

ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8809140339 DOC.DATE: 88/09/01 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL:50-331 Duane Arnold Energy Center, Iowa Electric Light & Pow 05000331
 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 MILLER,L.D. Iowa Electric Light & Power Co.
 HANNEN,R.L. Iowa Electric Light & Power Co.
 RECIPI.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 88-009-00:on 880803,missed fire watch due to communication error.

W/8 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 4
 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL
	PD3-3 LA	1 1	PD3-3 PD	1 1
	HALL,J.R.	1 1		
INTERNAL:	ACRS MICHELSON	1 1	ACRS MOELLER	2 2
	ACRS WYLIE	1 1	AEOD/DOA	1 1
	AEOD/DSP/NAS	1 1	AEOD/DSP/ROAB	2 2
	AEOD/DSP/TPAB	1 1	ARM/DCTS/DAB	1 1
	DEDRO	1 1	NRR/DEST/ADS 7E	1 0
	NRR/DEST/CEB 8H	1 1	NRR/DEST/ESB 8D	1 1
	NRR/DEST/ICSB 7	1 1	NRR/DEST/MEB 9H	1 1
	NRR/DEST/MTB 9H	1 1	NRR/DEST/PSB 8D	1 1
	NRR/DEST/RSB 8E	1 1	NRR/DEST/SGB 8D	1 1
	NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10	1 1	NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10	1 1
	NRR/DOEA/EAB 11	1 1	NRR/DREP/RAB 10	1 1
	NRR/DREP/RPB 10	2 2	NRR/DRIS/SIB 9A	1 1
	NUDOCS-ABSTRACT	1 1	<u>REG FILE</u> 02	1 1
	RES TELFORD,J	1 1	RES/DSIR DEPY	1 1
	RES/DSIR/EIB	1 1	RGN3 FILE 01	1 1
EXTERNAL:	EG&G WILLIAMS,S	4 4	FORD BLDG HOY,A	1 1
	H ST LOBBY WARD	1 1	LPDR	1 1
	NRC PDR	1 1	NSIC HARRIS,J	1 1
	NSIC MAYS,G	1 1		

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC)	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 1	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 1 3
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TITLE (4)
Missed Fire Watch Due to Communication Error

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
									None		0 5 0 0 0
0	8	03	8	8	8	0	9	01			0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)											
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 9 0	20.402(b)			20.405(c)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)		
	20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.38(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(c)		
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)			50.38(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)		
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)			X 50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)					
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(x)						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)								TELEPHONE NUMBER			
NAME Lonnie D. Miller, Technical Support Engineer								AREA CODE 3 1 9 8 5 1 - 7 2 0 4			

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)														
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)								EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO												

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On August 3, 1988, with the reactor operating at 90% power, a routine inspection of fire barrier penetrations identified two penetrations needing repair. The Control Room was notified and the fire watch was thought to have been initiated. Due to a miscommunication between control room personnel and the discoverer of the inadequate penetrations, the fire watch surveillance was logged in as commencing but the proper notification was not made to the group responsible for performing the hourly fire watches. The use of an additional information sheet to control fire watch activities resulted in a delay in the discovery of the situation and led to the fire watch not being performed until 0935 hours the following morning. The surveillance procedure is being rewritten so it will provide correct and timely information to the people conducting the fire watch inspections.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC)	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 1	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 8	0 0 9	0 0	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 306A's) (17)

I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On August 3, 1988, at 1000 hours, a fire watch was requested by an individual involved with the inspection of fire penetration seals when two fire penetration seals (KQ-PEN) were found to be in need of repair. A utility-licensed operator in the control room was contacted and it was determined an hourly fire watch was warranted. There was then a miscommunication regarding the establishment of the fire watch. The fire watch conducts rounds of areas requiring periodic fire watch. The operator thought that the individual involved in the inspection of fire penetration seals had notified the fire watch, while the individual thought that the operator was going to notify the fire watch. The result was that the control room updated their copy of the fire watch procedure to include the new area, but the fire watch on rounds within the plant continued to use a non-updated version of the procedure. Later that same day three other penetrations needing repair were discovered in the same area. Because this area had already been reported as needing a fire watch the control room was not contacted.

At 1900 hours the fire watch on duty went to the control room and received an updated copy of the fire watch surveillance, which included the new area noted at 1000 hours. However, this surveillance procedure did not provide detailed information regarding the location of, or the reason for, a given fire watch inspection. Therefore, a separate sheet listing more detailed information had been prepared and was being used by the fire watch. Because the surveillance procedure was not closely reviewed and compared to this additional sheet the fire watch remained unaware of the new area that was to have been inspected until the following morning at approximately 0900 hours. At that time a fire watch reviewing the surveillance test compared it to the detailed information sheet and discovered that the area in question was not being inspected as required. The control room was notified and an inspection was performed at 0935 hours. The inspections are continuing. When all the defective penetrations in this area have been repaired the fire watch will be cancelled.

II. CAUSE OF EVENT:

The cause of this event was determined to have been a communication error between the person inspecting the fire penetration seals and the utility-licensed operator. This resulted in no notifications being made to the personnel responsible for conducting the fire watches. A contributing cause was a cumbersome surveillance procedure which required additional information be available in order to complete the fire watch task.

III. ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

If a fire had been present in the area affected by this fire watch it would have been detected by fire detection equipment and the fire brigade would have immediately responded. There are two RHR (BO) pumps and one Core Spray

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR 8 8	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER - 0 0 9	REVISION NUMBER - 0 0			
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 308A's) (17)

(BG) pump and their associated equipment in the area affected by the fire watch. In the worst case of loss of these pumps, additional and/or redundant equipment in other areas was operable and available to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Immediately after the discovery of the event at approximately 0900 hours on August 4, 1988, the fire watch was added to the fire watch rounds. A watch was performed at 0935 hours, and continues to be performed pending repair of the penetrations. These penetration seals will be repaired by September 30, 1988. The surveillance procedure is being rewritten so that it will provide timely information to the people conducting the fire watch inspections. These actions will reduce the potential for miscommunication. This revision will be completed by September 30, 1988.

V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

A similar event was documented in Licensee Event Report 85-027.

On July 21, 1985, while the plant was in the run mode at 24% power, it was determined that a fire watch on the High Pressure Coolant Injection Deluge System (KP) had been prematurely cancelled. The event was caused by ineffective communications between operations personnel and the lack of a valve position verification prior to terminating the fire watch. A contributing cause in this event was determined to be an increased amount of work in the Control Room. The need to communicate between shifts through the use of control room logs and shift turnover data was re-emphasized with all Operations personnel. In addition, the need for appropriate valve lineup verification was re-emphasized prior to cancelling fire watches.

This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i).

Iowa Electric Light and Power Company

September 2, 1988
DAEC-88-0643


Mr. A. Bert Davis
Regional Administrator
Region III
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Subject: Duane Arnold Energy Center
Docket No: 50-331
Op. License DPR-49
Licensee Event Report #88-009

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 please find attached a copy of the subject Licensee Event Report.

Very truly yours,



Rick L. Hannen
Plant Superintendent - Nuclear

RLH/LDM/go

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector - DAEC

File A-118a

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