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 AUTH. NAME: AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 MINECK, D.L. Iowa Electric Light & Power Co.
 RECIP. NAME: RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 KEPPLER, J.G. Region 3, Chicago, Office of the Director

10/24

SUBJECT: RO: on 801111, lockout relay starting A standby gas treatment sys failed to trip when reactor vessel water level dropped 7 inches below instrument zero. Caused by wiring error made in design change work during 1980 outage. Error corrected.

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Iowa Electric Light and Power Company

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November 11, 1980
DAEC-80-492

Mr. James G. Keppler, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement - Region III
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Subject: Prompt Notification of a
Reportable Occurrence

File: A-118a

Dear Mr. Keppler:

This letter, telecopied to your office, is intended to satisfy the requirement for prompt notification of a Reportable Occurrence in accordance with Specification 6.11.2.a of the Duane Arnold Energy Center Technical Specifications.

Technical Specification paragraph(s) violated:

Description Occurrence:

Following a reactor transient and automatic scram during which reactor vessel water level dropped to 7 inches below instrument zero, operations personnel noted that the lockout relay which starts the "A" Standby Gas Treatment System was not tripped. This relay normally would have been tripped when the reactor protection system relays were tripped when reactor water level dropped below 12 inches above instrument zero. Investigation revealed the Group 3 Isolation "A" logic had not tripped as it should have. Group 3 isolation valves include containment purge and vent valves. The Group 3 "B" logic had tripped and the corresponding valves isolated. The problem was traced to a wiring error apparently made during design change work during the 1980 refueling outage. The error effectively bypassed the low water level Group 3 "A" logic isolation. The error was corrected and the Group 3 "A" Logic Isolation verified to operate properly.

Very truly yours,

Daniel L. Mineck

Daniel L. Mineck
Chief Engineer
Duane Arnold Energy Center

DLM/JVS/pl

cc: Director, Management Information and Program Control (2)
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

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Prompt Notification

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November 11, 1980

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
c/o Document Management Branch
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector

US NRC DISTRIBUTION SERVICES UNIT

Iowa Electric Light and Power Company

November 11, 1980
DAEC-80-492

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BRANCH

10/14

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Office of Inspection and Enforcement - Region III
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

50-332

Subject: Prompt Notification of a Reportable Occurrence

File: A-118a

Dear Mr. Keppler:


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Very truly yours,



Daniel L. Mineck
Chief Engineer

Duane Arnold Energy Center

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DLM/JVS/pl

cc: Director, Management Information and Program Control (2)
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

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Prompt Notification
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November 11, 1980

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NRC Resident Inspector