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DRESSEN, J.D.	Wisconsin Public Service Corp.	
SCHROCK, C.A.	Wisconsin Public Service Corp.	
RECIP.NAME	RECIPIENT AFFILIATION	

SUBJECT: LER 93-003-00:on 930306,three MS valves found inoperable due to mechanical drift.Cause of event not been determined. Safety valves will be disassembled,rebuilt & tested.Suppl to LER will be provided.W/930406 ltr.

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	NRR/DSSA/SRXB	1	1 🤅	REG FILE 02	1	1
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EXTERNAL:	EG&G BRYCE, J.H	2	2	L ST LOBBY WARD	1	1.
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NRC-93-060 EASYLINK 62891993

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION

600 North Adams • P.O. Box 19002 • Green Bay, WI 54307-9002

April 6, 1993

10 CFR 50.73

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Ladies/Gentlemen:

Docket 50-305 Operating License DPR-43 Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Reportable Occurrence 93-003-00

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73, "Licensee Event Report System," the attached Licensee Event Report (LER) for reportable occurrence 93-003-00 is being submitted. This LER is being submitted 31 days after the event occurred. Our NRC Project Manager was informed of this on April 6, 1993.

Sincerely,

C.a. School

C. A. Schrock Manager-Nuclear Engineering

JDD

Attach.

cc - INPO Records Center US NRC Senior Resident US NRC, Region III

7304120058 730406 PDR ADUCK 05000305 S PDR

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NRC Form (9-83)	366		<u>.</u>		· · · · · ·		LIC	ENSE	E EVE	NT RE	PORT	(LER)	-		U.S. N	UCLEA APPRC EXPIR	AR REG DVED O IES 8/3	ULAT M8 NG 1/85	ORY CO	.0104	SION
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On March 6, 1993, with the plant in hot shutdown for the 1993 refueling outage, Surveillance Procedure 06-077, Main Steam Safety Valve Test" was performed. During the performance of the procedure it was discovered that the lift pressure of three of the ten main steam (MS) safety valves was out of tolerance, and hence, were declared inoperable.

The three inoperable MS valves will be disassembled, rebuilt and tested before exceeding hot shutdown after the 1993 refueling outage. The cause of the safety valve failure will be investigated further when the valves have been disassembled. A supplement to this LER will be provided to report the results of that investigation.

Sufficient pressure relieving capability existed to ensure the health and safety of the public at all times through a combination of the relieving capability of the MS safety valves and the non-safety related steam relief capabilities of the system.

NRC Form 386A (9-83)	LICENSEE EVENT REPOR	T (LER) TEXT CONTINU	ATION	U.S. NUCLEAR REG APPROVED O EXPIRES: 8/3	IULATORY COMMISS MB NO: 3150-0104 1785
FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER	1 (6)	PAGE (3)

Kewaunee	Nuclear	Power	Plant	
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DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LEA NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)					
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Description of Event

TEXT /// more space is required, use additional NRC Form 385A/a/ (17)

On March 6, 1993, with the plant in hot shutdown for the 1993 refueling outage, Surveillance Procedure (SP) 06-077, "Main Steam Safety Valve Test, " was performed. During the performance of SP 06-077 the lift pressure of three of the ten main steam (MS) safety valves was found to be out of tolerance, hence, the valves were declared inoperable.

In accordance with the IST plan, two of the ten MS safety valves are selected each year to be tested. MS safety valves SD1A3 and SD1A4 were scheduled to be tested during the 1993 refueling outage. SP 06-077 requires that the as found lift pressure be recorded and meet two criteria, the test acceptance criterion and the set pressure acceptance criterion.

The test acceptance criterion is a wide band of -3 percent and +2 percent of the valve's nominal setpoint. Valves with lift pressures within this range are considered operable since they demonstrated acceptable performance within an analyzed range. If the as found lift pressure is outside of the test acceptance criterion the valve is considered inoperable.

The set pressure acceptance criterion is a narrower band of ± 1 percent of the nominal set point. If the lift pressure is within this band on two consecutive tests the valve may be returned to service. If a valve's as found lift pressure is outside of the set pressure acceptance criterion, but within the test acceptance criterion the valve is considered operable but must be adjusted and tested prior to returning it to service.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)
		YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION	
Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant	0 5 0 0 0 3 0 5	93-003-00	0 3 0 f 1 0
TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 386A's) (17)			

There are five MS safety values for each steam generator (SG), SD1A1 through SD1A5 and SD1B1 through SD1B5. These values are used to protect the 1A and 1B SGs from overpressurizing following certain postulated upset conditions. They are located outside of containment on the respective 30 inch MS headers (reference figure 1). The five safety values for each SG are set to relieve at 1074, 1090, 1105, 1120 and 1127 psig, respectively. The total combined relieving capacity of all 10 safety values is 7.71E+6 lb/hr at 1160 psig. The maximum full power steam flow at 1721 MWTH (104 percent of licensed power) is 7.45E+6 lb/hr; therefore, the main steam safety values can relieve the total maximum steam flow if necessary.

