# DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

# BASES FOR PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES TO ACCOMMODATE 18-MONTH OPERATING CYCLES

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section		Page
1.0	INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY	1-1
2.0	REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION DEFINITIONS	2-1
3.0	TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REVIEW AND EVALUATION	3-1
4.0	TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE EVALUATION	4-1
5.0	"NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION" EVALUATION	5-1
6.0	CONCLUSIONS	6-1
7.0	REFERENCES	7-1

i

#### 1.0 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

The core of the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) has been designed and analyzed to demonstrate the capability of fulfilling the safety and operational requirements for an 18-month operating cycle. The licensing analyses, including the updated safety analysis, supporting an 18-month operating cycle, are contained in Reference 1. The licensing analyses did not address changes to the technical specifications which are necessary to effectively implement 18-month operating cycles consistent with plant operational requirements.

The current technical specifications (Reference 2) define "operating cycle" (the interval which governs instrument and electrical surveillance) as 15 months or less. This definition is inconsistent with plant operational requirements, as many surveillance tests required by the technical specifications should be or must be performed during periods of planned plant shutdown, such as refueling. In order to be consistent with plant operational requirements, the surveillance frequencies must be changed. However, before this can be done, all surveillance tests now required to be performed with the frequency of once per operating cycle must be evaluated to assess the impact of longer intervals between surveillance tests.

The purpose of this report is to provide the bases for changing the current technical specifications for surveillance frequencies to accommodate core designs for operating cycles up to 18 months in length with a 25 percent allowance for operational uncertainties. In developing

the proposed technical specification changes, there are five primary considerations:

- The allowable plant operating mode for performing the required surveillance tests;
- 2. The available surveillance test data base, including any deviations from expected results encountered during the surveillance tests;
- 3. The relative safety importance of the surveillance tests:
- The significance of any deviations encountered during the surveillance tests; and
- 5. The current plant surveillance program requirements.

In evaluating surveillance test frequencies, it was determined that, in order to implement revised technical specifications for 18-month operating cycles, the definitions of "operating cycle," "refueling outage," and "surveillance frequency" would be changed and a new definition of "annual," as related to surveillance frequency, added. These revised definitions are provided in Section 2.0 and are included in the technical specifications accompanying this report.

In order to identify which technical specifications required changing, the current technical specifications were reviewed. All current technical specifications with a surveillance frequency of 12 to 36 months, including

those stated as "once per operating cycle" or "performed during refueling outages," were listed. These technical specifications were then examined, using the criteria contained herein, to establish which surveillance tests were candidates for increased surveillance test intervals. The results of this review and evaluation are contained in Section 3.0.

Each candidate for change was then evaluated to determine whether sufficient bases existed to justify extension of the surveillance test interval. The results of these evaluations are contained in Section 4.0 and a summary of each individual technical specification change evaluation is presented in Appendix A.

The evaluation of "no significant hazards consideration" is provided in Section 5.0.

Based upon our engineering judgment, as confirmed by the evaluations of the specifications reviewed, it was concluded that sufficient bases existed for extending the surveillance test intervals set out in the technical specifications which are addressed in the attached technical specification change request. Our conclusions are presented in Section 6.0, and the references are included in Section 7.0.

The current technical specifications are based on an operating cycle of approximately one year in length. As a result, certain definitions in the technical specifications require modification to reflect the use of 18-month operating cycles with a 25 percent allowance for operational uncertainties. The definitions which require change are: "operating cycle," "refueling outage," and "surveillance frequency." In addition, a new definition, "annual," should be added to the technical specifications to describe surveillance tests which will continue to be performed every 12 months. The proposed revised definitions are provided below.

<u>Operating Cycle</u>: For the purpose of designating surveillance test frequencies, the duration of an operating cycle shall not exceed 18 months plus 25 percent. Surveillance tests designated "once per operating cycle" shall be conducted during each operating cycle except that surveillance tests performed during an outage which commences before expiration of the operating cycle may be considered timely.

<u>Refueling Outage</u>: Refueling outage is the period of time between the shutdown of the unit prior to a refueling and the startup of the unit after that refueling. For surveillance test purposes, tests are to be performed during refueling outages as indicated in these technical specifications. In cases where the surveillance test frequency is required to be performed more than once during a refueling outage (e.g., once per week during refueling), the surveillance test shall not be performed less frequently than required by these technical specifications plus or minus 25 percent.

<u>Annual</u>: Occurring every 12 months. For the purpose of designating surveillance test frequencies, annual surveillance tests are to be conducted once every 12 months plus or minus 25 percent.

<u>Surveillance Frequency</u>: Periodic surveillance tests, checks, calibrations and examinations shall be performed within the specified surveillance intervals. In cases where the elapsed interval for annual and more frequent tests is within the specified interval (100 percent plus or minus 25 percent of the allowable interval), the next surveillance interval shall commence at the end of the original specified interval (100 percent of the allowable surveillance interval). In cases where the elapsed interval is less than 75 percent of the specified interval, the next surveillance interval may commence upon completion of the surveillance test.

To identify the technical specification surveillance tests which should be considered candidates for increased test intervals, the current technical specifications were reviewed to determine which specifications could be affected by the use of longer operating cycles. During the review, a list of each surveillance test with a frequency of 12 to 36 months was prepared. Included on this list were all surveillance tests performed "once per operating cycle" and "during refueling outages."

Only surveillance tests listed in the current technical specifications were considered. Technical specification reporting requirements, tests performed in accordance with the requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), tests resulting from commitments to the NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement, and tests to comply with the requirements of the Fire Protection Insurance Program were excluded.

After the list of potentially-affected technical specifications was prepared, the related Surveillance Test Procedures (STPs) were identified. The STPs were then screened to identify those test intervals which were candidates for extension. The primary considerations were engineering judgment, the current STP frequency, current technical specification test frequency, and a preliminary assessment of the failure occurrences which had been encountered in past performances of the STPs. The detailed review of the STP data base to evaluate longer surveillance intervals is described in Section 4.0.

Surveillance tests currently performed annually during a specified month, which do not require plant shutdown or a change in plant operating status, were eliminated as candidates for extension. An evaluation of the surveillance test data base was then made for the remaining surveillance tests following the screening process to determine which test intervals should be evaluated to be increased because of their impact on current plant test practices. As a result of this process, we concluded that the surveillance test frequency intervals for the 50 technical specifications which are listed in Table 3-1 should not be increased at this time.

The technical specification surveillance tests identified in Table 3-1 should continue to be performed on an annual basis. Although the revised definitions will apply to these technical specifications, the test intervals for the listed surveillance tests remain unchanged and the revised definitions do not affect the original technical bases. Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions, as defined by 10 CFR 50.59, exist.

Next, those tests with a required frequency of once per 18 months to once per 36 months were identified. Included in this group are tests which must be performed on a "special" test frequency as stated in the technical specifications and are not associated with a refuel or plant shutdown mode. In 17 cases, it was determined that the recommended surveillance test frequency was the same as or more frequent than the current test frequency. The language of the technical specifications for the surveillance tests identified in Table 3-2 requires revision in order to maintain the same inspection frequency and incorporate the proposed new definitions. However, the test intervals for the tests identified in

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Table 3-2 remain unchanged, as do the original technical bases. Therefore, the changes recommended in Table 3-2 should be implemented to be consistent with current plant test practices and recommended changes in technical specification definitions. Because the proposed changes in technical specification definitions do not change any technical specification tests or surveillance intervals, no unreviewed safety questions, as defined by 10 CFR 50.59, exist.

Finally, those tests now required to be performed during refueling outages were reviewed to determine whether the reactor must be in the refueling mode in order to perform the test. In 17 cases, it was determined that the tests were related directly to the refueling or plant shutdown mode and were not affected by the length of the operating cycle. These surveillance tests are identified in Table 3-3.

In some cases, the language of the technical specifications for the tests identified in Table 3-3 must be changed to incorporate the proposed new definitions. Because of the unique nature of the tests identified in Table 3-3, the revisions of definitions do not change the original technical bases and must be implemented to be consistent with current test practices. Because the proposed changes in technical specification definitions do not change any test or surveillance intervals, no unreviewed safety questions, as identified by 10 CFR 50.59, exist.

After completion of the review and evaluation process described in this section, we evaluated the remaining technical specifications for possible changes in surveillance frequency. The process for evaluating the proposed technical specification changes is described in Section 4.0.

