

UNITED STATES **NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

August 8, 2011

MEMORANDUM TO:

Harold K. Chernoff, Chief

Plant Licensing Branch I-2

Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

FROM:

Peter Bamford, Project Manager

Plant Licensing Branch I-2

Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

MEMORANDUM TO FILE: TRANSCRIPT FOR 10 CFR 2.206

Maniford

PETITION REGARDING LIMERICK SCRAMS - SECOND

TELECONFERENCE WITH PETITIONER

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide, and make publically available, a transcript of the second teleconference associated with a petition submitted by Mr. Thomas Saporito regarding the Limerick Generating Station. The petition was submitted pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 2.206. The enclosure contains the transcript from the petitioner's second opportunity to address the petition review board (PRB) which occurred on June 30, 2011. The transcript has been corrected based upon review by the NRC staff, as supported by the audio recording of the call. Areas where corrections were made to the original transcript are marked in square brackets.

Docket Nos. 50-352 and 50-353

Enclosure:

As stated

Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title: 10 CFR 2,206 Petition RE Limerick Scrams

Docket Number: [50-352, 50-353]

Location: (telephone conference)

Date: Thursday, June 30, 2011

Work Order No.: NRC-998 Pages 1-51

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1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA		
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		
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4	10 CFR 2.206 PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB)		
5	CONFERENCE CALL		
6	RE:		
7	LIMERICK SCRAMS		
8	+ + + +		
9	THURSDAY		
10	JUNE 30, 2011		
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12	The conference call was held, David Skeen, Chairperson		
13	of the Petition Review Board, presiding.		
14	PETITIONER: THOMAS SAPORITO		
15	PETITION REVIEW BOARD MEMBERS:		
16	DAVID SKEEN, Petition Review Board Chairman		
17	and Deputy Director, Division of Engineering, Office		
18	of Nuclear Reactor Regulation		
19	PETER BAMFORD, Petition Manager for 2.206		
20	Petition		
21	MERRILEE BANIC, 2.206 Petition Coordinator		
22	AUDREY KLETT, Performance Assessment Branch,		
23	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation		
24	MUHAMMAD RAZZAQUE, Reactor Systems Branch,		
25	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation		
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ROSEBROOK, Senior Project Engineer,

NRC REGION I STAFF:

Division of Reactor Projects, Region I

GLENN STEWART, Exelon Nuclear Licensing

ANDREW

ALSO PRESENT:

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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

10:04 a.m.

MR. BAMFORD: Hi. This is Peter Bamford with the NRC. Before we get started I just want to check and make sure that everybody is on the line that needs to be for this call.

I heard Region I and Mr. Saporito.

How about the court reporter?

COURT REPORTER: I'm here. This is the court reporter.

MR. BAMFORD: Okay.

How about the licensee?

MR. STEWART: Hey, Peter. You've got Glenn Stewart here, [from] Exelon.

MR. BAMFORD: Okay. All right. Then I think we'll get started.

I would like to thank everybody for attending this teleconference. My name is Peter Bamford. I'm the Limerick Generating Station [project] manager here at NRR.

We are here today to allow the petitioner, Thomas Saporito, to address the Petition Review Board regarding a 2.206 petition dated June 1, 2011, and supplemented by a teleconference held on June 13, 2011.

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1	I'm the petition manager for the petition
2	and the Petition Review Board chairman is David Skeen.
3	As part of the Petition Review Board's review of this
4	petition, Thomas Saporito has requested this
5	opportunity to address the PRB, Petition Review Board.
6	This teleconference is scheduled from
7	10:00 to 11:00 eastern time. It's being recorded by
8	the NRC Operations Center and will be transcribed by a
9	Court Reporter. The transcript will become a
10	supplement to the petition. The transcript will also
11	be made publicly available.
12	I would like to open the teleconference
13	with introductions. As we go around the room, please
14	be sure to clearly state your name, your position, and
15	the office you work for with the NRC for the record.
16	I'll start off. Peter Bamford, Office of
17	Nuclear Reactor Regulation here at the NRC.
18	CHAIRMAN SKEEN: This is Dave Skeen. I'm
19	also with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation at
20	the NRC and I'm the Petition Review Board chair.
21	MR. RAZZAQUE: This is Muhammad Razzaque
22	from Reactor Systems Branch, NRR.
23	
24	MS. KLETT: This is Audrey Klett. I'm a

reactor operations engineer with NRR.

1	MS. BANIC: Lee Banic, petition
2	coordinator, NRR.
3	MR. BAMFORD: That's it for folks here at
4	headquarters. Is there anybody from headquarters on
5	the phone? Okay.
6	How about NRC participants in the regional
7	office. Could you please introduce yourself?
8	MR. ROSEBROOK: Andy Rosebrook. I'm a
9	senior project engineer for Division of Reactor
10	Projects. That's in Region I.
11	MR. BAMFORD: Okay. Any representatives
12	of the licensee, please introduce yourself.
13	MR. STEWART: Glenn Stewart, Exelon
14	Nuclear Licensing.
15	MR. BAMFORD: Okay. Anybody else from
16	Exelon, Glenn?
17	MR. STEWART: There might have one or two
18	more that I was expecting but they haven't joined the
19	call.
20	MR. BAMFORD: Okay.
21	Mr. Saporito, would you please introduce
22	yourself for the record?
23	MR. SAPORITO: Yes. My name is Thomas
24	Saporito. I'm a senior consulting associate,
25	Saprodani Associates in Jupiter, Florida, and I'm the

petitioner in this proceeding.

