

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND The Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System AC sources consist of the offsite power sources (preferred power sources, normal and alternate), and the onsite standby power sources (four emergency diesel generators (EDGs)). As required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17 (Ref. 1), the design of the AC electrical power system provides independence and redundancy to ensure an available source of power to the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems.

The onsite Class 1E AC Distribution System is divided into redundant load groups (divisions) so that the loss of any one group does not prevent the minimum safety functions from being performed. Each division has connections to two preferred offsite power sources and a dedicated EDG.

Offsite power is supplied to the unit switchyard(s) from the transmission network by at least two transmission lines. Two 100% capacity emergency auxiliary transformers receive power from the switchyard, reduce the voltage to 6.9 kV, and feed the Emergency Power Supply System (EPSS), which provides Class 1E power to the four divisions of safety related plant loads. Two normal auxiliary transformers feed the Normal Power Supply System (NPSS), which provides power to non-safety related plant loads. The Class 1E EPSS is totally independent of the non-Class 1E NPSS. A detailed description of the offsite power network and the circuits to the Class 1E ESF buses is found in FSAR Chapter 8 (Ref. 2).

An offsite circuit consists of all breakers, transformers, switches, interrupting devices, cabling, and controls required to transmit power from the offsite transmission network to the onsite Class 1E ESF bus(es).

Certain required unit loads are returned to service in a predetermined sequence in order to prevent overloading the transformer supplying offsite power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. Within 1 minute after the initiating signal is received, all automatic and permanently connected loads needed to recover the unit or maintain it in a safe condition are returned to service via the Distributed Control System. The onsite standby power source for each 6.9 kV ESF bus is a dedicated EDG. EDGs 30XKA10, 30XKA20, 30XKA30, and 30XKA40 are dedicated to ESF Divisions 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. An EDG starts automatically on Degraded Grid Voltage or Loss of Offsite Power signals. After the EDG has started, it will automatically tie to its respective bus after offsite power is tripped as a consequence of ESF bus undervoltage, independent of, or coincident with, a Safety Injection System (SIS) Actuation signal. The EDGs will also start and operate in the standby mode without tying to the ESF bus

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on an SIS Actuation signal alone. Following the trip of offsite power, the Distributed Control System strips nonpermanent loads from the ESF bus. When the EDG is tied to the ESF bus, loads are then sequentially connected to its respective ESF bus by the Distributed Control System. The sequencing logic prevents overloading the EDG.

In the event of a loss of preferred power, the ESF electrical loads are automatically connected to the EDGs in sufficient time to provide for safe reactor shutdown and to mitigate the consequences of a postulated accident, such as a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

Certain required unit loads are returned to service in a predetermined sequence in order to prevent overloading the EDG in the process. Within 1 minute after the initiating signal is received, all loads needed to recover the unit or maintain it in a safe condition are returned to service.

The four divisions of the onsite Class 1E AC Distribution System are arranged into "divisional pairs" to support maintenance activities (i.e., Divisions 1 and 2 are one divisional pair and Divisions 3 and 4 are the other divisional pair). Each division can be aligned to power a subset of loads ("alternate fed loads") in the other division in its divisional pair by means of an "alternate feed". An alternate feed provides a standby source of power to required safety systems, safety support systems, or components that do not have the required redundant trains to support maintenance. The EDGs and busses have been sized to accommodate the alternate fed loads. The alternate feeds are manually controlled and interlocked such that two power sources can not be supplied to any alternate fed bus at the same time.

Ratings for the four EDGs satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). The continuous service rating of each EDG is 9500 kW with 10% overload permissible for up to 2 hours in any 24 hour period. The ESF loads that are powered from the 6.9 kV ESF buses are listed in Reference 2.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The initial conditions of postulated accident and anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs) in FSAR Chapter 6 (Ref. 4) and FSAR Chapter 15 (Ref. 5), assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC electrical power sources are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

The OPERABILITY of the AC electrical power sources is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This results in maintaining at least two divisions OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

- a. An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC power; and
- b. A worst case single failure.

There are four EDGs. Each supports one independent ESF division. Each ESF division provides redundancy for most four division safety systems. However, there are some required safety systems, safety support systems, or components that do not have the necessary redundancy to support maintenance. For these systems, safety support systems, or components, an alternate feed is provided between the Class 1E electrical divisional pairs (i.e., between Divisions 1 and 2 and between Divisions 3 and 4) to facilitate maintenance on a division while still providing normal and emergency power to the required loads.

The design of the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System ensures that, with one EDG or portion of one division's electrical distribution system not available and the associated alternate feed aligned, all safety functions required for a postulated accident, coincident with a single failure and the loss of offsite power will be powered.

The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E Electrical Power System and separate and independent EDGs for each division ensure availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an AOO or a postulated accident.

Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in FSAR Chapter 8 and are part of the licensing basis for the unit.

Each offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the ESF buses.

Each offsite circuit is capable of supplying power to all four divisions. However, normal plant lineup is such that each offsite circuit powers two divisions. Offsite circuit #1 is powered from the switchyard through Emergency Auxiliary Transformer 30BDT01 and feeds Division 1 bus 31BDA and Division 3 bus 33BDA via normal feeder breakers. The circuit can also be aligned to feed Division 2 bus 32BDA and Division 4 bus

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LCO (continued)

34BDA via normally open feeder breakers. Offsite circuit #2 is powered from the switchyard through Emergency Auxiliary Transformer 30BDT02 and feeds Division 2 bus 32BDA and Division 4 bus 34BDA via normal feeder breakers. The circuit can also be aligned to feed Division 1 bus 31BDA and Division 3 bus 33BDA via normally open feeder breakers.

Each EDG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of loss of bus voltage or degraded bus voltage. This will be accomplished within 15 seconds. Each EDG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as EDG in standby with the engine hot and EDG in standby with the engine at ambient conditions. Additional EDG capabilities must be demonstrated to meet required Surveillances, (e.g., capability of the EDG to revert to standby status on a SIS Actuation signal while operating in parallel test mode).

Proper sequencing of loads, including tripping of nonessential loads, is a required function for EDG OPERABILITY.

The AC sources in one division must be separate and independent (to the extent possible) of the AC sources in the other divisions. For the EDGs, separation and independence are complete.

For the offsite AC sources, separation and independence are to the extent practical. A circuit may be connected to more than one ESF bus, with fast transfer capability to the other circuit OPERABLE, and not violate separation criteria. A circuit that is not connected to an ESF bus is required to have OPERABLE fast transfer interlock mechanisms to at least two ESF buses to support OPERABILITY of that circuit.

APPLICABILITY

The AC sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that:

- a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
- b. Adequate core cooling is provided and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated accident.

The AC power requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are covered in LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown."

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ACTIONS

A Note prohibits the application of LCO 3.0.4.b when two or more EDGs are inoperable. There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with inoperable EDGs and the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.b, which allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not be applied in this circumstance.

A.1

To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with one offsite circuit inoperable, it is necessary to verify the OPERABILITY of the remaining offsite circuit on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action not met. However, if a second required circuit fails SR 3.8.1.1, the second offsite circuit is inoperable, and Condition D for two offsite circuits inoperable, is entered.

A.2

Required Action A.2, which only applies if the division cannot be powered from an offsite source, is intended to provide assurance that an event coincident with a single failure of the associated EDG will not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical redundant required features.

These features are powered from the redundant AC electrical power divisions. Required features are those features required to be OPERABLE by their associated LCOs.

The Completion Time for Required Action A.2 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

- a. The division has no offsite power supplying its loads; and
- b. A required feature on another division is inoperable.

If at any time during the existence of Condition A (one offsite circuit inoperable) a redundant required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

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ACTIONS (continued)

Discovering no offsite power to one division of the onsite Class 1E Electrical Power Distribution System coincident with one or more inoperable required support or supported features, or both, that are associated with the other divisions that have offsite power, results in starting the Completion Times for the Required Action. Twenty-four hours is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the unit to transients associated with shutdown.

The remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and EDGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. The 24 hour Completion Time takes into account the component OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 24 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a postulated accident occurring during this period.

A.3

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition A for a period that should not exceed 72 hours. With one offsite circuit inoperable, the reliability of the offsite system is degraded, and the potential for a loss of offsite power is increased, with attendant potential for a challenge to the unit safety systems. In this Condition, however, the remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and EDGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System.

The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a postulated accident occurring during this period.

B.1

The Required Actions have been modified by a Note. The Note recognizes that the alternate feed from an OPERABLE EDG in a divisional pair would not provide power if both EDGs in the divisional pair were inoperable. Therefore, this Required Action does not need to be performed.

If one EDG is inoperable and the alternate feed is not aligned, certain required safety systems, safety support systems, and components that do not have 100% four division redundancy do not have sufficient AC power source availability to ensure the completion of all safety functions for a postulated accident coincident with a single failure and the loss of offsite power.

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ACTIONS (continued)

To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with an inoperable EDG, it is necessary to verify the availability of the offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action being not met. However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 3.8.1.1, it is inoperable. Upon offsite circuit inoperability, additional Conditions and Required Actions must then be entered.

B.2

Required Action B.2 is intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite power, during the period that the EDG is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. These features are designed with redundant safety related divisions. Redundant feature failures consist of inoperable features associated with a division, redundant to the division that has an inoperable EDG.

The Completion Time for Required Action B.2 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

- a. An inoperable EDG exists; and
- b. A required feature on another division is inoperable.

If at any time during the existence of this Condition (one EDG inoperable), a required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time would begin to be tracked.

Discovering one EDG inoperable coincident with one or more inoperable support or supported features, or both, that are associated with the OPERABLE EDGs, results in starting the Completion Time for the Required Action. Four hours from the discovery of these events existing concurrently is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the unit to transients associated with shutdown.

In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE EDGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection for the feature's function may have been lost; however, function has not been lost. The 4 hour Completion Time takes into account the OPERABILITY

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of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable feature. Additionally, the 4 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a postulated accident occurring during this period.

B.3.1 and B.3.2

Required Action B.3.1 provides an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of OPERABLE EDGs. If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable EDG does not exist on the OPERABLE EDGs, SR 3.8.1.2 does not have to be performed. If the cause of inoperability exists on other EDGs, the other EDGs would be declared inoperable upon discovery. Once the failure is repaired, the common cause failure no longer exists, and Required Action B.3.1 is satisfied. If the cause of the initial inoperable EDG cannot be confirmed not to exist on the remaining EDGs, performance of SR 3.8.1.2 suffices to provide assurance of continued OPERABILITY of those EDGs.

In the event the inoperable EDG is restored to OPERABLE status prior to completing either B.3.1 or B.3.2, the plant corrective action program will continue to evaluate the common cause possibility. This continued evaluation, however, is no longer under the 24 hour constraint imposed while in Condition B.

According to Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 7), 24 hours is reasonable to confirm that the OPERABLE EDGs are not affected by the same problem as the inoperable EDG.

B.4

If one EDG is inoperable and the alternate feed is not aligned, certain required safety systems, safety support systems, and components that do not have adequate redundancy to support maintenance, do not have sufficient AC power source availability to ensure the completion of all safety functions for a postulated accident coincident with a single failure and the loss of offsite power.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition B without the alignment of the alternate feed for a period that should not exceed 72 hours. With the alternate feed aligned, the electric power sources required by GDC 17 are available at the required voltage and capacity for the nuclear station and capable of withstanding a system

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contingency such as (a) a single failure involving loss of generation by the nuclear unit, any other critical generation source, or loss of power from a transmission system element, or (b) a double failure involving a loss of power from the transmission network and the loss of one division of onsite AC power.

In Condition B, the remaining OPERABLE EDGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. The 72 hour Completion Time to align the alternate feed from a division containing an OPERABLE EDG takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources and the low probability of a postulated accident occurring during this period.

C.1 and C.2

The Required Actions have been modified by a Note. The Note recognizes that the alternate feed from an OPERABLE EDG in a divisional pair would not provide power if both EDGs in the divisional pair were inoperable. Therefore, this Required Action does not need to be performed.

Each division can be aligned to power a subset of loads (“alternate fed loads”) in the other division in its divisional pair by means of an “alternate feed.” An alternate feed provides a standby source of power to required safety systems, safety support systems, or components that do not have the required redundant trains to support maintenance. With an OPERABLE EDG in each divisional pair, and at least one alternate feed aligned from an OPERABLE EDG, standby power is provided to the minimum required ESF functions to achieve completion of required safety functions following an AOO or postulated accident, regardless of which two EDGs are inoperable.

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With one EDG in both divisional pairs inoperable and the alternate feeds not aligned, there may be no remaining standby AC sources for certain required safety systems, safety support systems, and components that do not have 100% four division redundancy. Thus, with an assumed loss of offsite electrical power, insufficient standby AC sources are available to power the minimum required ESF functions. Since the offsite electrical power system may be the only source of AC power for certain required safety systems, support systems, or components at this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a very short time could be less than that associated with an immediate controlled shutdown (the immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total loss of AC power). Since any inadvertent generator trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC power for certain required safety systems, safety support systems, and components that do not have 100% four division redundancy, however, the time allowed for continued operation is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation. According to Reference 6, operation may continue for a period that should not exceed 2 hours. Also in accordance with Reference 6, operation may continue with one EDG in both divisional pairs inoperable and one alternate feed aligned for a period that should not exceed 72 hours.

