# **Official Transcript of Proceedings**

## **NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

Title: 10 CFR 2.206 Petition Review Board

RE H.B. Robinson Plant

Docket Number: (n/a)

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1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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4	10 CFR 2.206 PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB)
5	CONFERENCE CALL
6	RESPONDENT
7	H.B. ROBINSON PLANT
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9	THURSDAY
10	JULY 28, 2011
11	The conference call was held, John Lubinski,
12	Chairperson of the Petition Review Board, presiding.
13	PETITIONER: THOMAS SAPORITO
14	PETITION REVIEW BOARD MEMBERS
15	JOHN LUBINSKI, Chair, Deputy Director
16	Division of Component Integrity, NRR
17	NRC HEADQUARTERS STAFF
18	TRACY ORF, Petition Manager
19	TANYA MENSAH, PRB Coordinator
20	SEAN CURRIE, Operator Licensing and Training
21	Branch, NRR
22	JIM DODSON, Division of Reactor Projects,
23	Region II
24	DOUG BROADDUS, NRR
25	BRENDA MOZAFARI, NRR
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### P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

1:05 P.M.

MR. ORF: Okay. I'd like to thank everyone for attending this meeting. Again, my name is Tracy Orf, and I'm the St. Lucie Project Manager.

We're here today to allow the petitioner, Mr. Thomas Saporito, to address the Petition Review Board regarding his 10 CFR 2.206 petition that he had submitted earlier and was received by the NRC on May  $12^{\rm th}$ , 2011.

I am the Petition Manager for this petition, and the Petition Review Board Chairman is Mr. John Lubinski. As part of the Petition Review Board, our PRB has reviewed the petition. Thomas Saporito has requested this opportunity to address the PRB.

This meeting is scheduled from 1:00 o'clock P.M., Eastern Time. The meeting is being recorded by the NRC operations center, and will be transcribed by a Court Reporter. The transcript will become supplement to the petition, and the transcript will also remain publically available.

I'd like to open this meeting with introductions. As we go around the room, please be

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sure to clearly state your name, your position, and the office that you work for within the NRC, for the record. I'll start it off. My name is Tracy Orf. I am the Project Manager for St. Lucie in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. MR. CURRIE: I'm Sean Currie, I'm from the 8 Operator Licensing and Training Branch, in the 9 Division of Inspection and Regional Support. 10 MENSAH: I'm Tanya Mensah, I'm from MS. 11 the Division of Policy and Rulemaking in the Office of NRR and I'm the 2.206 Coordinator. 12 CHAIRMAN LUBINSKI: John Lubinski, I'm the 13 14 Deputy Director, Division of Component Integrity, NRR, 15 and I'm the Petition Review Board Chair. 16 BROADDUS: Doug Broaddus, MR. 17 Branch Chief in the Division of Operating Reactor 18 Licensing and NRR, with responsibility over HB 19 Robinson. 20 MOZAFARI: I'm Brenda Mozafari, I'm MS. 21 the Project Manager, Robinson, in the Office of 22 Nuclear Reactor Regulation. 23 ORF: Okay. We've completed MR. 24 introductions at the NRC headquarters. At this time, 25 are there any NRC participants from headquarters,

other than those mentioned before? Are there any NRC participants form the regional office on the phone? MR. DODSON: Yes, this is Jim Dodson, the Senior Project Engineer for Reactor Projects Branch 4 in Region II. ORF: Are there any representatives MR. for the licensee on the phone? Hearing none, Mr. 8 Saporito, would you please introduce yourself for the record? 10 SAPORITO: Yes, my name is Thomas 11 Saporito. I'm a senior consultant with Saprodani 12 Associates. I'm based in Jupiter, Florida. ORF: Okay. It is not required for 13 MR. 14 members of the public to introduce themselves for this 15 However, if there are any members of the public call. on the phone who wish to do so at this time, please 16 17 state your name for the record. 18 I'd like to emphasize that we each need to speak clearly and loudly to ensure that the Court 19 Reporter can accurately transcribe this meeting. 20 21 you do have something that you would like to say, 22 please first state your name for the record. 23 For those dialing into the meeting, please 24 remember to mute your phones to minimize 25 background noise or distractions. If you do not have a mute button, this can be done by pressing the keys star, six.

