

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-331/86011(DRSS)

Docket No. 50-331

License No. DPR-49

Licensee: Iowa Electric Light and
Power Company
Post Office Box 351
Cedar Rapids, IA 52406

Facility Name: Duane Arnold Energy Center

Inspection At: Duane Arnold Energy Center, Palo, IA

Inspection Conducted: May 27-30, 1986

Date of Last Physical Security Inspection: June 24-27, 1985

Type of Inspection: Unannounced Special Physical Security Inspection

Inspector: G. L. Pirtle
for J. R. Kniceley
Physical Security Inspector

7/8/86
Date

Approved By: G. L. Pirtle
G. L. Pirtle, Acting Chief
Safeguards Section

7/8/86
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on May 27-30, 1986 (Report No. 50-331/86011(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Included a review of allegations received by NRC Region III of perceived security deficiencies in the licensee's security program. The inspection began during the day shift and some offshift inspection activities were performed.

Results: The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements within the areas examined during this inspection.

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DETAILS

1. Key Persons Contacted

- *D. Mineck, Plant Superintendent, Iowa Electric (IE)
- *K. Young, Assistant Plant Superintendent, Radiation Protection and Security (IE)
- *D. Wilson, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and EP (IE)
- *W. Miller, Technical Services Superintendent (IE)
- *J. Smith, Technical Support Supervisor (IE)
- *M. Sparks, Security Supervisor, (IE)
- *L. Wille, Assistant Security Supervisor (IE)
- *R. Wetherelle, Security Training Instructor (IE)
- *M. Theisen, Security Shift Supervisor (IE)
- *N. Gilles, Resident Inspector (IE)

In addition to the key members of the licensee's staff listed above, the inspectors interviewed other licensee employees and members of the security organization. The asterisk (*) denotes those present at the Exit Meeting on May 30, 1986.

2. Entrance and Exit Interviews (IP 30703):

At the beginning of the inspection, the Plant Superintendent was informed of the functional areas and allegations to be examined and the purpose of this visit. No written material pertaining to the inspection was left with licensee or contractor representatives.

The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on May 30, 1986. A brief description of the scope of the inspection was provided. The licensee was informed and acknowledged that no violations of their NRC approved physical security plan were identified during review of the alleged security deficiencies.

3. Allegation Review (AMS No. RIII 86-A-0065)

The licensee is required as stated in Operating License No. DPR 49 Section 2.c(5) to maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the Commission approved physical security plan, including amendments and changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.54(p). No violations in the implementation of the security plan were identified but it was noted that in some areas that the licensee has chosen to exceed plan requirements, which is acceptable. The adequacy of security pertaining to the areas addressed by the allegations was based on the Commission approved security plan requirements for the issues.

Region III received allegations in April 1986, of perceived security deficiencies in the licensee's security program generally involving the number of guards, inadequacies in weapons, riot training, and response

capabilities. The individual concerns were also addressed to members of the NRC Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER) team and the Senior Resident Inspector. During a subsequent interview with the individual during the inspection conducted May 27-30, 1986, it was related to the inspector that the individual concerns were not of wrong doing by the licensee, but opinions in ways security could be improved at the site. The review of the allegations/concerns are addressed below:

- a. Allegation: There are not enough guards available on off-shifts.

Finding: The licensee's approved physical security plan describes the minimum staffing level for the security force. This minimum complement normally occurs on the back shift due to the reduced activity during those hours. A review of security shift logs for January 1985 through April 1986, and through interviews with security management and officers, it was determined that the required manning levels are always maintained.

This allegation was not substantiated because no evidence was found to indicate that required manning levels were not maintained.

- b. Allegation: Armed responders have other duties besides being armed responders, i.e., escorts and first aid response.

Finding: Interviews with security management and review of the Licensee's approved security plan showed that security force members participate in Fire Brigade responses, fire watches, vehicle or personnel escort duties, first aid responses, Emergency Plan responses, and compensatory measures. If any of the activities described above are expected, security personnel are held over from a previous shift or called out to supplement the normal shift complement to ensure that these additional duties do not detract from normal shift security operations. Unarmed personnel will normally be used first to fulfill these tasks. Activation of armed responders would possibly require some of the security force members to leave posted compensatory measures. Any event which would require activation of the armed responders would also initiate a call to the local law enforcement agencies.

This allegation was substantiated because armed responders do have other duties besides being armed responders. However, these other duties are allowed and described in the licensee's approved physical security plan. These other duties have not affected security manning levels.

- c. Allegation: There are no drills that require guards to get certain types of weapons described by the allegor.

Findings: Interviews with security management and a review of conducted drills showed that there have been no drills involving the type of weapon described by the allegor. The licensee stated that there is no requirement for use of such weapons in the drill

program; however, they will consider the use of the specified type of weapon as part of future scenarios. The weapons are locked within a specified location within the protected area which is accessible to security personnel. The licensee is not considering relocation of the weapons.

This allegation was substantiated because there have been no drills involving the use of the type of weapon described by the alleged. However, the licensee's requirements for firing with the specified weapon is once a year, but the licensee actually conducts such training twice a year. Concerns in this area noted by the RER team were addressed in their exit meeting. NRC Region III is also monitoring security drills as an "open" inspection finding from a previous inspection.

