

AEC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL
(TEMPORARY FORM)

CONTROL NO: 8737

FILE:

FROM: Iowa Electric Light & Power Co Cedar Rapids, Iowa		DATE OF DOC 8-15-74	DATE REC'D 8-23-74	LTR XXX	TWX	RPT	OTHER
TO: Mr. Keppler		ORIG 1 signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR <u>XXX</u> SENT LOCAL PDR <u>XXX</u>		
CLASS.	UNCLASS XXXXXX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1	DOCKET NO: 50-331		

DESCRIPTION:

Ltr trans the following:

ACKNOWLEDGED

PLANT NAME: Duane Arnold

ENCLOSURES:

REPORT: Abnormal Occurrence #74-28 on 8-10-74 re closed reactor pressure switch instrument isolation valves.

(1 cy rec'd)

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION 8-23-74 ehf

- | | | | |
|----------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|
| BUTLER (L)
W/ CYS | SCHWENGER (L)
W/ CYS | ZIEMANN (L)
W/ CYS | REGAN (E)
W/ CYS |
| CLARK (L)
W/ CYS | STOLZ (L)
W/ CYS | DICKER (E)
W/ CYS | ✓LEAR
W/4 CYS |
| FAER (L)
W/ CYS | WISSALLO (L)
W/ CYS | KNIGHTON (E)
W/ CYS | W/ CYS |
| KNIEL (L)
W/ CYS | PURPLE (L)
W/ CYS | YOUNGBLOOD (E)
W/ CYS | W/ CYS |

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

- | | | | | |
|----------------------|--------------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| ✓ <u>REG FILE</u> | <u>TECH REVIEW</u> | DENTON | <u>LIC ASST</u> | <u>A/T IND</u> |
| ✓ AEC PDR | ✓ SCHROEDER | GRIMES | DIGGS (L) | BRAITMAN |
| ✓ OGC | ✓ MACCARY | GAMMILL | GEARIN (L) | SALTZMAN |
| ✓ MUNTZING/STAFF | ✓ KNIGHT | KASTNER | GOULBOURNE (L) | B. HURT |
| ✓ CASE | ✓ PAWLICKI | BALLARD | KREUTZER (E) | <u>PLANS</u> |
| GIAMBUSSO | ✓ SHAO | SPANGLER | LEE (L) | MCDONALD |
| BOYD | ✓ STELLO | <u>ENVIRO</u> | MAIGRET (L) | CHAPMAN |
| MOORE (L)(LWR-2) | ✓ HOUSTON | MULLER | REED (E) | DUBE w/input |
| ✓ DEYOUNG (L)(LWR-1) | ✓ NOVAK | DICKER | SERVICE (L) | E. COUPE |
| SKOVHOLT (L) | ✓ ROSS | KNIGHTON | SHEPPARD (L) | |
| GOLLER (L) | ✓ IPPOLITO | YOUNGBLOOD | SLATER (E) | ✓ D. THOMPSON (2) |
| P. COLLINS | ✓ TEDESCO | REGAN | SMITH (L) | ✓ KLECKER |
| DENISE | ✓ LONG | PROJECT MGR | ✓ TEETS (L) | ✓ EISENHUT |
| ✓ REG OPR | ✓ LAINAS | HARLESS | WILLIAMS (E) | |
| FILE & REGION (2) | ✓ BENAROYA | | WILSON (L) | |
| ✓ MORRIS | ✓ VOLLMER | | | |
| ✓ STEELE | | | | |

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

- | | | |
|--|-------------------------------|-----------------------|
| ✓ 1 - LOCAL PDR Cedar Rapids, IO | (1)(2)(10)-NATIONAL LABS | 1-PDR-SAN/LA/WY |
| ✓ 1 - TIC (ASERNATHY) | 1-ASLBP(E/W Bldg, Rm 529) | 1-BROOKHAVEN NAT LAB |
| ✓ 1 - NSIC (BUCHANAN) | 1-W. PENNINGTON, Rm E-201 GT | 1-G. ULRIKSON, ORNL |
| 1 - ASLB | 1-B&M SWINEBROAD, Rm E-201 GT | 1-AGMED (RUTH GUSMAN) |
| 1 - Newton Anderson | 1-CONSULTANTS | Rm B-127 GT |
| ✓ 5 - ACRS SENT TO LIC ASST <i>Teets</i> | NEWARK/RI/IME/ACBARTAN | |