## DAEC TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

### ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE TEST INTERVALS

·	TS Pg #	Tech Spec #	Item	Proposed TS Frequency	Current TS Frequency
1)	3.1-2	4.1.B.2	RPS MG Set OV, UF, UF, and EPA Functional Test and Calibration	Annual	1/0.C.
2)	3.2-24	Table 4.2-A Item 3	Main Steamline Area High Temperature Instrument Functional Test/ <u>Calibration</u>	Annual	1/0.C.
3)	3.2-24 and	Table 4.2-A Item 4	Reactor Low Water Level (Recir. and MSIV Trip) Functional Test/Calibration	Annual	1/0.C.
	3.2-34	Table 4.2-G	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
4)	3.2-24	Table 4.2-A	PCIS (Steamline Isolation) Logic System Functional Test	Annual	1/0.C.
5)	3.2-24	Table 4.2-A Item 9	Reactor Water Cleanup System Steam Leak Detection Instrument Functional Test/ Calibration	Annual	1/0.C.
6)	3.2-24	Table 4.2-A Item 11	Main Condenser Loss of Vacuum Instrument Functional Test & <u>Calibration</u>	Annual	1/0.C.
7)	3.2-24	Table 4.2-A	PCIS (Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation) Logic System Functional Test	Annual	1/0.C.
8)	3.2-26	Table 4.2-B Item 10	RCIC Steam Leak Detection Temperature Monitoring System Functional Test/ <u>Calibration</u>	Annual	1/0.C.
9)	3.2-26	Table 4.2-B Item 10	Suppression Chamber Steam Leak Detection Temperature Monitoring System Functional Test/ <u>Calibration</u>	Annual	1/0.C.
10)	3.2-26	Table 4.2-B Item 10	HPCI Steam Leak Detection Temperature Monitoring System Functional Test/ <u>Calibration</u>	Annual	1/0.C.

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## DAEC TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

# ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE TEST INTERVALS (continued)

	TS Pg #	Tech Spec #	Item	Proposed TS Frequency	Current TS Frequency
11)	3.2-26	Table 4.2-B Item 13	4KV Emergency Bus Degraded Voltage Functional Test/ Calibration	Annual	1/0.C.
12)	3.2-26	Table 4.2-B Item 13	4KV Emergency Bus Under- voltage Relay Instrument Functional Test/Calibration	Annual	1/0.C.
13)	3.2-26	Table 4.2-B Item 4,13	4KV Emergency Bus Sequential Loading Relay <u>Instrument</u> Functional Test/Calibration	Annual	1/0.C.
14)	3.2-26	Table 4.2-B Item 13	4KV Emergency Bus Under- voltage Instrument Calibration	Annual	1/0.C.
15)	3.2-26	Table 4.2-B Item 13	ECCS Bus Power Relay Drop Out Voltage Measurement	Annual	1/0.C.
16)	3.2-26	Table 4.2-B •Item 14	Instrument AC and Battery Bus Undervoltage Relay Calibration	Annual	1/0.C.
17)	3.2-27 and	Table 4.2-B Item 1,8	Core Spray Trip System Logic Functional Test and Timer Calibration	Annual	1/0.C.
	3.2-26	Item 4			
18)	3.2-27	Table 4.2-B	LPCI Trip System Logic Functional Test and Timer	Annual	1/0.C.
	and	Item 2,8	Calibration		
	3.2-26	Item 4			
19)	3.2-27	Table 4.2-B Item 3,8	Containment Spray Cooling Logic System Functional Test	Annual	1/0.C.
20)	3.2-27	Table 4.2-B Item 4,8	HPCI Actuation Logic System Functional Test	Annual	1/0.C.

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#### DAEC TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

# ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE TEST INTERVALS (continued)

	TS Pg #	Tech Spec #	Item	Proposed TS Frequency	Current TS Frequency
21)	3.2-27	Table 4.2-B Item 5	HPCI System Auto Isolation Logic Functional Test	Annual	1/0.C.
22)	3.2-27	Table 4.2-B Item 7	RCIC System Auto Isolation Logic Functional Test	Annual	1/0.C.
23)	3.2-27	Table 4.2-B Item 9	Low-Low Set Instrument Functional Test and Calibration	Annual	1/0.C.
24)	3.2-29	Table 4.2-D	Steam Jet Air Ejector Offgas Line Isolation Logic System Functional Test	Annual	Refuel
25)	3.2-29	Table 4.2-D	Steam Jet Air Ejector Charcoal Bed Bypass Logic System Functional Test	Annual	Refuel
26)	3.2-30	Table 4.2-E	Drywell Equipment & Floor Drain Sump Flow Timer Func- tional Test and <u>Calibration</u>	Annual	1/0.C.
27)	3.2-34	Table 4.2-G	Reactor High Pressure (Recirc. Trip) Instrument Functional Test/Calibration	Annual	Refuel
28)	3 <b>.</b> 2-34a	Table 4.2-H	Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitoring System Functional Test/ <u>Calibration</u>	Annual	1/0.C.
29)	3.2-34a	Table 4.2-H	Turbine Building Vent Radiation Monitoring System Calibration	Annual	1/0.C.
30)	3.2-34a	Table 4.2-H	Offgas Stack Radiation Monitoring System Calibration	Annual	1/0.C.



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#### DAEC TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

# ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE TEST INTERVALS (continued)

	TS Pg #	Tech Spec #	Item	Proposed TS Frequency	Current TS Frequency
31)	3.2-34a	Table 4.2-H	Post-Accident Sampling System Functional Test	Annual	1/0.C.
32)	3.2-34a	Table 4.2-H	Post-Accident Analysis Laboratory Operational Test/ Calibration	Annual	1/0.C.
33)	3.5-1	4.5.A.1a	Core Spray Quarterly & <u>Annual</u> Operability Test	Annual	1/0.C.
34)	3.5-2	4.5.A.3a	LPCI System Quarterly & Annual Operability Test	Annual	1/0.C.
35)	3.5-7	4.5.E.1a	RCIC Actuation Logic System Functional Test	Annual	1/0.C.
36)	3.5-11	4.5.H.2	LPCI Filled Discharge Piping Functional Test (Combined with 45A002-A)	Annual	1/0.C.
37)	3.5-11	4.5.H.2	Core Spray Filled Discharge Piping Functional Test (Combined with 45A001-A)	Annual	1/0.C.
38)	3.7-13	4.7.A.6a	Containment Atmospheric Dilu- tion System Functional Test	Annual	1/0.C.
39)	3.7-13 -14	4.7.A.6c	CAD Systems Analyzers Func- tional Test and Calibration	Annual	1/0.C.
40)	3.7-15	4.7.B.1a	Standby Gas Treatment System Pressure Drop Test	Annual	1/0.C.
41)	3.7-15	4.7.B.1b	Standby Gas Treatment System Heater Output Check	Annual	1/0.C.
42)	3.7-15 and 3.7-16	4.7.B.1c 4.7.B.2a	Standby Gas Treatment System HEPA & Charcoal Filter Efficiency Tests	Annual	1/0.C.
43)	3.7-15	4.7.B.1e	Standby Gas Treatment System Bypass Operability Test	Annual	1/0.C.

## DAEC TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

### ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE TEST INTERVALS (continued)

	TS Pg #	Tech Spec #	Item	Proposed TS Frequency	Current TS Frequency
44)	3.8-2	4.8.A.1e	Standby Diesel Generator Annual Inspection	Annual	Annual
45)	3.10-1 and 3.10-1	4.10.A.1 4.10.A.2a	Main Control Room Ventilation Standby Filter Units Test	Annual	1/0.C.
46)	3.10-2	4.10.A.3	Main Control Room Ventilation Test	Annual	1/0.C.
47)	3.13-3 and 3.13-4	4.13.B.1e 4.13.B.1h	Diesel & Electric Fire Pump Operability	Annual	1/18 mos & Annual
48)	3.13-5	4.13.C.1a	Deluge System Operability Tests (5 rooms)	Annual	Annual
49)	3.13-6	4.13.D.1b	CO <sub>2</sub> System Simulated Actuation Test	Annual	Annual
50)	3.13-7	4.13.E.1b	Fire Hose, Gasket, & Valve Integrity	Annual	Annual

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#### DAEC TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

### CURRENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE INTERVAL UNCHANGED

	TS Pg #	Tech Spec #	Item	Proposed TS Frequency	Current TS Frequency
. 1)	3.1-1	4.1.A.2	RPS Channel Response Time Check	1/0.C.	1/18 Mos
2)	3.1-1	4.1.A.2	Reactor High Pressure (RPS) Instrument Response Time	1/0.C.	1/18 Mos
3)	3.1-1	4.1.A.2	Reactor Low Water Level Instrument (RPS) Response Time	1/0.C.	1/18 Mos
4)	3.2-29	Table 4.2-D	Refuel Area Exhaust Monitors Test and Calibration	1/0.C.	Refuel
5)	3.2-29	Table 4.2-D	Reactor Building Area Exhaust Monitors Test and Calibration	1/0.C.	Refuel
6)	3.2-29	Table 4.2-D	Offgas Post-Treatment Radiation Monitors Test and Calibration	1/0.C.	Refuel
. <b>7)</b>	3.2-29	Table 4.2-D	Offgas Pre-Treatment Radiation Monitors Test and Calibration	1/0.C.	Refuel
8)	3.5-9	4.5.F.1.a	ADS Simulated Automatic Actuation Test	1/0.C.	Refuel
9)	3.5-9	4.5.F.1.b	ADS Accumulator Check Valve Test	1/0.C.	Refuel
10)	3.6-10	4.6.H.1	Hydraulic & Mechanical Snubber Visual Inspection	Current Tech Spec	· SP
11)	3.6-12	4.6.H.3	Hydraulic & Mechanical Snubber Operability Check	Current Tech Spec	SP
12)	3.7-4 and 3.7-6	4.7.A.2 a(9) 4.7.A.2d(1)	Primary Containment Leak Rate Test (Type A Test, or Integrated Leak Rate Test)	Current Tech Spec	SP
13)	3.7-6	4.7.A.2 d(2)(a)	Leak Rate Test - Type B Penetrations Test	Current Tech Spec	SP
14)	3.7-6	4.7.A.2 d(2)(b)	Airlock Local Leak Rate Test	Current Tech Spec	SP
15)	3.7-7	4.7.A.2 d(3)	Containment Isolation Valve Tightness Test - Type C Penetrations	Current Tech Spec	SP
16)	3.13-3	4.13.B.1f	Fire Suppression Water System Ring Header Flush	Current Tech Spec	SP
17)	3.13-8	4.13.F.1a	Fire Barrier Penetration Seals Inspection	Current Tech Spec	SP

NOTE: SP is used to indicate a special surveillance test frequency as defined by the specific current technical specifications.