MR. BAMFORD: It's not required for members of the public to introduce themselves for the call. However, if there are any members of the public on the phone that wish to do so at this time, please state your name for the record.

I would like to emphasize that we need to speak clearly and loudly to make sure that the court reporter can actually transcribe the teleconference. If you do have something you would like to say, please first state your name for the record.

For those dialing into the teleconference, please remember to mute your phones to minimize any background noise or distractions. If you do not have a mute button, you can do this by pressing the *6 key on your telepad and to unmute press the [*]6 key again. Thank you.

At this time I'll turn it over to the PRB chairman Dave Skeen.

CHAIRMAN SKEEN: Thanks. Good morning and welcome, everyone, to this second teleconference regarding the 2.206 petition submitted by Mr. Saporito.

I would like to first share some background on the process that we follow here. The

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section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations describe[s] the petition process. It's the primary mechanism for the public to request enforcement action by the NRC in a public process. This process permits anyone to petition the NRC to take enforcement type action related to NRC licensees or licensed activities.

Depending on the results of its evaluation, the NRC can modify, suspend, or [r]evoke an NRC-issued license or take any other appropriate enforcement action to resolve a problem. The NRC staff's guidance for the deposition of 2.206 petition request is in Management Directive 8.11 which is publicly available.

The purpose of today's teleconference is to give the petitioner an opportunity to provide any additional explanation or support for the petition before the Board makes our final decision.

This teleconference is not a hearing, nor is it an opportunity for the petitioner to question or examine the Petition Review Board on the merits or issues presented in the petition request.

No decisions regarding the merits of this petition will be made at this teleconference. Following the teleconference the Petition Review Board

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will conduct further internal deliberations. The outcome of these internal deliberations will then be discussed with the petitioner.

The Petition Review Board typically consists of a chairman, which is usually a manager at the senior executive service level at the NRC, as well as a petition manager and a PRB coordinator. Other members of the Board are determined by the NRC staff based on the content of the information that is in the petition request.

At this time I would like to introduce again the Board here. I'm [D]ave Skeen, Petition Review Board chairman. Peter Bamford is the petition manager and Marrilee Banic is the PRB coordinator.

The technical staff that we have includes Muhammad Razzaque from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Reactor Systems Branch[,] Andy Rosebrook from NRC Region I in the Division of Reactor Projects, and Audrey Klett from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Performance Assessment Branch.

As described in our process, the [NR]C staff may ask clarifying questions in order to better understand the petitioner's presentation and to reach a reasoned decision whether to accept or reject the petitioner's request for review under the 2.206

process.

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Now I would like to summarize the scope of the petition that is under consideration and the NRC's activities to date. On June 1, 2011, Mr. Saporito submitted to the NRC a petition under 2.206 regarding two scram events which occurred at the Limerick Generating Station Unit 2 on May 29th and May 30th, 2011.

In this petition request Mr. Saporito requested that the NRC take two actions. One, take escalated enforcement action against Exelon Generating Company, LLC, and suspend or revoke the NRC license granted for operation of the Limerick Generating Station.

Two, issue a notice of violation with a proposed civil penalty against the licensee and Mr. John Rowe, the chairman and chief executive officer of the Exelon Corporation in this matter.

basis for As the this request, Mr. Saporito states that on or about May 30, 2011 Limerick Generating Station experienced an unexpected shutdown, event, at Unit or scram 2 where two reactor recirculation pumps tripped offline during reactor start-up operations.

This significant event followed a similar

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significant event which occurred less than 36 hours earlier on the very same nuclear reactor where the nuclear reactor experienced the scram event.

He further states that the licensee failed to properly analyze, determine, and correct the root cause of the initial scram event which apparently led to the second scram event which did occur less than 36 hours later.

The petitioner is concerned that these unexpected scram events are serious events which challenge nuclear safety systems designed to protect public health and safety from exposure to nuclear particles and contamination.

Mr. Saporito states that the fact that the licensee failed to properly analyze, determine, and correct the root cause of the initial scram event prior to restarting the nuclear reactor in question significantly undermines any confidence that the NRC can have that the licensee will comply with the agency's safety regulations in the operation of the Limerick Generating Station under 10 CFR Part 50.

Thus, the petitioner's concern that the licensee cannot provide the NRC with any measure of reasonable assurance that it will comply with NRC regulations and requirements under 10 CFR Part 50 in

the operation of the Limerick Generating Station going forward.