To unmute, press the star six keys again.

Thank you. At this time, I'll turn it over to the PRB Chairman, John Lubinski.

CHAIRMAN LUBINSKI: Good afternoon. I appreciate everyone attending this meeting regarding the 2.206 petition presented by Mr. Saporito. I'd like to first share some background in our process.

Section 2.206 of 10 CFR describes the petition process, the primary mechanism for the public to request enforcement action by the NRC and a public process.

This process permits anyone to petition NRC to take enforcement-type action related to NRC licensees or licensed activity. Depending on the result of this evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend, or revoke an NRC issued license, or take other appropriate enforcement action to resolve the problem.

The NRC staff guidance for the disposition of 2.206 petition request is in Management Directive 8.11, which is publically available.

The purpose of today's meeting is to give the petitioner an opportunity to provide additional

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explanation or support for the petition following the Petition Review Board's initial recommendation.

This meeting is not a hearing, nor is it an opportunity for the petitioner to question or examine the PRB on merit or the issues presented in the petition request. No decision regarding the merits of the petition will be made at this meeting.

Following this meeting, the Petition Review Board will conduct its internal deliberations, and the outcome of this internal meeting will be discussed with the petitioner. The Petition Review Board specifically consists of a Chairman, usually a manager at the senior executive service level at the NRC.

It has a petition manager, and a PRB coordinator. Other members of the board are determined by the NRC staff based on the content of the information in the petition request. At this time, I would like to introduce the board.

I am John Lubinski, the Petition Review Board Chairman. Tracy Orf is petition manager for the petition under discussion today. Tanya Mensah is the Office PRB coordinator. Our technical staff includes Sean Currie, from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Operator Licensing and Training Branch, and

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Jim Dodson from our Region II Office Division of Reactor Projects.

As described in our process, the NRC staff may ask clarifying questions in order to better understand the petitioner's presentation. I would like to summarize the scope of the petition under consideration and the NRC activities to date.

On May 12<sup>th</sup>, 2011, Mr. Saporito submitted to the NRC a petition under 2.206 regarding the H. B. Robinson plant. In this petition request, Mr. Saporito's concern was that the risk of reactor core damage during the event was high.

Mr. Saporito requested that the NRC suspend or revoke the operating license for the H. B. Robinson plant, issue a notice of violation and a proposed civil penalty against the licensee for the H. B. Robinson plant, and issue a notice of violation with a proposed civil penalty against William Johnson, Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer of Progress Energy, Incorporated.

Allow me to discuss the NRC activities to date. On May  $25^{\rm th}$ , the petition manager contacted Mr. Saporito to discuss the 2.206 petition process, and to offer an opportunity to address the PRB by phone or in person.

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On June 14<sup>th</sup>, you addressed the PRB to present additional information regarding the petition.

On June 27<sup>th</sup>, the PRB met and determined that in accordance with Management Directive 8.1, your petition meets the criteria for rejection because the petition raises issues that have already been the subject of NRC review and evaluation, for which a resolution has been achieved.

The issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question. Specifically, a special inspection team began their inspection of the March 28<sup>th</sup>, 2010, event on March 30<sup>th</sup>, 2010, and the inspection was upgraded to an augmented inspection team on April 19<sup>th</sup>, 2010.

The team developed a sequence of events, reviewed related events, interviewed operators and individuals involved with the fire and plant response, and conducted a walkdown of affected areas.

On July 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2010, the AIT issued their inspection report. All items identified in the inspection were closed, including enforcement in accordance with NRC's processes and policies. There are no remaining open items from the AIT inspection, and in accordance with Management Directive 8.11, the petitioner has not provided any significant new

information to justify the NRC varying from its enforcement policies.

On July 8<sup>th</sup>, the petition manager contacted you, Mr. Saporito, and provided you with the PRB's initial recommendation. Subsequently, you requested to address the PRB to provided additional information to support your petition.

As a reminder for phone participants, please identify yourself if you make any remarks, as this will help us in preparation of the meeting transcripts that will be made available to the public after the call.

