## AP1000DCDCEm Resource

**From:** Will Martin [willm@virginia.edu]
**Sent:** Thursday, April 21, 2011 5:06 PM
**To:** Rulemaking Comments
**Subject:** Stop the AP1000 (Docket ID NRC-2010-0131)

Dear Secretary Vietti-Cook,

Three Mile Island and Chernobyl showed us what happens when nuclear power operators make mistakes. Fukushima showed us what happens when natural disasters strike a nuclear power plant. What we haven't seen yet is what happens when obsolete nuclear plants are never decommissioned as promised when built, and are used until they fail because corporations don't want to turn off profitable plants, even when they become dangerous, and they don't want to pay for decommissioning.

And then there's terrorists acts and potential future military attacks. Failed nuclear plants are long-term problems. Until the nuclear industry proves that it can be trusted to decommission their power plants like they promised before they built them, I don't trust them enough to want to let them build any more of them. Anywhere. Under any conditions.

Virginia has two power plants in Surry built in the late 1960s that were supposed to be decommissioned after 30 years. They are still operating.

In the wake of the crisis at Fukushima, it has become clear that we cannot afford to take any unnecessary risks when building nuclear reactors. Because disaster can occur at any nuclear reactor, the NRC needs to ensure that it has taken all possible precautions before moving forward with the new Westinghouse AP1000 reactor design considered for construction in Georgia, South Carolina and other states.

Addressing safety concerns, not satisfying the industry, should be the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's primary concern. NRC engineer John S. Ma's non-concurrence with the review of the reactor raised the possibility that the AP1000's shield building could shatter "like a glass cup." It would be indefensible for the NRC to move forward without further addressing that weakness. Also, Westinghouse has not satisfactorily proved that the thin steel containment shell over the reactor would be effective during severe accidents or that the reactor could be properly cooled in conditions similar to those at Fukushima.

Especially considering the ongoing crisis in Japan and the review which will take place when the situation is brought under control, the current 75-day public comment period on the reactor design is insufficient for the new AP1000 reactor. I request that the NRC put the license application on hold until a thorough review of the Japanese accident has been conducted and weaknesses in the AP1000 design have been reviewed in light of the accident. To stick with the grossly inadequate 75-day rulemaking comment period would be the height of irresponsibility by the NRC.

Also, please accept the petition filed by the twelve environmental organizations of the AP1000 Oversight Group to suspend rulemaking. To ensure transparency, please include this comment and all others in the formal review proceedings and post them in the NRC's online library so the public can see any expressed concerns.

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