Now I would like to discuss the NRC activities to date. On June 2, 2011, the petition manager contacted Mr. Saporito to discuss the 10 CFR 2.206 process and to offer an opportunity to address the PRB by phone or in person. Mr. Saporito requested to address the PRB by phone prior to its internal meeting to make the initial recommendation to either accept or reject the petition for review.

On June 13, 2011, we held this teleconference. At this time Mr. Saporito clarified the amount of the request for the civil penalty at \$500,000. The PRB then held it's internal meeting and on June 27, 2011, Mr. Saporito was informed of the PRB's initial recommendation regarding the petition which is to reject the petition for review because it does not provide any element of support beyond the basic assertions to warrant further inquiry.

Part of the Board's rationale for this initial determination is summarized as follows at this time. In both the original petition and in the June 13, 2011 teleconference the petition provided a summary of recent events at the Limerick Generating Station.

The PRB generally agrees that the events are described correctly. However, the petitioner's primary basis for the requested action is the assertion that the licensee did not perform a proper root cause analysis of these various events prior to the restart citing the lack of reactor such information in the 10 CFR 50.72 event reports that were made by the licensee.

I can certainly understand how someone could reasonably assume that the licensee did not perform a root cause analysis of the events based on the reading of the information in the 50.72 event notifications. However, I think it would be worthwhile at this point to explain to the petitioner a little bit about the NRC's reporting requirements and our follow-up process that we do to our reactor oversight process.

First, reports made under 10 CFR 50.72 are meant to inform the NRC in a timely manner about events such as the actuation of the reactor protection system at nuclear power plants in order to provide us with immediate notification of significant events where either immediate regulatory actions to protect the public health and safety may be required, or where the NRC needs timely and accurate information to

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respond to a heightened public concern.

The licensee is required to report a valid reactor protection system actuation to the NRC within a short period of time. [And f]or scram events the reporting requirement is four hours if the reactor was critical at the time of the [actuation].

As such, these reports are not mean to provide the root cause of an event but just to inform the NRC of the event in case immediate action is warranted, or if the NRC needs to respond to any public concerns.

In addition to the 50.72 event notification, licensees are also required to provide a more detailed report of the event to the NRC within 60 days of the occurrence of the event. This report is called a license event report, or an LER, and the requirements are provided in 10 CFR 50.73.

The NRC now has either received, or expects to receive, LERs from Limerick regarding all the scram events that were described in either the original petition or in the supplemental teleconference that we held on June 13, 2011.

In addition to these reporting requirements that all reactor licensees must follow, the NRC has resident inspectors at all nuclear power

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plant sites, including Limerick, to work at the site every day and respond to all plant scrams in order to monitor the licensee's action to evaluate the cause of the scram prior to the licensee restarting the unit.

The NRC inspectors are in contact with the managers in the NRC regional office on a daily basis. This interaction between the inspector and the NRC regional office ensures that NRC management is aware of the apparent cause of the event prior to the licensee's restart of the reactor so that the NRC is in a position to challenge the licensee about restarting if there is any safety concern.

In each of the cases at Limerick described by the petitioner, the resident inspectors monitored the restart process after the plant was scramed including the status of the licensee's investigation the causes of the event and the inspectors identified immediate safety with no concerns restarting the units.

Therefore, since the petitioner's request is based on the information in the 50.72 notifications and no additional facts or information have been provided beyond the description in the 50.72 reports, the Petition Review Board made an initial determination that the request should be rejected.

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Hopefully this short explanation helps in understanding part of the rationale for the PRB's initial recommendation.

Now, as a reminder for the phone participants, please identify yourself if you make any remarks as this will help us in the preparation of the teleconference transcript that will be made publicly available and I thank you for that.

At this time, Mr. Saporito, I'll turn it over to you to allow you to provide any further information you believe the PRB should consider before we make our final decision.

MR. SAPORITO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name for the record again is Thomas Saporito. I'm a senior consulting associate with Saprodani Associates based in Jupiter, Florida. We maintain a website at saprodani-associates.com with a hyphen between those two words spelled S-A-P-R-O-D-A-N-I - associates.com.

First of all, let me correct the record that was misrepresented in my view as stated by the NRC this morning. First of all, there was an initial petition filed by myself on June 1, 2011 and the enforcement action as stated by the NRC was correct. And there was a subsequent June 13, 2011

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teleconference call.

However, the NRC conveniently surmised that the gist of that teleconference call at the NRC was merely to request \$500,000 worth of enforcement action. That's wholly unsupported by the record in this proceeding. It's misleading to the public and to the media who may be attending this meeting.

It calls into question the NRC's credibility in this matter because the NRC is here to protect public health and safety. It's the only government agency charged by the United States congress to serve that function.

Now, let me clarify the background of this proceeding because it was not properly provided to the public by the NRC this morning. I received an email correspondence from Peter Bamford, B-A-M-F-O-R-D. He's an NRC employee. I received this on June 27, 2011.

The gist of this it says, "Based on information in your petition and the supplemental information you provide in a teleconference on June 13, 2011, PRB's initial recommendation is that the petition does not meet the criteria for review. Per NRC management directive MD 8.11 the facts that constitute the basis for taking that particular action

must be specified and the petitioner must provide some element of support beyond the [bare] assertion.