#### DAEC TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

SURVEILLANCE TESTS RELATED TO REFUELING OUTAGES OR PLANT SHUTDOWN

	TS Pg #	Tech Spec #	Item	Proposed TS Frequency	Current TS Frequency
1)	3.1-8 and 3.2-28	Table 4.1-1 Table 4.2-C	IRM Trip Functional Test & Calibration (High Flux & Inoperative)	Current Tech Spec	SP
2)	3.1-8	Table 4.1-1	APRM High Flux (15% Scram) Instrument Functional Test/Calibration	Current Tech Spec	SP
3)	3.1-12	Table 4.1-2	APRM to IRM Comparison on Controlled Shutdowns	Current Tech Spec	SP
4)	3.2-28	Table 4.2-C	SRM/IRM Detector Not in the Startup Position Calibration	Current Tech Spec	SP
5)	3.2-28	Table 4.2-C	SRM/IRM Detector Not in the Startup Position Functional Test	Current Tech Spec	SP
6)	3.2-28	Table 4.2-C	SRM Trip Functional Test & Calibration	Current Tech Spec	SP
7)	3.2-31	Table 4.2-F	APRM Gain Adjust Calibration	Current Tech Spec	SP
8)	3.3-3 3.3-3 and 3.3-4	4.3.B.1a 4.3.B.1b 4.3.B.1c	Nuclear Instrument Response to Control Rod Motion & Control Rod Coupling Integrity Check	Current Tech Spec	SP
9)	3.3-4	4.3.B.3	RSCS & Rod Worth Minimizer Capability Tests	Current Tech Spec	SP
10)	3.3-5	4.3.B.4	Control Rod Withdrawal Requirements	Current Tech Spec	SP
11)	3.3-7	4.3.D	Reactivity Anomalies Check	Refuel	SP
12)	3.6-1	4.6.A.1	Heatup and Cooldown Rate Log	Current Tech Spec	SP
13)	3.6-2	4.6.A.3	Reactor Vessel Head & Head Flange Thermal Limitation	Current Tech Spec	SP
14)	3.6-3	4.6.B.1c	Reactor Coolant Gamma and Iodine Activity	Current Tech Spec	SP
15)	3.6-3b	4.6.B.2a	Reactor Coolant Chloride Ion and Conductivity	Current Tech Spec	SP
16)	3.9-1	4.9.A.1	Refueling Interlocks Functional Tests	Current Tech Spec	SP
17)	3.9-4	4.9.B	SRM Daily Response Check	Current Tech Spec	SP

NOTE: SP is used to indicate a special surveillance test frequency as defined by the specific current technical specifications.

The technical specification candidates for extension of surveillance test intervals were identified through the process described in Section 3.0. Each candidate was evaluated considering the available Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) data. At the DAEC, approximately 10 years of surveillance test results exist and can be used in the evaluation process. The sources of data were Deviation Reports (DRs) and Licensee Event Reports (LERs) as recorded in the plant computer data bases. This information was used in conjunction with our engineering judgment to determine whether extension of each surveillance test interval was warranted.

The majority of STPs are performed to demonstrate compliance with technical specification test requirements. DRs are prepared each time there is an equipment malfunction, a failure to satisfy the STP acceptance criteria, or other occurrence resulting in the unsatisfactory completion of an STP. A computer sort of the DR data base was performed for each STP related to a candidate technical specification. This process provided the DR data base pertinent to the tests being considered for increased surveillance intervals.

The DRs identified through the sorting process were then reviewed to determine whether the particular surveillance test under consideration would uniquely identify the equipment failure modes which had been encountered.

LERs are prepared and submitted to the NRC as required by NRC regulations. Prior to the January 1984 revision of the LER reporting requirements, LERs were generally prepared for equipment performance outside the limits identified in the technical specifications. The LERs, therefore, constitute an important data base that includes more failures than are currently required to be reported. Evaluation of the LER data base identified LERs applicable to the STPs which, in turn, are associated with specific candidate technical specifications.

Initially, all LERs were computer sorted to identify those originated in surveillance testing. Those LERs were then reviewed to establish whether the failure mode encountered would have been only identified by an STP that is used to demonstrate compliance with any of the technical specifications which are candidates for extension of surveillance intervals. Through this process, a list of applicable LERs and their associated STPs was prepared for further evaluation. Through the collective sorting process described above, the DRs and LERs applicable to the candidate technical specifications and associated STPs were identified for further evaluation. Each candidate technical specification and associated STP was evaluated to determine whether an increase in surveillance test interval would involve an unreviewed safety question in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.

In the evaluation process, three types of situations were encountered. In the first case, no applicable DR or LER was identified. In the second case, three or less applicable DRs and LERs were identified which were random in nature. In the third case, a larger number of DRs and LERs were encountered. The evaluation process is described below and documented in Appendix A.

In the first case, the absence of DRs or LERs provides confidence that the technical specification surveillance interval can reasonably be increased without introducing an unreviewed safety question. The introduction of a longer technical specification test interval does not significantly increase risk and is considered acceptable. Should future performance of the STPs detect a potential generic concern, a specific test program may be implemented to reduce the likelihood of recurrence or determine the root cause.

In the second case, each applicable DR and LER was evaluated to determine its significance. As long as the failures appeared to be random, e.g., different failures modes, and actions had been taken to prevent recurrence, the change in risk introduced by a longer technical specification test interval does not significantly increase risk and is considered acceptable.

In the third case, each applicable DR and LER was evaluated to determine its significance. In addition, the test results and the apparent failure mechanism were reviewed and extension of the surveillance test frequency was evaluated for safety considerations. If the evaluation concluded that no unreviewed safety question existed, a longer technical specification test interval is considered acceptable. The evaluation process described in this section, and documented in Appendix A, provides the bases for the conclusion that the proposed extension in surveillance test intervals involved "no significant hazards consideration." The "no significant hazards consideration" evaluation is described in Section 5.0.

The proposed technical specification changes recommended as a result of the evaluations described in this report have been reviewed and have been determined to involve no significant hazards. The changes which result only from the proposed revisions of definitions (i.e., "operating cycle," "refueling outage," "annual," and "surveillance frequency") and do not extend the surveillance interval or change its technical bases (as described in Section 3.0) are considered to involve no significant hazards because they are administrative changes and do not involve changes in technical specification testing requirements. The bases for conclusions regarding those proposed revisions of technical specifications which involve an actual extension of surveillance test interval identified in Section 4.0 are provided below, with specific responses to the considerations identified in 10 CFR 50.92.

(1) Does the proposed license amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

<u>Response</u>: No. Each of the proposed technical specification changes which involves an extension in surveillance test interval was specifically evaluated using the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) surveillance test data. Based upon these evaluations and engineering judgment, it has been determined that the proposed increases in surveillance test intervals represent a negligible potential increase in the consequences of accidents previously evaluated. The proposed technical specification changes are generally not associated

with safety analysis event initiators described in Chapter 15 of the DAEC UFSAR and therefore do not significantly affect event probability.

The basis for this conclusion is explained by the evaluation process and engineering judgment as described in Section 4.0 and documented in Appendix A.

(2) Does the proposed license amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

<u>Response</u>: No. Each of the proposed technical specification changes which involves an extension in surveillance test interval was specifically evaluated to determine whether the change could create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident. The increase in surveillance test interval does not involve any change in technical specification setpoints, plant operation, or plant configuration. Therefore, the changes in surveillance test interval do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

(3) Does the proposed license amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

<u>Response</u>: No. Each of the proposed technical specification changes which involves an extension in surveillance test interval was specifically evaluated to determine whether the change could reduce

the plant margin of safety. Based upon this evaluation, it has been determined that any small changes in equipment performance introduced by increased technical specification surveillance test intervals would not be expected to impact significantly the plant safety analysis, and therefore would not result in a significant reduction in the margin of safety of the plant. In the April 6, 1983 <u>Federal Register</u>, the NRC published examples of amendments that are not likely to involve a significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment involves only one or more of the following examples. Example numbers (i), (iii), (iv), and (vi) of that list state:

- (i) A purely administrative change to technical specifications: for example, a change to achieve consistency throughout the technical specifications, correction of an error, or a change in nomenclature.
- (iii) For a nuclear power reactor, a change resulting from a nuclear reactor core reloading, if no fuel assemblies significantly differ from those found previously acceptable to the NRC for a previous core at the facility in question are involved. This assumes that no significant changes are made to the acceptance criteria for the technical specifications, that the analytical methods used to demonstrate conformance with the technical specifications and regulations are not significantly changed, and that NRC has previously found such methods acceptable.