If two EDGs in one divisional pair are inoperable, required safety systems, safety support systems, and components do not have sufficient AC power source availability to ensure the completion of all safety functions for a postulated accident coincident with a single failure and the loss of offsite power. According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition C for a period that should not exceed 72 hours. Completing Required Action C.1 restores the required redundancy in AC power source for required safety systems, safety support systems, and components necessary to ensure completion of the safety function. If two EDGs in one divisional pair are inoperable, the remaining OPERABLE EDG divisional pair and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a postulated accident occurring during this period.

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D.1 and D.2

Required Action D.1, which applies when two offsite circuits are inoperable, is intended to provide assurance that an event with a coincident single failure will not result in a complete loss of redundant required safety functions. The Completion Time for this failure of redundant required features is reduced to 12 hours from that allowed for one circuit without offsite power (Required Action A.2). The rationale for the reduction to 12 hours is that Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6) allows a Completion Time of 24 hours for two offsite circuits inoperable, based upon the assumption that two complete safety divisions are OPERABLE. When a concurrent redundant required feature failure exists, this assumption is not the case, and a shorter Completion Time of 12 hours is appropriate. These features are powered from redundant AC safety related divisions.

The Completion Time for Required Action D.1 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

- a. All offsite circuits are inoperable; and
- b. A required feature is inoperable.

If at any time during the existence of Condition D (two offsite circuits inoperable) a required feature becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition D for a period that should not exceed 24 hours. This level of degradation means that the offsite electrical power system may not have the capability to effect a safe shutdown and to mitigate the effects of a postulated accident; however, the onsite AC sources have not been degraded. This level of degradation generally corresponds to a total loss of the immediately accessible offsite power sources.

Because of the normally high availability of the offsite sources, this level of degradation may appear to be more severe than other combinations of two AC sources inoperable that involve one or more EDGs inoperable. However, two factors tend to decrease the severity of this level of degradation:

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- a. The configuration of the redundant AC electrical power system that remains available is not susceptible to a single bus or switching failure; and
- b. The time required to detect and restore an unavailable offsite power source is generally much less than that required to detect and restore an unavailable onsite AC source.

With both of the offsite circuits inoperable, sufficient onsite AC sources are available to maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a postulated accident or AOO. In fact, a simultaneous loss of offsite AC sources, a LOCA, and a worst case single failure were postulated as a part of the design basis in the safety analysis. Thus, the 24 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to effect restoration of one of the offsite circuits commensurate with the importance of maintaining an AC electrical power system capable of meeting its design criteria.

According to Reference 6, with the available offsite AC sources, two less than required by the LCO, operation may continue for 24 hours. If two offsite sources are restored within 24 hours, unrestricted operation may continue. If only one offsite source is restored within 24 hours, power operation continues in accordance with Condition A.

E.1 and E.2

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it were inoperable, resulting in deenergization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition E are modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition E is entered with no AC source to any division, the Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Operating," must be immediately entered. This allows Condition E to provide requirements for the loss of one offsite circuit and one EDG, without regard to whether a division is deenergized. LCO 3.8.9 provides the appropriate restrictions for a deenergized division. According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition E for a period that should not exceed 12 hours.

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ACTIONS (continued)

In Condition E, individual redundancy is lost in the offsite electrical power system and the onsite AC electrical power system is degraded. Since power system redundancy is provided by two diverse sources of power, however, the reliability of the power systems in this Condition may appear higher than that in Condition D (loss of both required offsite circuits). This difference in reliability is offset by the susceptibility of this power system configuration to a single bus or switching failure. The 12 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a postulated accident occurring during this period.

F.1

With three or more EDGs inoperable, there may be no remaining standby AC sources for certain required safety systems, safety support systems, and components that do not have 100% four division redundancy. Thus, with an assumed loss of offsite electrical power, insufficient standby AC sources are available to power the minimum required ESF functions. Since the offsite electrical power system may be the only source of AC power for certain required safety systems, support systems, or components at this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a very short time could be less than that associated with an immediate controlled shutdown (the immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total loss of AC power). Since any inadvertent generator trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC power for certain required safety systems, safety support systems, and components that do not have 100% four division redundancy, however, the time allowed for continued operation is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation. According to Reference 6, operation may continue for a period that should not exceed 2 hours.

G.1 and G.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Conditions A, B, C, D, E, or F cannot be met, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

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ACTIONS (continued)

H.1

Condition H corresponds to a level of degradation in which all redundancy in the AC electrical power supplies may have been lost. At this severely degraded level, any further losses in the AC electrical power system may cause a loss of function. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. The unit is required by LCO 3.0.3 to commence a controlled shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and testing of all important areas and features, especially those that have a standby function, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18 (Ref. 8). Periodic component tests are supplemented by extensive functional tests during refueling outages (under simulated accident conditions). The SRs for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the EDGs are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) and Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 9).

Where the SRs discussed herein specify voltage and frequency tolerances, the following values satisfy the motor terminal voltages and frequency requirements as indicated in NEMA MG 1-2006 (Ref. 11). The minimum steady state output voltage of 6555 V is 95% of the nominal 6.9 kV output voltage. This value allows for a combined variation in voltage and frequency of 10% when considering voltage drop to the terminals of 6600 V motors whose minimum operating voltage is specified as 90% or 5940 V. It also allows for a combined variation in voltage and frequency of 10% when considering voltage drops to motors and other equipment down through the 120 V level where minimum operating voltage is also usually specified as 90% of name plate rating. The specified maximum steady state output voltage of 7260 V is equal to the maximum operating voltage specified for 6600 V motors. It ensures that for a lightly loaded distribution system, the voltage at the terminals of 6600 V motors is no more than the maximum rated operating voltages.

The specified minimum and maximum frequencies of the EDG are 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz, respectively. These values are equal to $\pm 2\%$ of the 60 Hz nominal frequency and are derived from the recommendations given in Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3).

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.8.1.1

This SR ensures proper circuit continuity for the offsite AC electrical power supply to the onsite distribution network and availability of offsite AC electrical power. The breaker alignment verifies that each breaker is in its correct position to ensure that distribution buses and loads are connected to their preferred power source, and that appropriate independence of offsite circuits is maintained. The 7 day Frequency is adequate since breaker position is not likely to change without the operator being aware of it and because its status is displayed in the control room.

SR 3.8.1.2 and SR 3.8.1.7

These SRs help to ensure the availability of the standby electrical power supply to mitigate postulated accidents and transients and to maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition.

To minimize the wear on moving parts that do not get lubricated when the engine is not running, these SRs are modified by a Note (Note 1 for SR 3.8.1.2 and the Note for SR 3.8.1.7) to indicate that all EDG starts for these Surveillances may be preceded by an engine prelube period and followed by a warmup period prior to loading.

For the purposes of SR 3.8.1.2 and SR 3.8.1.7 testing, the EDGs are started from standby conditions. Standby conditions for an EDG mean that the diesel engine coolant and oil are being continuously circulated and temperature is being maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

In order to reduce stress and wear on diesel engines, some manufacturers recommend a modified start in which the starting speed of EDGs is limited, warmup is limited to this lower speed, and the EDGs are gradually accelerated to synchronous speed prior to loading. These start procedures are the intent of SR 3.8.1.2 Note 2, which is only applicable when such modified start procedures are recommended by the manufacturer.

SR 3.8.1.7 requires that, at a 184 day Frequency, the EDG starts from standby conditions and achieves required voltage and frequency within 15 seconds. The 15 second start requirement supports the assumptions of the design basis LOCA analysis in FSAR Chapter 15 (Ref. 5).

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

The 15 second start requirement is not applicable to SR 3.8.1.2 (see Note 2) when a modified start procedure as described above is used. If a modified start is not used, the 15 second start requirement of SR 3.8.1.7 applies.

Since SR 3.8.1.7 requires a 15 second start, it is more restrictive than SR 3.8.1.2, and it may be performed in lieu of SR 3.8.1.2.

In addition to the SR requirements, the time for the EDG to reach steady state operation, unless the modified EDG start method is employed, is periodically monitored and the trend evaluated to identify degradation of governor and voltage regulator performance.

The 31 day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.2 is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). The 184 day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.7 is a reduction in cold testing consistent with Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 7). These Frequencies provide adequate assurance of EDG OPERABILITY, while minimizing degradation resulting from testing.

SR 3.8.1.3

This Surveillance verifies that the EDGs are capable of synchronizing with the offsite electrical system and accepting loads greater than or equal to the equivalent of the maximum expected accident loads. A minimum run time of 60 minutes is required to stabilize engine temperatures, while minimizing the time that the EDG is connected to the offsite source.

Although no power factor requirements are established by this SR, the EDG is normally operated at a power factor between 0.8 lagging and 1.0. The 0.8 value is the design rating of the machine, while the 1.0 is an operational limitation to ensure circulating currents are minimized. The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the EDG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain EDG OPERABILITY.

The 31 day Frequency for this Surveillance is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3).

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

This SR is modified by four Notes. Note 1 indicates that diesel engine runs for this Surveillance may include gradual loading, as recommended by the manufacturer, so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine are minimized. Note 2 states that momentary transients, because of changing bus loads, do not invalidate this test. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the limit do not invalidate the test. Note 3 indicates that this Surveillance should be conducted on only one EDG at a time in order to avoid common cause failures that might result from offsite circuit or grid perturbations. Note 4 stipulates a prerequisite requirement for performance of this SR. A successful EDG start must precede this test to credit satisfactory performance.

SR 3.8.1.4

This SR provides verification that the level of fuel oil in the day tank is at or above the level at which fuel oil is automatically added. The level is expressed as an equivalent volume in gallons, and is selected to ensure adequate fuel oil for a minimum of 1 hour of EDG operation at full load plus 10%.

The 31 day Frequency is adequate to assure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided and facility operators would be aware of any large uses of fuel oil during this period.

SR 3.8.1.5

Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the fuel oil day tanks once every 31 days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. This is the most effective means of controlling microbiological fouling. In addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during EDG operation. Water may come from any of several sources, including condensation, ground water, rain water, contaminated fuel oil, and breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria. Frequent checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system. The Surveillance Frequencies are established by Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 9). This SR is for preventative maintenance. The presence of water does not necessarily represent failure of this SR, provided the accumulated water is removed during the performance of this Surveillance.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.8.1.6

This Surveillance demonstrates that each required fuel oil transfer pump operates and transfers fuel oil from its associated storage tank to its associated day tank. This is required to support continuous operation of standby power sources. This Surveillance provides assurance that the fuel oil transfer pump is OPERABLE, the fuel oil piping system is intact, the fuel delivery piping is not obstructed, and the controls and control systems for automatic fuel transfer systems are OPERABLE.

The 31 day Frequency is appropriate considering the reliability and redundancies of the system.

SR 3.8.1.7

See SR 3.8.1.2.

SR 3.8.1.8

Transfer of each 6.9 kV ESF bus power supply from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite circuit demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the alternate circuit distribution network to power the shutdown loads. The 24 month Frequency of the Surveillance is based on engineering judgment and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

[This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that, during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, unit safety systems. This restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 or 2 is further amplified to allow the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed Surveillance, a successful Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when the Surveillance is performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.]

-----REVIEWER'S NOTE-----

The above MODE restrictions may be deleted if it can be demonstrated to the staff, on a plant specific basis, that performing the SR with the reactor in any of the restricted MODES can satisfy the following criteria, as applicable:

- a. Performance of the SR will not render any safety system or component inoperable,
 - b. Performance of the SR will not cause perturbations to any of the electrical distribution systems that could result in a challenge to steady state operation or to plant safety systems, and
 - c. Performance of the SR, or failure of the SR, will not cause, or result in, an AOO with attendant challenge to plant safety systems.
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SR 3.8.1.9

Each EDG is provided with an engine overspeed trip to prevent damage to the engine. Recovery from the transient caused by the loss of a large load could cause diesel engine overspeed, which, if excessive, might result in a trip of the engine. This Surveillance demonstrates the EDG load response characteristics and capability to reject the largest single load without exceeding predetermined voltage and frequency and while maintaining a specified margin to the overspeed trip. For this unit, the single largest load for each EDG is the component cooling water pump with a horsepower (HP) rating of 1250 HP. This Surveillance may be accomplished by:

- a. Tripping the EDG output breaker with the EDG carrying greater than or equal to its associated single largest post-accident load while paralleled to offsite power, or while solely supplying the bus; or
- b. Tripping its associated single largest post-accident load with the EDG solely supplying the bus.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

As required by Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), the load rejection test is acceptable if the increase in diesel speed does not exceed 75% of the difference between nominal speed and the overspeed trip setpoint, or 115% of nominal speed, whichever is lower.

The time, voltage, and frequency tolerances specified in this SR are derived from Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) recommendations for response during load sequence intervals. The 3 seconds specified is equal to 60% of a typical 5 second load sequence interval associated with sequencing of the largest load. The voltage and frequency specified are consistent with the design range of the equipment powered by the EDG. SR 3.8.1.9.a corresponds to the maximum frequency excursion, while SR 3.8.1.9.b and SR 3.8.1.9.c are steady state voltage and frequency values to which the system must recover following load rejection. The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3).

This SR is modified by [two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. This restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 or 2 is further amplified to allow the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed Surveillance, a successful Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when the Surveillance is performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

Note 2] ensures that the EDG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible. When synchronized with offsite power, testing should be performed at a power factor of ≤ 0.9 . This power factor is representative of the actual inductive loading an EDG would see under postulated accident conditions. Under certain conditions, however, the Note allows the Surveillance to be conducted at a power factor other than ≤ 0.9 . These conditions occur when grid voltage is high, and the additional field excitation needed to get the power factor to ≤ 0.9 results in voltages on the emergency busses that are too high.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Under these conditions, the power factor should be maintained as close as practicable to 0.9 while still maintaining acceptable voltage limits on the emergency busses. In other circumstances, the grid voltage may be such that the EDG excitation levels needed to obtain a power factor of 0.9 may not cause unacceptable voltages on the emergency busses, but the excitation levels are in excess of those recommended for the EDG. In such cases, the power factor shall be maintained as close as practicable to 0.9 without exceeding the EDG excitation limits.

