supervisor |
| S. Ruesch | Nuclear Oversight Manager |
| P. Wild | Design Engineering Manager |
| J. Kenny | Mechanical Maintenance Manager |
| B. Wright | Online Scheduling Manager |
| M. Pederson | Systems Engineering |
| F. Domke | I&C Systems Supervisor |
| P. Holzman | Heat Exchanger Testing Engineer |
| S. Clark | Systems Engineering Supervisor |
| L. Hawki | Engineering Performance Improvement Manager |
| J. Schweitzer | Operations Support Manager |
| J. Pierce | Chemistry Manager |

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

M. Kunowski, Chief, Branch 5, Division of Reactor Projects
S. Burton, Senior Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

PLANT PROCEDURES

| <u>Number</u> | <u>Description or Title</u> | <u>Date or Rev</u> |
|----------------------|--|----------------------|
| 0-SOP-SW-105 | South Service Water Pump Header Isolation | Revision 8 |
| 0-SOP-SW-105 | South Service Water Pump Header Isolation | Revision 7 Draft |
| 2RMP 9075-1 | A-01 4160 V Loss Of Voltage Monthly Surveillance | Revision 14 |
| 2RMP 9075-2 | A-02 4160 V Loss Of Voltage Monthly Surveillance | Revision 9 |
| 2RMP 9359-9A | 2D-205 Battery, 2D-207 Battery Charger Maintenance | Revision 1 |
| BALCM Appendix B | Boric Acid Examination Guidelines | Revision 4 |
| BALCM Program | Boric Acid Leakage And Corrosion Monitoring Program | Revision 5 |
| DG-G01 | Human Factors Design Document | Revision 10 |
| EN-AA-203-1000 | Engineering Evaluation | Revision 0 |
| EN-AA-203-1001 | Operability Determinations/Functionality Assessments | Revision 5 |
| EOP-0 Unit 1 | Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection | Revision 55 |
| EOP-0 Unit 1 | Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection | Revision 54 |
| EOP-0 Unit 2 | Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection | Revision 55 |
| EOP-0 Unit 2 | Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection | Revision 54 |
| EOP-0.1 Unit 1 | Reactor Trip Response | Revision 37 |
| EOP-0.1 Unit 1 | Reactor Trip Response | Revision 36 |
| EOP-0.1 Unit 2 | Reactor Trip Response | Revision 37 |
| EOP-0.1 Unit 2 | Reactor Trip Response | Revision 36 |
| EP Appendix M | Matrix For Emergency Preparedness Equipment | Revision 4 |
| ER-AA-201-2001 | System and Program Health Reporting | Revision 3 |
| ER-AA-201-2002 | System Performance Monitoring | Revision 1 |
| ER-AA-203-2002 | Integrated Project Prioritization | Revision 1 |
| FP-E-MOD-10 | Modification Turnover And Closeout | Revision 12 |
| FP-E-SE-04 | Conduct Of System Engineering | Revision 6 |
| FP-PA-ARP-01 | Action Request Process | Revision 32 |
| FP-PA-OE-01 | Operating Experience | Revision 13 |
| FSAR Section 11.5 | Radiation Monitoring System | UFSAR 2009 |
| LI-AA-200-1000-10000 | NextEra Fleet Licensing Performance Indicators | Revision 04 |
| NA-AA-200 | Employee Concerns Program Process Description | Revision 4 |
| NAP-412 | Operational Decision-Making | Revision 10 |
| NP 1.2.6 | Infrequently Performed Tests Or Evolutions (IPTEs) | Revision 16 |
| NP 1.2.6 | Infrequently Performed Tests Or Evolutions (IPTEs) | Revision 15 Draft |
| NP 1.9.9 | Transient Combustible Control | Revision 17 |

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| NP 2.1.11 | Operational Decision Making Fundamentals | Revision 0 |
| NP 7.7.28 | Cable Condition Monitoring Program | Revision 2 |
| NP 7.7.5 | MRule Monitoring | Revision 22 |
| NP 8.4.11 | Penetrating Barriers | Revision 17 |
| NP 8.5.1 | Equipment Identification And Labeling Procedure | Revision 11 |
| NP 800 | Employee Concerns Program | Revision 6a |
| OM 3.26 | Use Of Dedicated/Assigned Operators | Revision 13 |
| OM 3.27 | Control Of Fire Protection And Appendix R Safe Shutdown Equipment | Revision 41 |
| OM 3.39 | Degraded Equipment/Adverse Condition Monitoring Procedure | Revision 3 |
| OM 5.4.4 | Control Of Posted Plant Information | Revision 10 |
| OP 4E | Reactor Coolant System Lowered Inventory Requirements Unit 1 | Revision 3 |
| OP-AA-100-1000 | Conduct of Operations | Revision 1 |
| PI-AA-100-1005 | Root Cause Analysis | Revision 3 |
| PI-AA-100-1006 | Common Cause Evaluation | Revision 1 |
| PI-AA-100-1007 | Apparent Cause Evaluation | Revision 3 |
| PI-AA-100-1008 | Condition Evaluation | Revision 1 |
| PI-AA-101 | Self Assessment And Benchmarking Program | Revision 6 |
| PI-AA-101 | Self-Assessment And Benchmarking Program | Revision 7 |
| PI-AA-102 | Operating Experience | Revision 3 |
| PI-AA-203 | Action Tracking Management | Revision 4 |
| PI-AA-204 | Condition Identification And Screening Process | Revision 12 |
| PI-AA-205 | Condition Evaluation And Corrective Action | Revision 12 |
| PI-AA-207 | Trend Coding And Analysis | Revision 1 |
| RMP 9305 | DB-75 Breaker Routine Maintenance | Revision 19 |
| RMP 9359-5A | D-05 Station Battery, D-07 Battery Charger Maintenance And Surveillances | Revision 5 |