- (iv) A relief granted upon demonstration of acceptable operation from an operating restriction that was imposed because acceptable operation was not yet demonstrated. This assumes that the operating restriction and the criteria to be applied to a request for relief have been established in a prior review and that it is justified in a satisfactory way that the criteria have been met.
- (vi) A change which either may result in some increase to the probability or consequences of a previously-analyzed accident or may reduce in some way a safety margin, but where the results of the change are clearly within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system or component specified in the Standard Review Plan: for example, a change resulting from the application of a small refinement of a previously used calculational model or design method.

The above examples fit within the framework of the proposed technical specification changes. The changes in technical specification definitions are intended to achieve consistency throughout the technical specifications and are similar to example (i). The extension of technical specification test intervals results from core reload design changes which permit 18-month operating cycles. A safety analysis of the reload using previously approved methodology is documented in Reference 1 and is similar to example (iii). The technical specification surveillance intervals were generally established in the original plant license and, as described in Section 4.0, the surveillance test data base has been evaluated (in conjunction with engineering judgment) to provide the bases for

extension of the surveillance interval. This is a "relief" similar to example (iv). The changes satisfy existing safety analysis event acceptance criteria, and thus fall within example (vi). Therefore, based upon the above information, the proposed technical specification changes should be judged to involve "no significant hazards consideration." Based upon evaluations of the DAEC surveillance test data base, in conjunction with engineering judgment, it is concluded that the technical specification surveillance test intervals, as evaluated in Appendix A, can be extended to accommodate an 18-month operating cycle without the introduction of an unreviewed safety question and without involving a significant hazards consideration, as identified by 10 CFR 50.92. Specifically, 17 STPs had no applicable LERs or DRs; 16 STPs had 3 or less applicable DRs and LERs which were apparently random in nature and found to involve no unreviewed safety question; and the 5 STPs which had more than 3 applicable DRs and LERS were subjected to safety evaluations which determined that no unreviewed safety questions existed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. Collectively, the specific evaluations performed on the proposed technical specifications provide assurance that the changes involve "no significant hazards consideration."

In addition, the proposed revisions of definitions discussed in Section 2.0 should be incorporated into the DAEC Technical Specifications. It is anticipated that adoption of the revised definitions will eliminate potentially confusing requirements, such as which surveillance tests must be performed during a refueling outage because they are associated with the refueling process and which tests may be performed during a convenient opportunity.

Also, the technical specifications identified in Tables 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3 will be changed by virtue of revising the definitions although no increase

in surveillance test interval is involved. None of these changes represents an unreviewed safety question in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, or involves a significant hazards consideration in accordance with 10 CFR 50.92.

In conclusion, it should be recognized that the extension of the operating cycle from 12 to 18 months represents a negligible or, at most, a small incremental risk. We recommend extension of the intervals for 47 technical specification surveillance tests, and there are strong operational, safety, and economic reasons for these extensions. The benefits of the proposed longer surveillance intervals associated with 18-month operating cycles include the following:

- 1. A longer operating cycle should improve the DAEC plant capacity factor by reducing the number of refueling outages during the plant lifetime.
- 2. The longer operating cycle should reduce the overall plant shutdown and cooldown cycles over the plant lifetime.
- The increased surveillance test intervals should result in slightly reduced radiation exposures to plant personnel performing surveillance testing.
- 4. The increased surveillance test intervals should result in slightly reduced component wear.

- 5. The proposed changes in technical specification definitions should result in more efficient utilization of manpower during refueling outages by providing more flexibility in test scheduling.
- 6. The proposed changes in technical specifications are consistent with current plant surveillance practices and can be implemented with minimal impact.
- 7. The STP intervals are more consistent and easier to understand and should be more consistently interpreted.

7.0 REFERENCES

- 23A1739, "Supplemental Reload Licensing Submittal for Duane Arnold Atomic Energy Center - Reload 7," December 1984.
- DPR-49, "Operating License and Technical Specifications Duane Arnold Energy Center," through Revision No. 131, March, 1986.
- "Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Duane Arnold Energy Center," Revision 3.
- 4. NEDO-24011, "General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel."\*

\*Approved revision number at time analyses are performed.

# APPENDIX A

10CFR50.59 ANALYSES



Surv Test No1	Survelliand	ce Test Procedure Title	Recommended TS Fre	Pq F	Plant Status		
Tech Spec No. 2	_	4	Current TS Freq	6	0		
Tech Spec Pg3	-		Current STP Freq		8		
Observed DRs & LERs	Accident Type	Failure Probability	Consequences	New Accident	Safety Margin		
9	10	11	12	13	14		
9     10     11     12     13     14							
TEST PURPOSE:	<u></u>			CONCLUSION:			
15				16	6		
l		L		L			

A-1

Surv Test No. <u>41A012</u> Table 4.1. Tech Spec No. <u>Table 4.3</u> . Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.1-8 &amp; 3</u> .	1 & A.2.e Mode Switc Functional	<u>ice Test Procedure Title</u> h in Shutdown Instrument Test	Recommended TS Fre Current TS Freq Current STP Freq	<u>Refuel</u> Shu	<u>Plant Status</u> tdown Required related to refuel
Observed DRs & LERs	Accident Type	Failure Probability	Consequences	New Accident	Safety Margin
DR 010477 - 77001 Pressure trip point below that allowed in STP-Instrument Drift. PS B21-N020A-D - one of the four channels tripped below 600 psig.	7.2 - RPS Design Basis	No Increase Tripped in conservative direction. Individual channel trip not a drift of all four channels. Monthly functional tests and quarterly calibra- tions will catch drift.	No Increase	None	No Decrease
TEST PURPOSE: The Shutdown Mode bypasse line isolation. Test sig then determine if each tr give a 1/2 scram.	nals (high press)			CONCLUSION: Extend Test Inte No Unreviewed Sa	rval fety Questions Exis

A-2

Surv Test No. <u>41A020</u> Tech Spec No. <u>Table 4.1</u> Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.1-8</u>	<u>-1</u> Scram Test Functional	<u>e Test Procedure Title</u> Switch Instrument Test	Recommended TS Fre Current TS Freq Current STP Freq	<u>Refuel</u> Shute	Plant Status down required related to refuel
Observed DRs & LERs	Accident Type	Failure Probsbility	Consequences	New Accident	Safety Margin
None	7.2 RPS Design Basis	No Increase No failures observed	No Increase	None	No Decrease
TEST PURPOSE: Check of the individual rod scram test switches to assure that each functions.			CONCLUSION: Extend Test Intervsl No Unreviewed Safety Questions N		

41A006 & Surv Test No. 41A006.1 Table 4.1-7 Tech Spec No. Table 4.2-1 3.1-12 & Tech Spec Pg. 3.2-28	Z & C Discharge V	<u>e Test Procedure Title</u> olume High Water Level Functional Test and	Recommended TS Fre Current TS Freq Current STP Freq	<u>Refuel</u> Shute	Plant Status down required related to refuel
Observed DRs & LERs	Accident Type	Failure Probability	Consequences	New Accident	Safety Margin
DR 072276 - 76155 Test switch tripped at 10.75 inches. Setpoint is 10.50. DR 060484 - 84221 LS-1862 "B" tripped 3/4" from setpoint. STP tolerance is 1/2". LER 012875 - 75005 LS-1861 "D" tripped at + 2". Tech Spec limit is <u>+</u> 1/2".	7.2 RPS Design Basis	No Increase All failures associated with instrument drift. Each of the 6 trip chan- nels have a level switch. Redundant channels available.	No Increase	None	No Decrease
TEST PURPOSE: Assure that the level isn generate a scram signal i enough empty volume in th	f there is not	· · ·	I	CONCLUSION: Extend Test Inter No Unreviewed Safe	val ety Questions Exist

Tech Spec No. <u>Table 4.1-2</u> Turbine Contro		<u>e Test Procedure Title</u> trol Valve Fast Closure me Test & RPT Initiate	Recommended TS Fre Current TS Freq Current STP Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u> Shut	Plant Status nutdown required ot related to refuel	
Observed DRs & LERs	Accident Type	Failure Probability	Consequences	New Accident	Safety Margin	
DR 04237B - 18091 EHC CV-4 response in 40 ms, should be 30 ms DR 042384 - B4153 CV-3 response time was greater than 30 ms from chart trace.	15.2 NSSS Press Increase	No Increase Each of the four control valves has a pressure switch and a position switch in EHC hydraulic fluid. Redundant and diverse trips available.	No Increase	None	No Decrease	
TEST PURPOSE: Assure that TCV closure will rapidly initiate a scram				CONCLUSION: Extend Test Interval No Unreviewed Safety Questions Exis		