-----REVIEWER'S NOTE-----

The above MODE restrictions may be deleted if it can be demonstrated to the staff, on a plant specific basis, that performing the SR with the reactor in any of the restricted MODES can satisfy the following criteria, as applicable:

- a. Performance of the SR will not render any safety system or component inoperable,
 - b. Performance of the SR will not cause perturbations to any of the electrical distribution systems that could result in a challenge to steady state operation or to plant safety systems, and
 - c. Performance of the SR, or failure of the SR, will not cause, or result in, an AOO with attendant challenge to plant safety systems.
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SR 3.8.1.10

This Surveillance demonstrates the EDG capability to reject a full load without overspeed tripping or exceeding the predetermined voltage limits. The EDG full load rejection may occur because of a system fault or inadvertent breaker tripping. This Surveillance ensures proper engine and generator load response under the simulated test conditions. This test simulates the loss of the total connected load that the EDG experiences following a full load rejection and verifies that the EDG does not trip upon loss of the load. These acceptance criteria provide for EDG damage protection. While the EDG is not expected to experience this transient during an event and continues to be available, this response ensures that the EDG is not degraded for future application, including reconnection to the bus if the trip initiator can be corrected or isolated.

The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

This SR has been modified by [two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. This restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 or 2 is further amplified to allow the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed Surveillance, a successful Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when the Surveillance is performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

Note 2] ensures that the EDG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible. When synchronized with offsite power, testing should be performed at a power factor of ≤ 0.9 . This power factor is representative of the actual inductive loading an EDG would see under postulated accident conditions. Under certain conditions, however, the Note allows the Surveillance to be conducted at a power factor other than ≤ 0.9 . These conditions occur when grid voltage is high, and the additional field excitation needed to get the power factor to ≤ 0.9 results in voltages on the emergency busses that are too high. Under these conditions, the power factor should be maintained as close as practicable to 0.9 while still maintaining acceptable voltage limits on the emergency busses. In other circumstances, the grid voltage may be such that the EDG excitation levels needed to obtain a power factor of 0.9 may not cause unacceptable voltages on the emergency busses, but the excitation levels are in excess of those recommended for the EDG. In such cases, the power factor shall be maintained as close as practicable to 0.9 without exceeding the EDG excitation limits.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

-----REVIEWER'S NOTE-----

The above MODE restrictions may be deleted if it can be demonstrated to the staff, on a plant specific basis, that performing the SR with the reactor in any of the restricted MODES can satisfy the following criteria, as applicable:

- a. Performance of the SR will not render any safety system or component inoperable,
 - b. Performance of the SR will not cause perturbations to any of the electrical distribution systems that could result in a challenge to steady state operation or to plant safety systems, and
 - c. Performance of the SR, or failure of the SR, will not cause, or result in, an AOO with attendant challenge to plant safety systems.
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SR 3.8.1.11

As required by Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), Section 2.2.5, this Surveillance demonstrates the as designed operation of the standby power sources during loss of the offsite source. This test verifies all actions encountered from the loss of offsite power, including shedding of the nonessential loads and energization of the emergency buses and respective loads from the EDG. It further demonstrates the capability of the EDG to automatically achieve the required voltage and frequency within the specified time.

The EDG autostart time of 15 seconds is derived from requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a postulated large break LOCA. The Surveillance should be continued for a minimum of 5 minutes in order to demonstrate that all starting transients have decayed and stability is achieved.

The requirement to verify the connection and power supply of permanent and autoconnected loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the EDG loading logic. In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, the Low Head Safety Injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, or residual heat removal (RHR) systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the EDG systems to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

The Frequency of 24 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), Table 1, takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the EDGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the EDGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. This restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 is further amplified to allow portions of the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed partial Surveillance, a successful partial Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the partial Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when portions of the Surveillance are performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for the assessment. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

SR 3.8.1.12

This Surveillance demonstrates that the EDG automatically starts and achieves the required voltage and frequency within the specified time (15 seconds) from an actual or simulated Safety Injection System actuation signal and operates for ≥ 5 minutes. The 5 minute period provides sufficient time to demonstrate stability. SR 3.8.1.12.d and SR 3.8.1.12.e ensure that permanently connected loads and emergency loads are energized from the offsite electrical power system on a SIS actuation without loss of offsite power.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

The requirement to verify the connection of permanent and autoconnected loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the EDG loading logic. In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, RHR systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the EDG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

The Frequency of 24 months is intended to be consistent with the expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is modified by [two Notes. The reason for Note 1] is to minimize wear and tear on the EDGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the EDGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

[The reason for Note 2 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this Surveillance could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. This restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 or 2 is further amplified to allow portions of the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed partial Surveillance, a successful partial Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the partial Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when portions of the Surveillance are performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for the assessment. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.]

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

-----REVIEWER'S NOTE-----

The above MODE restrictions may be deleted if it can be demonstrated to the staff, on a plant specific basis, that performing the SR with the reactor in any of the restricted MODES can satisfy the following criteria, as applicable:

- a. Performance of the SR will not render any safety system or component inoperable,
 - b. Performance of the SR will not cause perturbations to any of the electrical distribution systems that could result in a challenge to steady state operation or to plant safety systems, and
 - c. Performance of the SR, or failure of the SR, will not cause, or result in, an AOO with attendant challenge to plant safety systems.
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SR 3.8.1.13

This Surveillance demonstrates that EDG noncritical protective functions are bypassed on an actual or simulated Loss of Offsite Power signal on the emergency bus concurrent with an actual or simulated SIS actuation signal. Noncritical automatic trips are all automatic trips except:

- a. Engine overspeed;
- b. Generator differential current;
- c. Low lubricating oil pressure;
- d. High jacket water temperature; and
- e. Low Essential Service Water pressure.

The noncritical trips are bypassed during postulated accidents and provide an alarm on an abnormal engine condition. This alarm provides the operator with sufficient time to react appropriately. The EDG availability to mitigate the postulated accident is more critical than protecting the engine against minor problems that are not immediately detrimental to emergency operation of the EDG.

The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), Table 1, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

[The SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required EDG from service. This restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 or 2 is further amplified to allow the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed Surveillance, a successful Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when the Surveillance is performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.]

-----REVIEWER'S NOTE-----

The above MODE restrictions may be deleted if it can be demonstrated to the staff, on a plant specific basis, that performing the SR with the reactor in any of the restricted MODES can satisfy the following criteria, as applicable:

- a. Performance of the SR will not render any safety system or component inoperable,
- b. Performance of the SR will not cause perturbations to any of the electrical distribution systems that could result in a challenge to steady state operation or to plant safety systems, and
- c. Performance of the SR, or failure of the SR, will not cause, or result in, an AOO with attendant challenge to plant safety systems.

SR 3.8.1.14

Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) requires demonstration once per fuel cycle that the EDGs can start and run continuously at full load capability for an interval of not less than 24 hours, ≥ 2 hours of which is at a load equivalent to 105% - 110% of the continuous duty rating and the remainder of the time at a load equivalent to the continuous duty rating of the EDG. The EDG starts for this Surveillance can be performed either from standby or hot conditions. The provisions for prelubricating and warmup, discussed in SR 3.8.1.2, and for gradual loading, discussed in SR 3.8.1.3, are applicable to this SR.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the EDG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain EDG OPERABILITY.

The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), Table 1, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This Surveillance is modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the power factor limit will not invalidate the test.

Note 2 ensures that the EDG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible. When synchronized with offsite power, testing should be performed at a power factor of ≤ 0.9 . This power factor is representative of the actual inductive loading an EDG would see under postulated accident conditions. Under certain conditions, however, Note 2 allows the Surveillance to be conducted as a power factor other than ≤ 0.9 . These conditions occur when grid voltage is high, and the additional field excitation needed to get the power factor to ≤ 0.9 results in voltages on the emergency busses that are too high. Under these conditions, the power factor should be maintained as close as practicable to 0.9 while still maintaining acceptable voltage limits on the emergency busses. In other circumstances, the grid voltage may be such that the EDG excitation levels needed to obtain a power factor of 0.9 may not cause unacceptable voltages on the emergency busses, but the excitation levels are in excess of those recommended for the EDG. In such cases, the power factor shall be maintained close as practicable to 0.9 without exceeding the EDG excitation limits.

SR 3.8.1.15

This Surveillance demonstrates that the diesel engine can restart from a hot condition, such as subsequent to shutdown from normal Surveillances, and achieve the required voltage and frequency within 15 seconds. The 15 second time is derived from the requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA. The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3).

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 ensures that the test is performed with the diesel sufficiently hot. The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the EDG. Routine overloads may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain EDG OPERABILITY. The requirement that the diesel has operated for at least 2 hours at full load conditions prior to performance of this Surveillance is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). Momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Note 2 allows all EDG starts to be preceded by an engine prelube period to minimize wear and tear on the diesel during testing.

SR 3.8.1.16

As required by Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), Table 1, this Surveillance ensures that the manual synchronization and automatic load transfer from the EDG to the offsite source can be made and the EDG can be returned to ready to load status when offsite power is restored. It also ensures that the autostart logic is reset to allow the EDG to reload if a subsequent loss of offsite power occurs. The EDG is considered to be in ready to load status when the EDG is at rated speed and voltage, the output breaker is open and can receive an autoclose signal on bus undervoltage, and the load sequence timing is reset.

The Frequency of 24 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), Table 1, and takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. This restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODES 1, 2, 3 or 4 is further amplified to allow the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed Surveillance, a successful Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when the Surveillance is performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.8.1.17

Demonstration of the test mode override ensures that the EDG availability under accident conditions will not be compromised as the result of testing and the EDG will automatically reset to ready to load operation if a SIS actuation signal is received during operation in the test mode. Ready to load operation is defined as the EDG running at rated speed and voltage with the EDG output breaker open. These provisions for automatic switchover are required by IEEE-308 (Ref. 10), paragraph 5.2.4.6(b).

SR 3.8.1.17b ensures that emergency loads are energized from the offsite electrical power system on a SIS actuation without a loss of offsite power. SR 3.8.1.17b also demonstrates that the emergency loading was not affected by EDG operation in test mode. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the emergency loads to perform these functions is acceptable.

This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), Table 1, takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance could perturb the electrical distribution system and challenge safety systems. This restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4 is further amplified to allow portions of the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed partial Surveillance, a successful partial Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the partial Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes.

These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when portions of the Surveillance are performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for the assessment. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.8.1.18

In the event of a postulated accident coincident with a loss of offsite power, the EDGs are required to supply the necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, RCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

This Surveillance demonstrates the EDG operation, as discussed in the Bases for SR 3.8.1.11, during a loss of offsite power actuation test signal in conjunction with a SIS actuation signal. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the EDG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

The Frequency of 24 months takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with an expected fuel cycle length of 24 months.

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the EDGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the EDGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations for EDGs. The reason for Note 2 is that the performance of the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. This restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODES 1, 2, 3 or 4 is further amplified to allow portions of the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed partial Surveillance, a successful partial Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the partial Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes.

These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when portions of the Surveillance are performed in MODES 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for the assessment. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.8.1.19

This Surveillance demonstrates that the EDG starting independence has not been compromised. Also, this Surveillance demonstrates that each engine can achieve proper speed within the specified time when the EDGs are started simultaneously.

The 10 year Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), Table 1.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize wear on the EDG during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the EDGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.
2. FSAR Chapter 8.
3. Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 4, March 2007.
4. FSAR Chapter 6.
5. FSAR Chapter 15.
6. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.
7. Generic Letter 84-15.
8. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18.
9. Regulatory Guide 1.137, Rev. 1, October 1979.
10. IEEE Standard 308-2001.
11. NEMA MG 1-2006.

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND A description of the AC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating."

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES**

The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC sources during MODES 5 and 6 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies ensures that:

- a. The unit can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;
- b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and
- c. Adequate AC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as a fuel handling accident involving handling irradiated fuel.

In general, when the unit is shut down, the Technical Specifications requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that many postulated accidents that are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 have no specific analyses in MODES 5 and 6. Worst case bounding events are deemed not credible in MODES 5 and 6 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and the corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrence being significantly reduced or eliminated, and in minimal consequences. These deviations from accident analysis assumptions and design requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCO for required systems.

During MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, various deviations from the analysis assumptions and design requirements are allowed within the Required Actions. This allowance is in recognition that certain testing and maintenance activities must be conducted provided an acceptable level of risk is not exceeded. During MODES 5 and 6, performance of a significant number of required testing and maintenance activities is also required. In MODES 5 and 6, the activities are generally planned and administratively controlled. Relaxations from MODE 1, 2, 3, and 4 LCO requirements are acceptable during shutdown modes based on:

- a. The fact that time in an outage is limited. This is a risk prudent goal as well as a utility economic consideration;

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

- b. Requiring appropriate compensatory measures for certain conditions. These may include administrative controls, reliance on systems that do not necessarily meet typical design requirements applied to systems credited in operating MODE analyses, or both;
- c. Prudent utility consideration of the risk associated with multiple activities that could affect multiple systems; and
- d. Maintaining, to the extent practical, the ability to perform required functions (even if not meeting MODE 1, 2, 3, and 4 OPERABILITY requirements) with systems assumed to function during an event.