ARs Reviewed

| <u>Number</u> | <u>Description or Title</u> |
|---------------|--|
| ACE 01142817 | South SW Header Removed From Service In Accordance With 1-SOP-SW-105, ACE Assignment 01 |
| ACE 01159784 | Valve Stem Of Manual Isolation Valve SF-2, P-12B SFP Pump Manual Discharge Isolation Valve, ACE Assignment 01, Revision 4 |
| ACE 01163219 | Adequacy Of Documentation For Evaluating Seismic III/II With Regard To Unit 1 And Unit 2 Containment Sump Strainers, ACE Assignment 01 |
| ACE 01165673 | Potential Non-Compliance With NP 8.4.16 Requirements, ACE Assignment 01, Revision 2 |
| ACE 01175986 | Inadequate Evaluation Of Westinghouse NSAL 09-08 |
| ACE 01363240 | Increasing Inboard Bearing Oil Leakage On 2P-011B |
| ACE 01374449 | 2si-897b Failed To Fully Stroke From The Control Room |
| ACE 01374551 | Reactor Vessel Level Calibration At 70% Level |
| ACE 01376022 | Bechtel Corrective Action Program Is Not Being Effectively Used |
| ACE 01381584 | Inadequate Implementation Of Bechtel QA Program |
| ACE 01384097 | Steam Pressure Dynamics Out Of Tolerance |
| ACE 01385044 | Trend CAP Of Foreign Material In Unit 1 RCS |
| ACE 01398159 | 2N-40 OOS: Unavailability Limit Exceeded |
| ACE 01609804 | Unexpected Control Room Alarms; Revision 1 |
| ACE 01619914 | Failure To Obtain SRO Approval Prior To Start Of Work |
| AR 00889394 | Calculated Short Circuit Currents Exceed Equipment Ratings |
| AR 01180534 | Panel D13 Short Circuit Currents Exceed Panel Rating |
| AR 01321492 | 2P-11A, CCW Pump Excessive Oil Leakage |
| AR 01331880 | OIC Fault On 2P-2C VFD When Starting Pump |
| AR 01357411 | Increased CC Pump Oil Leakage |
| AR 01358438 | RE 230 Drip Pan Corrosion |
| AR 01358457 | Procedure, Process And Controls For SW Header Isolation Work |
| AR 01360844 | RMS Area Monitor Local Readouts |
| AR 01361361 | Added Oil To 1P-11B |
| AR 01361767 | G-02 EDG Tripped On Reverse Power |
| AR 01362668 | Oil Leak On 2P-11B CCW Pump Inboard Bearing |
| AR 01362964 | Enhancements To Our Safety Conscious Work Environment |
| AR 01363131 | 2P-11B CCW Pump Oil Collection And Quantification |
| AR 01363632 | Atmosphere Monitor Alarmed In U1 Tendon Gallery |
| AR 01363811 | Potential Design Control Violation For Fuel Oil Volume (NRC) |
| AR 01363837 | Received Unexpected PPCS Alarm: 2RE-229 Alert |
| AR 01364522 | Unsatisfactory Closeout Of CAR 01118728 |
| AR 01364619 | D-06 Open Circuit Voltage Above Calculated Value |
| AR 01365387 | During U2 Down Power Two Power Range Recorders Failed To Follow Power Level |
| AR 01365393 | AR 01121653 Closed To Actions Taken But Issue Not Resolved |
| AR 01365972 | NRC Question – Condensate Pump Oil Sampling |
| AR 01366527 | 1RE-229 Flow Switch Not Operating Properly |
| AR 01366759 | ACE 01149193 – Failed Quality Review |
| AR 01366842 | RE-105 Removal From Operation |
| AR 01366885 | CAP Closure Prior To Completion Of Assigned Actions |
| AR 01367132 | Inadequate Closeout Of CAP 01141212 |

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| AR 01367583 | Revise FP-WM-WOI-01 Rev 3 Per CA 1145204-02 (Secondary) |
| AR 01367586 | Corrective Actions Not Completed Satisfactorily |
| AR 01367604 | Questions Regarding Coiled Cables Above P-38A And B |
| AR 01367681 | 1N-31 Reads Counts When De-Energized |
| AR 01367721 | 2-274/A06 Relay Found Outside Tech Spec Limits |
| AR 01368155 | Out of Tolerance Resistance As-Found values RT06 |
| AR 01368317 | 1RE-215 Detector Failed High Alarm Check During Calibration |
| AR 01368319 | 1RE-215 Detector Bound Tight In Detector Well |
| AR 01368446 | DAM 3 Tx Timeout Errors On RMS System Server In Control |
| AR 01368725 | DAM 3 Failed/Rad Monitors OOS |
| AR 01368966 | ACE Quality Failure |
| AR 01368988 | DAM 3 Communication Failure |
| AR 01369631 | CAP Closed With No Action Taken |
| AR 01369724 | NRC Question On 2P-10A Flange Stud Thread Engagement |
| AR 01369867 | Fouling Of Heat Exchangers |
| AR 01369933 | 1FI-2888 Fouled With Grass |
| AR 01370627 | 1N-31 Erratic Indication While De-Energized |
| AR 01371114 | Failure Of Effluent Sump Alarm |
| AR 01371118 | Shutdown Safety |
| AR 01371334 | Time Critical Action Verification Process Enhancements |
| AR 01371774 | Numerous RE-315 Alert Alarms |
| AR 01371960 | ACE 01154245 Does Not Meet Minimum Standards |
| AR 01372026 | 2RE-128 Module Shuts Down Power Supply When Reinstalling |
| AR 01372250 | North / South SW Header Valve Testing / SW-2890, SW-2891 |
| AR 01372623 | Corrective Actions Not Completed |
| AR 01372706 | 1RE-211 Containment Air Particulate Detector Is Reading Less |
| AR 01373001 | SOERs 85-3 and 88-3 Not Cited In Site Procedures |
| AR 01373145 | Safety Related Cable Trays In U2 8' Th Under Path Of FWHTR |
| AR 01373984 | HX-012D HX Found To Be Approximately 66% Blocked |
| AR 01373985 | Unexpected 2RE-303 Alert And High Alarm |
| AR 01374038 | HX-12D CCW Hx Bryozoa Fouling, GL 89-13 Issue |
| AR 01374100 | RE-230 Leak On U2 Turbine Bldg 8' Floor Contains H-3 |
| AR 01374130 | Unit 2 N-32 SRNI Failed To Energize On Rx Shutdown |
| AR 01374136 | Gas Analyzer Alarm Left In During Unit 2 Shutdown |
| AR 01374162 | RE-224 Gas Stripper Building RM Went Into Alert Alarm |
| AR 01374386 | Inadequate Closeout of CAP 01124417 |
| AR 01374387 | Inadequate Closeout of CAP 01124029 |
| AR 01374395 | CAP 01149819 Inadequate Closeout |
| AR 01374633 | 1N-31 SRNI Indicating 100cps While De-Energized Previously WO |
| AR 01374649 | 2ICP 04.023-1 Rev 7 |
| AR 01374694 | Square Rooters Left Out Of Tolerance |
| AR 01374906 | CCW/HX Fouling |
| AR 01375044 | Received An Unexpected U2 SR High Flux At Shutdown Alarm |
| AR 01375252 | PM To Replace Filters On 1F-003 Closed And Not Worked |
| AR 01375294 | Open Items Identified In EPU Electrical Calculations |
| AR 01375414 | RE-214 Alert Alarm |