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Surv Test No.41A009Surveillance Test Procedure TitleTech Spec No.Table 4.1-2MSIV Closure Instrument Functional Test and Physical InspectionTech Spec Pg.3.1-12		Recommended TS Freq 1/0.C.Plant StatusCurrent TS FreqRefuelShutdown requiredCurrent STP FreqRefuelNot related to refuel			
Observed DRs & LERs	Accident Type	Failure Probability	Consequences	New Accident	Safety Margin
None	15.2 NSSS Press Increase	No failures observed	No Increase	None	No Decrease
TEST PURPOSE: Physical inspection and actuation is to identify possible deterioration.				CONCLUSION: Extend Test Interval No Unreviewed Safety Questions Exis	

A-6

Surv Test No. <u>41A019</u> Tech Spec No. <u>Table 4.1-</u> Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.1-12</u>	2 Recirculati Calibration	e Test Procedure Title on Pump Flow Transmitter -	Recommended TS Fre Current TS Freq Current STP Freq	<u>Refuel</u> Shu	Plant Status tdown Required related to refuel
Observed DRs & LERs	Accident Type	Failure Probability	Consequences	New Accident	Safety Margin
DR 032978 - 78071 FT-4631A,C,D snd FT4632B were out of calibation. Instrument drift. DR 041480 - 80072 FT-4631D could not be calibrated. DR 040781 - 81066 FT-4632C could not be calibrated.	Not used in analysis of design basis events.	No Increase One case of instrument drift. Redundant chan- nel available in all cases.	No Increase	None	No Decrease
TEST PURPOSE: Calibrate the recirc flow that provide signals to t controller and rod block	he recirc flow			CONCLUSION: Extend Test Inte No Unreviewed Sa	rval fety Questions Exis

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Surv Test No. <u>41A014</u> Table 4.1-2 Tech Spec No. <u>Table 4.2.7</u> <u>3.1-12 &amp;</u> Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.2-24</u>	2 & A Steamline H	e Test Procedure Title ligh Radiation Calibration	Recommended TS Fre Current TS Freq Current STP Freq	Refuel	Plant Status Shutdown required Not related to refuel
Observed DRs & LERs None	Accident Type Not used in analysis of design basis events.	Failure Probability No Increase No failures observed	Consequences No Increase	New Accide	ent Safety Margin No Decrease
TEST PURPOSE: Calibrate sensors RE 4448 a radiation source.	A,B,C,D with			CONCLUSION: Extend Test I No Unreviewed	Interval I Safety Questions Exist

Surv Test No. <u>41AO10</u> Tech Spec No. <u>Table 4.1-</u> Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.1-13</u>	2 RPT Initiate bine Stop Va	e Test Procedure Title Logic Functional & Tur- Nve Closure Instrument est & Physical Inspection	Recommended TS Fre Current TS Freq Current STP Freq	<u>Refuel</u> Shuto	Plant Status down required related to refuel
Observed DRs & LERs	Accident Type	Fsilure Probability	Consequences	New Accident	Safety Margin
None	15.2 NSSS Press Increase	No Increase No failure observed	No Increase	None	No Increase
TEST PURPOSE: Physical inspection of 8 position switches to check for deterioration.			1	CONCLUSION: Extend Test Interv No Unreviewed Safe	l val ety Questions Exist

	Tech Spec No. <u>Table 4.2-A</u> PCIS (RHR & Logic Syste		Recommended TS Freq <u>1/0.C.</u> Current TS Freq <u>1/0.C.</u> Current STP Freq <u>1/0.C.</u>		<u>Plant Status</u> Shutdown required Not related to refuel	
Observed DRs & LERs	Accident Type	Failure Probability	Consequences	New Accide	nt Safety Margin	
DR 032476 - 76060 CV04301, Torus outboard vent valve won't close. Pilot vslve diassembled snd cleaned. DR 051981 - 81103 RHR MOV-1900 did not shut. Breaker 34-42 smoked. (Shutdown cooling supply valve) DR 052381 - 81106 RHR MOV-1900 failed to close. Closed contactor not picking up complete- ly causing contractor coil to burn up. (Shutdown cooling supply valve)	15.6 Decrease in Reactor Coolant	No Increase Redundant valves on each line were opersble. These valves are normally closed & must stay closed.	No Increase	None	No Decrease	
TEST PURPOSE: Test signals initiate PCI positions are checked for position.			1	CONCLUSION: Extend Test Interval No Unreviewed Safety Questions Ex		

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Surv Test No. <u>428012</u> Table 4.2- Tech Spec No. <u>4.5.F.1</u> 3.2-27 Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.5-9</u>	Bå ADS Trip Sy	e Test Procedure Title stem Logic Functional imer) Calibration	Recommended TS Fre Current TS Freq _ Current STP Freq S	Refuel Shute	Plant Status down required related to refuel
Observed DRs & LERs	Accident Type	Fsilure Probability	Consequences	New Accident	Safety Margin
DR 060978 - 78140 ADS 'A' Trip System Timer found inoperable. 'A' timer replaced and tested satisfactorily. DR 030184 - 84091 Test switch in AB posi- tion ADS timers did not start. Cause: faulty HS-4462	15.6 Decrease in Reactor Coolant	No Increase Random fsilures. Redundant channel avail- able. Diverse system (HPCI) available. Timer calibrstion and function- al test semi-annually.	No Increase	None	No Decrease
TEST PURPOSE: Logic test to confirm the for (a) Rx Low Level or ( Pressure and (c) LPCI/Con initiste ADS. Timers are seconds to allow HPCI or primary response.	b) High Drywell e Spray will set at 120			CONCLUSION: Extend Test Interv No Unreviewed Safe	val ety Questions Exis -

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Surv Test No.         42D005           Table 4.2-           Tech Spec No.           3.2-29           Tech Spec Pg.           3.7-15	D & dStsndby Gas &ation & Rea	e Test Procedure Title Treatment System Actu- ctor Building Isolation m Functional Test	Recommended TS Fre Current TS Freq Current STP Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u> Shi	Plant Status utdown required lated to refuel
Observed DRs & LERs	Accident Type	Failure Probability	Consequences	New Accident	Safety Margin
DR 122378 - 78205 SBGT HS-5718A, MOV-5716A, MOV-5728A, disabled or broken. CV-5703A & 5719A did not open. CV-4307 did not open IV-EF-3A. DR 021680 - 80029 IV-RF-1A, IV-RF-1B and MO-5727B fans tagged out for D/W work. Unable to get indication; MO-5727B has open light and does not go out when valve is closed. Reset limit switches. DR 040482 - 82090 CV-5703A would not open.	15.7 Radio- active Release	No Increase Redundant train is available. Logic is tested semi-annually.	No Increase	None	No Decrease
TEST PURPOSE: Testing verifies that SBG 'B' will start and run, t filtered releases from th	hus assuring		<b>I</b>	CONCLUSION: Extend Test Into No Unreviewed Sa	erval afety Questions Exist

Surv Test No. <u>42F010</u> Tech Spec No. <u>Table 4.2-</u> Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.2-31</u>	F Drywell & T	ce Test Procedure Title orus Pressure (Indicator) Calibration	Recommended TS Fre Current TS Freq Current STP Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u> SH	Plant Status nutdown required ot related to refuel
Observed DRs & LERs	Accident Type	Failure Probability	Consequences	New Accident	safety Margin
None	15.6 NSSS Inventory Decrease	No Increase No failures observed	No Increase	None	No Decrease
TEST PURPOSE: Calibration of drywell pressure <u>indicator</u> PI-4368A and Torus pressure <u>indicator</u> PI-4368B.				CONCLUSION: Extend Test Int No Unreviewed S	cerval Safety Questions Exist

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		<u>e Test Procedure Title</u> e (EOC) RPT System me	Recommended TS Fre Current TS Freq Current STP Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u> Shut	Plant Status Shutdown required Not related to refuel	
Observed DRs & LERs	Accident Type	Failure Probability	Consequences	New Accident	Safety Margin	
None	15.2 NSSS Press Increase	No Increase No failures observed	No Increase	None	No Decrease	
•	-					
TEST PURPOSE: Repsonse time from initiation of turbine control valve fast closure or turbine stop valve closure actuation of recirc pump trip breaker.				CONCLUSION: Extend Test Inter No Unreviewed Saf	val ety Questions Exist	

Surv Test No. <u>42B043</u> Tech Spec No. <u>Table 4.2-</u> Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.2-34a</u>		e Test Procedure Title lief Valve Position alibration	Recommended TS Fre Current TS Freq Current STP Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u>	<u>Plant Status</u> Shutdown required Not related to refue
Observed DRs & LERs	Accident Type	Failure Probability	Consequences	New Accide	
DR 052782 - 82158 Pressure switch PS-4404A Inop. Switch did not actuate above 25 + 6.75 psig. Reset for 25 + 6.75/-2.25 psig.	15.6 NSSS Inventory Decrease	This is an indication of an open valve. Redundant and diverse indication is available.	No Increase	None	No Decrease
TEST PURPOSE:				CONCL USION :	
TEST PURPOSE: Calibration of the ADS valve pressure switch which receives a signal from drywell pressure sensors.				Extend Test I	nterval Safety Questions Ex