Regulatory Docket File

IOWA ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY

General Office


CEDAR RAPIDS, IOWA

DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER

PALO, IOWA

AUGUST 15, 1974

DAEC - 74 - 292



Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Region III
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

SUBJECT: Abnormal Occurrence No. 50-331/74-28
FILE: A-118a

Dear Mr. Keppler:


In accordance with Appendix A to Operating License DPR-49, Technical Specifications and Bases for Duane Arnold Energy Center, please find enclosed a written report on the subject abnormal occurrence. Your office was notified of the occurrence by telegram at approximately 1300 hours on August 10, 1974.

Yours very truly,

G. G. Hunt
Chief Engineer
DAEC

JSA:GGH:bh
Enclosure

- CC: ✓ E. G. Case
C. W. Sandford
J. A. Wallace
E. L. Hammond
B. R. York
D. L. Wilson
O. C. Schellberg
L. D. Root
H. W. Rehrauer-Chairman, Safety Committee
J. R. Newman
G. A. Engle
B. L. Hopkins



8737

IOWA ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY

General Office

CEDAR RAPIDS, IOWA

Subject: Abnormal Occurrence
Report Number: AO 50-331/74-28
Report Date: August 16, 1974
Occurrence Date: August 10, 1974
Facility: Duane Arnold Energy Center, Unit No. 1, Palo, Iowa

Identification of Occurrence

Closed reactor pressure switch instrument isolation valves, reportable in accordance with Appendix A of Operating License DPR-49, Specification 1.0.4.b.

Description of Occurrence

On August 10, 1974, during a random inspection of the Reactor Protection System instrument panels, it was discovered that two reactor pressure switch instrument isolation valves were closed. One of the pressure switches provides a high reactor pressure trip signal to Reactor Protection System Channel A and the other to Channel B. (Redundant pressure switches providing a high reactor pressure trip signal to both Reactor Protection System Channels were found to be operable.)

The apparent cause of the occurrence was that the instrument isolation valves were inadvertently not opened following the completion of surveillance testing.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The two valves were last operated on July 18, 1974, during the performance of Surveillance Test Procedure No. 41A001, Rev. 1, Reactor High Pressure (RPS) Instrument Functional Test and Calibration. The technician who performed the surveillance test initialed the procedure step requiring that the instrument isolation valves be returned to the open position. He stated that to his best recollection, he returned all the isolation valves to the open position as indicated in the procedure.

However, the technician apparently was in error and inadvertently did not close two of the isolation valves at the completion of the surveillance test.

Analysis of Occurrence

It has been determined that the occurrence did not have a deleterious affect on plant safety. Reactor protection from high pressure was still provided in that one reactor pressure switch in each channel of the Reactor Protection System was fully operable.

Corrective Action

The closed instrument isolation valves were immediately opened and the instrument valves to the second pair of reactor pressure switches were verified open. Also, during the random inspection, all other Reactor Protection System instrumentation was inspected and found to have correct valve line-ups. The Surveillance Test Procedure was reviewed and found to be adequate with respect to the requirement for opening instrument isolation valves following the completion of testing. The technician who last completed Surveillance Test Procedure No. 41A001 was reinstructed as to the importance of using caution and verifying each step of a Surveillance Test Procedure is complete before signing the step.

Conclusion

The contents of this report, including corrective actions, were reviewed and approved by the DAEC Operations Committee on August 16, 1974. The Committee concluded that the occurrence did not present a hazard to the health and safety of the public.



G. G. Hunt
Chief Engineer
Duane Arnold Energy Center

JSA:DLW:GGH:bh