In the event of an accident during shutdown, this LCO ensures the capability to support systems necessary to avoid immediate difficulty, assuming either a loss of all offsite power or a loss of all onsite emergency diesel generator (EDG) power.

The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

One offsite circuit capable of supplying the onsite Class 1E power distribution subsystem(s) of LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown," ensures that all required loads are powered from offsite power. Two OPERABLE Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) in one divisional pair are required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.10, to ensure a diverse power source is available to provide electrical power support, assuming a loss of the offsite circuit. Together, OPERABILITY of the required offsite circuit and EDGs ensures the availability of sufficient AC sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents). Both EDGs in a divisional pair are required to be OPERABLE because an OPERABLE EDG in each divisional pair may not provide the capability to supply the necessary electrical power for the various combinations of subsystems, equipment, and components required Operable by LCO 3.8.10 with the alternate feeds not aligned.

The qualified offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) bus(es). Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in FSAR Chapter 8 and are part of the licensing basis for the unit.

BASES

LCO (continued)

Each offsite circuit is capable of supplying power to all four divisions. However, normal plant lineup is such that each offsite circuit powers two divisions. Offsite circuit #1 is powered from the switchyard through Emergency Auxiliary Transformer 30BDT01 and feeds Division 1 bus 31BDA and Division 3 bus 33BDA via normal feeder breakers. The circuit can also be aligned to feed Division 2 bus 32BDA and Division 4 bus 34BDA via normally open feeder breakers. Offsite circuit #2 is powered from the switchyard through Emergency Auxiliary Transformer 30BDT02 and feeds Division 2 bus 32BDA and Division 4 bus 34BDA via normal feeder breakers. The circuit can also be aligned to feed Division 1 bus 31BDA and Division 3 bus 33BDA via normally open feeder breakers.

Each EDG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage. This sequence must be accomplished within 15 seconds. The EDG must be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as EDG in standby with the engine hot and EDG in standby at ambient conditions.

Proper sequencing of loads, including tripping of nonessential loads, is a required function for EDG OPERABILITY.

It is acceptable for divisions to be cross tied during shutdown conditions, allowing a single offsite power circuit to supply all required divisions.

APPLICABILITY

The AC sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies provide assurance that:

- a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core;
- b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;
- c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and
- d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The AC power requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.1.

BASES

ACTIONS

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 5 or 6. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 5 or 6, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Entering LCO 3.0.3, while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 would require the unit to be shutdown unnecessarily.

A.1

An offsite circuit would be considered inoperable if it were not available to one required ESF division. Although two divisions are required by LCO 3.8.10, the one division with offsite power available may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of irradiated fuel movement. By the allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable, with no offsite power available, appropriate restrictions will be implemented in accordance with the affected required features LCO's ACTIONS.

A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, B.1, B.2, and B.3

With the offsite circuit not available to all required divisions, the option would still exist to declare all required features inoperable. Since this option may involve undesired administrative efforts, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made. With one or both required EDG inoperable, the minimum required diversity of AC power sources is not available. It is, therefore, required to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM (MODE 5) or boron concentration (MODE 6). Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum SDM or boron concentration limit is required to assure continued safe operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than that what would be required in the RCS for minimum SDM or refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation. Introduction of temperature changes including temperature increases when operating with a positive Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) must also be evaluated to ensure they do not result in a loss of required SDM.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

Suspension of these activities does not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability or the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC source and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary AC power to the unit safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required AC electrical power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the unit safety systems may be without sufficient power.

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System's ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it are inoperable, resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition A are modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition A is entered with no AC power to any required ESF bus, the ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.10 must be immediately entered. This Note allows Condition A to provide requirements for the loss of the offsite circuit, whether or not a division is de-energized. LCO 3.8.10 would provide the appropriate restrictions for the situation involving a de-energized division.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.2.1

SR 3.8.2.1 requires the SRs from LCO 3.8.1 that are necessary for ensuring the OPERABILITY of the AC sources in other than MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. SR 3.8.1.8 is not required to be met since only one offsite circuit is required to be OPERABLE. SR 3.8.1.12 and SR 3.8.1.18 are not required to be met because the Safety Injection System actuation signal is not required to be OPERABLE. SR 3.8.1.17 is not required to be met because the required OPERABLE EDG(s) is not required to undergo periods of being synchronized to the offsite circuit. SR 3.8.1.19 is excepted because starting independence is not required with the DG(s) that is not required to be OPERABLE.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE EDG(s) from being paralleled with the offsite power network or otherwise rendered inoperable during performance of SRs, and to preclude deenergizing a required 6.9 kV ESF bus or disconnecting a required offsite circuit during performance of SRs. With limited AC sources available, a single event could compromise both the required circuit and the EDG. It is the intent that these SRs must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required during periods when the EDG and offsite circuit is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.8.1 for a discussion of each SR.

REFERENCES

None.

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lubricating Oil, and Starting Air

BASES

BACKGROUND

Each emergency diesel generator (EDG) is provided with a storage tank having a diesel fuel oil capacity sufficient to operate that diesel for a period of 7 days while the EDG is supplying maximum post loss of coolant accident load demand discussed in FSAR Section 9.5.4.2 (Ref. 1). The maximum load demand is calculated using the assumption that a minimum of any two EDGs are available. This onsite diesel fuel oil capacity is sufficient to operate the EDGs for longer than the time to replenish the onsite supply from outside sources.

Diesel fuel oil is transferred from a storage tank to a day tank by either of two transfer pumps associated with each storage tank. Redundancy of pumps and piping precludes the failure of one pump, or the rupture of any pipe, valve or tank to result in the loss of more than one EDG.

For proper operation of the standby EDGs, it is necessary to ensure the proper quality of the diesel fuel oil. Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 2) addresses the recommended diesel fuel oil practices as supplemented by ANSI N195 (Ref. 3). The diesel fuel oil properties governed by these SRs are the water and sediment content, the kinematic viscosity, specific gravity (or API gravity), and impurity level.

The EDG lubricating oil system is designed to provide sufficient lubrication to permit proper operation of its associated EDG under all loading conditions. The system is required to circulate the lubricating oil to the diesel engine working surfaces and to remove excess heat generated by friction during operation. Each engine's lubricating oil system contains an inventory capable of supporting a minimum of 7 days of operation. The auxiliary lubricating oil tank in addition to the engine oil sump is sufficient to ensure 7 days of continuous operation. This supply is sufficient to allow the operator to replenish lubricating oil from outside sources.

Each EDG has an air starting system with adequate capacity for five successive start attempts on the EDG without recharging the starting air receiver(s).

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES

The initial conditions of postulated accident and anticipated operational occurrences (AOO) analyses in FSAR Chapter 6 (Ref. 4), and in FSAR Chapter 15 (Ref. 5), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The EDGs are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that fuel, Reactor Coolant System and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

Since diesel fuel oil, lubricating oil, and starting air systems support the operation of the standby AC power sources, they satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

Each EDG is required to have sufficient diesel fuel oil supply for 7 days of full load operation. The diesel fuel oil is also required to meet specific standards for quality. Additionally, sufficient lubricating oil supply must be available to ensure the capability to operate at full load for 7 days. These requirements, in conjunction with an ability to obtain replacement supplies within 7 days, supports the availability of EDGs required to shut down the reactor and to maintain it in a safe condition for an AOO or a postulated accident with loss of offsite power. EDG day tank diesel fuel oil requirements, as well as transfer capability from the storage tank to the day tank, are addressed in LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating," and LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown."

The starting air system is required to have a minimum capacity for five successive EDG start attempts without recharging the starting air receivers.

APPLICABILITY

The AC sources (LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2) are required to ensure the availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an AOO or a postulated accident. Since diesel fuel oil, lubricating oil, and the starting air systems support LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2, diesel fuel oil, lubricating oil, and starting air are required to be within limits when the associated EDG is required to be OPERABLE.

BASES

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS Table is modified by a Note indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each EDG. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable EDG subsystem. Complying with the Required Actions for one inoperable EDG subsystem may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable EDG subsystem(s) are governed by separate Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

A.1

In this Condition, the 7 day diesel fuel oil supply for an EDG is not available. However, the Condition is restricted to diesel fuel oil level reductions that maintain at least a 6 day supply. These circumstances may be caused by events, such as full load operation required after an inadvertent start while at minimum required level, or feed and bleed operations, which may be necessitated by increasing particulate levels or any number of other diesel fuel oil quality degradations. This restriction allows sufficient time for obtaining the requisite replacement volume and performing the analyses required prior to addition of diesel fuel oil to the tank. A period of 48 hours is considered sufficient to complete restoration of the required level prior to declaring the EDG inoperable. This period is acceptable based on the remaining capacity (> 6 days), the fact that procedures will be initiated to obtain replenishment, and the low probability of an event during this brief period.

B.1

With lubricating oil inventory < 750 gallons, sufficient lubricating oil to support 7 days of continuous EDG operation at full load conditions may not be available. However, the Condition is restricted to lubricating oil volume reductions that maintain at least a 6 day supply. This restriction allows sufficient time to obtain the requisite replacement volume. A period of 48 hours is considered sufficient to complete restoration of the required volume prior to declaring the EDG inoperable. This period is acceptable based on the remaining capacity (> 6 days), the low rate of usage, the fact that procedures will be initiated to obtain replenishment, and the low probability of an event during this brief period.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

C.1

This Condition is entered as a result of a failure to meet the acceptance criterion of SR 3.8.3.3. Normally, trending of particulate levels allows sufficient time to correct high particulate levels prior to reaching the limit of acceptability. Poor sample procedures (bottom sampling), contaminated sampling equipment, and errors in laboratory analysis can produce failures that do not follow a trend. Since the presence of particulates does not mean failure of the diesel fuel oil to burn properly in the diesel engine, and particulate concentration is unlikely to change significantly between Surveillance Frequency intervals, and proper engine performance has been recently demonstrated (within 31 days), it is prudent to allow a brief period prior to declaring the associated EDG inoperable. The 7 day Completion Time allows for further evaluation, resampling and re-analysis of the EDG diesel fuel oil.

D.1

With the stored diesel fuel oil properties defined in the Bases for SR 3.8.3.3 not within the required limits, a period of 30 days is allowed for restoring the stored diesel fuel oil properties. This period provides sufficient time to test the stored diesel fuel oil to determine if new diesel fuel oil, when mixed with previously stored diesel fuel oil, remains acceptable, or to restore the stored diesel fuel oil properties. This restoration may involve feed and bleed procedures, filtering, or combinations of these procedures. Even if an EDG start and load was required during this time interval and the diesel fuel oil properties were outside limits, there is a high likelihood that the EDG would still be capable of performing its intended function.

E.1

With starting air receiver pressure < 435 psig, sufficient capacity for five successive EDG start attempts does not exist. However, as long as the receiver pressure is > 220 psig, there is adequate capacity for at least one start attempt, and the EDG can be considered OPERABLE while the air receiver pressure is restored to the required limit. A period of 48 hours is considered sufficient to complete restoration to the required pressure prior to declaring the EDG inoperable. This period is acceptable based on the remaining starting air capacity, the fact that most EDG starts are accomplished on the first attempt, and the low probability of an event during this brief period.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

F.1

With a Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, or one or more EDG diesel fuel oil, lubricating oil, or starting air system not within limits for reasons other than addressed by Conditions A through E, the associated EDG may be incapable of performing its intended function and must be immediately declared inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.3.1

This SR provides verification that there is an adequate inventory of diesel fuel oil in the storage tanks to support each EDG's operation for 7 days at full load. The 7 day period is sufficient time to place the unit in a safe shutdown condition and to bring in replenishment diesel fuel oil from an onsite or offsite location.

The 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient supply of diesel fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided and unit operators would be aware of any large uses of diesel fuel oil during this period.

SR 3.8.3.2

This Surveillance ensures that sufficient lubricating oil inventory is available to support at least 7 days of full load operation for each EDG. The 750 gallon requirement is based on the EDG manufacturer consumption values for the run time of the EDG. Implicit in this SR is the requirement to verify the capability to transfer the lubricating oil from its storage location to the EDG, when the EDG lubricating oil sump does not hold adequate inventory for 7 days of full load operation without the level reaching the manufacturer recommended minimum level.

A 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient lubricating oil supply is onsite, since EDG starts and run time are closely monitored by the unit staff.

SR 3.8.3.3

The tests listed below are a means of determining whether new diesel fuel oil is of the appropriate grade and has not been contaminated with substances that would have an immediate, detrimental impact on diesel

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

engine combustion. If results from these tests are within acceptable limits, the diesel fuel oil may be added to the storage tanks without concern for contaminating the entire volume of diesel fuel oil in the storage tanks. These tests are to be conducted prior to adding the new diesel fuel oil to the storage tank(s), but in no case is the time between receipt of new diesel fuel oil and conducting the tests to exceed 31 days. The tests, limits, and applicable ASTM Standards are as follows:

- a. Sample the new diesel fuel oil in accordance with ASTM D4057-1995 R2000 (Ref. 6);
- b. Verify in accordance with the tests specified in ASTM D975-2006 (Ref. 6) that the sample has an absolute specific gravity at 60/60°F of ≥ 0.83 and ≤ 0.89 or an API gravity at 60°F of $\geq 27^\circ$ and $\leq 39^\circ$ when tested in accordance with ASTM D1298-1999 R2005 (Ref. 6), a kinematic viscosity at 40°C of ≥ 1.9 centistokes and ≤ 4.1 centistokes, and a flash point of $\geq 125^\circ\text{F}$; and
- c. Verify that the new diesel fuel oil has a clear and bright appearance with proper color when tested in accordance with ASTM D4176-2004 E2005 (Ref. 6) or a water and sediment content within limits when tested in accordance with ASTM D2709-1996 R2006 (Ref. 6).