Surv Test No. <u>42F015</u> Tech Spec No. <u>Table 4.2-</u> Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.2-34a</u>	H Drywell and Radiation Mo	e Test Procedure Title Torus Room High Range nitors Instrument	Recommended TS Fro Current TS Freq Current STP Freq	<u>Refuel</u> Shut	Plant Status down required related to refuel
Observed DRs & LERs None	Accident Type 15.6 NSSS Inventory Decrease (Post Accident Monitoring Instruments)	Failure Probability No Increase No failures observed	Consequences No Increase	New Accident None	Safety Margin No Decrease
TEST PURPOSE: Calibrate the sensors with a known radiation source.			1	CONCLUSION: Extend Test Inter No Unreviewed Ssf	val Yety Questions Exist

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Surv Test No.       43A001       Surveillance         Tech Spec No.       4.3.A.1       Shutdown Max         Tech Spec Pg.       3.3-1       State		e Test Procedure Title argin Test	Recommended TS Freq <u>Refuel</u> Current TS Freq <u>Refuel</u> Current STP Freq <u>Refuel</u>		<u>Plant Status</u> Shutdown required Related to refuel	
Observed DRs & LERs	Accident Type	Failure Probability	Consequences	New Accid	lent Safety Margin	
None	15.4 Reactiv- ity Anomalies	No Increase No failures observed	No Increase	None	No Decrease	
TEST PURPOSE: Based on rod pull form full in to criti- cality, a shutdown margin of 0.38% dk/k must be demonstrated.			1	CONCLUSION: Extend Test No Unreviewe		

Surv Test No. 43C001	Surveilland	e Test Procedure Title	Recommended TS Fre	eq <u>Refuel</u>	Plant Status
Tech Spec No. <u>4.3.C.1</u>	_ Scram Insei	tion Time Test	Current TS Freq	<u>Refuel</u> Shute	down required
Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.3-6</u>	_		Current STP Freq	<u>Refuel</u> Rela	ed to refuel
Observed DRs & LERs	Accident Type	Failure Probability	Consequences	New Accident	Safety Margin
DR 031379 - 79045 Control Rod 22-31 did not scram while using individual scram switches on 1C-16. Failed scram solenoid valve. Rod driven to full in and left. DR 010883 - 83006 CRD 30-27 gave a "Rod Overtravel" annunciator. Rod was uncoupled. Rod driven full in and left.	4.6 Control Rod Drive Design Basis	No Increase Single control rod failures only. Scram requirements for core average satisfied.	No Increase	None	No Decrease
TEST PURPOSE:	TEST PURPOSE:			CONCLUSION:	Į
Check of mechanical clear binding or blocking – as control rod insertion rate	verified by			Extend Test Interv No Unreviewed Safe	val ety Questions Exist

Surv Test No. <u>44A002</u>	Surveilland	e Test Procedure Title	Recommended TS Fre	eq <u>1/0.C.</u>	Plant Status
Tech Spec No. <u>4.4.A.2</u>			Current TS Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u> Shut	down required
Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.4-1</u>	-		Current STP Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u> Not	related to refuel
Observed DRs & LERs	Accident Type	Fsilure Probability	Consequences	New Accident	Safety Margin
None	SLCS Design Basis	No Increase No failures obsrved	No Increase	None	No Decrease
TEST PURPOSE:			-	CONCLUSION:	
Test the operability of t squib valves and ability into the reactor vessel.	he explosive to pump water			Extend Test Inter No Unreviewed Saf	val ety Questions Exist

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Surv Test No. <u>45D001</u> Tech Spec No. <u>4.5.D.1a &amp;</u> <u>4.5.D.1e</u>		e Test Procedure Title em Monthly/ <u>Cycle</u> ty Tests	Recommended TS Fre Current TS Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u>	Plant Status Shutdown required
Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.5-6</u>	_		Current STP Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u>	Not related to refuel
Observed DRs & LERs	Accident Type	Failure Probability	Consequences	New Acci	dent Safety Margin
LER 122076 - 76089 HPCI turbine tripped on fast start with high flow indication. Other ECCS operable. High flow PDIS setpoints were corrected and HPCI system test satisfac- torily.	15.6 NSSS Inventory Decrease	No Increase Procedural error - one occurrence only	No Increase	None	No Decrease
TEST PURPOSE: During startup from cold a demonstrate the ability of	hutdown,		- I	CONCLUSION Extend Test	

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Surv Test No. <u>450</u> Tech Spec No. <u>4.</u> 4. Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.</u>	5.E.le & RCIC Syst 5.E.lf Cycle Opt	<u>ce Test Procedure Title</u> tem Monthly/ <u>Once Per</u> erability Tests	Recommended TS Fre Current TS Freq Current STP Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u> Shut	<u>Plant Status</u> down required related to refuel
Observed DRs & La None	ERs Accident Type 15.6 NSSS Inventory Decrease	Failure Probability No Increase No failures observed	Consequences No Increase	New Accident None	Safety Margin No Decrease
TEST PURPOSE: During startup fro demonstrate the ab deliver 400 gpm at	ility of the RCIC to	· · · · ·	<b>I</b>	CONCLUSION: Extend Test Inter No Unreviewed Safe	val ety Questions Exis

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Surv Test No. <u>453001</u>	Surveilland	e Test Procedure Title	Recommended TS Fre	eq <u>1/0.C.</u>	Plant Status
Tech Spec No. <u>4.5.J.la</u>	_ River Wat	River Water Supply System Simulated Automatic Actuation		<u>Refuel</u> Shut	down required
Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.5-12</u>	- 			<u>Refuel</u> Not	related to refuel
Observed DRs & LERs	Accident Type	Failure Probability	Consequences	New Accident	Safety Margin
None	15.6 NSSS Inventory Decrease	No Increase No failures observed	No Increase	None	No Decrease
TEST PURPOSE:			<b>L</b>	CONCLUSION:	1
Test signals simulate auto actuation.	omatic			Extend Test Inter No Unreviewed Saf	val ety Questions Exist
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Surv Test No. <u>46D001</u>	Surveilland	e Test Procedure Title	Recommended TS Fre	eq <u>1/0.C.</u>	Plant Status
Tech Spec No. <u>4.6.D.1</u>	_ Reactor S	afety Valve Check	Current IS Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u>	Shutdown required
Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.6-5</u>	_		Current STP Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u>	Not related to refuel
Observed DRs & LERs	Accident Type	Failure Probability	Consequences	New Accid	lent Safety Margin
DR 040577 - 77072 LER 040577 - 77027 PSV-4404 lifted at 1266 psig. Requirement is 1240 +/- 12 psig. Valve reset. DR 040378 - 78075 SRVs 8491, 189, 227 & 218 tripped 9 psi high, 93 psi high, 4 psi high, & 4 psi low. Pilot valves reworked and restarted.* DR 041681 - 81071 PSV-4403 lifted at 1310. Requirement is 1240 +/- 12 psig. Second valve lifted at 1253. * Relief valve DRs and LERs should be associ- ated with STP 46D002.	5.2.2 Over- pressure Protection	No Increase All occurrences are attributsble to set- point drift. Valves were operable and would have opened, but at an elevated pressure. The DAEC dsta is consistent with experience at other BWRs which indicates that the occurrences are random in nsture.	No Increase Safety valves are provided to satisfy ASME Code require- ments for overpressure protection. The setpoint drift experi- ence would not lead to the ASME Code limits being exceeded.	None	No Decrease The safety mar- gin is consi- dered to be the difference be- tween the ASME Code limits and vessel failure. Setpoint drift could slightly increase peak calculated ves- sel pressure; however, the Code limit would not be exceeded. For example, analyses pre- sented in the FSAR (Ref. 3) indicate for a valve failure to open, the increase would increase peak vessel pressure less than 20 psig. The valve failure case bounds

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Surv Test No. <u>46D001</u>		Test Procedure Title	Recommended TS Fre		Plant Status
Tech Spec No.         4.6.D.1           Tech Spec Pg.         3.6-5	_ Reactor Saf	ety Valve Check	Current TS Freq Current STP Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u> <u>1/0.C.</u>	Shutdown required Not related to refuel
Observed DRs & LERs	Accident Type	Failure Probability	Consequences	New Acc	ident Safety Margin the setpoint drift for safety values experienced. Currently, th licensing lim for the over- pressure pro- tection analy is 1375 psig, whereas the Code would allow 1500 psig (Ref. 4)
TEST PURPOSE:				CONCLUSION	
Check of high pressure sa setpoints.	tety valve			Extend Test No Unreview	: Interval wed Safety Questions Exi

2 NSSS No 2 NSSS No 2 Sure In- 2 ase and Al 2.2 Over- at 2 Sure dr 2 Dtection op	Failure Probability D Increase 11 occurrences are	Current TS Freq Current STP Freq Consequences No Increase	<u>1/0.C.</u> Not re New Accident	own required elated to refuel Safety Margin
2 NSSS No essure In- ease and Al 2.2 Over- at essure dr otection op	Failure Probability D Increase	Consequences	New Accident	
2 NSSS No essure In- ease and Al 2.2 Over- at essure dr otection op	o Increase 11 occurrences are			Safety Margin
va DA wi BW th	ctributable to setpoint rift. Valves were bened, but at an ele- ated pressure. The AEC data is consistent ith experience at other WRs which indicates that he occurrences are andom in nature.	Relief valves are provided to limit the pressure in- crease during transients. In addition, they act with the safety valves to satisfy the ASME Code re- quirements for overpressure protection. The setpoint drift experi- ence would not lead to the transient or ASME Code limits being exceeded.	None The setpoint drift could slightly in- crease peak steamline pres- sure which may slightly in- crease the prob- ability of a spurious safety valve opening during a tran- sient. However, a safety valve opening, should it occur, would be of a short duration. The consequences are bounded by an inadvertent opening of a safety or relief event which is evaluated in the FSAR (Ref. 3). There- fore, a new type	No Decrease The safety margin is con- sidered to be the difference between the ASME Code limits and unacceptable results for the event. Setpoint drift could slightly in- crease peak calculated ves- sel pressure; however, the Code limit would not be exceeded. Based on pre- vious analyses (Ref. 3), a valve failure (bounding for setpoint drift) would be ex- pected to in- crease peak vessel pres-
			of accident 15	<u>sure less than</u>
				fore, a new type of accident is