Mr. Saporito, I'd now like to turn to you to allow you to provide additional information you believe the PRB should consider as part of its petition.

MR. SAPORITO: All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For the record, my name's Thomas Saporito.

I'm a senior consultant for Saprodani Associates.

We're located in Jupiter, Florida, and we maintain a website at Saprodani-associates.com, S-A-P-R-O-D-A-N-I, hyphen, associates, dot, com.

First of all, let me correct the record here, because someone from the NRC, they stated in this proceeding that the petition was dated May of

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this year. But, actually, the petition was filed on April  $17^{\rm th}$ , 2011.

I don't know why the NRC's documents have a different date, but the petition that's subject to this proceeding is dated April 17<sup>th</sup>, 2011. As was previously discussed here was a subsequent—an initial meeting between myself and the NRC Petition Review Board on June 14<sup>th</sup> this year, which I provided additional information and a background of license activities at the HP Robinson plant, which were the subject of the initiating events of the enforcement petition filed here.

Since that time, since that meeting of June  $14^{\rm th}$ , I attended via teleconference call another meeting between the NRC and the licensee for the H. B. Robinson plant that took place on July  $20^{\rm th}$  of this year.

And, during that enforcement conference, the licensee averred to the NRC that there had been significant chances at the facility, establishment of a leadership team. And, there was new maintenance manager, and operations manager, recovery support manager, and a leadership delegator.

There's a new team alignment, where they meet, you know, team alignment meets every morning to

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discuss issues. Tailgate meetings held on Tuesdays. There's a--since the reactor trip of October 2010, the licensee considered that a watershed event and, to the extent that they were wanting to make these changes, to bring the plant back into conformance with NRC requirements and regulations.

There was a discussion about the safety culture at the H. B. Robinson plant, and limited discussion of what the licensee believes the causes were and the completion of the corrective actions in that area and discovery of corrective action.

They talked about hiring an outside entity to do an evaluation. The culture at the plant, work environment at the plant, and they talked about a backlog of work orders and talked a little bit about ALARA at the plant and what efforts they're making in that area. Issues to drive the attitudes of the nuclear workers, improvement of the plant, and in the culture survey, I believe they termed it to be an industrial culture surveyed and taken by an outside entity.

Before I get into the specifics here, I first want to make certain that this public record documents as a fact the amazing fact that the licensee is not represented at this important meeting. The NRC

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should take that as an adverse inference from this licensee that any statement or contentions made on the part of the licensee take corrective action, may not necessarily be true.

Because, you know, if the licensee were sincere about protecting public health and safety by taking corrective actions in addressing root cause determinations involving this October 2010 event, then someone would have been here at this meeting.

So, they can learn from this meeting about what the public is concerned about, and be able to respond to questions, if need be, from the public. But, the fact that they're not even here, they haven't even bothered to attend this meeting in person or by simply by picking up a telephone and making a call, is just incredible and the NRC should see that as a reflection of the attitude that exists at the H. B. Robinson plant at the executive management level.

And, I also want to note for the record, during the enforcement conference held between the NRC and the licensee on July  $20^{\rm th}$  of this year, at the end of that meeting the public was given an opportunity to engage the NRC at that time.

There was myself and one or two other individuals of the public that attended that meeting.

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Since I began to make comments and inquiry of the NRC at that meeting, the licensee decided to get up and leave.

But, they didn't even have the professional courtesy and decency to sit through an enforcement conference to the extent that they could learn from public inquires at that time, either, and I just find their attitudes very disdainful towards the public, and the representation to the NRC in these circumstances to be disingenuous to the extent that they were trying to make believe that they care about public health and safety and want to improve plant conditions.

We have an enforcement conference and you fail to attend, 2.206 petition where your plant could be ordered to shut down, there's something extremely wrong with the executive level management. It's just not common sense. There's something wrong there, the NRC should look into it.

Alright, having said that, now, going back again to the enforcement conference on July 20<sup>th</sup>, 2011, I made a specific inquiry about the backlog of work orders. The licensee had contended at that time that their efforts to reduce the backlog of work

orders, they qualified it as they having established 1/3, they completed, eliminated 1/3 of the backlog.