Your petition did not provide any element of support, i.e., new or pertinent facts related to the need for the requested action, beyond the basic assertions to warrant further inquiry. There is some other language in there. I was suppose[d] to get a written statement from the NRC to justify their denying the petition request. I never received that in the mail to this date.

Now, with that statement from that email letter from Mr. Bamford, I want to describe to the public and for the record how erroneous that statement is. On[], June 13, 2011 through the telephone conference, that telephone conference call was a supplement to the original petition.

For the public's information, when you file a petition under 2.206 you're not allowed to talk to the NRC with a dialogue. All you are allowed to do is make statements on the record like I'm doing here today but you can't talk to the NRC. You can't ask them, "What are you thinking here? What do you think about what I said? Do you want me to clarify anything?"

It doesn't happen. They just sit there.

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They are like sponges and hopefully they absorb what you're talking about. Apparently they didn't in this case because they made a terrible erroneous decision.

[Now t]he record that was transcribed by on Jun 13, 2011 clearly reflects the On page 11 of that record it stated following. specifically, "Because the licensee failed to properly analyze, determine, and correct the root cause of one or more scram events or nuclear reactor trips prior to the restart of the subject nuclear reactor, that action significantly undermines any confidence or reasonable assurance that the NRC can have that the comply with the [AEC's] licensee will safety regulations under 10 CFR Part 50 in operation of the Limerick Nuclear Plant.

It goes on to say on page 11 and 12 that,
"Petitioners request, (1) that the NRC suspend or
revoke the NRC licenses issued to the licensee
authorizing operation of the Limerick Nuclear Plant.

And (2) that the NRC issue a notice of violation with a civil penalty in the amount of \$500,000 against the licensee to make certain that the licensee realizes the serious, serious nature of the violation and endangerment to public health and safety and to ensure that recurrence of this type of

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violation is prevented."

Then the transcript continues on page 13 and says, "In addition, as the NRC stated this morning, the[y] conveniently again only describe two events that were the subject of the initial petition."

Again, this petition was supplemented by this record that I'm reading now, the July 13th teleconference record.

On page 13 it specifically says, "On February 25, 2011 Unit 2 employed a manual nuclear reactor trip from 100 percent power. On April 2, 2011, Unit 2 refueling outage activities and invertor alternate power manual transfer switch was transferred from the primary alternate to the secondary alternate position. This resulted in a primary containment isolation valve automatically closing on more than one system."

Continuing on page 14, "On May 29, 2011, Unit 2 nuclear reactor tripped offline. On May 30, 2011, Unit 2 was manually tripped offline. On June 3, 2011, Unit 1 tripped offline from 100 percent power."

Continuing on page 15, "This history highlights the seriousness of the events that have occurred during the short period of six months at the Limerick Nuclear Plant. The scram event, or an event

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where the nuclear reactor automatically shuts down or trips offline, places a tremendous amount of stress on the entire nuclear reactor system and supporting equipment. This stress can cause failure of one or more systems at any time, especially of the reactor vessels."

"And after 40 years of operation the reactor vessel at the Limerick Nuclear Station on has become embrittled to a certain degree from the [e]ffects of high-level radiation bombardment during the fission process which takes place in the reactor core during normal plant operations on a seven-day 24-hour basis."

Continuing on page 16. "Clearly this number of nuclear reactor scrams, be it automatic or manual, it should be seen by the NRC as unacceptable performance by the licensee. The NRC should increase its inspection activities in accordance with its own reactor oversight process and to ensure for the protection of public health and safety."

The record continues on page 18, "Petitioner further feels that there is a lack of training on system functionality and repair activities on the part of the licensee at the Limerick Nuclear Station.

There also appears to be a lack of supervisory oversight during repair activity at the Limerick Nuclear Station where apparently management were not doing their job to oversee the maintenance activities of the nuclear workers at the Limerick Nuclear Plant when they do repair activities at the plant, when they do post-maintenance activity on the repair activities at the plant, and when they do surveillance testing."

Continuing on page 19, "Most concerning to petitioners is the failure on the part of the licensee to affirmatively determine a root cause of the nuclear reactor trip prior to restart with a nuclear reactor."

Now, that record speaks for itself which I just read into the record for a second time. Clearly it shows that the NRC mislead the public this morning and they skimmed over all that evidence and all that supplemental information which the NRC Petition Review Board sitting here today at this meeting was required to review and required to consider.

We're not talking about just a couple of scram events or reactor trips that happened in approximately June of this year. We're talking about a sequence of reactor trips, either manually or automatic, where the reactor was inadvertently shut

down, for one reason or another, over the course of six months. Six months.

We're talking about plant nuclear workers who go in during a refueling outage[, you know], and open electrical circuits for an invertor to switch an invertor supply, power supply, from one position to another so that it can do some kind of testing and it automatically engages safety systems and containment isolation on more than one system.