- d. Allegation: Handguns are minimal and guards practice with bullets that use lower power loads than regularly assigned ammunition.

Finding: Interviews with security management and firearms instructor and review of the approved security plan showed that the licensee provides a larger handgun than required, which are designed to withstand the rigors of high velocity ammunition and will not rust from weather conditions.

The security force uses a lesser velocity cartridge than the maximum cartridge the weapon is designed for. The lesser velocity cartridge has several advantages; some of which are less wear on the weapon because of design, less recoil because the weapon is heavier, less noise and the cartridge has a high "relative stopping power." The licensee's approved security plan allows rounds of less than full velocity to be used for range safety consideration purposes and will not degrade the individuals level of competence. Firearms qualification records showed that the security forces qualifying scores were good and anyone requesting or requiring additional assistance would receive assistance during normal duty time at no additional expense or time to the security officer. Old service ammunition as well as a variety of other ammunition is used for practice purposes.

This allegation was partially substantiated because a variety of ammunition is used for practice purposes, but the ammunition and weapons carried and used for qualification purposes are as required by the security plan. The security plan allows a variety of ammunition for practice purposes.

- e. Allegation: The site is not set up for armed response.

Finding: Interviews with security management, observations, and a review of the approved security plan showed that the site topography is flat and offers little cover to intruders outside of the protected area. The protected area is relatively small, compact, and easy to patrol. The licensee's approved security plan identifies the

response force availability, assignment of responsibilities, contingency requirements, and explains the overall physical security program performance capabilities. The capabilities described in the security plan provides adequate protection of the facility, therefore, this allegation is not substantiated.

- f. Allegation: Guards do not qualify enough with their weapons. They currently qualify twice a year and the individual feels this should be increased.

Finding: Interviews with security management, review of weapons qualification records, and security plan review showed that the security plan requires the DAEC security force to qualify with firearms once a year, to include daytime and night firing. Both night and day time qualifications are conducted twice a year which includes the weapons used by the security force.

This allegation was not substantiated because the security force qualified more often than is required by the security plan. The licensee does not plan to increase the number of qualifications, but does allow unlimited range usage for anyone needing or requesting additional practice at no expense to the officer.

- g. Allegation: Additional weapons just reappeared. They were stored in a locked desk with the shift supervisor having access. This was done to impress the NRC Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER) team.

Finding: Interviews with security management showed that the additional weapons were deleted from the security plan and were no longer required. They were removed from the weapons storage locker and transferred to another location. Training on the weapons was discontinued and they were to be removed from site as soon as a new location could be found. The licensee could not locate a place to dispose of the weapons so they were returned to the weapons lockers until a final determination for the weapons was made. The licensee stated that the weapons were not put back into the gun cabinet to impress the RER team. Based upon a RER team recommendation, the licensee will reevaluate their plans to eliminate the weapons from their inventory.

This allegation was not substantiated because no evidence was developed which indicated that the weapons reappeared to impress the RER team.

- h. Allegation: More guards were hired during the week of the RER Inspection and this was done to impress the RER team.

Finding: Interviews with security management and employment records review showed that one guard was hired April 15, 1986, which was after the RER inspection, and six watchmen were hired in February 1986, for additional support for the Low-Level Radwaste building construction. The RER inspection was conducted during the first week of April 1986.

This allegation was not substantiated because no personnel were hired during the week of or immediately prior to the RER inspection. Personnel hired before and after the inspection were not hired to impress the RER team, but to fill needed positions.

- i. Allegation: The Local Law Enforcement Agencies (LLEA) response may not be timely. The guards do not have sufficient gear and have not received sufficient training for riot control situations.

Finding: Interviews with security management and the review of Letters of understanding provided by the LLEA's showed the nature and degree of support which will be provided by the LLEA in support of contingencies. LLEA response to needs at DAEC has always been in a timely manner and there is excellent cooperation between the LLEA and DAEC.

The equipment required by the security plan is available and the guards have received training pertaining to the equipment. It is the licensee's position that there is no requirement in the security plan for additional equipment and they do not see a need to purchase more equipment and train security personnel on additional contingency equipment.

This allegation was particularly substantiated. No evidence was developed to indicate that the LLEA has not been timely in response when requested. The guards do not have certain equipment suggested by the allegor and they have not received training suggested by the allegor in reference to riot control. However, the licensee is meeting security plan requirements. Riot control measures would be the primary responsibility of the LLEA.

- j. Allegation: During the week of the RER inspection the licensee stopped concrete truck deliveries into the protected area because of the RER inspection.

Finding: Interviews with security management, security officers, and review of vehicle access records showed that only one to two guards are assigned on a daily basis to escorting vehicles for the Data Acquisition Center Project. The request for this support must be transmitted to the Security Supervisor by Friday of the previous week by the Data Acquisition Center Project Superintendent for scheduling purposes. Interviews with the Assistant Plant Superintendent, Radiation Protection and Security, showed that he did not instruct anyone to stop processing concrete trucks into the protected area during the RER inspection. There appeared to be no decrease in vehicle activity during this period.

This allegation was not substantiated because no evidence was developed to indicate that concrete trucks deliveries were stopped because of the RER inspection. The only time vehicle traffic was stopped or slowed is when there was not enough escort personnel available to escort vehicles.