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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
STANDARD REVIEW PLAN
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SECTIONS 2.2.1 - 2.2.2 IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL HAZARDS IN SITE VICINITY

REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES

Primary - Accident Analysis Branch (AAB)

Secondary - None

I. AREAS OF REVIEW

Locations and separation distances from the site of industrial, military, and transportation facilities and routes in the vicinity of the site. Such facilities and routes include air, ground, and water traffic, pipelines, and fixed manufacturing, processing, and storage facilities. Potential external hazards or hazardous materials that are present or which may reasonably be expected to be present during the projected life time of the proposed plant. The purpose of this review is to establish the information concerning the presence of potential external hazards which is to be used in further review in Sections 2.2.3, 3.5.1.5, and 3.5.1.6.

II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

1. Data in the SAR adequately describes the locations and distances of industrial, military, and transportation facilities in the vicinity of the plant, and is in agreement with data obtained from other sources, when available.

2. Descriptions of the nature and extent of activities conducted at nearby facilities, including the products and materials likely to be processed, stored, used, or transported, are adequate to permit evaluations of possible hazards in Part 3 review sections dealing with specific hazards.

3. Where potentially hazardous materials may be processed, stored, used, or transported in the vicinity of the plant, sufficient statistical data on such materials are provided to establish a basis for evaluating the potential hazard to the plant.

III. REVIEW PROCEDURES

Selection and emphasis of various aspects of the areas covered by this review plan will be made by the reviewer on each case. The judgment of the areas to be given attention during the review is to be based on an inspection of the material presented, the similarity of the material to that recently reviewed on other plants, and whether items of special safety significance are involved. The following procedures are followed:

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1. The reviewer should be especially alert, in the construction permit(CP) stage review, for any potentially hazardous activities in close proximity of the plant, since the variety of activities having damage potential at ranges under about one kilometer can be very extensive. All identified facilities and activities within eight kilometers (5 miles) of the plant should be reviewed. Facilities and activities at greater distances should be considered if they otherwise have the potential for affecting plant safety-related features. At the operating license (OL) stage, most hazards will already have been identified. Emphasis should be placed on any new information. At the operating license stage, any analyses pertaining to potential accidents involving hazardous materials or activities in the vicinity of the plant will be reviewed to ensure that results are appropriate in light of any new data or experience which is then available. Facilities which are likely to either produce or consume hazardous materials should be investigated as possible sources of traffic of hazardous materials past the site.

2. Information should be obtained from sources other than the SAR wherever available, and should be used to check the accuracy and completeness of the information submitted in the SAR. This independent information may be obtained from sources such as U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) maps and aerial photos, published documents, contacts with state and federal agencies, and from other nuclear plant applications (especially if they are located in the same general area or on the same waterway.) Information should also be obtained during the site visit and subsequent discussions with local officials. (See Standard Review Plan 2.1.1 for further guidance with regard to site visits.) An attempt should be made to investigate future potential hazards over the proposed life of the plant.

3. The specific information relating to types of potentially hazardous material, including distance, quantity, and frequency of shipment, is reviewed to eliminate as many of the potential accident situations as possible by inspection, based on past review experience. At the operating license stage, nearby industrial, military and transportation facilities and transportation routes will be reviewed for any changes or additions which may affect the safe operation of the plant. If these changes alter the data or assumptions used in previous hazards evaluations or demonstrate the need for new ones, appropriate evaluations will be performed.

   For pipeline hazards, Reference 7 may be used as an example of an acceptable risk assessment. For cryogenic fuels, Reference 9 may be used, and for tank barge risks, Reference 8. For military aviation, Reference 10 may be used. Safe separation distances for explosives are identified in Reference 2, and for toxic chemicals, References 3 and 4 should be consulted.

   The distance from nearby railroad lines is checked to determine if the plant is within the range of a "rocketing" tank car which, from Reference 5, is taken to be 350 meters with the range for smaller pieces extending to 500 meters.

4. Potential accidents which cannot be eliminated from consideration as design basis events because the consequences of the accidents, if they should occur, could be serious enough to affect plant safety-related features, are identified. Potential accidents so identified are assessed in detail, using criteria in Standard Review Plan Sections 2.2.3, 3.5.1.5, or 3.5.1.6, as appropriate.

IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS

The reviewer verifies that sufficient information has been provided, and that his evaluation is sufficiently complete and adequate to support conclusions of the following type, to be used in the staff's safety evaluation report:

"The nature and extent of activities involving potentially hazardous materials which are conducted at nearby industrial, military, and transportation facilities have been evaluated to identify any such activities which have the potential for adversely affecting plant safety-related structures. Based on evaluation of information contained in the SAR, as well as information independently obtained by the staff, it is concluded that all potentially hazardous activities in the vicinity of the plant have been identified. The hazards associated with these activities have been reviewed and are discussed in Sections _____ and _____ of this SER."

If the activities are identified as being potentially hazardous, the evaluations described in Standard Review Plans 2.2.3, 3.5.1.5 and 3.5.1.6 are performed with respect to the inherent capability of the plant or special plant design measures to prevent radiological releases in excess of the 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines.

V. REFERENCES

1. Department of the Army Technical Manual TM5-1300, "Structures to Resist the Effects of Accidental Explosions," June 1969.

2. Regulatory Guide 1.91, "Evaluation of Explosions Postulated to Occur on Transportation Routes Near Nuclear Power Plant Sites."

3. Regulatory Guide 1.78, "Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release."

4. Regulatory Guide 1.95, "Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators Against an Accidental Chlorine Release."

5. National Transportation Safety Board Railroad Accident Report, "Southern Railway Company, Train 154, Derailment with Fire and Explosion, Laurel, Mississippi, January 25, 1969," October 6, 1969.

6. Regulatory Guide 1.70, "Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 2.

7. NUREG-0014 Safety Evaluation Report, Hartsville Nuclear Plants A1, A2, B1, and B2, April 1976, Docket STN 50-518.

8. Safety Evaluation of the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 November 9, 1976 and supplements. Docket 50-412.

9. Safety Evaluation Report, Hope Creek Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Supplement No. 5, March 1976, Docket 50-354 and 50-355.

10. Project 485, Aircraft Considerations, Preapplication Site Review, Boardman Nuclear Plant. October 1973.

* U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1978—720-387/277