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| AR 01375421 | SFP Pump Suction Isolation Valve Stem Contacting Adjacent Pipe Insulation |
| AR 01375480 | Thermal Overloads Found Tripped On 2B52-329K |
| AR 01376144 | Safety Related Power Supply Found Out Of Tolerance |
| AR 01376194 | Discrepancies Found During NRC Observed IT IT-04A RHR Test |
| AR 01376313 | 2N-42 Calibration As-Found Out Of Tolerances |
| AR 01376450 | Mis-Wiring Of BF Relay Cause Ground Fault |
| AR 01376609 | RE-220 SFP Monitor In Alert |
| AR 01376772 | Intervening Combustible Wire In PAB |
| AR 01376811 | Unplanned LCO Entry Due To Wiring Error EC 13401 |
| AR 01376931 | 2N-31 Source Range Out Of Tolerance |
| AR 01376938 | 1ICP 04.023-1 Rev 8 |
| AR 01377019 | Found Bistable NC-101 In 2N-31 Source Range High OOT |
| AR 01377039 | Cap Bank PMT Caused Loss Of Some Electrical Loads |
| AR 01377858 | 1P-2C Charging Pump Tripped After Approximately 11 Seconds |
| AR 01377968 | EC 14637 Changed Wiring That Affects UV Testing Procedures |
| AR 01378102 | NRC Inspection: G-01 And G-02 Fire Dampers Are Not Classified |
| AR 01378129 | ACE 01157505 Failed To Meet Minimum Requirements |
| AR 01378236 | NRC Inspection TS Bases 3.8.1 Not Supported By Calc |
| AR 01378366 | SW-2890 – North Hdr Vlv Mid Position When Valve Locally Shut |
| AR 01378396 | DG Room Temperature Calc Has Low Margin |
| AR 01378732 | RE-234/235 Rad Monitor Unable To Be Worked As Scheduled |
| AR 01378880 | 50.59 Evaluation 2008-018 Incomplete |
| AR 01378902 | High Calibration Constant On RE-234 |
| AR 01379027 | RE-218 Element Apparently Needs Cleaning |
| AR 01379047 | Follow-Up Issue – SCWE Confirmatory Order Inspection |
| AR 01379245 | Issues With Under Voltage Relay Testing |
| AR 01379249 | 2RMP 9075-2 Rev8 Temp Change Permanent Revision |
| AR 01379454 | 2RE-222, Blowdown Tank Radiation Monitor Went Into Alarm |
| AR 01379456 | 1RE-219 Had A 1 Min Average Alarm On RMS Server |
| AR 01379648 | 2N-31: MRE Needed |
| AR 01379779 | CAP 01139647 Closeout Not IAW Procedure |
| AR 01379931 | Deficiencies In NP 1.9.6, “Plant Cleanliness And Storage” |
| AR 01380269 | RCE Rejected At TRN Dept CARB |
| AR 01380574 | Cable Submergence Issues |
| AR 01380584 | Status Of RE-218 Is Inhibiting Outage Preps/Water Processing |
| AR 01380701 | RE-224 Readings Trending Up |
| AR 01380718 | 1SC-954A Identified Vs. Unidentified Leakage |
| AR 01380792 | Re-224 Average Calculated Efficiency In Spec But Low |
| AR 01380796 | 2RE-222 Post Cal. Testing Not Completed Yet On WO 380828 |
| AR 01380896 | Out of Tolerance On Threshold Voltage On RE-00218 |
| AR 01380930 | Receiving DAM 3 RX And TX Timeouts |
| AR 01380977 | Unexpected Common Area Radiation Monitor High Alarm |
| AR 01381037 | Improving CAP Closure |
| AR 01381063 | SW-2891 S To N Supply Xconn Leak Ck PM – Unable To Complete |
| AR 01381110 | Unexpected 2RE-217 CCW Liquid Monitor Alert Alarms |

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| AR 01381310 | Potential Non-Compliance With NP 8.4.16 Requirements |
| AR 01381337 | HELB Penetration M-3-5-17-F203, Potential Spec Non-Compliance |
| AR 01381464 | Inadequate Closure Of CAP-01157499 |
| AR 01381466 | Inadequate Cold Weather Preparation CAP Closure |
| AR 01381584 | Inadequate Implementation Of Bechtel QA Program |
| AR 01381909 | SFP Cooler Shell Side Fouling (Increased Mussel Shells) |
| AR 01382017 | CAP 01160639 Inadequate Closure |
| AR 01382042 | RE-242 Monthly Test Failure |
| AR 01382230 | Functionality Assessment Process Shortfalls |
| AR 01382330 | Fire Seals At M-3-5-17 F203 Are Deficient |
| AR 01382615 | D-04 DC Bus Bar Ampacity Condition |
| AR 01382729 | SW-2890 Indicates Intermediate In The Control Room |
| AR 01382994 | SW-2890 Indicates Intermediate In The Control Room |
| AR 01382997 | SW-2891 Indicates Intermediate In The Control Room |
| AR 01383001 | SW-2890 Leaks By 50 GPM During 0-SOP-SW-105 |
| AR 01383095 | Received PPCS Alarm "RE-126 Cntnt Hi Range Rad Indication" |
| AR 01383258 | SR NI SUR Spike On Both Channels When Shifting Modes On CSDs |
| AR 01383347 | 1N32 Channel Failed to Indicate When Energized |
| AR 01383653 | 1N-32 Isolation Amp Output To PPCS Left Out Of Tolerance |
| AR 01383785 | PMO Change May Not Be Appropriate |
| AR 01383809 | System Server Receives Fail Low 1RE-134 At Midnight |
| AR 01383971 | Non-Compliance With NP-8.4.16 HELB Requirements |
| AR 01384003 | RE-230 Waste Water Effluent Rad Monitor Fail External Alarms |
| AR 01384175 | 1RE-102, Unit 1 Containment Low Range Monitor Spike High |
| AR 01384176 | Discovered ICC-744A, HX-8B BA Evap CC Supply Throttled |
| AR 01384500 | Outdated HELB Barrier Postings |
| AR 01385406 | Drumming Area Vent Stack (RE-221) Had Multiple Alert Alarms |
| AR 01385415 | 1RE-211/212 Secured Without Notifying RP |
| AR 01385430 | ACE 01165947 Quality Did Not Meet Expectations |
| AR 01385493 | ACE 01165036 Quality Did Not Meet Expectations |
| AR 01385515 | Unit 2 Condenser Fouling Increase |
| AR 01385885 | U1 8' Containment Paint Chips And Dust On Sump Pump B Screen |
| AR 01386083 | Inappropriate CAP Closure |
| AR 01386145 | 1N-31 NM-106 Out Of Tolerance |
| AR 01386208 | Control Room C01A 3-11 & 4-11 Alarms Disabled During EPU Mod |
| AR 01386252 | 2N-40, N1 Fission Channel OOS Greater Than 30 Days |
| AR 01386492 | New AFW Meter Faces Are Not Labeled Properly |
| AR 01386700 | Unit 1 Reactor Startup Was Aborted |
| AR 01387426 | HELB Door 193 Not Closing Properly |
| AR 01387496 | RE-224 LDGS Building Rad Monitor Alert Alarm |
| AR 01387578 | CW System Yellow Work Order Closed with Work Not Performed |
| AR 01387792 | Elevated RMS: RE-214 And RE-221 |
| AR 01387912 | ACE 01166586 Failed To Meet Minimum Requirements |
| AR 01387992 | HELB Barrier Controls From AR 01165673 |
| AR 01387996 | Effect Of Breached HELB Barrier On Tech Spec Equipment |