Apparently they are not trained right, or maybe there's a problem with the procedures, or maybe there's a problem with the procedures and they are not trained right. For sure they are not supervised correctly. Where was the supervisor for those crews when that was happening?

Where was the interaction between the maintenance activities and plant operations when that event happened? That event could have happened for any other safety-related system. Fortunately for the public health and safety it happened to the containment isolation.

These were all put into the record. [T]he NRC Petition Review Board[] didn't bother looking at them. Didn't bother considering them but they are part of the record. They are required under the law

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to review that information and to consider it as supplemental information just the same as if I had written it word for word into the original petition. They apparently did not do that. [The] petition talks specifically to the reactor vessel itself and how brittle that reactor vessel is. Forty years of operation.

The Limerick Nuclear Plant at the very end of its original license, the original safety design basis and the final safety analysis report, during the fission process high-level radioactive neutrons are bombarding the metal of that reactor vessel day in and day out, 24 hours a day, seven days a week for the entire time that reactor is online. That causes the metal in the reactor vessel to become brittle.

This is a scientific fact. This is well known to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and known the has been to Nuclear Regulatory Commission since the agency was created in 1974 through the Energy Reorganization Act, and before that under the Atomic Energy Commission.

But the NRC Petition Review Board apparently didn't consider how embrittled the reactor vessel is. We're talking -- I'm only talking about six months here where the reactor has been tripped

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offline one time after another time after another time after another time for one reason after another reason after another reason.

That is a tremendous amount of stress placed on that reactor vessel and all the safety related systems associated in that scram event. That could cause that reactor vessel to s[h]atter just like a glass and then you're going to have a core meltdown just like in Japan where there are three nuclear reactors melting down simultaneously and nothing on this planet is going to stop that reactor from melting down.

It will be an uncontrolled nuclear reactor meltdown. It don't matter how many fire trucks you pull up there to pour water onto it, the water is going to come right out of the vessel because it's cracked or shattered. You're not going to stop that meltdown. You are going to release tremendous amounts of hydrogen as that water boils away.

The containment building is going to become full of hydrogen just like in Japan and you are going to have huge explosion just like in Japan, and you are going to contaminate the environment just like in Japan for miles and miles and miles by air, by land, and by sea. You are going to have to evacuate

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hundreds, if not millions, of people not just living around Limerick depending on wherever that wind carries that plum[e].

The seriousness of these reactor trips can not be understated here. [And] if you take into context the history of this plant, we could be here all day talking about how many times the reactor tripped offline prior to 2011 but I'm just talking about the first six months. This is a tremendous amount.

The NRC says, "Well, we protect public health and safety because we have a Reactor Oversight Process. Yeah. [And] you know, we periodically go in there on a quarterly basis and inspect different areas of the plant. If anybody would take the time to read this, it's a hopscotch type of inspection.

They don't inspect the entire plant. They just pick and choose certain areas. Then even if they find serious violations, you know, the chairman Gregory Jaczko, J-A-C-Z-K-O, I think he pronounces it Jaczko, it's his view and his policy that you don't cause the licensee to pay any fines.

No. What we'll do instead we'll just increase our inspection activities. Is that protecting public health and safety? Not in my view.

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If there is anybody in the public listening to this, this is how bad it's gotten in the United States.

Getting back to the chairman's remarks today, you know, he talked about the Petition Review Board, you know, they look at your petition in light of 10 CFR 50.72 reports, LERs, 10 CFR 50.73 reports. Apparently you got your information off these reports about whether or not the licensee reported a root cause.

But, you know what? The licensee is required to tell us about the root cause and their corrective actions in these other documents, the 50.72 documents, the 50.73 documents, licensee LERs, etc., etc. But, you know what? The NRC chairman, or spokesperson, today said that the NRC expects to receive these reports.

Expects to receive them. That means that they haven't received them. The NRC Petition Review Board made their flawed judgment on my petition requesting enforcement action without even having the benefit of these reports in front of them from the licensee. [Now, w]hy did they make this rush to judgment? What was so urgent that they couldn't wait for these reports to come in here before rejecting my petition out of hand?

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I demand on this public record today that the NRC forward a copy of the entire transcript to this case and all associated documents in connection with the filing of this petition to the NRC Office of the Inspector General so that agency can make an informed decision as to whether the NRC should be investigated for wrongdoing and noncompliance with their own regulations under [MD 8.11]. And a lack of common sense quite frankly.

I also request that a copy of all these same documents be provided to Senator Edward Markey of the United States Congress for his review. Also, the chairman or whoever the spokesperson was today from the NRC said, "We have resident inspectors. They were there in the control room and they didn't see any immediate safety concerns which would have prevented them from letting the licensee bring these reactors back online."

Well, if you read some of those documents from the NRC, you'll see that the resident inspectors looked to see if they followed procedures in restarting the reactor and controlling the situation from that point of view. The resident inspectors didn't go out there and do any inspection activities.

They didn't go out there and check the

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reactor vessel or do any type of investigation as to why the reactor was shut down manually or as to why the reactor tripped offline. No. In fact, the record speaks for itself. It shows the very short turnaround time in hours, a matter of hours from when the reactor is tripped offline to when it's restarted in full view and plain site of the NRC resident inspectors.