Failure to meet any of the above limits is cause for rejecting the new diesel fuel oil, but does not represent a failure to meet the LCO concern since the diesel fuel oil is not added to the storage tanks.

Within 31 days following the initial new diesel fuel oil sample, the diesel fuel oil is analyzed to establish that the other properties specified in Table 1 of ASTM D975-2006 (Ref. 6) are met for new diesel fuel oil when tested in accordance with ASTM D975-2006 (Ref. 6), except that the analysis for sulfur may be performed in accordance with ASTM D1552-2003, ASTM D2622-2005, or ASTM D4294-2003 (Ref. 6). The 31 day period is acceptable because the diesel fuel oil properties of interest, even if they were not within stated limits, would not have an immediate effect on EDG operation. This Surveillance ensures the availability of high quality diesel fuel oil for the EDGs.

Diesel fuel oil degradation during long term storage shows up as an increase in particulate, due mostly to oxidation. The presence of particulates does not mean the diesel fuel oil will not burn properly in a diesel engine. The particulates can cause fouling of filters and diesel fuel oil injection equipment, however, which can cause engine failure.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Particulate concentrations should be determined in accordance with ASTM D5452-2005 (Ref. 6). This method involves a gravimetric determination of total particulate concentration in the diesel fuel oil and has a limit of 10 mg/l. It is acceptable to obtain a field sample for subsequent laboratory testing in lieu of field testing.

The Frequency of this test takes into consideration diesel fuel oil degradation trends that indicate that particulate concentration is unlikely to change significantly between Frequency intervals.

SR 3.8.3.4

This Surveillance ensures that, without the aid of the refill compressor, sufficient starting air capacity for each EDG is available. The starting air system design requirements provide for a minimum of five engine start cycles without recharging. A start cycle is defined by the EDG vendor, but usually is measured in terms of time (seconds of cranking) or engine cranking speed. The pressure specified in this SR is intended to reflect the lowest value at which the five starts can be accomplished.

The 31 day Frequency takes into account the capacity, capability, redundancy, and diversity of the AC sources and other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to below normal air start pressure.

SR 3.8.3.5

Microbiological fouling is a major cause of diesel fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in diesel fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the diesel fuel storage tanks once every 92 days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. This is the most effective means of controlling microbiological fouling. In addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the diesel fuel oil during EDG operation. Water may come from any of several sources, including condensation, contaminated diesel fuel oil, and from breakdown of the diesel fuel oil by bacteria. Frequent checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the diesel fuel oil system. The Surveillance Frequencies are established by Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 2). This SR is for preventive maintenance. The presence of water does not necessarily represent failure of this SR, provided the accumulated water is removed during performance of the Surveillance.

BASES

- REFERENCES
1. FSAR Section 9.5.4.2.
 2. Regulatory Guide 1.137, Rev. 1, October 1979.
 3. ANSI N195-1976, Appendix B.
 4. FSAR Chapter 6.
 5. FSAR Chapter 15.
 6. ASTM Standards: D4057-1995 R2000; D975-2006; D1298-1999 R2005; D4176-2004 E2005; D2709-1996 R2006; D1552-2003; D2622-2005; D4294-2003; D5452-2005.
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B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND The station DC electrical power system provides the AC emergency power system with control power. It also provides both motive and control power to selected safety related equipment and preferred AC vital bus power (via inverters). As required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17 (Ref. 1), the DC electrical power system is designed to have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety functions, assuming a single failure. The DC electrical power system also conforms to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.6 (Ref. 2) and IEEE-308 (Ref. 3).

The 250 VDC electrical power system consists of four independent and redundant safety related Class 1E DC electrical power divisions. Each division consists of one 250 VDC battery, two 100% capacity battery chargers, and all the associated control equipment and interconnecting cabling.

One battery charger in each division is capable of being alternately fed from the other division in the divisional pair. The alternate feeds are provided between Divisions 1 and 2 and between Divisions 3 and 4. The alternate feeds are controlled such that the requirements of independence and redundancy between divisional pairs are maintained.

During normal operation, the 250 VDC system load is powered from one of the battery chargers with the battery floating on the system. In case of loss of normal power to the battery charger, the DC load is automatically powered from the station batteries.

The DC electrical power subsystems provide the control power for their associated Class 1E AC power load group, 6.9 kV switchgear, and 480 V load centers. The DC electrical power subsystems also provide DC electrical power to the inverters, which in turn power the AC vital buses.

The DC power distribution system is described in more detail in Bases for LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution System - Operating," and LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown."

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

Each 250 VDC battery is separately housed in a ventilated room apart from its charger and distribution center. Each subsystem is located in an area separated physically and electrically from the other subsystems to ensure that a single failure in one subsystem does not cause a failure in a redundant subsystem. There is no sharing between redundant Class 1E divisions for the batteries, inverters, or distribution panels. One battery charger in each division can be powered from the other division in the divisional pair. The chargers are interlocked such that only one charger can be connected to the DC subsystem at one time.

Each battery has adequate storage capacity to meet the duty cycle(s) discussed in FSAR Chapter 8 (Ref. 4). The battery is designed with additional capacity above that required by the design duty cycle to allow for temperature variations and other factors.

The batteries for the DC subsystems are sized to produce required capacity at 80% of nameplate rating, corresponding to warranted capacity at end of life cycles and the 100% design demand. The minimum design voltage limit is 210 V.

The battery cells are of flooded lead acid construction with a nominal specific gravity of 1.215. This specific gravity corresponds to an open circuit battery voltage of approximately 250 V for a 120 cell battery (i.e., cell voltage of 2.065 volts per cell (Vpc)). The open circuit voltage is the voltage maintained when there is no charging or discharging. Once fully charged with its open circuit voltage ≥ 2.065 Vpc, the battery cell will maintain its capacity for 30 days without further charging per manufacturer's instructions. Optimal long term performance however, is obtained by maintaining a float voltage 2.20 to 2.25 Vpc. This provides adequate over-potential, which limits the formation of lead sulfate and self discharge. The nominal float voltage of 2.22 Vpc corresponds to a total float voltage output of 266.4 V for a 120 cell battery as discussed in FSAR Chapter 8 (Ref. 4).

Each DC subsystem battery charger has ample power output capacity for the steady state operation of connected loads required during normal operation, while at the same time maintaining its battery bank fully charged. Each battery charger also has sufficient excess capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge to its fully charged state within 24 hours while supplying normal steady state loads discussed in FSAR Chapter 8 (Ref. 4).

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

The battery charger is normally in the float-charge mode. Float-charge is the condition in which the charger is supplying the connected loads and the battery cells are receiving adequate current to optimally charge the battery. This assures the internal losses of a battery are overcome and the battery is maintained in a fully charged state.

When desired, the charger can be placed in the equalize mode. The equalize mode is at a higher voltage than the float mode and charging current is correspondingly higher. The battery charger is operated in the equalize mode after a battery discharge or for routine maintenance.

Following a battery discharge, the battery recharge characteristic accepts current at the current limit of the battery charger (if the discharge was significant, e.g., following a battery service test) until the battery terminal voltage approaches the charger voltage setpoint. Charging current then reduces exponentially during the remainder of the recharge cycle. Lead-calcium batteries have recharge efficiencies of greater than 95%, so once at least 105% of the ampere-hours discharged have been returned, the battery capacity would be restored to the same condition as it was prior to the discharge. This can be monitored by direct observation of the exponentially decaying charging current or by evaluating the amp-hours discharged from the battery and amp-hours returned to the battery.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The initial conditions of postulated accidents and anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs) analyses in FSAR Chapter 6 (Ref. 5) and FSAR Chapter 15 (Ref. 6), assume that Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the EDGs, emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation.

DC control and I&C power must be provided to the safety systems, safety support systems, or components that do not have four 100% redundant divisions. If one EDG is out of service, an alternate feed is provided to allow one battery charger in that division to be powered from the other division in the divisional pair to ensure completion of safety functions.

The OPERABILITY of the DC sources is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining the DC sources OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

- a. An assumed loss of all offsite AC power or all onsite AC power; and
- b. A worst-case single failure.

The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

BASES

LCO The DC electrical power subsystems, each subsystem consisting of one battery, one battery charger, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling supplying power to the associated bus within the division are required to be OPERABLE to ensure the availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an AOO or a postulated accident. Loss of any division DC electrical power subsystem does not prevent the minimum safety function from being performed (Ref. 4).

An OPERABLE DC electrical power subsystem requires all required batteries and one battery charger to be operating and connected to the associated DC bus.

APPLICABILITY The DC electrical power sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure safe unit operation and to ensure that:

- a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
- b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated accident.

The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are addressed in the Bases for LCO 3.8.5, "DC Sources - Shutdown."

ACTIONS A.1, A.2, and A.3

Condition A represents one division with one required battery charger inoperable (e.g., the voltage limit of SR 3.8.4.1 is not maintained). The ACTIONS provide a tiered response that focuses on returning the battery to the fully charged state and restoring a fully qualified charger to OPERABLE status in a reasonable time period. Required Action A.1 requires that the battery terminal voltage be restored to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage within 2 hours. This time provides for returning a required inoperable charger to OPERABLE status or providing an alternate means of restoring battery terminal voltage to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage. Restoring the battery terminal voltage to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage provides good assurance that, within 12 hours, the battery will be restored to its fully charged condition (Required Action A.2) from any discharge that might have occurred due to the charger inoperability.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

A discharged battery having terminal voltage of at least the minimum established float voltage indicates that the battery is on the exponential charging current portion (the second part) of its recharge cycle. The time to return a battery to its fully charged state under this condition is simply a function of the amount of the previous discharge and the recharge characteristic of the battery. Thus there is good assurance of fully recharging the battery within 12 hours, avoiding a premature shutdown with its own attendant risk.

If established battery terminal float voltage cannot be restored to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage within 2 hours, and the charger is not operating in the current-limiting mode, a faulty charger is indicated. A faulty charger that is incapable of maintaining established battery terminal float voltage does not provide assurance that it can revert to and operate properly in the current limit mode that is necessary during the recovery period following a battery discharge event that the DC system is designed for.

If the charger is operating in the current limit mode after 2 hours that is an indication that the battery is partially discharged and its capacity margins will be reduced. The time to return the battery to its fully charged condition in this case is a function of the battery charger capacity, the amount of loads on the associated DC system, the amount of the previous discharge, and the recharge characteristic of the battery. The charge time can be extensive, and there is not adequate assurance that it can be recharged within 12 hours (Required Action A.2).

Required Action A.2 requires that the battery float current be verified as less than or equal to 2 amps. This indicates that, if the battery had been discharged as the result of the inoperable battery charger, it has now been fully recharged. If at the expiration of the initial 12 hour period the battery float current is not less than or equal to 2 amps this indicates there may be additional battery problems and the battery must be declared inoperable.

Required Action A.3 limits the restoration time for the required inoperable battery charger to 72 hours. This action is applicable if an alternate means of restoring battery terminal voltage to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage has been used (e.g., use of a spare battery charger). The 72 hour Completion Time reflects a reasonable time to effect restoration of the required qualified battery charger to OPERABLE status.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1

Condition B represents one subsystem with one battery inoperable. With the battery inoperable, the DC bus is being supplied by the required OPERABLE battery charger. Any event that results in a loss of the AC bus supporting the battery charger will also result in loss of DC to that division. Recovery of the AC bus, especially if it is due to a loss of offsite power, will be hampered by the fact that many of the components necessary for the recovery (e.g., diesel generator control and field flash, AC load shed and diesel generator output circuit breakers, etc.) likely rely upon the battery. In addition the energization transients of any DC loads that are beyond the capability of the required battery charger and normally require the assistance of the battery will not be able to be brought online. The 2 hour limit allows sufficient time to effect restoration of an inoperable battery given that the majority of the conditions that lead to battery inoperability (e.g., loss of battery charger, battery cell voltage less than 2.07 V, etc.) are identified in Specifications 3.8.4, 3.8.5, and 3.8.6 together with additional specific Completion Times.

C.1

Condition C represents one required division with a loss of ability to completely respond to an event, and a potential loss of ability to remain energized during normal operation. It is therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for complete loss of DC power to the affected division. The 2 hour limit is consistent with the allowed time for an inoperable DC distribution subsystem.

If one of the required DC subsystems is inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or B (e.g., inoperable battery charger and associated inoperable battery), the remaining DC subsystems have the capacity to support a safe shutdown and to mitigate an accident condition. Since a subsequent worst-case single failure could, however, result in the loss of the minimum necessary DC subsystems to mitigate a worst case accident, continued power operation should not exceed 2 hours. The 2 hour Completion Time is based on Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 7) and reflects a reasonable time to assess unit status as a function of the inoperable DC subsystem and, if the DC subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status, to prepare to effect an orderly and safe unit shutdown.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

D.1 and D.2

If the inoperable DC subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. The Completion Time to bring the unit to MODE 5 is consistent with the time required in Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 7).