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| AR 01388005 | Weakness In Past Operability Evaluation For 1HX-015A |
| AR 01388211 | HELB Barrier Compensatory Measures |
| AR 01388366 | NRC EPU Information Request |
| AR 01388448 | Unit 2 MEL Appears To Be Operating Unexpectedly |
| AR 01388852 | B.5.b Walkdown NRC Debrief Enhancement Recommendations |
| AR 01389331 | ACE 01171145-01 Failed To Meet Minimum Requirements |
| AR 01389520 | Question On Prompt Operability Call – AR 01166160 |
| AR 01389524 | 1RE-219 Alert Alarm |
| AR 01389948 | ACE 01171472 Returned For Additional Work |
| AR 01389975 | RE-230 Effluent Monitor Low Flow |
| AR 01390330 | Delay In D-07 Work Due To HELB Barrier Issue |
| AR 01390461 | 2RE-217 Went Into Alert For About 2 Min |
| AR 01390789 | Nuclear Instrumentation Maintenance Rule Criteria |
| AR 01390824 | History Of Inverter Transfer To Alternate Source |
| AR 01391093 | Question Regarding Application Of IEEE 384 To 125VDC Testing |
| AR 01391406 | HX-055A Diesel Cooler Fouling |
| AR 01391443 | Potential Adverse Trend – Mispositioning Events |
| AR 01391532 | WOs 371104 And 363942 Closed With No Action |
| AR 01391612 | CAP 01158754 Not Satisfactorily Addressed |
| AR 01391623 | Potential Inadequate Evaluation of Westinghouse NSAL 09-08 |
| AR 01391731 | Unexpected 2RE-215 RMS Alarms |
| AR 01392152 | Unexpected 1RE-229 Fail External Alarms |
| AR 01392244 | Unexpected Alarm: 2RE-222 High Alarm |
| AR 01393811 | U1 Power System Stabilizer Operation On Startup |
| AR 01393928 | EPU Evals Of License Renewal Missed Certain Conditions |
| AR 01394159 | Contingencies May Not Be In Order For U1 Condenser Fouling |
| AR 01394175 | ACE 01175675-02 Was Rejected By CARB |
| AR 01394317 | 2Q10 NRC URI-Inverter Transfers To Alt Power During Test |
| AR 01394857 | 2RE-222 – Third Occurrence Within 19 Months |
| AR 01394952 | Power Uprate Package Quality |
| AR 01395125 | Failure Of U1 SW Chlorination System |
| AR 01396318 | 1RE-217 Was Stuck In Well Due To Corrosion |
| AR 01396327 | Short Circuit Failures Requiring Resolution Prior To EPU |
| AR 01396926 | Tripped D-107 Battery Charger During Testing |
| AR 01397140 | 1RE-229 Flow Switch Failure During Quarterly Functional Test |
| AR 01397189 | PBSA-OPS-10-01 Identified Areas For Improvement |
| AR 01397190 | PBSA-OPS-10-01 Identified Enhancements |
| AR 01397422 | NRC PI Cornerstone Owners Areas For Improvement |
| AR 01397923 | Calc N-93-062 Major Revision 3 For 2D-205 Battery |
| AR 01397925 | Calc N-93-061 Major Revision 3 For 1D-205 Battery |
| AR 01398810 | PC 23 Closed To No Work Performed |
| AR 01399368 | Inadequate Calculations To Support Mod EC 15513 |
| AR 01399741 | NRC Question On Past Operability Requirements |
| AR 01400338 | Various Errors With EC 12078, 2X-01Transformer Mod |
| AR 01400403 | RE-240 Alert Alarm Light On Remote Meter Needs Replacement |
| AR 01401275 | ACE 01183099 Graded At Below 80 |

