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 AUTH. NAME AUTHDR AFFILIATION
 PAGER, M.S. Iowa Electric Light & Power Co.
 RECIP. NAME. RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 Region 3, Chicago, Office of the Director

SUBJECT: LER 81-010/03L-0: on 810224, fan for standby filter unit B
 found not running during operational test. Caused by
 personnel error in opening breaker for control bldg
 emergency air supply fan. Personnel reinstructed.

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MSB

Iowa Electric Light and Power Company

March 25, 1981

DAEC-81-171

Mr. James G. Keppler, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region III
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Subject: Licensee Event Report No. 81-010
(30 day)

File: A-118a

Dear Mr. Keppler:

In accordance with Appendix A to Operating License DPR-49, Technical Specifications and Bases for Duane Arnold Energy Center and Regulatory Guide 10.1, please find attached a copy of the subject Licensee Event Report. (Total of 3 copies transmitted).

Very truly yours,



Daniel L. Mineck
Chief Engineer
Duane Arnold Energy Center

DLM/MSR/pl

Docket 50-331

attachment

cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30)
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Director, Management Information and Program Control (3)
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

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NRC Resident Inspector - DAEC

MAR 30 1981

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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01 | REPORT SOURCE | 6 | 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 3 3 1 | 7 | 0 1 2 2 4 8 1 1 | 8 | 0 1 3 2 5 8 1 | 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 | During surveillance testing of the Standby Filter Units (SBFU), the fan f
03 | or SBFU "B" was found not running during an operational test. Investigati
04 | on revealed the breaker for the Control Bldg Emerg Air Supply Fan, 1V-SF-
05 | 30B, had been opened by Operations personnel. Tech Spec 3.10.A.3 requires
06 | both trains of the SBFU to be operable during reactor operation. The "A"
07 | SBFU had previously been operationally tested sat. No previous occurrence
08 | s of this nature have been recorded.

09 | SYSTEM CODE | 11 | CAUSE CODE | 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE | 13 | COMPONENT CODE | 14 | COMP. SUBCODE | 15 | VALVE SUBCODE | 16
17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | 18 | EVENT YEAR | 19 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 20 | OCCURRENCE CODE | 21 | REPORT TYPE | 22 | REVISION NO.
23 | ACTION TAKEN | 24 | FUTURE ACTION | 25 | EFFECT ON PLANT | 26 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | 27 | HOURS | 28 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | 29 | NPRO-4 FORM SUB. | 30 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | 31 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | 32

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 | Personnel error. Preventative maintenance on "A" SBFU required its break
11 | er be opened. Ops personnel inadvertently opened the "B" SBFU fan breake
12 | r instead. This interrupted operational run of "B" SBFU and caused B-tra
13 | in to be inop. Brkr open for approx 10.5 hrs. Operational test completed
14 | sat. Ops personnel reinstructed. Plant procedures will be reviewed.

15 | FACILITY STATUS | 16 | % POWER | 17 | OTHER STATUS | 18 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | 19 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | 20

16 | ACTIVITY CONTENT | 17 | RELEASED OF RELEASE | 18 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | 19 | LOCATION OF RELEASE | 20

17 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES | 18 | NUMBER | 19 | TYPE | 20 | DESCRIPTION | 21

18 | PERSONNEL INJURIES | 19 | NUMBER | 20 | DESCRIPTION | 21

19 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY | 20 | TYPE | 21 | DESCRIPTION | 22

20 | PUBLICITY ISSUED | 21 | DESCRIPTION | 22

20 | NAME OF OPERATOR | 21 | PHONE | 22

Matthew S. Rager

319-851-5611

DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER
Iowa Electric Light and Power Company
Licensee Event Report - Supplemental Data
Docket No. 050-0331

Licensee Event Report Date:

Reportable Occurrence No: 81-010

Event Description:

During surveillance testing of the Standby Filter Units (SBFU), the "B" SBFU was discovered to be not running during a 10-hour operational run. Investigation revealed that the breaker for the Control Building Emergency Air Supply Fan, 1V-SF-30B, had been opened by Operations personnel. The breaker was closed and operational test restarted. The "B" SBFU was out of service for approximately 10.5 hours. Technical Specification 3.10.A.3 requires both SBFUs to be operable during reactor operation. The "A" train of SBFU had previously completed its 10-hour operational test satisfactorily. No previous occurrences of this nature have been recorded.

Cause Description:

Personnel error. Operations personnel had begun the 10-hour operational run of the "B" SBFU when its breaker was mistakenly opened. Maintenance personnel had been instructed to perform lubrication on the "A" SBFU. To provide for their safety the breaker for that unit's fan was to be opened prior to maintenance. Poor communications between ops personnel resulted in the wrong breaker being opened.

Corrective Action:

Ops personnel discovered the "B" SBFU wasn't running at the scheduled completion of its 10-hour run. Investigation revealed the wrong breaker had been opened and not reclosed following maintenance. The breaker was closed and the operational test completed with satisfactory results. Plant procedures will be reviewed to determine if weaknesses which may have contributed to this event can be identified and eliminated. Operations personnel have been reinstructed on the need to monitor, more closely, maintenance on safety-related equipment.