When I pressed the issue, the licensee admitted that there were 615 open work orders, corrective action work orders at that facility. 615, and that's an unjustified number in my opinion, an unjustified number of open maintenance corrective actions at any nuclear plant.

This nuclear plant is a troubled nuclear plant. They repetitively violate NRC safety requirements under 10 CFR 50. They violate station procedures, they violate technical specifications, they fail to follow procedures. It goes on and on and on.

The nuclear safety concern centered around having 615 open maintenance work orders is of paramount importance to public health and safety, and the NRC should be gravely concerned about that number of open work orders. Because, when you have that many work orders, what that means is, for the licensee to maintain license activities in having a nuclear reactor operation at 100% power, or at any level of power, the licensee has to create what's known in the industry as workarounds.

So, when a plant is licensed by the NRC to bring these nuclear reactors to power, the NRC granted that license with the understanding and review of the licensee's final safety analysis report, reviewed the licensee's technical specifications, which included plant procedures, wiring diagrams, P & I diagrams, the NSS system, et cetera.

Now, because of this extensive amount of backlog work orders, there's numerous workarounds implemented at that nuclear plant, the H. B. Robinson nuclear plant. So, what you have going on, you have one circuit after another circuit which have been altered and modified in one way or another so that the licensee can keep the reactor operating under power.

The trouble with that is, when you have 615 open corrective maintenance work orders, that's such a huge number that these workarounds can become an entity of their own, take on a life of their own, and become a nuclear safety issue.

Because, you can have safety related systems that are workaround in such a manner that they misalign the proper configuration of the plant, so that in event of an emergency, if the operator takes certain corrective actions to mitigate consequences of

a nuclear accident, and when he takes those actions per procedure, they may not happen.

Valves may not open, valves may not close, pumps may not start, pumps that were intended to start--other pumps may start. Because, it may be a misconfiguration of the plant because of these workarounds. And, that's a significant safety issue, nuclear safety issue, which could cause core damage, could result in a Fukushima event here in the United States.

It's certainly something--you know, I hope the NRC takes seriously and looks into. Another issue that was brought to light during the enforcement conference on July 20<sup>th</sup> when I listened to the licensee speak, you know, this watershed event that happened in October 2010, when you come right down to it, the root cause of that event was a failure of the licensee to follow station procedures, which is a violation of NRC requirements under 10 CFR part 50.

And, to that extent, you know, the licensee's corrective action can't even come close, from my perspective, to resolving the issue because their corrective actions did not, from what I understood at that meeting, and can tell, retraining of the plant staff, across the board. Operations,

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health physics, electrical maintenance, instrument control maintenance, security, et cetera.

Everybody needs to be trained to follow procedure, step by step, verbatim compliance. And had that attitude and culture been instilled in October 2010, you wouldn't have had the chain of events that almost resulted in core damage at that time.

So, that's one area of concern, where the licensee's proposed corrective action didn't even come close to resolving the root cause in my view. Also, there is no corrective actions taken by the licensee to ensure that this type of violation will not be repeated in the future.

Of course, this is already a repetitive violation. We could go on and on about how many times the licensee has failed to follow procedures at the H. B. Robinson plant. But, to the extent that the root cause of this problem can be traced directly back to, again, failure of the licensee to follow station procedures.

You would--the NRC, as the Government regulator, would be wise to require the licensee to make certain that their corrective actions include intervention by the quality assurance and quality control Department that's supposed to be operating at

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that H. B. Robinson nuclear plant, under their license.

Because, that's part of their license, is having an operating and efficient and an effective quality assurance quality control program. way that that is supposed to be implemented, and it certainly was implemented during my tenure in the nuclear industry as an instrument control technician, a corrective maintenance you have action, especially one that involves safety related or quality related systems, the procedure itself that the actual nuclear workers or technicians take with them in the field to do the task at hand incorporates work stop points, or work hold points for quality control quality assurance inspection personnel who actually have to come off of the job and inspect what the maintenance technicians and maintenance personnel have done to that point in the procedure and initial and date acceptance of the work up to that point.