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| AR 01401329 | Initiator Feedback Improvement |
| AR 01401443 | 2SC-951 Containment Isolation Valve Stroke Time Testing |
| AR 01401650 | TS Scheduled Too Close to 125% Compliance |
| AR 01401858 | Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip During Reactor Startup |
| AR 01402010 | NRC Questions Regarding HELB |
| AR 01402064 | Oil Leak on 1P-11A CCW Pump Outboard Bearing |
| AR 01402154 | LER Required For Past HELB Issues |
| AR 01402178 | TI-177, Gas Intrusion Inspection Follow-Up Discussion |
| AR 01402180 | SW-2890 – North Hdr Vlv Mid Position When Valve Locally Shut |
| AR 01608247 | SW Temperature Limit Not Specified For 2HX-15C1-C8 (D1-D8) |
| AR 01608767 | LHSI Sentinel Point Monitoring Results |
| AR 01609804 | Unexpected Control Room Alarms – 1.1% Downpower Required |
| AR 01610979 | Water Seals On Top Of C35 Missing / Degraded |
| AR 01612401 | CDBI FSA Calc 2001-0049, STPT 21.2 VS EPU Implementation |
| AR 01613514 | Chemistry Not Notified Of 1RE-215 Being Taken OOS |
| AR 01615766 | 1XY-114 Troubleshooting, Repair, And RTS identified Issues |
| AR 01616175 | Design Flaw In Capacitor Bank Setpoint |
| AR 01616193 | Replacement RMS Isolation Transformer And Parts Needed |
| AR 01616620 | 4Q10 Potential NCV On Failure To Submit LER On HELB Issues |
| AR 01617134 | Unit 1 And 2 XY-113 And XY-114 Capacitor Issues |
| AR 01617227 | CR Related To Unit 2 Closed Inappropriately |
| AR 01617848 | Increasing Sample Flow On Sping 24 |
| AR 01618182 | Breaker B52-DB25-021 Failed To Open During Testing |
| AR 01618183 | SW-2890 Stopped 25% Open |
| AR 01618991 | INPO IER L3 11-9: Oyster Creek Scram During Startup |
| AR 01619079 | Water Seals On Top Of C35 Missing/Degraded |
| AR 01619732 | AMSAC Function Was Disabled |
| AR 01619914 | Failure To Obtain SRO Approval Prior To Start Of Work |
| AR 01620143 | 2FT-925 Found Isolated And Equalized |
| AR 01620275 | ICP 13.001-3 (Sping 23) Found OOT |
| AR 01620782 | Poor Status Control Of SW-2890 Service Water Ring Header |
| AR 01621239 | 2N-31 Indicating With Detector De-Energized (2R31) |
| AR 01621414 | Preconditioning Of The Unit 2 CFCS On 9/21/10 |
| AR 01621596 | DAM 6 Battery Failed. Found During ICP 13.003 WO 384936 12 |
| AR 01624198 | D-05 Battery Voltage – Low Margin |
| AR 01624591 | 1RE-229 Did Not Show Fail External When Secured |
| AR 01624689 | 2N-31 Failed to Energize on 2R31 Shutdown |
| AR 01625587 | Service Water Chlorination System Chemical Leak |
| AR 01626072 | 2N-31 Troubleshooting Inconclusive – Test Equipment Issue |
| AR 01626344 | NRC Observation During Ultrasonic (UT) Exam |
| AR 01626385 | IT 535B Results Indicate Excessive Seat Leakage On 2SI-856B |
| AR 01626503 | Rejected ACEs At Eng CARB |
| AR 01626625 | 2N-31: Test High Voltage Cutoff Function (2R31 Mode 6) |
| AR 01626674 | N-31 SRNI Spiked High 2 Times Without Cause |
| AR 01626693 | 2N-31 SRNI Counts Drop by 60 cps When N-35 Bypassed |

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| AR 01627172 | RE-230 Monitor Going In And Out Of Service Impacting Chemistry |
| AR 01627428 | Issues Noted During Walkdown Of 2LP-447 RV Level |
| AR 01627924 | Mechanical Maintenance Inspection of 2HX-027 A/B |
| AR 01627998 | 2N-31 SRNI Counts Fluctuating By 50 cps |
| AR 01628109 | Intermittent Trend Alarms On RE-317 |
| AR 01628109 | Intermittent trend Alarms On RE-317 |
| AR 01628928 | RE-214, PABVS Process Monitor, Alarm Response |
| AR 01629007 | ACE Action Will Not Reduce Likelihood of Repeat Event |
| AR 01629371 | Sping-21 Fail External |
| AR 01629378 | 2PM-368A And 2PM-483A Found Out Of Tech. Spec. Limit |
| AR 01630690 | Unexpected Chlorination System Alarm |
| AR 01630870 | 1 ACE And 2 CES Rejected By Station Uprate CARB |
| AR 01631815 | 2P-29 AFW Suction Press Control Panel Nest Power Supply |
| AR 01633234 | SW-2890 Indicates Intermediate When The Valve Is Shut |
| AR 01633248 | Control Room Intermediate Indication VS Local Full Shut |
| AR 01633384 | IER1 11-1 Unanalyzed Challenge From Non-Seismic Int Flooding |
| AR 01634447 | CR01632330 Closed to Incorrect Information |
| AR 01634473 | Bechtel Rigging Program Qualification Deficiencies |
| AR 01634515 | IER1 11-1 Non-Seismic Flood Barrier |
| AR 01634571 | Sping-21 Filter Clogged, Causing PPCS Alarm |
| AR 01634586 | Missing Mounting Screw On 2FC-474B-XA Relay Replace Screw |
| AR 01635304 | Error in Recently Approved Electrical Calculations |
| AR 01636520 | CC Temperature Exiting RHR Heat Exchanger |
| AR 01637106 | Work Groups Not Cleaning Up Work Areas |
| AR 01637576 | 2N-32: 2R31 ECAD Cables From 2C-131 |
| AR 01637687 | Loss Of RE230 Impacts On Chemistry Resources |
| AR 01637715 | Received Unexpected PPCS Alarm: RE-317 Trend |
| AR 01637903 | ACE 01625979 Graded At Below 80 |
| AR 01638987 | ACE Does Not Meet Quality Standards |
| AR 01639521 | D-18-10/D-22-10 BKRS Off Created Challenges During ILRT |
| AR 01639697 | AFI CY.1-2 (Continued From CY.1-1, 2009) |
| AR 01640577 | Debris Found During Post-ILRT Inspection |
| AR 01640776 | SW-2890 indicates Intermediate During IT-07G |
| AR 01641593 | N-31 SRNII Counts Rose To 6000 cps And Back Down Over 5 Min |
| AR 01641618 | Spurious RE-224 Gas Stripper Building RMS Alert |
| AR 01642252 | 2RE-303, U2 Purge Iodine Detector Fails Low |
| AR 01642311 | RM-Sping-22 Fan Degrading |
| AR 01642354 | Low Flow On Sping-22 |
| AR 01642445 | Vacuum Pump Failing On Sping |
| AR 01642639 | Repeated Concerns With SW-2890 |
| AR 01642654 | ACE 01629378 Does Not Meet Quality Expectations |
| AR 01642964 | SW-2890 Indicates Intermediate |
| AR 01644658 | Repeat Unexpected "Failed External" Alarm On Sping 21 |
| AR 01645462 | TC-06637 Out Of Spec. |
| AR 01648310 | ACE Rejected At Eng CARB |
| AR 01648765 | Disposition Of Uprate Actions After Fall Outage |

