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TOKYO, JAPAN

July 15, 2011

Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Attention: Mr. Jeffrey A. Ciocco

Docket No. 52-021 MHI Ref: UAP-HF-11218

Subject: Transmittal of the amendment of the Updated Tier 2, Chapter 12 of US-APWR DCD

- Reference: 1) Letter MHI Ref: UAP-HF-11078 from Y. Ogata (MHI) to U.S. NRC, "Submittal of US-APWR Design Control Document Revision 3 in Support of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.'s Application for Design Certification of the US-APWR Standard Plant Design" dated on March 31, 2011.
 - Letter MHI Ref: UAP-HF-11091 from Y. Ogata (MHI) to U.S. NRC, "Transmittal of the Updated Tier 2, Chapters 9, 10 and 12 of US-APWR DCD" dated on April 6, 2011.
 - Letter MHI Ref: UAP-HF-11208 from Y. Ogata (MHI) to U.S. NRC, "Transmittal of the amendment of the Updated Tier 2, Chapter 12 of US-APWR DCD" dated on July 7, 2011.

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. ("MHI") transmitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") Staff the proposed mark-up to be made to DCD Revision 3 (Reference 1) under MHI Reference UAP-HF-11091 on April 6, 2011 (Reference 2) and UAP-HF-11208 on July 7, 2011 (Reference 3). In the proposed mark-up, sentences described in both Chapters 9 and 12, and both Chapters 10 and 12 should be consistent, however, sentences in Chapter 12 unintentionally are inconsistent a little.

With this letter, MHI submits to the NRC Staff the amendment of the proposed mark-up for Chapter 12. This update will be incorporated into future DCD revisions.

Please contact Dr. C. Keith Paulson, Senior Technical Manager, Mitsubishi Nuclear Energy Systems, Inc. for any questions concerning any aspect of this letter. His contact information is provided below.

Sincerely,

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Yoshiki Ogata, General Manager- APWR Promoting Department Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, LTD.



Enclosure:

1. Update of Tier 2, Chapter 12 of US-APWR DCD

CC: J. A. Ciocco C. K. Paulson

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Enclosure 1

UAP-HF-11218 Docket No. 52-021

Update of Tier 2, Chapter 12 of US-APWR DCD

July, 2011

Table 12.3-8 Regulatory Guide 4.21 Design Objectives and Applicable DCD Subsection Information for Minimizing Contamination and Generation of Radioactive Waste (Sheet 15 of 61)

Water Systems

(Note: The "System Features" column consists of excerpts/summary from the DCD)

Condensate Storage Facility

Objective		System Features	DCD Reference
1	Minimize leaks and spills and provide containment in areas where such events may occur.	The CST overflow is directed to the Condensate Storage Tank sump inside the dike area. The sump is equipped with a level instrument to detect fluid level and initiates alarms via representative alarm in the MCR for operator actions to stop condensate transfer and to investigate the extent of condition. After analysis for level of contamination, the content inside the dike area can be trucked to WWS for disposal; or two the LWMS for treatment and release.	9.2.6.2.4
		The transfer piping running between the CST and the hotwell is single-walled welded stainless steel piping in a coated trench with removable but sealed covers. This design is supplemented by periodic hydrostatic or pressure testing of pipe segments, instrument calibration, and when required, visual inspection and maintenance of piping, trench and instrument integrity, in compliance with the guidance of RG 4.21 and industry operating experience.	9.2.6.2.4
2	Provide for adequate leak detection capability to provide prompt detection of leakage for any structure, system, or component which has the potential for leakage.	Piping in a coated trench with removable but sealed covers, this design is supplemented by periodic hydrostatic or pressure testing of pipe segments, instrument calibration, and when required, visual inspection and maintenance of piping, trench and instrument integrity.	9.2.6.2.4

Table 12.3-8 Regulatory Guide 4.21 Design Objectives and Applicable DCD Subsection Information for Minimizing Contamination and Generation of Radioactive Waste (Sheet 60 of 61)

Objective		System Features	DCD Reference
1	Minimize leaks and spills and provide containment in areas where such events may occur.	The condensate piping from the ASSS drain tank is a single-walled carbon steel pipe run above ground in pipe chases from the A/B to the T/B, and is then connected to double-walled welded carbon steel piping through the T/B wall penetration to the auxiliary boiler. Since this is not a high traffic area, this segment of pipe is run above ground and is slightly sloped so that any leakage is collected in the outer pipe and drained to the auxiliary boiler building. At the auxiliary boiler building end, a leak detection instrument is provided to monitor leak. A drain pipe is provided to direct any drains to the building sump. The steam piping is jacketed with insulation and heat protection. The Auxiliary Boiler is designed with a blowdown connection from the boiler drum to the building sump. The boiler blowdown is drained directly into the sump for transfer into the Turbine Building sump. The T/B sump contents are then pumped to the Waste Holdup Tanks in the LWMS for processing. This design is supplemented by operational programs which includes periodic hydrostatic or pressure testing of pipe segments, instrument calibration, and when required, visual inspection and maintenance of piping, trench and instrument integrity.	10.4.11.2.1
2	Provide for adequate leak detection capability to provide prompt detection of leakage for any structure, system, or component which has the potential for leakage.	The auxiliary steam drain monitors the leakage of the radioactive materials from the boric acid evaporator to the condensed water of the ASSS. Monitoring the leakage from the primary side of the evaporator, the radiation monitor is attached to the downstream of the auxiliary steam drain pump. The high alarm of the monitor isolates the pump discharge line and steam supply line from main steam and trips the pump. Leakage of radioactive materials from primary side in the B/A evaporator.	10.4.11.1.2 10.4.11.2.1 10.4.11.2.3

Auxiliary Steam Supply System (Note: The "System Features" column consists of excerpts/summary from the DCD)

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