How is that protecting public health and safety? When you have a serious, serious event where reactor is tripped offline manually the automatically, the NRC should require the licensee to keep that reactor offline in a cold shutdown mode of operation until a[] thorough and valid and credible investigation is completed to the NRC's satisfaction to ensure that the root cause has been affirmatively identified and that preventive measures were taken so that particular event doesn't reoccur, that root cause that caused the reactor to trip offline, or the root cause that caused the operator to bring that reactor offline doesn't happen again.

That root cause could be a number of things. It could be improper training, a piece of equipment which is [defective], a piece of equipment which was improperly maintained, piece of equipment that housed a bad original equipment manufacturer's

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part in it, a surveillance test that was missed, employee didn't follow [a] procedure.

That root cause has to be determined and there is nobody with a lick of common sense that is going to accept the NRC's position that a nuclear plant can be turned around in a matter of hours and brought back online without determining what the root cause is. You have to shut it down and you have to take the time. It's going to take more than hours to do a proper investigation.

The NRC admitted on this public record today that they are still waiting on 10 CFR 50.72 documents, 10 CFR 50.73 documents from the licensee to describe exactly what the root cause was and what measures they took to prevent reoccurrence, etc., etc.

so the NRC made a rush to judgment, "[The] hell with public health and safety. We've got to help the licensee get this reactor back online so they can make their million dollars a day." That's right, a million dollars a day revenue for each nuclear reactor.

Now, I asked for enforcement action to suspend, revoke the license and to issue a monetary penalty. The NRC just blew all that off. Didn't even consider that. Didn't even as much take any

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enforcement action. They didn't increase inspection activities. They didn't issue notices [of] violation, nothing.

[And] recently the Brown Ferry Nuclear Power Plant operated by, I believe, Tennessee Valley Authorit[y], the licensee, the NRC over there issued a red finding. That's the highest violation that the NRC has on their books.

Why? Because there was apparently a valve that would not have operated when called to do its job because it had a defective seal or some part from the manufacturer was defective and it wasn't caught in a licensee surveillance program, etc., etc.

But the NRC issued a red finding. That's an escalated type of enforcement action that requires more oversight on the part of the NRC. That was just for one valve, one piece of equipment in the tens of thousands of pieces of equipment at the nuclear plant. Here talking about something a hundred fold more serious.

We're talking about a nuclear reactor tripping offline, manually or automatically, numerous times within a six-month period of time. We're talking about nuclear plant workers throwing the wrong switch causing [power] to fail on vital safety-related

equipment which caused containment isolation valves to actuate which they shouldn't have [done].

You're talking about employees who don't appear to be trained well or in procedures don't appear to be guiding these employees right. There appears to be a lack of understanding on make-no-break electrical cont[]acts when they change the power configuration from one inverter power supply to another. A lack of management supervisory oversight. A lack of communications between the control room and these maintenance activities.

But the NRC they didn't even consider that. The Petition Review Board just blows all that off, too. Well, there has got to be a reason that the NRC is failing to protect public health and safety in these circumstances, and there is.

A recent report by the Associated Press dated June 27, 2011, and other reports show the AP has reported that aging plants, their lives extended by industry and regulations are prone to breakdown that can lead to accidents. The AP found serious weaknesses in plants or evacuations around the plants including emergency drills to move people, and failure to test different scenarios involving weather or the time of day.

AP analysis also showed that four million people now live within 10 miles of 65 operating sites.

There are choke points everywhere with respect to evacuations. Most concerning to the public should be this statement.

[is] findings by the Associated These Playing With the Numbers this is entitled. Press. says, "Part of this investigation the Associated Press has reported that researcher's numbers and assumptions, along with NRC regulations, have been periodically adjusted to keep the reactors within the stated limits for operating safety."

Is that incredible or what? That means that the NRC has safety rules, regulations, standards, and guidelines like the ones I talk about concerning the reactor vessel, the degree that it's embrittled. Over the years the NRC has consistently relaxed these safety margins.

Otherwise, these nuclear reactors including the Limerick Nuclear Power Plant would not be operating today because I'm telling you here on this record today it's not a matter of if but a matter of when one of these 104 nuclear reactor vessels is going to crack and shatter and there is going to be a serious nuclear meltdown.

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I hope to God it's not the Limerick Nuclear Plant but the NRC has taken no investigative efforts, made no independent investigation or findings to determine just how embrittled and how brittle the vessel metal of the Limerick Nuclear Reactor is. But that was part of my petition and they didn't consider that.

That is something that they are required to consider in Management Directive 8.11. That's what this whole process is for; so the public can participate; so public stakeholders have a say in their own safety; so the NRC can be held accountable to do their jobs.

On my website that I mentioned earlier, saprodani-associates.com, if you go to that website there is the entire video portion of the AP investigative findings and it shows the complacency of the NRC. I stand to tell you today the NRC is extremely complacent with the oversight inspection activities and the lack of enforcement action at the Limerick Nuclear Power Generating Station.