Before, the technicians could continue. Now, because of the serious nature of this particular watershed event that occurred in October 2010, it would be incumbent upon the NRC to require the licensee to upgrade its procedures to this extent where quality control quality assurance hold points,

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or check points, or sign up points, however you want to term them, are incorporated into these procedures as needed to make certain these types of events aren't repeated.

I can't overstate how important that is. I mean, the NRC may have one or two resident inspectors, some 104 licensed nuclear reactors across the United States, so the NRC can't be everywhere all the time. And, the NRC should take advantage of the quality control quality assurance programs and personnel which are required under the NRC licenses granted to the H. B. Robinson nuclear power plant.

And, you know, that's part of the NRC's reactor oversight programs, and the NRC should be using that as a tool, for their benefit, protecting public health and safety so that all these areas the NRC may or may not be able to get to, especially if you're under refueling hours, the NRC can rely on the station procedures holding the quality control quality assurance personnel accountable for these work stop points and inspection points in these critical procedures.

You know--recently, I'd say it was in the last 18 months, two years, there was a significant event at the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant here in South

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Miami, Florida, and it involved a senior licensed nuclear reactor operator, an individual who had his own license issued by the NRC, in addition to the FPL's license to operate the Turkey Point nuclear reactor.

This individual kept bringing safety concerns to the licensee, and they kept initiating these workarounds because of the incredible number of backlogs active and open maintenance work orders down at the station facility at that time.

Just became frustrated. It was one workaround after another workaround, then they had an initiating event where substation mentioned nearby violated procedure, and they caused a variance in the transmission lines, which automatically scrammed both Turkey Point nuclear reactors while this individual was on duty, and that was kind of like the icing on the cake.

This individual, he resigned, he was forced resignation because he couldn't get his safety concerns resolved by executive management, and it was all due to the extensive number of backlog maintenance work orders and the extreme amount of workarounds that this individual had to keep on top of.

You know, his license, his own, personal NRC license was in jeopardy, a nuclear action had occurred under his watch. That's how important it is that the H. B. Robinson nuclear plant, that this backlog get addressed in a meaningful and timely fashion.

And, quite frankly, listening to the licensee at that enforcement conference on the 20<sup>th</sup> of July, left big questions in my mind. They appeared to be overwhelmed in many areas. Just look at the actions they're taking--changing out management, they're bringing in outside contractors to do culture surveys.

They're upgrading their procedures at cost--this is a nuclear plant that's been operating for the better part of 30, 35 years, and procedures they've been using all this time, now, all of a sudden they've got to correct them all? They've got to enhance them all?

Well, how the hell they didn't--how have they been operating this plant for all this time if these procedures were so poor to begin with? It's such a broad base, pervasive action on the part of the NRC that it's not reasonably mindful that, or conceivable that they can make all these corrections

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and all these improvements and turn that plant around and address the 615 outstanding maintenance work orders--probably more, by now, because that was back in July--and still operate the nuclear plant under power.

And that brings me back to the enforcement petition. It's being requested that the NRC order the licensee to shut the plant down, and only by shutting this plant down will the licensee have sufficient time where they can step back and fully assess the problems with that nuclear plant. These problems aren't new problems, or special problems. These problems are repetitive violations of NRC safety margins under 10 CFR part 50, over and over again.

It's now to the point where it's out of control, it's beyond the control of the licensee. And, you can see that by the responses at these enforcement conferences. You can see that by their refusal to even attend the 2.206 petition process for their license to be suspended or revoked.

It's just a piss-poor attitude from the executive level management all the way down, and these so-called surveys, done by third party, outsourced entities, are useless. The NRC needs to get in there with their augmented inspection teams and conduct

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independent employee interviews, one on one, where the employee doesn't have to be afraid that someone's going to over hear him and what he says to the NRC.

And, that's the only way you're going to get a true picture of what the work environment is like at the H. B. Robinson plant. And also, NRC should be looking at the corrective action program and how many of these corrective maintenance work orders have been submitted.

When were they submitted, who submitted them, and how long did it take for them to get resolved, and did the root cause get identified and corrected? And, did the employee who initiated the condition report through the corrective action program, did that employee get feedback from anybody that their problem was acknowledged, that their problem was taken seriously, and that their problem was corrected?