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.4.1

Verifying battery terminal voltage while on float charge helps to ensure the effectiveness of the battery chargers, which support the ability of the batteries to perform their intended function. Float charge is the condition in which the charger is supplying the continuous charge required to overcome the internal losses of a battery and maintain the battery in a fully charged state while supplying the continuous steady state loads of the associated DC subsystem. On float charge, battery cells will receive adequate current to optimally charge the battery. The voltage requirements are based on the nominal design voltage of the battery and are consistent with the minimum float voltage established by the battery manufacturer (2.20 Vpc or 264 V at the battery terminals). This voltage maintains the battery plates in a condition that supports maintaining the grid life (expected to be approximately 20 years). The 7 day Frequency is consistent with manufacturer recommendations and IEEE-450 (Ref. 8).

SR 3.8.4.2

This SR verifies the design capacity of the battery chargers. According to Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref. 9), the battery charger supply is recommended to be based on the largest combined demands of the various steady state loads and the charging capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge state to the fully charged state, irrespective of the status of the unit during these demand occurrences. The minimum required amperes and duration ensures that these requirements can be satisfied.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

This SR provides two options. One option requires that each battery charger be capable of supplying 400 amps at the minimum established float voltage for 8 hours. The ampere requirements are based on the output rating of the chargers. The voltage requirements are based on the charger voltage level after a response to a loss of AC power. The time period is sufficient for the charger temperature to have stabilized and to have been maintained for at least 2 hours.

The other option requires that each battery charger be capable of recharging the battery after a service test coincident with supplying the largest combined demands of the various continuous steady state loads (irrespective of the status of the plant during which these demands occur). This level of loading may not normally be available following the battery service test and will need to be supplemented with additional loads. The duration for this test may be longer than the charger sizing criteria since the battery recharge is affected by float voltage, temperature, and the exponential decay in charging current. The battery is recharged when the measured charging current is ≤ 2 amps.

The Surveillance Frequency is acceptable, given the unit conditions required to perform the test and the other administrative controls existing to ensure adequate charger performance during these 24 month intervals. In addition, this Frequency is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

SR 3.8.4.3

A battery service test is a special test of the battery capability, as found, to satisfy the design requirements (battery duty cycle) of the DC electrical power system. The discharge rate and test length should correspond to the design duty cycle requirements as specified in Reference 4.

The Surveillance Frequency of 24 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref. 9) and Regulatory Guide 1.129 (Ref. 10), which state that the battery service test should be performed during refueling operations, or at some other outage, with intervals between tests not to exceed 24 months.

This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 allows the performance of a modified performance discharge test in lieu of a service test.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would perturb the electrical distribution system and challenge safety systems. This restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1, 2, 3 or 4 is further amplified to allow portions of the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed partial Surveillance, a successful partial Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or on-site system when they are tied together or operated independently for the partial Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when portions of the Surveillance are performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for the assessment. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.
 2. Regulatory Guide 1.6, March 1971.
 3. IEEE-308-2001.
 4. FSAR Chapter 8.
 5. FSAR Chapter 6.
 6. FSAR Chapter 15.
 7. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.
 8. IEEE-450-2002.
 9. Regulatory Guide 1.32, Rev. 3, March 2004.
 10. Regulatory Guide 1.129, Rev. 2, February 2007.
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B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.5 DC Sources - Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND A description of the DC/UPS System is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources – Operating."

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES**

The initial conditions of postulated accidents and anticipated operational occurrences in FSAR Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and FSAR Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume the Distributed Control System (DCS) is OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the EDGs, emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation.

The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum DC electrical power sources during MODES 5 and 6 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies ensures that:

- a. The unit can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;
- b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and
- c. Adequate DC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as a fuel handling accident.

In general, when the unit is shut down, the Technical Specifications requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that many postulated accidents that are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 have no specific analyses in MODES 5 and 6 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and the corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrence being significantly reduced or eliminated, and in minimal consequences. These deviations from analysis assumptions and design requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCO for required systems.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

The shutdown Technical Specification requirements are designed to ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of certain postulated accidents. Worst case accidents which are analyzed for operating MODES are generally viewed not to be a significant concern during shutdown MODES due to the lower energies involved. The Technical Specifications therefore require a lesser complement of electrical equipment to be available during shutdown than is required during operating MODES. More recent work completed on the potential risks associated with shutdown, however, has found significant risk associated with certain shutdown evolutions. As a result, in addition to the requirements established in the Technical Specifications, the industry has adopted NUMARC 91-06, "Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management," as an Industry initiative to manage shutdown tasks and associated electrical support to maintain risk at an acceptable low level. This may require the availability of additional equipment beyond that required by the shutdown Technical Specifications.

The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

Two DC subsystems, each of which consists of one battery, one required battery charger, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling supplying power to the associated bus within the division, are required to be OPERABLE to support two divisions of the distribution systems required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown." This ensures the availability of sufficient DC electrical power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents).

APPLICABILITY

The DC subsystems sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, provide assurance that:

- a. Required features to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core;
 - b. Required features needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;
 - c. Required features necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and
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BASES

APPLICABILITY (continued)

- d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.4.

ACTIONS

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 5 or 6. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 5 or 6, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Entering LCO 3.0.3, while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 would require the unit to be shutdown unnecessarily.

A.1, A.2, and A.3

Condition A represents one subsystem with one battery charger inoperable (e.g., the voltage limit of SR 3.8.4.1 is not maintained). The ACTIONS provide a tiered response that focuses on returning the battery to the fully charged state and restoring a fully qualified charger to OPERABLE status in a reasonable time period. Required Action A.1 requires that the battery terminal voltage be restored to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage within 2 hours. This time provides for returning the inoperable charger to OPERABLE status or providing an alternate means of restoring battery terminal voltage to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage. Restoring the battery terminal voltage to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage provides good assurance that, within 12 hours, the battery will be restored to its fully charged condition (Required Action A.2) from any discharge that might have occurred due to the charger inoperability.

A discharged battery having terminal voltage of at least the minimum established float voltage indicates that the battery is on the exponential charging current portion (the second part) of its recharge cycle. The time to return a battery to its fully charged state under this condition is simply a function of the amount of the previous discharge and the recharge characteristic of the battery. Thus there is good assurance of fully recharging the battery within 12 hours.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

If established battery terminal float voltage cannot be restored to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage within 2 hours, and the charger is not operating in the current-limiting mode, a faulty charger is indicated. A faulty charger that is incapable of maintaining established battery terminal float voltage does not provide assurance that it can revert to and operate properly in the current limit mode that is necessary during the recovery period following a battery discharge event that the DC system is designed for.

If the charger is operating in the current limit mode after 2 hours that is an indication that the battery is partially discharged and its capacity margins will be reduced. The time to return the battery to its fully charged condition in this case is a function of the battery charger capacity, the amount of loads on the associated DC system, the amount of the previous discharge, and the recharge characteristic of the battery. The charge time can be extensive, and there is not adequate assurance that it can be recharged within 12 hours (Required Action A.2).

Required Action A.2 requires that the battery float current be verified as less than or equal to 2 amps. This indicates that, if the battery had been discharged as the result of the inoperable battery charger, it has now been fully recharged. If at the expiration of the initial 12 hour period the battery float current is not less than or equal to 2 amps this indicates there may be additional battery problems and the battery must be declared inoperable.

Required Action A.3 limits the restoration time for the inoperable battery charger to 72 hours. This action is applicable if an alternate means of restoring battery terminal voltage to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage has been used (e.g., balance of plant non-Class 1E battery charger). The 72 hour Completion Time reflects a reasonable time to effect restoration of the qualified battery charger to OPERABLE status.

B.1, B.2.1, B.2.2, and B.2.3

By allowing the option to declare required features inoperable with the associated DC subsystem(s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions will be implemented in accordance with the affected required features LCO ACTIONS. In many instances this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and operations involving positive reactivity additions) that

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

could result in loss of required SDM (MODE 5) or boron concentration (MODE 6). Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum SDM or boron concentration limit is required to assure continued safe operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than that what would be required in the RCS for minimum SDM or refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation. Introduction of temperature changes including temperature increases when operating with a positive Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) must also be evaluated to ensure they do not result in a loss of required SDM.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required DC subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary DC electrical power to the unit safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required DC subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the unit safety systems may be without sufficient power.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.5.1

SR 3.8.5.1 requires performance of all Surveillances required by Specification 3.8.4, "DC Sources - Operating". See the corresponding Bases for Specification 3.8.4 for a discussion of each SR.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DC subsystems from being discharged below their capability to provide the required power supply or otherwise rendered inoperable during the performance of SRs. It is the intent that these SRs must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR Chapter 6.
 2. FSAR Chapter 15.
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B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.6 Battery Parameters

BASES

BACKGROUND This LCO delineates the limits on battery float current as well as electrolyte temperature, level, and float voltage for the DC batteries. A discussion of these batteries and their OPERABILITY requirements is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources – Operating" and LCO 3.8.5, "DC Sources - Shutdown." In addition to the limitations of this Specification, the licensee controlled program also implements a program specified in Specification 5.5.16 for monitoring various battery parameters that is based on the recommendations of IEEE Standard 450-2002, "IEEE Recommended Practice For Maintenance, Testing, And Replacement Of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries For Stationary Applications" (Ref. 1).

The battery cells are of flooded lead acid construction with a nominal specific gravity of 1.215. This specific gravity corresponds to an open circuit battery voltage of approximately 250 V for 120 cell battery (i.e., cell voltage of 2.065 volts per cell (Vpc)). The open circuit voltage is the voltage maintained when there is no charging or discharging. Once fully charged with its open circuit voltage ≥ 2.065 Vpc, the battery cell will maintain its capacity for 30 days without further charging per manufacturer's instructions. Optimal long term performance however, is obtained by maintaining a float voltage 2.20 to 2.25 Vpc. This provides adequate over-potential which limits the formation of lead sulfate and self discharge. The nominal float voltage of 2.22 Vpc corresponds to a total float voltage output of 266.4 V for a 120 cell battery as discussed in FSAR Chapter 8 (Ref. 2).

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES**

The initial conditions of postulated accidents and anticipated operational occurrences in FSAR Chapter 6 (Ref. 3) and FSAR Chapter 15 (Ref. 4), assume the Distributed Control System (DCS) and Engineered Safety Features systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the EDGs, emergency auxiliaries, Instrumentation and Control, and control and switching during all MODES of operation.

The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining at least two divisions of DC sources OPERABLE during accident conditions, in the event of:

- a. An assumed loss of all offsite AC power or all onsite AC power; and
- b. A worst-case single failure.

Battery parameters satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

BASES

LCO Battery parameters must remain within acceptable limits to ensure availability of the required DC power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated accident. Battery parameter limits are conservatively established, allowing continued DC electrical system function even with limits not met. Additional preventative maintenance, testing, and monitoring performed in accordance with the licensee controlled program is conducted as specified in Specification 5.5.16.

APPLICABILITY The battery parameters are required solely for the support of the associated DC divisions. Therefore, battery parameter limits are only required when the DC division is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to the Applicability discussion in Bases for LCO 3.8.4 and LCO 3.8.5.

ACTIONS A Note has been added providing that, for this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each battery. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable battery. Complying with the Required Actions for battery cell parameters allows for restoration and continued operation, and subsequent out of limit battery cell parameters may be governed by separate Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

A.1, A.2, and A.3

With one or more cells in the battery < 2.07 V, the battery cell is degraded. Within 2 hours verification of the required battery charger OPERABILITY is made by monitoring the battery terminal voltage (SR 3.8.4.1) and of the overall battery state of charge by monitoring the battery float charge current (SR 3.8.6.1). This assures that there is still sufficient battery capacity to perform the intended function. Therefore, the affected battery is not required to be considered inoperable solely as a result of one or more cells < 2.07 V, and continued operation is permitted for a limited period up to 24 hours.

Since the Required Actions only specify "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.4.1 or SR 3.8.6.1 acceptance criteria does not result in this Required Action not met. However, if one of the SRs is failed, the appropriate Condition(s), depending on the cause of the failures, is entered. If SR 3.8.6.1 is failed, then there is not assurance that there is still sufficient battery capacity to perform the intended function and the battery must be declared inoperable immediately.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1 and B.2

A battery with float current > 2 amps indicates that a partial discharge of the battery capacity has occurred. This may be due to a temporary loss of a battery charger or possibly due to one or more battery cells in a low voltage condition reflecting some loss of capacity. Within 2 hours verification of the required battery charger OPERABILITY is made by monitoring the battery terminal voltage. If the terminal voltage is found to be less than the minimum established float voltage, there are two possibilities, the battery charger is inoperable or is operating in the current limit mode. Condition A addresses charger inoperability. If the charger is operating in the current limit mode after 2 hours that is an indication that the battery has been substantially discharged and likely cannot perform its required design functions. The time to return the battery to its fully charged condition in this case is a function of the battery charger capacity, the amount of loads on the associated DC system, the amount of the previous discharge, and the recharge characteristic of the battery. The charge time can be extensive, and there is not adequate assurance that it can be recharged within 12 hours (Required Action B.2). The battery must therefore be declared inoperable.

If the float voltage is found to be satisfactory but there are one or more battery cells with float voltage less than 2.07 V, the associated "OR" statement in Condition F is applicable and the battery must be declared inoperable immediately. If float voltage is satisfactory and there are no cells less than 2.07 V there is good assurance that, within 12 hours, the battery will be restored to its fully charged condition (Required Action B.2) from any discharge that might have occurred due to a temporary loss of the battery charger.

A discharged battery with float voltage (the charger setpoint) across its terminals indicates that the battery is on the exponential charging current portion (the second part) of its recharge cycle. The time to return a battery to its fully charged state under this condition is simply a function of the amount of the previous discharge and the recharge characteristic of the battery. Thus there is good assurance of fully recharging the battery within 12 hours, avoiding a premature shutdown with its own attendant risk.