As incredible as it may sound and seem, the record transcripts for June 13, 2011, clearly reflect -- I specifically asked at the end of my testimony on that record whether or not the NRC

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Petition Review Board had any questions and nobody on that entire panel, the same panel sitting here today I would imagine, had any questions. They didn't need anything clarified.

Nothing. That entire page after page of testimony they had no questions, not one. An NRC individual from, I believe, Region I had a question and it only had to deal with my interpretations of where I got the information that comprised the petition itself which was the event report.

The Petition Review Board didn't have a single question, didn't need anything clarified. Yet, in a very short time period they turn around and deny the petition. It's just a generic statement which the Chairman apparently mischaracterized the entire scope with the petition and supplemental testimony which makes the petition supplemented by law as it is being supplemented today so that the public gets the NRC's version which is a industry-friendly version so they can have a basis to deny these petitions.

That is part of the bigger problem of the NRC and this 2.206 process because I have written through the Federal Register's notice of how the process should be changed. The petitioner should be able to engage the Petition Review Board members in a

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court of law in front of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.

They need to be cross-examined and we need to be able to bring expert witness testimony to bear on the NRC because the NRC apparently is not a credible organization and a credible agency, I should say. They are not protecting public health and safety.

Now, clearly this entire record from the inception of the June 1, 2011 petition as supplemented on June 13, 2011 and as supplemented today clearly shows more than a sufficient basis for the NRC to take the escalated enforcement action I have requested.

I am again going on this record and again requesting the NRC to take escalated enforcement action against those entities described in the petition as the licensee and suspend, revoke their license, issue the \$500,000 civil penalty, notices of violation, require the licensee to make affirmative and definitive determinations as to root cause of each and every nuclear reactor trip or scram for the entire 2011 time period, this six months we're talking about from January through the end of June.

Require the licensee to review their training programs and review through testing the

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knowledge of their maintenance crews, the training of their management and supervisory personnel who oversee maintenance activities, to review any procedures or policies or lack thereof that should communication between the control room operators who were licensed by the NRC and the maintenance workers and supervisory personnel when maintenance activities are going on such as in a refueling outage where the electrical cont[]actor for the inverter, which was a make or break, inadvertently caused unwanted safetyrelated [action] in the containment isolation valve movement.

These are serious events and the NRC inspectors aren't doing their job because they don't get involved in these refueling outages to the extent they should have. These issues should have been highlighted by the resident inspectors. They should have demanded that their region get involved and send inspection teams out there, augmented inspection teams, find out where these root causes are before these reactors are allowed to be back on line.

The more times a reactor trips in such a short period of time in six months should be a red flag for the NRC that something is wrong here. These reactors should not be tripping offline so many times

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in such a short period of time. But where is the enforcement action?

Where are the notices of violation? Where is the civil penalty? Where's the confirmatory orders? They are all missing because the NRC is pronuclear energy. The NRC promotes nuclear energy through the failure of the agency to take enforcement action.

The NRC won't come out and say, "We are cheerleaders for the nuclear industry," but they will do it by not finding -- by not issuing monetary fin[e]s against a nuclear plant operator like the Limerick Generating Station for violating their safety margin. And they will not issue notices of violations.

They promote nuclear power by failing to issue notices of violations when these safety margins are violated. That is how they do it. That's how they promote it. There's a complacency, a generic complacency among the whole agency. There are 104 nuclear plants. The United States has more nuclear power plants than any other --

(Interruption by operator.)

MR. SAPORITO: Hello. Am I still on this phone?

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MR. BAMFORD: Yes, we can still hear you,
Mr. Saporito. It sounds like the headquarters
Operations Office may have unmuted for a second
possibly. Can you still hear me?

MR. SAPORITO: Yes. May I continue[?]

MR. BAMFORD: Okay. Why don't we just continue at this point.

MR. SAPORITO: All right. In summary, for the benefit and protection of public health and safety let [this] record reflect that the United States Congress should abolish the Commission, the NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and replace it with a structured organization with a director and, you know, a regular like the Department of Energy is structured with a [director], an assistant director, etc., etc. so there is some accountability. There is no accountability right now. It's my view public health and safety is in grave, grave danger from a serious nuclear accident.

I am going to once again offer the NRC Petition Review Board an opportunity to ask any questions so that I can take the time to make certain they fully understand the seriousness of this petition and why they are required under law to accept this petition.

CHAIRMAN SKEEN: Mr. Saporito, are you finished?

MR. SAPORITO: Yes, I am.

CHAIRMAN SKEEN: Thank you. This is Dave Skeen again. I appreciate your comments. I have a question on the reactor embrittlement. Do you have any information, technical information, that would indicate that the reactors are embrittled at Limerick?

MR. SAPORITO: Just the [fact] that the

plant has operated for the duration it has --

CHAIRMAN SKEEN: Okay.