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|-------------|--|
| AR 01649648 | Received Unexpected PPCS Alarms Due To Sping-21 |
| AR 01649694 | CR Emergency Filtration And Fire Barrier, Past Operability |
| AR 01649945 | ACE 01637440 Graded At Below 80 |
| AR 01651300 | FS-4133D Brings In Inadvertent Low Flow Alarm |
| AR 01651375 | 2011 PI&R Preps – CR 01393259 Closure Quality |
| AR 01651418 | CA Closed W/Out Action Being Performed (PI&R Preps) |
| AR 01651427 | Inadequate Closeout Of CR 013700053 |
| AR 01651856 | 1Q11 CAP Closure Quality Quick-Hit Assessment Results |
| AR 01652090 | Operability Determination Implementation, Process Weakness |
| AR 01652104 | D-08 And D-07 Battery Charger Trouble Alarms |
| AR 01652270 | 2011 PI&R Preps – CR 01395085 Improperly Closed |
| AR 01652297 | 2011 PI&R Preps –Unsat Closure Of CR 01395373 |
| AR 01652330 | 2011 PI&R Preps – CR 01365829 Closure Quality |
| AR 01652446 | Unexpected D-08 Battery Charger Ground Fault Alarm |
| AR 01652705 | 2011 PI&R Preps – CR 01401097 Closure Inadequate |
| AR 01652781 | 2011 PI&R Preps – CR 10402010 Assignment Closed Prematurely |
| AR 01652868 | Potential Trend – CAPS Returned From MRC For Cancelled WR |
| AR 01652875 | ACE 01640784 Returned For Additional Work |
| AR 01652909 | Control Room Habitability Engineering Evaluation 03-E19 |
| AR 01653323 | HELB Door 193 Held Open |
| AR 01653458 | Two CRs Not Processed Timely |
| AR 01653591 | ACE Rejected At Engineering CARB |
| AR 01653756 | 2011 PI&R Preps Licensing Review Of 2009-2011 NRC Finding CR |
| AR 01653760 | 2011 PI&R Preps Licensing Review Of 2009-2011 NRC Finding CR |
| AR 01653788 | Received Unexpected PPCS Alarm: Re-317 Trend |
| AR 01653792 | AFW Pump Room Drain Plugged |
| AR 01653799 | Pitting And Corrosion On SW Piping Between SW-833 And SW-364 |
| AR 01653978 | CR HVAC Room Floor Seal Needs Re-Coating Maintenance |
| AR 01654217 | SAM at Free Release Found OOS |
| AR 01655515 | ACE Rejected By Licensing |
| AR 01655732 | 2CS-110 Handwheel Is Contacting Pipe Above |
| AR 01655974 | Industry Trend – NCVS Regarding Operability Determinations |
| AR 01657179 | ACE 01643652 Graded At Below 80 |
| AR 01657556 | CL-20 Pre-Walkdown Issues |
| AR 01657687 | CL 20 Post Outage Containment Closeout Inspection Unit 2 |
| AR 01657712 | CL 20 Identified Grey Cord On I-Beam 46' U2 Containment |
| AR 01657735 | 2RC-00430 Metal Insulation |
| AR 01657740 | Rope In Conduit Below 2Z-24B1 Upender Motor |
| AR 01657745 | CL 20 Identified Questionable Coating On Keyway Ceiling |
| AR 01657810 | 2B-04 Safeguards 480V Bus Was De-Energized |
| AR 01657864 | ACE 01647848 Graded At Below 80 |
| AR 01658989 | NRC Resident Inspector Walkdown Of Containment (Follow-Up) |
| AR 01659381 | Containment Sample Flow Indicator Fouled With Algae/Grass |
| AR 01661717 | Incorrect Noun Name On Instrument Face |
| AR 01661834 | Missed LR/GL89-13 Bearing Oil Cooler Inspection |
| AR 01661865 | U1 and U2 Chlorination Frequencies Were Not Met |

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|--------------|---|
| AR 01663895 | Procedure Inadequacy Led To P-206A Being Left In Stop |
| AR 01664588 | 1FS-00229 Was Found With Debris Preventing An Alarm |
| AR 01665314 | Unexpected Alarm: Common Process Radiation Monitor High |
| AR 01665452 | PMS-2 Needs Repair (From Sping-21) |
| AR 01665457 | PMS-2 Taken From The Store Room Needs Repair, S/N 383 |
| AR 01665571 | PRA Diesel Air Compressor Status |
| AR 01665986 | 2F-84A RE-219 Blowdown Sample Filter Plugged |
| AR 01666038 | 2RE-00102 High Alarm Setpoint Change Required |
| AR 01666044 | 2RE-219 Low Flow Due To Blockage |
| AR 01666369 | RE325 Drum Area Vent LR Gas Rad |
| AR 01666649 | RM-Sping-24 Drum Area Exh Low Range Gas Channel Alert |
| CAR 10-051 | CAR 10-051, 24" SW Butterfly Valve Replacements |
| CE 01145204 | CAPs Closed to Work Orders 1/1/09 – 3/15/09 |
| CE 01165081 | Review Initial Classification Of RCS Leak At 1SC-954A, CE Assignment 01 |
| RCE 01358965 | 1P-11B CCW Pump Oil Bubbler Low |
| RCE 01368219 | Hoist Separation From Lift Beam During P-032E SW Pump Maintenance |
| RCE 01369845 | Work Management Root Cause Evaluation |
| RCE 01616620 | 4Q10 Potential NCV On Failure To Submit LER On HELB Issues |
| TAR 01165673 | Potential Non-Compliance With NP 8.4.16 Requirements, Rev. 1 |
| TAR 01169784 | Technical Assessment For Reportability For CR 1169784, Rev. 1 |
| WO 00378701 | SW-00021 / Valve Leakby |
| WO 00383699 | 0SW-02890 – Valve Leaks By 50 GPM During 0-SOP-SW-105 |
| WO 386504-07 | Reactor Protection And Safeguards Analog Racks Steam Pressure Refueling Calibration For 2ICP 04.001E |
| WO 40063428 | 1XY-114 / Transformer Has 5 Volt Output |

OPERATING EXPERIENCE

| <u>Number</u> | <u>Description or Title</u> | <u>Date or Rev</u> |
|---------------|---|--------------------|
| OE31354 | Diesel Generator Frequency Not Considered In Calculation | June 24, 2010 |
| OE30798 | Emergency Diesel Generator Failed To Close | April 12, 2010 |
| IN 2008-18 | Loss Of A Safety-Related Motor Control | April 6, 2009 |
| IN 2010-09 | Importance Of Understanding Circuit Breaker Control Panel Indications | April 28, 2010 |