If the condition is due to one or more cells in a low voltage condition but still greater than 2.07 V and float voltage is found to be satisfactory, this is not indication of a substantially discharged battery and 12 hours is a reasonable time prior to declaring the battery inoperable.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

Since Required Action B.1 only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.4.1 acceptance criteria does not result in the Required Action not met. However, if SR 3.8.4.1 is failed, the appropriate Condition(s), depending on the cause of the failure, is entered.

C.1, C.2, and C.3

With one battery with one or more cells electrolyte level above the top of the plates, but below the minimum established design limits, the battery still retains sufficient capacity to perform the intended function. Therefore, the affected battery is not required to be considered inoperable solely as a result of electrolyte level not met. Within 31 days the minimum established design limits for electrolyte level must be re-established.

With electrolyte level below the top of the plates there is a potential for dryout and plate degradation. Required Actions C.1 and C.2 address this potential (as well as provisions in Specification 5.5.16, Battery Monitoring and Maintenance Program). They are modified by a Note that indicates they are only applicable if electrolyte level is below the top of the plates. Within 8 hours level is required to be restored to above the top of the plates. The Required Action C.2 requirement to verify that there is no leakage by visual inspection and the Specification 5.5.16.b item to initiate action to equalize and test in accordance with manufacturer's recommendation are taken from Annex D of IEEE Standard 450-2002 (Ref. 1). They are performed following the restoration of the electrolyte level to above the top of the plates. Based on the results of the manufacturer's recommended testing the battery may have to be declared inoperable and the affected cell(s) replaced.

D.1

With one battery with pilot cell temperature less than the minimum established design limits, 12 hours is allowed to restore the temperature to within limits. A low electrolyte temperature limits the current and power available. Since the battery is sized with margin, while battery capacity is degraded, sufficient capacity exists to perform the intended function and the affected battery is not required to be considered inoperable solely as a result of the pilot cell temperature not met.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

E.1

With one battery in two or more divisions with battery parameters not within limits there is not sufficient assurance that battery capacity has not been affected to the degree that the batteries can still perform their required function, given that multiple batteries are involved. With multiple batteries involved this potential could result in a total loss of function on multiple systems that rely upon the batteries. The longer Completion Times specified for battery parameters are therefore not appropriate, and the parameters must be restored to within limits on all but one division within 2 hours.

F.1

With one battery with any battery parameter outside the allowances of the Required Actions for Condition A, B, C, D, or E, sufficient capacity to supply the maximum expected load requirement is not assured and the corresponding battery must be declared inoperable. Additionally, discovering one or more batteries with one or more battery cells float voltage less than 2.07 V and float current greater than 2 amps indicates that the battery capacity may not be sufficient to perform the intended functions. The battery must therefore be declared inoperable immediately.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.6.1

Verifying battery float current while on float charge is used to determine the state of charge of the battery. Float charge is the condition in which the charger is supplying the continuous charge required to overcome the internal losses of a battery and maintain the battery in a charged state. The float current requirements are based on the float current indicative of a charged battery. Use of float current to determine the state of charge of the battery is consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 1). The 7 day Frequency is consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 1).

This SR is modified by a Note that states the float current requirement is not required to be met when battery terminal voltage is less than the minimum established float voltage of SR 3.8.4.1. When this float voltage is not maintained the Required Actions of LCO 3.8.4 ACTION A are being taken, which provide the necessary and appropriate verifications of the battery condition. Furthermore, the float current limit of 2 amps is established based on the nominal float voltage value and is not directly applicable when this voltage is not maintained.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.8.6.2 and SR 3.8.6.5

Optimal long term battery performance is obtained by maintaining a float voltage greater than or equal to the minimum established design limits provided by the battery manufacturer, which corresponds to 270.0 V at the battery terminals, or 2.25 Vpc. This provides adequate over-potential, which limits the formation of lead sulfate and self discharge, which could eventually render the battery inoperable. Float voltages in this range or less, but greater than 2.07 Vpc, are addressed in Specification 5.5.16. SRs 3.8.6.2 and 3.8.6.5 require verification that the cell float voltages are equal to or greater than the short term absolute minimum voltage of 2.07 V. The Frequency for cell voltage verification every 31 days for pilot cell and 92 days for each connected cell is consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 1).

SR 3.8.6.3

The limit specified for electrolyte level ensures that the plates suffer no physical damage and maintains adequate electron transfer capability. The Frequency is consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 1).

SR 3.8.6.4

This Surveillance verifies that the pilot cell temperature is greater than or equal to the minimum established design limit (i.e., 65°F). Pilot cell electrolyte temperature is maintained above this temperature to assure the battery can provide the required current and voltage to meet the design requirements. Temperatures lower than assumed in battery sizing calculations act to inhibit or reduce battery capacity. The Frequency is consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 1).

SR 3.8.6.5

See SR 3.8.6.2.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.8.6.6

A battery performance discharge test is a test of constant current capacity of a battery, normally done in the as found condition, after having been in service, to detect any change in the capacity determined by the acceptance test. The test is intended to determine overall battery degradation due to age and usage.

Either the battery performance discharge test or the modified performance discharge test is acceptable for satisfying SR 3.8.6.6; however, only the modified performance discharge test may be used to satisfy the battery service test requirements of SR 3.8.4.3.

A modified discharge test is a test of the battery capacity and its ability to provide a high rate, short duration load (usually the highest rate of the duty cycle). This will often confirm the battery's ability to meet the critical period of the load duty cycle, in addition to determining its percentage of rated capacity. Initial conditions for the modified performance discharge test should be identical to those specified for a service test.

It may consist of just two rates; for instance the one minute rate for the battery or the largest current load of the duty cycle, followed by the test rate employed for the performance test, both of which envelope the duty cycle of the service test. Since the ampere-hours removed by a one minute discharge represents a very small portion of the battery capacity, the test rate can be changed to that for the performance test without compromising the results of the performance discharge test. The battery terminal voltage for the modified performance discharge test must remain above the minimum battery terminal voltage specified in the battery service test for the duration of time equal to that of the service test.

The acceptance criteria for this Surveillance are consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 1) and IEEE-485 (Ref. 5). These references recommend that the battery be replaced if its capacity is below 80% of the manufacturer's rating. A capacity of 80% shows that the battery rate of deterioration is increasing, even if there is ample capacity to meet the load requirements. Furthermore, the battery is sized to meet the assumed duty cycle loads when the battery design capacity reaches this 80% limit.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

The Surveillance Frequency for this test is normally 60 months. If the battery shows degradation, or if the battery has reached 85% of its expected life and capacity is < 100% of the manufacturer's rating, the Surveillance Frequency is reduced to 12 months. However, if the battery shows no degradation but has reached 85% of its expected life, the Surveillance Frequency is only reduced to 24 months for batteries that retain capacity \geq 100% of the manufacturer's ratings. Degradation is indicated, according to IEEE-450 (Ref. 1), when the battery capacity drops by more than 10% relative to its capacity on the previous performance test or when it is \geq 10% below the manufacturer's rating. These Frequencies are consistent with the recommendations in IEEE-450 (Ref. 1).

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would perturb the electrical distribution system and challenge safety systems. This restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 is further amplified to allow portions of the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed partial Surveillance, a successful partial Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the partial Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when portions of the Surveillance are performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for the assessment. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

REFERENCES

1. IEEE-450-2002.
2. FSAR Chapter 8.
3. FSAR Chapter 6.
4. FSAR Chapter 15.
5. IEEE-485-1997.

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.7 Inverters - Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND The inverters are the preferred source of power for the AC vital buses because of the stability and reliability they achieve. The function of the inverter is to provide AC electrical power to the vital buses. The Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) loads can be powered from an AC source or from the station battery. The station battery provides an uninterruptible power source for the Instrumentation and Control (I&C) system power, which includes the Distributed Control System (DCS) and Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) starting logic. Specific details on inverters and their operating characteristics are found in FSAR Chapter 8 (Ref. 1).

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The initial conditions for postulated accidents and anticipated operational occurrences in FSAR Chapter 6 (Ref. 2) and FSAR Chapter 15 (Ref. 3), assume the DCS and Engineered Safety Features systems are OPERABLE. The inverters are designed to provide the required capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of normal and emergency power for 480 VAC loads requiring uninterruptible power and the AC/DC converters that provide power to the I&C system, which includes the DCS, during all MODES of operation. This ensures that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

The OPERABILITY of the inverters is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based on meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining required AC vital buses OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

- a. An assumed loss of all offsite AC electrical power or all onsite AC electrical power; and
- b. A worst case single failure.

Inverters are a part of the distribution system and, as such, satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

BASES

LCO The inverters ensure the availability of AC electrical power for the instrumentation required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated accident. The inverters also supply motive power to certain ESF components (e.g., containment isolation valves).

Maintaining the required inverters OPERABLE ensures that the redundancy incorporated into the design of the DCS is maintained. The four inverters (one per division) ensure an uninterruptible supply of AC electrical power to the AC vital buses even if the 6.9 kV safety buses are de-energized.

OPERABLE inverters require the associated vital bus to be powered by the inverter with output voltage and frequency within tolerances, and power input to the inverter from a 250 VDC station battery. Alternatively, the UPS power supply may be from an AC source as long as the station battery is available as the uninterruptible power supply.

APPLICABILITY The required inverters are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that:

- a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
- b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated accident.

Inverter requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are covered in the Bases for LCO 3.8.8, "Inverters - Shutdown."

ACTIONS

A.1

With an inverter inoperable, its associated AC vital bus becomes inoperable until it is re-energized from its Class 1E voltage regulated bus. For this reason a Note has been included in Condition A requiring the entry into the Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Operating." This ensures that the vital bus is re-energized within 2 hours.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

Required Action A.1 allows 24 hours to fix the inoperable inverter and return it to service. The 24 hour limit is based upon engineering judgment, taking into consideration the time required to repair an inverter and the additional risk to which the unit is exposed because of the inverter inoperability. This has to be balanced against the risk of an immediate shutdown, along with the potential challenges to safety systems such a shutdown might entail. When the AC vital bus is powered from its voltage regulated bus, it is relying upon interruptible AC electrical power sources (offsite and onsite). The uninterruptible inverter source to the AC vital buses is the preferred source for powering instrumentation trip setpoint devices.

B.1 and B.2

If the inoperable inverter cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.7.1

This Surveillance verifies that the inverters are functioning properly with all required circuit breakers closed and AC vital buses energized from the inverter. The verification of proper voltage and frequency output ensures that the required power is readily available for the instrumentation of the DCS connected to the AC vital buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the inverters and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to inverter malfunctions.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR Chapter 8.
 2. FSAR Chapter 6.
 3. FSAR Chapter 15.
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B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.8 Inverters - Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND A description of the inverters is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.7, "Inverters - Operating."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The initial conditions of postulated accidents and anticipated operational occurrences in FSAR Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and FSAR Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume the Distributed Control System (DCS) and Engineered Safety Features systems are OPERABLE. The DC to AC inverters are designed to provide the required capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of required power to the Instrumentation and Control (I&C) system, which includes the DCS and Emergency Diesel Generator starting logic so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

The OPERABILITY of the inverters is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the inverter to each AC vital bus during MODES 5 and 6 ensures that:

- a. The unit can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;
- b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and
- c. Adequate power is available to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as a fuel handling accident.

In general, when the unit is shut down, the Technical Specifications requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that many postulated accidents that are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 have no specific analyses in MODES 5 and 6 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and the corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrence being significantly reduced or eliminated, and in minimal consequences. These deviations from analysis assumptions and design requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCO for required systems.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

The shutdown Technical Specification requirements are designed to ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of certain postulated accidents. Worst case postulated accidents which are analyzed for operating MODES are generally viewed not to be a significant concern during shutdown MODES due to the lower energies involved. The Technical Specifications therefore require a lesser complement of electrical equipment to be available during shutdown than is required during operating MODES. More recent work completed on the potential risks associated with shutdown, however, has found significant risk associated with certain shutdown evolutions. As a result, in addition to the requirements established in the Technical Specifications, the industry has adopted NUMARC 91-06, "Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management," as an Industry initiative to manage shutdown tasks and associated electrical support to maintain risk at an acceptable low level. This may require the availability of additional equipment beyond that required by the shutdown Technical Specifications.

The inverters were previously identified as part of the distribution system and, as such, satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

| LCO

The inverters ensure the availability of electrical power for the instrumentation for systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated accident. The battery powered inverters provide uninterruptible supply of AC electrical power to the AC vital buses even if the 6.9 kV safety buses are de-energized. OPERABILITY of the inverters require that the AC vital bus be powered by the inverter. This ensures the availability of sufficient inverter power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents).

| APPLICABILITY

The inverters required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies provide assurance that:

- a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core;
- b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;
- c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

BASES

APPLICABILITY (continued)

- d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

Inverter requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.7.

ACTIONS

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 5 or 6. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 5 or 6, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Entering LCO 3.0.3, while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 would require the unit to be shutdown unnecessarily.