MR. SAPORITO: and with the understanding that the -- excuse me. Let me finish. You asked a question -- and with the understanding that the neutron caused embrittlement when the fission process is going on, and to the extent that the AP, Associated with the Press, over investigation found that the reactor vessels are embrittled and, in fact, interviewed the NRC, and the that the NRC admitted reactor vessels become embrittled from the neutron bombardment, it stands to reason that the Limerick Nuclear Power Plant reactor vessel is embrittled.

I'm requesting that the NRC conduct an independent investigation to determine just -- we know

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40 it's brittle but we don't know how brittle. The NRC cannot here today tell the public just how brittle that reactor vessel is or whether it's going to crack, whether it's beyond the safety margin, even revised safety margins that the NRC has lessened over the years. That's a concern that we want resolved. I appreciate that. CHAIRMAN SKEEN: Okay. Thanks for that clarification. Also, I understand that you want the record of the prior phone call as well as this one to be considered supplements to your petition. Is that correct? MR. SAPORITO: Absolutely. Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN SKEEN: Okay. I think that's all the questions I have.

I'll ask staff, do you have any questions for Mr. Saporito?

Okay. Hearing none here, how about the Regions? Andy, do you have any questions?

MR. ROSEBROOK: I [don't] have [any] questions but there are a couple items just for the record. As indicated on the transcript on page 42, I am a member of the Petition Review Board and I did ask a clarifying question on June 13th that was directly related to the understanding what the basis of your initial [claim] was.

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One other item I think should be at least clarified in the record is the statement that Limerick has been operating for 40 years isn't totally accurate. Full power license was granted for Unit 1 in 1985 and Unit 2 in 1989. I just wanted to make that correction [to] the record.

I definitely appreciate your passion on this issue. I think I would like to understand what your -- you talk about the reactor oversight process. Based on the timeliness expectations for the NRC to take enforcement action on an issue, what is your understanding of how much time it takes to intercede a processing issue considering that these scrams happened late last month, or May?

MR. SAPORITO: Well, first of all, let me stand corrected. When reading the record I saw that you were from Region I. I was not aware -- I should have read the transcripts more accurately. I got up early today but had a bunch of things to do to get ready for this meeting but I didn't know you were a member of the Petition Review Board so I stand corrected on that point.

With respect to the age of these reactors, they have operated sufficient -- the Limerick plant has operated more than sufficient to cause

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embrittlement of the reactor vessel no matter if it has operated 40 years or not. The determination to the embrittlement is critical to reactor safety. That is one thing the NRC should look into.

With respect to reactor oversight process, it's a failed program in my view. The NRC used to have the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance, SALP. It was a much more effective The inspection entailed the entire plant program. all top to bottom, the systems, all procedures, interviews, etc.

For some reason the NRC did away with that program, replaced the reactor oversight process which basically has four pillars, or four corners of expectation, blah, blah, blah. Whether you meet those or not, the NRC will consider increasing inspection activities but it's not a clear-cut process and it's haphazard. The NRC only inspects part of the plant one time, part of it at another.

Maybe eventually it all gets inspected but the public is being denied the safety critique of the NRC because the entire plant is not being overviewed on a quarterly basis. There's a lot of stuff in those plants.

Tens of thousands of pieces of equipment

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and procedures and stuff that should be looked at on a quarterly basis by the NRC which are not. Whether it's the staffing, funding, whatever, I don't know what the problem is. All I know is the public is in grave jeopardy because of it.

With respect to the timeliness issue of the NRC, my point today was the Petition Review Board apparently made a rush to judgment in denying my petition without having the benefit of the documents that were required to be produced by the licensee under the regulations that I spoke to earlier.

employ the reactor oversight process with respect to operations of the Limerick Nuclear Power Plant, it is my contention, and it's just a matter of common sense, that when a nuclear reactor trips offline, if the NRC's mission was truly to protect public health and safety and the environment with respect to the Limerick Nuclear Power Plant, then the NRC should issue a confirmatory order preventing that nuclear power plant from restart until all the information that the licensee is required to provide the NRC, as was mentioned today, 10 CFR 50.72 and .73, etc., etc., licensee [event] reports, whatever is required, should have been provided to the NRC before that reactor was

August 8, 2011

MEMORANDUM TO:

Harold K. Chernoff, Chief

Plant Licensing Branch I-2

Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

FROM:

Peter Bamford, Project Manager /RA/

Plant Licensing Branch I-2

Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

MEMORANDUM TO FILE: TRANSCRIPT FOR 10 CFR 2,206

PETITION REGARDING LIMERICK SCRAMS - SECOND

TELECONFERENCE WITH PETITIONER

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide, and make publically available, a transcript of the second teleconference associated with a petition submitted by Mr. Thomas Saporito regarding the Limerick Generating Station. The petition was submitted pursuant to Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations*, Section 2.206. The enclosure contains the transcript from the petitioner's second opportunity to address the petition review board (PRB) which occurred on June 30, 2011. The transcript has been corrected based upon review by the NRC staff, as supported by the audio recording of the call. Areas where corrections were made to the original transcript are marked in square brackets.

Docket Nos. 50-352 and 50-353

Enclosure: As stated

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