When the MS safety values are tested, steam line pressure is between 900 and 1000 psig. A hydroset is used to increase pressure to the lift setpoint of the value being tested. The pressure from the hydroset and the steam line pressure is then added to determine the lift setpoint of the value. If a value's lift set point does not meet the test acceptance criterion, the following steps are required:

- The group supervisor and shift supervisor shall be notified immediately.
- 2. A Surveillance Procedure Exception Report, an Incident Report and a work request shall be written.
- 3. The valve shall be repaired or replaced.
- 4. Two additional valves must also be tested and if the set pressure of either of the two additional valves falls outside of the test acceptance criterion, all remaining MS safety valves shall be tested.

NRC-Form 366A (9-83)

LICENSEE EVENT	REPORT (LER) TEXT	CONTINUATION
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U.B. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)
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During the 1993 refueling outage, MS safety values SD1A3 and SD1A4 were selected to be tested and rebuilt in accordance with SP-06-077. When the values were tested, SD1A4 was found to be within the set pressure criterion, and SD1A3 was found to be outside of the test acceptance criterion. Because SD1A3 was found to be outside of the acceptance criterion, two additional values, SD1A5 and SD1A2, were chosen to be tested.

When SD1A5 was found to be outside of the test acceptance criterion, all the remaining valves required testing.

Safety valve SD1A2 was tested next. During the testing of SD1A2 a noticeable precalibrated zero shift was noted on the pressure gauge used to measure the hydroset pressure. Due to the zero shift, a calibration check was performed on the gauge and it was found to be reading 50 psig low. Because the gauge was reading 50 psig low there were concerns of the gauge's accuracy during the previous tests. It should be noted that this gauge was calibrated prior to performance of SP-06-077, in accordance with standard KNPP practices.

When the pressure gauge was replaced, valve SD1A1 was tested and the actuation pressure was within the set pressure acceptance criterion, reference table 2. Safety valves SD1B1 through SD1B5 were tested next.

When safety valves SD1B1 through SD1B5 were tested, SD1B4 was found to be within the set pressure acceptance criterion. Valves SD1B3 and SD1B5 were operable but needed setpoint adjustment. Valves SD1B1 and SD1B2 were found to be outside of the test acceptance criterion and were declared inoperable.

NRC-Form 366A (9-83)

URC: Form 366A 9-831 LICENSEE EVENT REPO	ORT (LER) TEXT CONTINU	U.S.	APPROVED OF EXPIRES: 8/31	ULATORY COMMISSION M8 NO. 3150-0104 /85
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Because the data obtained from testing SD1A2, SD1A3, SD1A4 and SD1A5 was considered to be in question, due to an inaccurate pressure gauge, it was decided to retest these valves. When valves SD1A2, SD1A3, SD1A4 and SD1A5 were retested, SD1A2 and SD1A4 met the set pressure acceptance criterion. Valve SD1A3 was operable but needed a setpoint adjustment. Valve SD1A5 was found to be outside of the test acceptance criterion, reference table 2.

The valves which met the set pressure acceptance criteria, SD1A1, SD1A2 and SD1B4, do not require repair or further testing. The valves which were found to be outside of the set pressure acceptance criteria but inside the test acceptance criterion, SD1B3 and SD1B5, will be adjusted to be within the set pressure acceptance criteria before exceeding hot shutdown from the 1993 refueling outage. The valves which failed, SD1A5, SD1B1 and SD1B2, will be disassembled, rebuilt and tested to ensure they are within the set pressure criterion prior to exceeding hot shutdown after the 1993 refueling outage. Because SD1A3 and SD1A4 were scheduled to be tested during the 1993 refueling outage they will be rebuilt and verified to be within the set pressure acceptance criterion prior to exceeding hot shutdown.

Cause of Event

The cause of valves SD1A5, SD1B1 and SD1B2 to fail the surveillance test has not been determined. These valves will be disassembled, rebuilt and tested later in the 1993 refueling outage. The results of the rebuild will be supplied in a supplement to this LER.

LICENSEE EVENT I	REPORT (LER)	TEXT CONTINUATION
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

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Analysis of Event

NRC Form 366A (9-83)

> This event is reportable in accordance with 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) as a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant. This event was also reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) at 1239 on March 6, 1993.

> A review of the KNPP Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) indicates that the MS safety valves are needed to mitigate the following accidents: RCP Locked Rotor, Loss of Load, Loss of Feedwater, Uncontrolled Rod Withdrawal, SG Tube Rupture and the Anticipated Transient Without Scram. The review concluded that the main steam isolation valves are not required to isolate for the accidents mentioned above. Because the MS isolation valves do not actuate there is a high level of confidence that the steam dump system would be able to perform its function and relieve SG pressure (reference figure 1).