A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, and A.2.3

If two divisions are required by LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown," the remaining OPERABLE inverter(s) may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of irradiated fuel movement and operations with a potential for positive reactivity additions. By the allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with the associated inverter(s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions will be implemented in accordance with the affected required features LCOs' Required Actions. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and operations involving positive reactivity additions) that could result in loss of required SDM (MODE 5) or boron concentration (MODE 6). Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum SDM or boron concentration limit is required to assure continued safe operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than that what would be required in the RCS for minimum SDM or refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation. Introduction of temperature changes including temperature increases when operating with a positive Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) must also be evaluated to ensure they do not result in a loss of required SDM.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the inverter(s) and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary inverter power to the unit safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the inverter(s) should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the unit safety systems may be without power or powered from a voltage regulated bus.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.8.1

This Surveillance verifies that the inverters are functioning properly with all required circuit breakers closed and AC vital buses energized from the inverter. The verification of proper voltage and frequency output ensures that the required power is readily available for the instrumentation connected to the AC vital buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the inverters and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to inverter malfunctions.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR Chapter 6.
 2. FSAR Chapter 15.
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B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.9 Distribution Systems - Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND

The onsite Class 1E AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems are divided by division into four redundant and independent AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems.

The AC electrical power subsystem for each division consists of several Class 1E 6.9 kV buses and secondary 480 buses, distribution panels, motor control centers and load centers. Each 6.9 kV bus has at least two separate and independent offsite sources of power as well as a dedicated onsite emergency diesel generator (EDG) source. Each 6.9 kV bus is normally connected to a preferred offsite source. After a failure of the emergency auxiliary transformer supplying preferred offsite power to a 6.9 kV bus, a high speed bus transfer is used to connect the alternate offsite power source to the 6.9 kV bus. If all offsite sources are unavailable, the onsite EDG supplies power to the 6.9 kV bus. Control power for the 6.9 kV breakers is supplied from the Class 1E batteries. Additional description of this system may be found in the Bases for LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating," and the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources - Operating."

The secondary AC electrical power distribution subsystem for each division includes the safety related switchgear, load centers, and motor control centers shown in Table B 3.8.9-1.

The 480 VAC vital buses are arranged with one 480V motor control center per division and are normally powered from the inverters. The alternate power supply for the vital buses are Class 1E voltage regulated buses powered from the same division as the associated inverter, and its use is governed by LCO 3.8.7, "Inverters – Operating." Each voltage regulated bus is powered from a Class 1E AC source.

The DC electrical power distribution system consists of 250 VDC buses and distribution panels.

The list of all required DC and AC vital distribution buses is presented in Table B 3.8.9-1.

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES

The initial conditions of postulated accidents and anticipated operational occurrences in FSAR Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and FSAR Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume the Distributed Control System (DCS) and Engineered Safety Features systems are OPERABLE. The AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

The OPERABILITY of the AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining power distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

- a. An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC electrical power; and
- b. A worst case single failure.

The distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The required power distribution subsystems listed in Table 3.8.9-1 ensure the availability of AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power for the systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated accident. The designated AC, DC, and AC vital electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE.

Maintaining the Divisions 1, 2, 3, and 4 AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems OPERABLE ensures that the redundancy incorporated into the design of ESF is not defeated. Therefore, a single failure within any system or within the electrical power distribution subsystems will not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor.

OPERABLE AC electrical power distribution subsystems require the associated buses, load centers, motor control centers, and distribution panels to be energized to their proper voltages. OPERABLE DC electrical power distribution subsystems require the associated buses and distribution panels to be energized to their proper voltage from the associated battery or charger. OPERABLE vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems require the associated buses to be energized to their proper voltage from the associated inverter via inverted DC voltage, inverter using an AC source, or Class 1E voltage regulated bus.

BASES

LCO (continued)

In addition, tie breakers between redundant safety related AC, DC, and AC vital bus power distribution subsystems, if they exist, must be open unless they are being utilized to align the alternate feed.

Each division can be aligned to power a subset of loads (“alternate fed loads”) in the other division in its divisional pair by means of an “alternate feed.” An alternate feed provides a standby source of power to required safety systems, safety support systems, or components that do not have the required redundant trains to support maintenance. An OPERABLE EDG supporting the alternate feed loads and the remaining OPERABLE EDG(s) can power the minimum required ESF functions and achieve completion of required safety function following an AOO or postulated accident. The alternate feed is interlocked to prevent sources from two divisions supplying a bus at the same time. In addition, interlocks prevent inadvertently paralleling two EDGs together. Open tie breakers prevent any electrical malfunction in any power distribution subsystem from propagating to the redundant subsystem, that could cause the failure of a redundant subsystem and a loss of essential safety function(s). With a tie breaker closed to implement alternate feed, a fault within the alternate fed divisional pair may affect two redundant subsystems within the divisional pair. The inter-divisional alternate feeds have a protection and coordination scheme to provide protection so that a fault on one division does not degrade the other division below an acceptable level. The alternate feed circuit protection scheme uses circuit breakers so that a malfunction of the components performing the alternate feed function or a malfunction of the components being alternately fed does not result in unacceptable influences in the division that supplies the power. This applies to the onsite, safety related redundant electrical power distribution subsystems. It does not, however, preclude redundant Class 1E 6.9 kV buses from being powered from the same offsite circuit.

APPLICABILITY

The electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that:

- a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
- b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated accident.

BASES

APPLICABILITY (continued)

Electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are covered in the Bases for LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown."

ACTIONS

A.1

With one or more of the required AC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable and a loss of function has not occurred, the remaining AC electrical power distribution subsystems are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in one of the remaining power distribution subsystems could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the required AC electrical power distribution subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours.

Condition A worst scenario is one 6.9 kV AC electrical power distribution subsystem out for maintenance and another in the same divisional pair (Divisions 1 and 2 or Divisions 3 and 4) without AC power (i.e., no offsite power to the division and the associated EDG inoperable). In this Condition, the unit is more vulnerable to a complete loss of AC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the unit operator's attention be focused on minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining divisions by stabilizing the unit, and on restoring power to the affected division. The 8 hour time limit before requiring a unit shutdown in this Condition is acceptable because of:

- a. The potential for decreased safety if the unit operator's attention is diverted from the evaluations and actions necessary to restore power to the affected division, to the actions associated with taking the unit to shutdown within this time limit; and
- b. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component in the remaining divisions with AC power.

Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note that requires the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources - Operating," to be entered for DC division made inoperable by inoperable power distribution subsystems. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components. Inoperability of a distribution system can result in loss of charging power to batteries and eventual loss of DC power. This Note ensures that the appropriate attention is given to restoring charging power to batteries, if necessary, after loss of distribution systems.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1

With one or more AC vital subsystems inoperable, and a loss of function has not yet occurred, the remaining OPERABLE AC vital buses are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the unit and maintain it in the safe shutdown condition. Overall reliability is reduced, however, since an additional single failure could result in the minimum ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the required AC vital bus must be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours by powering the bus from the associated inverter via inverted DC, inverter using an AC source, or Class 1E voltage regulated bus.

Condition B represents one or more AC vital buses without power; potentially both the DC source and the associated AC source are nonfunctioning. In this situation, the unit is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all noninterruptible power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining vital buses and restoring power to the affected vital bus.

This 2 hour limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the vast majority of components that are without adequate vital AC power. Taking exception to LCO 3.0.2 for components without adequate vital AC power, that would have the Required Action Completion Times shorter than 2 hours if declared inoperable, is acceptable because of:

- a. The potential for decreased safety by requiring a change in unit conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) and not allowing stable operations to continue;
- b. The potential for decreased safety by requiring entry into numerous Applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without adequate vital AC power and not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions for restoring power to the affected division; and
- c. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component.

The 2 hour Completion Time takes into account the importance to safety of restoring the AC vital bus to OPERABLE status, the redundant capability afforded by the other OPERABLE vital buses, and the low probability of a postulated accident occurring during this period.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

C.1

With one or more DC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable, and a loss of function has not yet occurred, the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystems are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in one of the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystems could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the DC buses and distribution panels must be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours by powering the bus from the associated battery, charger, or inverter.

Condition C represents one or more DC buses or distribution panels without adequate DC power; potentially both with the battery significantly degraded and the associated charger nonfunctioning. In this situation, the unit is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all DC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining divisions and restoring power to the affected division.

This 2 hour limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the vast majority of components that would be without power. Taking exception to LCO 3.0.2 for components without adequate DC power, which would have Required Action Completion Times shorter than 2 hours, is acceptable because of:

- a. The potential for decreased safety by requiring a change in unit conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) while allowing stable operations to continue;
- b. The potential for decreased safety by requiring entry into numerous applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without DC power and not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions for restoring power to the affected division; and
- c. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component.

The 2 hour Completion Time for DC buses is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 3).

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

D.1 and D.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Conditions A, B, or C cannot be met, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

E.1

Condition E corresponds to a level of degradation in the electrical power distribution system that causes a required safety function to be lost. When more than one inoperable electrical power distribution subsystem results in the loss of a required function, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately to commence a controlled shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.9.1

This Surveillance verifies that the required AC, DC, and AC vital electrical power distribution systems are functioning properly with the correct circuit breaker alignment. This includes the alternate feeds, when aligned. The correct breaker alignment ensures the appropriate separation and independence of the electrical divisions is maintained, and the appropriate voltage is available to each required bus. The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required voltage is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the AC, DC, and AC vital electrical power distribution subsystems, and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to subsystem malfunctions.

BASES

- REFERENCES
1. FSAR Chapter 6.
 2. FSAR Chapter 15.
 3. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.
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Table B 3.8.9-1 (page 1 of 1)
AC, DC, and AC Vital Electrical Power Distribution Subsystems

VOLTAGE	DIVISION 1	DIVISION 2	DIVISION 3	DIVISION 4
AC ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION SUBSYSTEMS				
6.9 kV	Switchgear 31BDA, 31BDB, 31BDC, 31BDD	Switchgear 32BDA, 32BDB, 32BDD	Switchgear 33BDA, 33BDB, 33BDD	Switchgear 34BDA, 34BDB, 34BDC, 34BDD
480 V	Load Centers 31BMB, 31BMC, 31BMD Motor Control Centers 31BNA01, 31BNB01, 31BNB02, 31BNB03, 31BNC01, 31BND01	Load Centers 32BMB, 32BMD Motor Control Centers 32BNA01, 32BNA02, 32BNB01, 32BNB02, 32BNB03, 32BND01	Load Centers 33BMB, 33BMD Motor Control Centers 33BNA01, 33BNA02, 33BNB01, 33BNB02, 33BNB03, 33BND01	Load Centers 34BMB, 34BMC, 34BMD Motor Control Centers 34BNA01, 34BNB01, 34BNB02, 34BNB03, 34BNC01, 34BND01
AC VITAL ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION SUBSYSTEMS				
480 V	31BRA	32BRA	33BRA	34BRA
DC ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION SUBSYSTEMS				
250 V	31BUC	32BUC	33BUC	34BUC

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.10 Distribution Systems - Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND A description of the AC, DC, and vital AC electrical power distribution systems is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Operating."

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES**

The initial conditions of postulated accidents and anticipated operational occurrences in FSAR Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and FSAR Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume the Distributed Control System (DCS) and Engineered Safety Features systems are OPERABLE. The AC, DC, and AC vital electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

The OPERABILITY of the AC, DC, and AC vital electrical power distribution system is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC, DC, and AC vital electrical power distribution subsystems during MODES 5 and 6, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies ensures that:

- a. The unit can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;
- b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and
- c. Adequate power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as a fuel handling accident.

The AC, DC, and AC vital electrical power distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

BASES

LCO Various combinations of subsystems, equipment, and components are required OPERABLE by other LCOs, depending on the specific plant condition. Implicit in those requirements is the required OPERABILITY of necessary support required features. This LCO explicitly requires energization of the portions of the electrical distribution system necessary to support OPERABILITY of required systems, equipment, and components - all specifically addressed in each LCO and implicitly required via the definition of OPERABILITY.

Maintaining these portions of the distribution system energized ensures the availability of sufficient power to operate the unit in a safe manner to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents).

APPLICABILITY The AC, DC, and AC vital electrical power distribution subsystems required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, provide assurance that:

- a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core;
- b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;
- c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and
- d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition and refueling condition.

The AC, DC, and AC vital electrical power distribution subsystems requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.9.

ACTIONS LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 5 or 6. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 5 or 6, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Entering LCO 3.0.3, while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 would require the unit to be shutdown unnecessarily.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, and A.2.4

Although redundant required features may require redundant divisions of electrical power distribution subsystems to be OPERABLE, one OPERABLE distribution subsystem division may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of irradiated fuel movement. By allowing the option to declare required features associated with an inoperable distribution subsystem inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected distribution subsystem LCO's Required Actions. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM (MODE 5) or boron concentration (MODE 6). Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum SDM or boron concentration limit is required to assure continued safe operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than that what would be required in the RCS for minimum SDM or refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation. Introduction of temperature changes including temperature increases when operating with a positive Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) must also be evaluated to ensure they do not result in a loss of required SDM.

Suspension of these activities does not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC, DC, and AC vital electrical power distribution subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary power to the unit safety systems.

Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative Required Actions, a required residual heat removal (RHR) subsystem may be inoperable. In this case, Required Actions A.2.1 through A.2.3 do not adequately address the concerns relating to coolant circulation and heat removal. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the RHR ACTIONS would not be entered. Therefore, Required Action A.2.4 is provided to direct declaring RHR inoperable, which results in taking the appropriate RHR actions.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required distribution subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the unit safety systems may be without power.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.10.1

This Surveillance verifies that the AC, DC, and AC vital electrical power distribution subsystems are functioning properly, with all the buses energized. The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required power is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the capability of the electrical power distribution subsystems, and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to subsystem malfunctions.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR Chapter 6.
 2. FSAR Chapter 15.
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