And, did any of these employees who submitted nuclear safety concerns or concerns on a quality or safety related system, can be deemed to be nuclear safety concerns, did they ever get recognized in front of their peer group in a positive manner with some kind of reward or some kind of point system where they get credit towards their next performance review,

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could result in a pay increase, they get a letter of commendation presented to them in a public manner in front of their coworkers?

enhance a positive safety conscious work environment at a nuclear power plant like the H. B. Robinson plant. If you see your coworker getting rewarded in front of other people that he works with or she works with, for raising nuclear safety issues, that encourages that employee's coworkers to do the same.

It's only when the management fails to recognize, acknowledge, and positively commend the performance of an individual who raises these safety concerns, does the environment grow in a positive direction.

When you don't have that recognition--when an employee puts a concern in and gets no feedback at all that anybody even took them seriously or her seriously, corrective action, they don't know the problem was ever corrected.

And all they keep getting is more work orders. Go fix this, go fix that, hurry up, we've got to do this. Hurry up, we've got too many of these. And, either work environment becomes more and more

negative, more and work hostile and the attitude goes down the toilet very quickly.

And, I surmise that's what's going on at the H. B. Robinson plant, where management is pushing everybody. We've got to get this backlog done, you know, we've got to keep running but we've got to get the backlog done.

We've got to keep making money but we've got to get this backlog done, so with the overtime situation, stressed out nuclear workers, operators biting their nails because they've got, I don't know, numerous workarounds that they got to remember how everything is configured, and they throw this switch, they got to know what's going to happen.

And, it just gets worse and worse. And now, you're bringing in new management which no one knows, you know, these new managers don't know the crew, the crews don't know the new managers, there's going to be an intermingling of attitudes and performance issues.

It's just not a good situation, and it brings me back right to the point for the enforcement petition where the NRC should require the licensee to confirm and shut the plant down for a specific amount

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of time and NRC's a better judge of that than I am, how long it could reasonably be expected to turn the plant around keeping in mind the work environment, and to have a safety conscious work environment you've got to start by encouraging employees to raise safety concerns.

You've got to have some kind of an acknowledgment or a reward system, posting system.

Jobs are posted so people can track, Department by Department, where the hell their concern is, what's the status, et cetera.

the plant So, to allow to continue operation while you have all these numerous areas up in the air, being evaluated, re-evaluated, changed, modified, the scope, the magnitude of the procedure, upgrade program is huge. And that could cause problems all by itself, you know? Boys could be out there with the wrong procedure because there's an upgrade to that procedure, they don't even know about it.

The training, people need to be--we talked about retraining these people to follow procedures. But it goes beyond that, it goes into operator training. You know, there's an operator involved in this watershed event, October 2010. They re-energized

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an electrical circuit without following procedures and checking to see if it was even fixed.

Of course, it wasn't, it started a couple fires. Could have had a meltdown. So, in summary, it's not good enough with the licensee's presented to the NRC to date is not good enough. Enforcement action taken by the NRC to date is not satisfactory and needs to be escalated enforcement action.

The NRC's actions over the years have been evidenced through a recent Associated Press investigative report, which reviewed tens of thousands of NRC documents, showed complacency on the part of the NRC in regulating 104 nuclear power plants.

Now, you've got a situation where the Government has a dysfunctional Congress and they can't even raise the debt level of this country so the Government can pay its bills on time, and the constraints, the financial constraints on various Departments, including the NRC, where the NRC budget most likely being affected because of the fiscal problems going on in Washington, you know, the public is concerned about the NRC's ability to protect them.

And, certainly, when you've got a nuclear power plant, the H. B. Robinson nuclear plant, which is repetitively, time and time again, violated serious

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safety margins the NRC has laid out under 10 CFR part 50, and the corrective actions over the years have failed to correct these actions because they're doing it again and again and again.

All the way through October 2010, where they could have melted the nuclear reactor down, and, you know, if we have a Fukushima event over here, it's going to be worse than it was in Japan because there's so many more people now that are living near these reactors.

Tens of thousands of people are now clustered around these nuclear reactors, especially the H. B. Robinson plant, there weren't that—the population wasn't nearly as great when that plant was initially licensed, 30, 40 years ago by the NRC.