AUDITS, ASSESSMENTS, AND SELF-ASSESSMENTS

| <u>Number</u> | <u>Description or Title</u> | <u>Date or Rev</u> |
|---------------|--|--------------------|
| AR 1399171-01 | Maintenance Work Order Walkdown Quality Quick Hit Assessment | November 3, 2010 |
| AR 1399496-01 | Maintenance Work Order Walkdown Quality Quick Hit Assessment Follow Up | February 11, 2011 |
| PBN 09-024 | Point Beach Nuclear Oversight Report – Operations | September 3, 2009 |

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|-----------------|---|--------------------|
| PBN 09-026 | Emergency Planning | August 12, 2009 |
| PBN 09-039 | Operations – Equipment Control | January 21, 2010 |
| PBN 10-003 | 2009 4 th Quarter Site Priority DQS Roll-up | February 3, 2010 |
| PBN 10-015 | Point Beach Nuclear Oversight Report – Operations | June 9, 2010 |
| PBN 10-023 | Point Beach Nuclear Oversight Report – Emergency Planning | August 12, 2010 |
| PBN 10-028 | Point Beach Nuclear Oversight Report – Equipment Control | December 28, 2010 |
| PBSA-ENG-11-01 | FSA For CDBI Preparations | September 14, 2010 |
| PBSA-EP-10-01 | Quick Hit Assessment Checklist For AR 01156883 | June 11, 2010 |
| PBSA-EP-10-04 | Focused Self-Assessment Report For SAR 01163809 | September 22, 2010 |
| PBSA-MTN-10-01 | Conduct Of Maintenance Quick Hit Assessment | July 21, 2010 |
| PBSA-MTN-10-06 | Review Of Station Power Uprate Work Package Quality | August 17, 2010 |
| PBSA-OPS-09-02 | Quick Hit Assessment Report For AR 01155797 | June 28, 2011 |
| PBSA-OPS-10-01 | Conservative Decision-Making Focused Self-Assessment | September 28, 2010 |
| PBSA-OPS-10-01 | Focused Self-Assessment Report For SAR 01150024 | September 28, 2010 |
| PBSA-PI-10-27 | CAP Feedback | December 7, 2010 |
| PBSA-PROJ-10-01 | EPU Implementation | May 12, 2010 |
| PBSA-SRC-10-03 | NRC Performance Indicators | September 30, 2010 |

CONDITION REPORTS GENERATED DURING INSPECTION

| <u>Number</u> | <u>Description or Title</u> |
|---------------|--|
| AR 01664877 | PI&R: CC Bypass Loop Corrosion |
| AR 01664881 | PI&R: CCW Liquid Radiation Monitor Contacts Adjacent Pipe |
| AR 01665495 | Re-Align And Tighten Pipe Support |
| AR 01665868 | 2011 PI&R Inspection - Work Request Cancelations |
| AR 01666221 | 2011 PI&R: Immediate Operability Determinations |
| AR 01666232 | 2011 PI&R: TAR01610979 Adequacy Questioned |
| AR 01667086 | FSAR Appendix A.7, Delete Waterproofing On HVAC Room |
| AR 01667417 | PI&R: RMS Walkdown Observation |
| AR 01667418 | 2011 PI&R: RMS Walkdown Observation |
| AR 01668683 | Protective Shrink Tube Around Coaxial Cable |
| AR 01668861 | 2011 PI&R: Modification Punchlists |
| AR 01668923 | Potential Trends Related To Potential Schedule Pressure |
| AR 01668982 | 2011 PI&R: CAP Risk Ranking Change |
| AR 01669000 | PI&R Inspection: 2PI-2907 Vibration |
| AR 01669659 | Retrospective Review Of U2R31 Potential Concerns Is Needed |
| AR 01670042 | 2011 PI&R: Identification of Existing Field Issues |
| AR 01670046 | 2011 PI&R: Leak Management Program Observation |
| AR 01670053 | 2011 PI&R: ACE Rejection Rate |

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| AR 01670071 | 2011 PI&R: System Health Trending |
| AR 01670082 | 2011 PI&R: Use Of Immediate And Compensatory Corrective Action |
| AR 01670086 | 2011 PI&R: Improve Understanding Of Closed To Action Taken |
| AR 01670091 | 2011 PI&R: Self-Assessment Performance |
| AR 01670098 | 2011 PI&R: Safety Culture Activity And Awareness |

MISCELLANEOUS

| <u>Number</u> | <u>Description or Title</u> | <u>Date or Rev</u> |
|---------------|--|------------------------------------|
| | Nuclear Instrumentation (a)(1) System Action Plan | December 9, 2010 |
| | Containment Integrity (a)(1) System Action Plan | April 15, 2010 |
| | Point Beach Daily Quality Summary Report – Bechtel | January 1 To July 13, 2011 |
| | Monthly PBNP Performance Improvement Measures Of Success | January to June, 2011 |
| | Performance Improvement Job Aid For Action Tracking – CAPCO And IST Guidance | January 4, 2011 |
| | Management Review Committee Meeting Agendas | June 28, 29, 30, and July 11, 2011 |
| | System Health Reports, Unit 1 – Non-Risk Significant Systems | April 1, 2009 to March 31, 2011 |
| | System Health Reports, Unit 2 – Non-Risk Significant Systems | April 1, 2009 to March 31, 2011 |
| | Scope Change Request Process Instructions For 1XY-113 | March 9, 2011 |
| | System Health Reports, Unit 1 – Risk Significant/Safety-Related Systems | April 1, 2009 to March 31, 2011 |
| | Turnover Control Form For EC 259835 (NAMS) | June 3, 2011 |
| | Turnover Control Form For EC 12052 (Main Feedwater Isolation Valve) | June 5, 2011 |
| | Turnover Control Form For EC 258482 (EC-12054) | June 7, 2011 |
| | Common Cause Evaluation For CAP AR 01175806 | August 11, 2010 |
| | Component Mispositioning | May 2011 |
| | Common Cause Evaluation For CAP AR 01175806-10 | October 23, 2010 |
| | LMS Qualification Status Verification (Active Students) | June 17, 2010 |
| | Operations PCRA Backlog Scrub | December 23, 2009 |
| | AOC Training Cycle 9B Schedule/TRPR 17.0 Auxiliary Operator | Revision 4; March 25, 2009 |
| | LOCT Cycle 9C Schedule/PB-LOC-TPD, Licensed Operator Continuing Training | Revision 3; June 2, 2009 |
| | LOCT Cycle 9B Schedule/PB-LOC-TPD, Licensed Operator Continuing Training | Revision 4; April 2, 2009 |