> The steam dump system is designed for the turbine generator to accept a load rejection from 100 percent power to approximately 5 percent power without a reactor trip. The design capacity of the SD system is 85 percent of the plant design steam flow at 100 percent power. There are six condenser steam dump valves, three for each SG, with a relieving capacity of 3.00E6 lb/hr, or 40 percent of maximum calculated steam flow. There are also six atmospheric steam dump valves, three for each SG, with a relieving capacity of 3.37E6 lb/hr, or a total capacity of 45 percent of maximum calculated steam flow at 735 psig SG pressure.

> The total relieving capacity of the steam dump system is 6.37E6 lb/hr at 735 psig. With three SG safety valves inoperable, SD1B1, SD1B2 and SD1A5, which are capable of relieving 2.30E6 lb/hr, the

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMI (9.83) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/85					
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		YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER			
Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant	0 5 0 0 3 0 5	9 3 - 0 0 3 - 0 0	0 7 0 F 1 0		

steam dump system would have been able to relieve the SG pressure and allow operators to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition without any threat to the health and safety of the public.

There are also two power operated relief values, one on each MS header, upstream of the MS isolation values (reference figure 1). These values are used to minimize safety value operation during small pressure excursions. Each value has a relieving capacity of 3.72E5 lb/hr at 1050 psig. These values are automatically set to relieve at 1050 psig, which is below the lowest setpoint of the SG safety values. These values would be relieving pressure before the SG safety values would open, thus further enhancing the pressure relieving capabilities.

A hydrostatic test was performed on the secondary side of the SGs during construction. The test was performed at 1360 psig. The three valves which were inoperable would have actuated well before the pressure would have increased to 1360 psig. The ten SG safety valves were available to maintain SG pressure below the test pressure, therefore the SG would not have overpressurized beyond a pressure that it has been tested to.

Corrective Actions

Safety values SD1A5, SD1B1 and SD1B2 will be disassembled, rebuilt and tested before starting up after the 1993 refueling outage. The cause of the safety values to fail may be determined when the values are disassembled. A supplement to this LER will be provided after the work is completed.

LICENSEE EVENT	REPORT	(LER) TEXT	CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

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Additional Information

NAC Form 366A

Equipment Failure: Dresser Industrial Valve and Equipment, Model number 6-3787A-X1-RT-21-XLP1 Safety valve.

Similar Events: None.

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VRC Form 305A (9.63)		LICENSEE	EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINU	ATION	U.S. NUCLEAF APPROV EXPIRE	REGULATORY COMMISS (ED OMB NO. 3150-0104 S: 8/31/85	
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	•		T TEST DATA BEFORE REPLA	ABLE 1 ACING FAULTY PRESSUF	E GUAGE			
VALVE	TEST #	SETPOINT	SET PRESSURE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA (±1%)	TEST ACCEPTANCE C (-3%,+2%)	RITERIA	ACTUATION PRESSURE	STATUS	
SD1A4	1 2 3	1105	1094-1116	1072-1127		1121 1095 1104	OPERABLE	
SD1A3	1 2	1074	1053-1074	1042-1095		1099 10 <u>68</u>	INOPERABLE	
SD1A5	1 2	1127	1116-1138	1093-1145 ⁽¹⁾		1148 1118	INOPERABLE	
SD1A2	1 2 3	1090	1079-1101	1057-1112		1077 1058 1053	INOPERABLE	
VALVE	TEST #	SETPOINT	SET PRESSURE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA (+1%)	TEST ACCEPTANCE (-3%,+2%)	CRITERIA	ACTUATION PRESSURE	FINAL STATUS	
SD 1A 1	1	1120	(±1%) 1109-1131	1086-1143		1130	OPERABLE	
SD1B1	2	1127	1116-1138	1093-1145 ⁽¹⁾		1127	INOPERABLE	
SD1B2	1	1105	1094-1116	1072-1127		1187 1125	INOPERABLE	
SD1B3	1 2	1074	1053-1074	1042-1095	· · · · · · · ·	1080 1080	OPERABLE ADJUSTMENT NEEDED	
SD 1 B4	1 2 3	1090	1079-1101	1057-1112		1107 1086 1090	07 OPERABLE 36 20	
SD 185	1 2 3	1120	1109-1131	1086-1143		1143 1109 1099	OPERABLE ADJUSTMENT NEEDED	
SD1A5	1 2 3	1127	1116-1138	1093-1145 ⁽¹⁾		1134 1139 1147	INOPERABLE	
SD1A4	1 2 3	1105	1094-1116	1072-1127		1123 1115 111 3	OPERABLE	
SD1A3	1 2 3	1074	1053-1074	1042-1095		1089 1086 1089	OPERABLE ADJUSTMENT NEEDED	

1057-1112

1104 1087 1096

OPERABLE

(1)THESE VALVES LIMITED TO +1.6% BASED ON SG DESIGN PRESSURE

1090

1179-1101

NRC FORM 366A (9.83)

SD1A2

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1 2 3

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