So, there's going to be a lot more people affected if we get a Fukushima event here at H. B. Robinson plant, and, you know, that containment building explodes from a release of hydrogen, fuel damage event, then you know, those radionuclides come over here to Florida and affect my family and my friends and my property, and I sure as hell don't want that to happen.

So, that's why I write these 2.206 petitions. This is the only way that the public can

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engage the NRC to take escalated enforcement actions, and why the public wants to make certain the NRC understands the importance that licensees like the H.

B. Robinson nuclear power plant that everybody's on board with a solid understanding and training that they need to follow procedures.

And, that these people are trained and qualified to do their jobs out there. They certainly aren't, in this circumstance. We had a calamity of events which led to the event on October 2010.

At that, I'll stay on the line to answer

At that, I'll stay on the line to answer any questions that the NRC or the public who may be attending this meeting might have.

CHAIRMAN LUBINSKI: Mr. Saporito, thank you. We appreciate that additional information. As you said, at this time, we would like to turn to NRC staff to see if they have any questions or any clarifications. I'm going to start with the folks that are here in the room with me at headquarters.

If there's any clarifying questions--

MS. MOZAFARI: I just wanted to--

CHAIRMAN LUBINSKI: Could you please identify yourself?

MS. MOZAFARI: This is Brenda Mozafari, and I just wanted to know where you got the

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30 misinformation that the July 20<sup>th</sup> meeting was enforcement conference. Could you identify your source of information? Because it was not. CHAIRMAN LUBINSKI: Mr. Saporito, could you hear Ms. Mozafari? SAPORITO: I could hardly hear here. MR. Something about --CHAIRMAN LUBINSKI: Okay. Let me restate You had identified that there was a the question. July 20<sup>th</sup>, 2011, enforcement conference. It was not an enforcement conference on that day; it was a different type of meeting apparently. MOZAFARI: It was a voluntary meeting MS. where the licensee wanted to present their strategic plan for the future, but I was wondering where you got the impression it was an enforcement conference. SAPORITO: Okay. MR. Yes, I stand

MR. SAPORITO: Okay. Yes, I stand corrected, it was not an enforcement conference. It was a memorandum issued by the NRC on July 1<sup>st</sup>, 2011, the purpose of the meeting was representatives of Carolina Power management team, and to discuss the strategic plan for the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit number 2. You're right, I stand corrected. It was not an enforcement conference. It was a discussion about their new management team.

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

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MS. MOZAFARI: Thank you. CHAIRMAN LUBINSKI: Okay. And a clarifying question slash comment, Mr. Saporito. You, on numerous occasions during your discussion afternoon referred to the event as the October, 2010, event. I assume you meant the March 2010 event. that correct? 8 MR. SAPORITO: Yes. 9 CHAIRMAN LUBINSKI: Okay. 10 SAPORITO: Yes, that's correct. 11 CHAIRMAN LUBINSKI: Okay. Are there other 12 questions here in the room or at headquarters? Okay, I'm going to go to Jim Dodson, in our Region II 13 14 office. Jim, did you have any questions or 15 clarifications for Mr. Saporito? DODSON: No, I don't believe so. Not 16 MR. 17 at this time. CHAIRMAN LUBINSKI: Okay, thanks, Jim. 18 going to ask if anyone from the licensee joined the 19 20 call, and if so, do they have any questions? 21 Okay. Before I conclude the meeting, as 22 Trace stated earlier, members of the public may join 23 the call and do not need to identify themselves.

However, at this time, if there were any members of

the public that did join the call and would like to

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ask any questions, I would like to invite them to do so now. Okay. Hearing none, there is no questions from the public. Mr. Saporito, again, I would like to thank you for taking the time this afternoon to provide the NRC staff with clarifying information on the petition that you submitted. Before we close, does the Court Reporter additional information for the meeting need any 10 transcript? 11 COURT REPORTER: I have no questions. 12 CHAIRMAN LUBINSKI: Okay. With that, this meeting is concluded, and we will be terminating the 13 14 phone connection. Thanks, everyone. 15 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter 16 under discussion was taken off the record at 1:49 17 p.m.) 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25