| | | |
|-------------------|--|-----------------------------|
| | AOC Training Cycle 9C Schedule/TRPR 17.0 Auxiliary Operator | Revision 6; June 9, 2009 |
| Drawing 018995 | P&ID Service Water, PBNP Unit 1 | Revision 77 |
| Drawing 018996 | P&ID Service Water, PBNP Unit 1 | Revision 45 |
| Drawing 019029 | P&ID Service Water, PBNP Unit 2 | Revision 62 |
| Drawing 080033 | P&ID Service Water System, PBNP Unit 1 | Revision 26 |
| Drawing 080034 | P&ID Service Water, PBNP Unit 1 | Revision 66 |
| Drawing 275461 | P&ID Service Water System, PBNP Unit 2 | Revision 13 |
| Drawing 275463 | P&ID Service Water, PBNP Unit 1 | Revision 33 |
| Drawing PB19841 | P&ID Auxiliary Feedwater System, PBNP Unit 1 | Revision 02 |
| Drawing PB19842 | P&ID Auxiliary Feedwater System, PBNP Unit 2 | Revision 02 |
| EC13822/EC260250) | RE-216, Grass Fouling | Revision A |
| EC2427/MR 85-068 | RMS System | March 4, 1985 |
| Eval 2008-018 | Impact Of Revised Containment Heat Sink Paint Thickness On Containment Integrity Analyses (SLB And LOCA) For Units 1 And 2 | November 1, 2008 |
| Eval 2009-010 | Containment Integrity Evaluation For Increased Paint Thickness On Containment Structures | July 31, 2009 |
| MRE 1610979 | C-35, G-02 Control Cabinet, C-34, G-01 Control Cabinet | February 17, 2011 |
| NPM 2009-0208 | From S. J. Nikolai To CARB Members; Subject: Minutes From The June 23, 2009 CARB Meeting | June 23, 2009 |
| NPM 2009-0266 | From S. A. Pfaff To CARB Members; Subject: Minutes From The July 14, 2009 CARB Meeting | July 14, 2009 |
| NPM 2009-0315 | From J. M. Glaser To CARB Members; Subject: Minutes From The August 27, 2009 CARB Meeting | August 27, 2009 |
| NPM 2009-0317 | From J. M. Glaser To CARB Members; Subject: Minutes From The September 1, 2009 CARB Meeting | September 1, 2009 |
| NPM 2009-0328 | From J. M. Glaser To CARB Members; Subject: Minutes From The September 8, 2009 CARB Meeting | September 9, 2009 |
| NPM 2009-0368 | From J. M. Glaser To CARB Members; Subject: Minutes From The September 29, 2009 CARB Meeting | September 29, 2009 |
| NPM 2009-0382 | From J. M. Glaser To CARB Members; Subject: Minutes From The October 6, 2009 CARB Meeting | October 6, 2009 |
| NPM 2009-0396 | From J. M. Glaser To CARB Members; Subject: Minutes From The October 15, 2009 CARB Meeting | October 15, 2009 |

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|-------------|---|----------------------|
| ORT 3A | Safety Injection Actuation With Loss Of Engineered Safeguards AC (Train A) Unit 2 | Mar 8, 2011 |
| TAR 1610979 | Water Seals On Top Of C35 Missing/Degraded | Revisions 1, 2 and 3 |
| WO 00396997 | PP-34, Replace Breakers To Resolve Short Circuit Conditions | May 1, 2011 |
| WO 00396998 | PP-33, Replace Breakers To Resolve Short Circuit Conditions | May 2, 2011 |
| WR 00030036 | 2P-2C VFD Unit Having An "IOC" Fault On Start | November 9, 2007 |
| WR 00348636 | 2P-2C Perform Troubleshooting And Repair | August 14, 2008 |

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

| | |
|-------|--|
| ACE | Apparent Cause Evaluation |
| ADAMS | Agencywide Document Access Management System |
| AFW | Auxiliary Feedwater |
| AO | Auxiliary Operator |
| AR | Action Request |
| CA | Corrective Action |
| CAP | Corrective Action Program |
| CAPR | Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence |
| CAQ | Condition Adverse to Quality |
| CARB | Corrective Action Review Board |
| CCE | Common Cause Evaluation |
| CCW | Component Cooling Water |
| CE | Condition Evaluation |
| CFR | Code of Federal Regulations |
| CR | Condition Report |
| DRP | Division of Reactor Projects |
| DRS | Division of Reactor Safety |
| ECP | Employee Concerns Program |
| ECCS | Emergency Core Cooling System |
| EDG | Emergency Diesel Generator |
| EFR | Effectiveness Review |
| EPU | Extended Power Uprate |
| FSAR | Final Safety Analysis Report |
| HELB | High Energy Line Break |
| IMC | Inspection Manual Chapter |
| IN | Information Notices |
| IP | Inspection Procedure |
| IST | Issue Screening Team |
| IR | Inspection Report |
| LER | Licensee Event Report |
| LOOP | Loss Of Offsite Power |
| MRC | Management Review Committee |
| MRE | Maintenance Rule Evaluation |
| NCAQ | Not Condition Adverse to Quality |
| NCV | Non-Cited Violation |
| NOS | Nuclear Oversight |
| NP | Nuclear Plant Procedure |
| NRC | U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission |
| ODMI | Operations Decision Making Instruction |
| OE | Operating Experience |
| OI | Operating Instruction |
| OPR | Operability Recommendation (Operability Determination) |
| PARS | Publicly Available Records System |
| PCR | Procedure Change Request |
| PI&R | Problem Identification and Resolution |
| PMT | Post-Maintenance Test |
| PRA | Probabilistic Risk Assessment |
| RCE | Root Cause Evaluation |
| RHR | Residual Heat Removal |

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| RMP | Routine Maintenance Procedure |
| RP | Radiation Protection |
| SAM | Small Article Monitor |
| SCAQ | Significant Condition Adverse to Quality |
| SCCI | Substantive Cross-Cutting Issue |
| SCIT | Safety Culture Improvement Team |
| SCWE | Safety-Conscious Work Environment |
| SDP | Significance Determination Process |
| SI | Safety Injection |
| SW | Service Water |
| TAR | Technical Assessment for Reportability |
| TS | Technical Specification |
| WO | Work Order |

L. Meyer

-2-

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Sincerely,

/RA/

Michael A Kunowski, Chief
Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301
License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27

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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Letter to L. Meyer from M. Kunowski dated September 1, 2011

SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2,
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT
05000266/2011008; 05000301/2011008

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