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Surv Test No. <u>46D002</u>	Surveillance	Test Procedure Title	Recommended TS Fre	eq <u>1/0.C.</u>	Plant Status
Tech Spec No. <u>4.6.D.1</u>	_ Reactor Re	lief Valve Check	Current TS Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u> Shu	tdown required
Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.6-5</u>			Current STP Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u> Not	related to refuel
Observed DRs & LERs DR 032483 - 83084 SRV serial #218 and 176 lifted at 1097 & 1062 psig. Required at 1110 & 1080 psig. LER 032877 - 77026 During bench testing, four SRVs did not open and two opened at elevated pressure. Re- placed Dresser pilot valves with Target Rock model 67F. LER 040378 - 78018 One S/V lifted 9 psi high; three R/Vs lifted and 93 psi high, 4 psi high, and 4 psi low. Pilot valves reworked and retested.	Accident Type	Failure Probability	Consequences	New Accident not created.	Safety Margin 20 psi. Recent analyses (Ref. 4) indi- cate greater margin. Thus, the Code limits would not be exceeded.
TEST PURPOSE:				CONCLUSION:	
Check of high pressure re setpoints.	lief valve			Extend Test Inte No Unreviewed Sa	rval fety Questions Exist

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Surv Test No. <u>46D003</u>	<u>Surveillanc</u>	e Test Procedure Title	Recommended TS Fre	eq <u>1/0.C.</u>	<u>P1</u>	ant Status
Tech Spec No. <u>4.6.D.2</u>	_ Reactor R	elief Valve Inspection	Current TS Freq	<u>Refuel</u>	Shutdo	wn required
Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.6-6</u>	-		Current STP Freq	<u>Refuel</u>	Not re	lsted to refuel
Observed DRs & LERs	Accident Type	Failure Probability	Consequences	New Acc	ident	Safety Margin
DR 050383 - 83153 PSV-4402. Main disc assembly inspection revealed the weld hold- ing the seat was eroded. Valve operation was not impeded. Main body assembly replaced.	15.2 NSSS Pressure Increase	No Increase Only one reported occur- rence of internal valve wear since commercial operation began for DAEC. Valve was operable.	No Increase	Non	e	No Decrease
TEST PURPOSE: Check of internal valve we	ear.		1	CONCLUSION Extend Test		1

Surv Test No. <u>46D004</u> Tech Spec No. <u>4.6.D.3</u> Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.6-6</u>		e Test Procedure Title Depressurization System ve Test	Recommended TS Fre Current TS Freq Current STP Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u> Shut	Plant Status Shutdown required Not related to refuel	
Observed DRs & LERs None	Accident Type 15.2 NSSS Pressure Increase	Failure Probability No Increase No failures observed	Consequences No Increase	New Accident None	Safety Margin No Decrease	
TEST PURPOSE: Move the ADS valves off t assure that internals hav closed.	their seat to ve not stuck	· ·	-4	CONCLUSION: Extend Test Inter No Unreviewed Saf	rval Tety Questions Exis	

Surv Test No.47A001Surveillance Test Procedure TitleTech Spec No.4.7.A.1d & 4.7.A.2a(1)Suppression Chamber & Drywell Visual InspectionTech Spec Pg.3.7-1 & 3.7-2Suppression Chamber & Drywell Visual Inspection		Recommended TS Fre Current TS Freq Current STP Freq	<u>Refuel</u> Shu	Plant Status Shutdown required Not related to refuel	
Observed DRs & LERs LER 032977 - 77025 "A" RHR Torus suction strainer found deformed. "B" strainer undamaged. "A" strainer replaced.	Accident Type 15.6 NSSS Inventory Decrease	Failure Probability No Increase This single damage report is for one of the two strainers. It does not relate to drywell or torus struc- tural deterioration. System operable.	Consequences No Increase	New Accident None	Safety Margin No Decrease
TEST PURPOSE: Visual examination for ev deterioration.	idence of			CONCLUSION: Extend Test Inte No Unreviewed Sa	rval fety Questions Exist

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Tech Spec No. 4.7.A.4c Drywell-Su		e Test Procedure Title Suppression Chamber reaker Inspection	Recommended TS Fre Current TS Freq Current STP Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u> Shut	<u>Plant Status</u> Shutdown required Not related to refuel	
Observed DRs & LERs DR 070682 - 82194 CV-4327A would not operate properly.	Accident Type 15.6 NSSS Inventory Decrease	Failure Probability No Increase Only one reported event. There are monthly operability checks of these vacuum breakers.	Consequences No Increase	New Accident None	Safety Margin No Decrease	
TEST PURPOSE: Visual inspection is for evidence of material deterioration.				CONCLUSION: Extend Test Inter No Unreviewed Saf	vsl ety Questions Exist	

Surv Test No. <u>47A010</u> Tech Spec No. <u>4.7.A.4d</u> Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.7-11</u>	<u>Surveillance Test Procedure Title</u> Drywell to Suppression Chamber Leak Test		Recommended TS Fre Current TS Freq Current STP Freq	<u>Refuel</u> Shute	Plant Status down required related to refuel
Observed DRs & LERs None	Accident Type Failure Probability 15.6 NSSS No Increase Inventory Decrease No failures observed		Consequences No Increase	New Accident None	Safety Margin No Decrease
TEST PURPOSE: Test assures that steam/water leakage is quenched by the suppression chamber and does not bypass the pool and over-		· ·		CONCLUSION: Extend Test Interval No Unreviewed Safety Questions Exis	

		e Test Procedure Title Containment Integrity	Recommended TS Freq <u>Refuel</u> Current TS Freq <u>Refuel</u> Current STP Freq <u>Refuel</u>		1 Shutdown required	
Observed DRs & LERs DR 042384 - 84154 Neither SBGT train could maintain more than 0.23" vacuum. Isolation was complete. Recalibrated DP-7638.	Accident Type 15.7 Radio- active Releases	Failure Probability No Increase Only one reported event of this type. Cause is instrument drift not system capability.	Consequences No Increase	New Accid None	dent Safety Margin No Decrease	
TEST PURPOSE: Demonstrate that secondary containment can be isolated snd that releases are filtered.			Ext		CONCLUSION: Extend Test Interval No Unreviewed Safety Questions Exis	

Surv Test No. <u>47D001</u> Tech Spec No. <u>4.7.D.1a</u>		e Test Procedure Title e Closure Time Test	Recommended TS Fre Current TS Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u> Shutd	lant Status own required
Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.7-18</u>	-		Current STP Freq		elated to refuel
Observed DRs & LERs DR 011177 - 77008 Steam Line Drain Valve, MOV-4423, does not meet closing time. Closed in 16 seconds; requirement is 15 seconds. DR 100677 - 77217 RWCU Return Line Valve, MOV-2740, closed in 11.7 seconds. Requirement is 10.0 seconds. Valve open limit switch out of adjustment. DR 050283 - 83149 Torus Purge Outlet Valve CV4301 cloaed slower than 5 seconds.	Accident Type 15.7 Radio- active Releases.	Failure Probability No Increase Redundant valves 4423 and 4424 are normally closed and stay closed. The downstream check valves on this 4" return line will close when system inlet valves close. Redundant valves CV4300 and 4301 are normally closed and stay closed.	Consequences No Increase Containment isolation valves are re- dundant. Re- dundant valve closure time within speci- fications.	New Accident None Valves closed. Therefore, a new type of accident not created.	Safety Margin No Decrease Releases during a slow closure are minor. Accident con- sequences for slow closure time are bounded by the design basis event.

Surv Test No. <u>47D001</u>			Recommended TS Fr	req <u>1/0.C.</u> Plant Stat		ant Status
Tech Spec No. <u>4.7.D.la</u>			Current TS Freq	1/0.C.	Shutdo	wn required
Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.7-18</u>	-		Current SIP Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u>		elated to refuel
Observed DRs & LERs	Accident Type	Failure Probability	Consequences	New Acc.	ident	Safety Margin
LER 061074 - 73013 RCIC Steam Supply Valves, MDV-2400 D& 2401, closed slower than 20 seconds. Design change made.		These redundant 4" valves are normally open and will stay open if RCIC is needed.				
LER 032476 - 76024 Torus Purge Vent Valve, CV-4301 closed slower than 5 seconds. Dirty pilot solenoid valve. See DR 050283.		These redundant valves are normally closed and stay closed. Therefore, the test interval is not a factor.				
LER 091180 - 80047 RWCU Return Line Valve, MOV-2740, closed in 10.4 aeconds vs 10.0 required. Loose set rod for limit switch.		The downstream check valves on this 4" return line will close when system inlet valves close.				ţ
LER 122083 - 83047 Steamline Drain Valve, MOV-4423 closed in 15.2 seconds vs 15.0 required. See DR 011177.		Redundant valves 4423 & 4424 are normally closed and stay closed.				
TEST PURPOSE:				CONCLUSION	:	
Tests automatic initiation	and closing			Extend Test	Interval	
time of containment isolation valves.						Questions Exist

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Surv Test No. <u>47D002</u> Tech Spec No. <u>4.7.D.ld</u> Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.7-19</u>	Tech Spec No. <u>4.7.D.ld</u> Instrume Valve Te		Recommended TS Fre Current TS Freq Current STP Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u> Shutd	lant Status own required elated to refuel
Observed DRs & LERs DR 021476 - 76028 LER 021476 - 76010 XFV - 4528, 4611 & 4612 failed to close. 4528 replaced; test points for 4611 and 4612 changed. DR 031377 - 77055 XFV - 4504 blowing a fuse when pressure switch reset. DR 021283 - 83029 LER 021283 - 83007 With reactor at 400 psig, XFV-4643A would not check closed. XFV-4637 and 4458B had faulty posi- tion switches and gave both open and closed signalsvavles closed properly. 4643A had insufficient flow.	Accident Type 15.6 NSSS Inventory Decrease	Failure Probability No Increase Failures in test equip- ment and indicators. Valves operable.	Conaequences No Increase Instrument lines have orifices installed to limit inven- tory loss.	New Accident None Instrument line break evaluations consider valve failure. There- fore, new type of accident not created.	Safety Margin No Decrease Orifice provides backup to valve operation to limit inven- tory loss.
TEST PURPOSE: Functional test of valves that isolate a primary containment instrument line break.				CONCLUSION: Extend Test Interv No Unreviewed Safe	

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Surv Test No. <u>47E002</u>	Surveilland	e Test Procedure Title	Recommended TS Fre	q <u>1/0.C.</u>	Plant Status
Tech Spec No. <u>4.7.E.la &amp;</u> MSIV-Leakage Control System 4.7.E.le Simulated Actuation and		Current TS Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u>	Shutdown required	
Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.7-19a</u>	_ Blower Ca	apacity Tests	Current STP Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u>	Not related to refuel
Observed DRs & LERs DR 041377 - 77080 LER 041677 - 77034 PS-8404A, 8415A and 8315E had out of tolerance	Accident Type Not required for Design Basis Events. Provided for	Failure Probability No Increase Majority of occurrences attributable to instru-	Consequences No Increase System is man- ually initiated.	New Accid None	lent Safety Margin No Decrease System not re- quired for any
trips due to loose set- point lock screw. DR 082577 - 77187 PS-8415A & 84258 tripped at 40.5 and 44.4 psig. Should be 49.2 +/- 1.6 psig.	Additional Capability.	ment drift. System would still be function- al, but at a sightly higher value. Other failures are apparently random in nature and hsve not	Instrument drift would not significantly delay its avail- ability especi- ally when com- pared to the fission product		design basis event. There- fore, no re- duction in safety margin if system or part of system is not avail-
DR 011378 - 78013 PS-8415C trips at 44.8 psig. Should be 49.2 +/- 1.6 psig.		recurred.	transport time identified in the FSAR (Ref. 3). Other failure		able.
DR 041580 - 80074 PS-84158 & 8415C out of tolerance.			mechanisms would lead to failure of the system to one		
DR 051281 - 81091 PS-8415C trips at 2.0 psig. Should be 5 +/- l.6 psig. Diaphram leaks.			MSIV. Failure of an MSIV to close is more limit- ing.		

Tech Spec No. <u>4.7.E.la &amp;</u> MSIV-Leaka		ce Test Procedure Title age Control System Actuation and Blower Tests	Recommended TS Fr Current TS Freq Current STP Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u> Shute	<u>Plant Status</u> Shutdown required Not related to refuel	
Observed DRs & LERs DR 040782 - 82093 LER 040782 - 82026 PS-8404C failed render- ing MSIV-LCS 'C' Inop. Terminal strip corrosion. No similar occurrences. DR 042883 - 83134 LER 042883 - 83014 Relay B21-K2A would not activate on a high flow signal rendering the system inoperable. Sticking plunger in flow meter. FM-8408A. DR 043083 - 83147 PS-8415A tripped at 51.1 vs 50.8 psig. DR 050183 - 83148 PS-8415B trips at 52.4 psig. Should be 48 +/- 1.6 psig.	Accident Type	Failure Probability 	Consequences	New Accident	Safety Margin	
TEST PURPOSE: Test signals simulate automatic initia- tion. Blower capacity tests are similar to monthly operability tests.			- <b>I</b>	CONCLUSION: Extend Test Interv No Unreviewed Safe	/al ety Questions Exist	

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Surv Test No. <u>48A002</u>		e Test Procedure Title	Recommended TS Fre			
Tech Spec No. <u>4.8.A.1b</u> 4.8.C.1a Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.8-2 &amp;</u> <u>3.8-6</u>	Automatic S	esel Generator Simulated Start Test and Emergency Simulated Auto	Current TS Freq Current STP Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u> <u>1/0.C.</u>	Shutdown required Not related to refuel	
Observed DRs & LERs	Accident Type	Failure Probability	Consequences	New Accid	ent Safety Margin	
DR 051481 - 81096 IG-31 Diesel; RHR IP-229C did not start. Started manually. Out- put breaker did not close. LER 042375 - 75025 RHR pump start logic relay E11-K70B did not trip; therefore, RHR pump 229B did not start. The other 3 RHR pumps started. Relay was replaced.	Loss of Off- site power. s	No Increase RHR pump start failures not DG failures. There are monthly DG start tests & quarterly pump & valve (load) tests.	No Increase	None	No Decrease	
TEST PURPOSE: Demonstrate that DGs will auto start and are ready to accept load within a speci- fied time. Demonstrate auto start of Emergency Service water pumps and actua- tion of s stem valves.		Extend Tes		CONCLUSION: Extend Test No Unreviewe		

Surv Test No. <u>48A006</u> Tech Spec No. <u>4.8.A.2c</u>		e Test Procedure Title Discharge Tests	Recommended TS Freq <u>1/0.C.</u> Current TS Freq <u>1/0.C.</u>		Plant Status Shutdown required	
Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.8-3</u>			Current STP Freq	<u>1/0.C.</u>	Not related to refuel	
Observed DRs & LERs DR 032278 - 78060 250 VDC batteries failed to maintain 210 VDC for 8 hours. Weak cells replaced. DR 042284 - 84150 1D5 24V battery cell #2 voltage read 1.03V at 4 hours and 8 hours vs 1.75V required. Went to 1.83V upon load removal. DR 042284 - 04166 125V Sys II; cell 16 fell below 1.75V at 1 hour and cell 46 fell below 1.75 at 4 hours.	Accident Type Loss of off- site and on- site AC.	Failure Probability No Increase Sufficient battery capability was avail- able to satisfy design requirement for auto- matic system operation. Currently, there are weekly and quarterly cell voltage, specific gra- vity, temperature and overall voltage tests. Normally, DC is supplied through inverters from either of 2 off-site sources or either of 2 onsite (DG) sources 4 normal sources.	Consequences No Increase	New Acci		
TEST PURPOSE: 24V, 125V & 250V batteries are discharged under simulated load to demonstrate ability to deliver continuous DC power to 2E systems for a specified time duration.			1	CONCLUSION Extend Test No Unreview		

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Surv Test No. <u>4108002</u> Tech Spec No. <u>4.10.8.2</u> Tech Spec Pg. <u>3.10-2</u>	Emergency	e Test Procedure Title Shutdown Manual zation Functional Test	Recommended TS Fro Current TS Freq Current STP Freq	Plant Status down required related to refuel	
Observed DRs & LERs None	Accident Type 15.2 NSSS Pressure Increase	Failure Probability No Increase No failures observed	Consequences No Increase	New Accident None	Safety Margin No Decrease
TEST PURPOSE: Demonstrate that ADS valves can be opened manuallyassure valves don't stick.				CONCLUSION: Extend Test Interv No Unreviewed Safe	val sty Questions Exist

Surv Test No685001	Surveilland	e Test Procedure Title	Recommended TS Fre	eq <u>1/0.C.</u> Plant Status		
Tech Spec No. <u>6.8.5</u> Leakage Measurement Program		Current TS Freq	Annua I Sh	utdown required		
Tech Spec Pg. <u>6.8-2a</u>	-		Current STP Freq	1/0.C. No	t related to refue	
Observed DRs & LERs None	Accident Type 15.6 NSSS Inventory Decrease	Failure Probability No Increase No failures observed	Consequences No Increase	New Accident None	Safety Margin No Decrease	
TEST PURPOSE: Measure and identify any from selected components containment.	visible leakage outside			CONCLUSION: Extend Test Into No Unreviewed S	erval afety Questions Ex	

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