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 AUTH. NAME      AUTHOR AFFILIATION  
 SCHOMMER, K.      Wisconsin Public Service Corp.  
 SCHROCK, C.A.      Wisconsin Public Service Corp.  
 RECIP. NAME      RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 92-016-00: on 920824, review of surveillance procedure  
 55-167-1 indicated blowdown sampling valve in excess of  
 closing time. Caused by personnel error. Valve BT-31A declared  
 inoperable, BT-32A closed & BT-31A retested. W/920923 ltr.

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September 23, 1992

10 CFR 50.73

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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Gentlemen:

Docket 50-305  
Operating License DPR-43  
Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant  
Reportable Occurrence 92-016-00

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73, "Licensee Event Report System," the attached Licensee Event Report for reportable occurrence 92-016-00 is being submitted.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "C. A. Schrock".

C. A. Schrock  
Manager-Nuclear Engineering

KJS\jac

Attach.

cc - INPO Records Center  
Mr. Patrick Castleman, US NRC  
US NRC, Region III

28~035

9209300180 920923  
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*IF22*  
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 0 5 1	PAGE (3) OF 0 6
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TITLE (4)  
Steam Generator Blowdown Sample Valve Fails an Inservice Timing Test

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (5)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)					
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES			DOCKET NUMBER(S)		
0 8	2 4	9 2	9 2	0 1 6	0 0	0 9	2 3	9 2	N/A			0 5 0 0 0		
												0 5 0 0 0		

OPERATING MODE (8) N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)											
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0	20.402(b)			20.405(c)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)		
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)			50.38(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(e)		
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)			50.38(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vi)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 356A)		
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)					
	20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
	20.405(a)(1)(vi)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ix)					

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)										TELEPHONE NUMBER			
NAME Keith Schommer - Plant Nuclear Engineer										AREA CODE 4 1 4			
										3 8 8 - 2 5 6 0			

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUF. TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUF. TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
B	W I	F I S I V I	A 2 0 0	Y							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)								EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO								N/A				

**ABSTRACT** (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On August 24, 1992, with the plant at 100% power, a management review of the August 20, 1992, performance of surveillance procedure 55-167-1, "Blowdown Treatment Valves Timing Test (IST)," indicated a blowdown sampling valve, BT-31A had exceeded its closing time acceptance criteria. The failure to recognize this event on August 20, 1992, prevented Wisconsin Public Service Company (WPSC) from closing the redundant valve BT-32A and ultimately resulted in a violation of Technical Specification 4.2.a.2. TS 4.a.2 requires inservice testing of applicable ASME Section XI code class 1, 2, and 3 pumps and valves.

This event occurred as a result of personnel error. Personnel involved in performance of the Surveillance Procedure did not recognize the BT-31A closure time as being outside the acceptance criteria and thus did not close the redundant valve, BT-32A.

Upon the discovery of this event on August 24, 1992, the following actions were taken: BT-31A was immediately declared inoperable, redundant valve BT-32A was closed, and a retest was performed on BT-31A. The retest indicated BT-31A closed in 2 seconds, which is within its acceptance criteria. Additional corrective actions include: an increased surveillance frequency on BT-31A and increased emphasis during operator requalification training on the importance of self-assessment and second level review of performance data.

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		9   2   -	0   1   6   -	0   0	0   2	OF 0   6

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 386A's) (17)

Description of Event

This report describes an event which resulted in a violation of Kewaunee's Technical Specifications (TS). TS 4.2.a.2 requires inservice testing of applicable ASME Section XI code class 1, 2, and 3 pumps and valves. On August 24, 1992, with the plant at 100% power, it was determined that the TS 4.2.a.2 had been violated.

This event was discovered during management review of the August 20, 1992 performance of surveillance procedure (SP) 55-167-1, "Blowdown Treatment Valves Timing Test (IST)." The results indicated that the 0.375 inch BT-31A, "Steam Generator (SG) 'A' Sample Isolation Valve," had a closing time of 3 seconds. Kewaunee's Inservice Testing (IST) plan requires BT-31A [FSU] to close within 2 seconds and also requires all valves not closing within the action level to be declared inoperable. However, the slow closing time of BT-31A was not noted by operators on August 20, 1992, thus the following required actions were not completed:

1. Declare BT-31A inoperable
2. Close the redundant valve BT-32A
3. Initiate an incident report

It should be noted, that during the August 20, 1992 performance of SP 55-167-1 the "B" train steam generator [SG] sample isolation valve, BT-31B, was also found to exceed its 2 second closing time limit and appropriate actions were immediately taken. Reference attachment 1 for the SG sampling valves configuration.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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Upon the August 24, 1992, discovery of BT-31A's slow closure time which occurred on August 20, 1992, the following actions were immediately taken:

1. BT-31A was declared inoperable
2. BT-32A, the redundant valve was closed
3. BT-31A was retested by SP 55-167-1 and found to close in 2 seconds
4. An incident report was initiated

Since the failures of SG sampling isolation valves on August 20, 1992 Kewaunee has:

1. Increased the surveillance frequency of BT-31A and BT-31B to a weekly schedule with no additional failures to date. The time interval between the periodic tests will be increased as test data indicates assurance of proper valve performance.
2. A solenoid supplying instrument air to BT-31B was replaced to improve the performance of BT-31B.

Cause of The Event

This event occurred as a result of personnel error. The slow closure time for BT-31A was not identified as being in the action level by the Reactor Operator or the Reactor Operator In Training assisting in the test. A second level review performed by the Shift Supervisor also did not note the closure time as being outside its acceptance criteria.

The physical cause of BT-31A closing slow is unknown at this time. Both BT-31A and BT-31B will be monitored. In an attempt to repeat the failure, the solenoid valve removed from BT-31B

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 306A's) (17)

has been and will continue to be tested in the Instrument and Control shop. Periodic weekly actuation and timings have not duplicated the solenoid failure to date.

Analysis of Event

This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a violation of TS 4.2.a.2 which requires inservice testing of ASME Section XI code class 1, 2, and 3 pumps and valves.

The safety significance of BT-31A closing in 3 seconds as opposed to 2 seconds has minimal safety implications. BT-31A's function is to: Isolate or open SG inventory sampling flow (normally approximately 4 gpm), and to close on a containment isolation signal as noted in Kewaunee's Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Table 5.2-2. The USAR classifies BT-31A as part of a normally operating outgoing line not connected to the Reactor Coolant System that isolation is subject to special consideration on leakage and testing requirements because its principal function is related to rupture of steam generator secondary side systems and not loss of coolant. The post-LOCA function of this valve is to provide steam generator isolation.

The 3 second closure of BT-31A did not affect its ability to adequately perform the above required functions. Additionally, the redundant valve, BT-32A, was operable and capable of closing and performing the above functions.

The quarterly scheduled test on BT-31A was performed on August 20, 1992 and as indicated in this report recorded a slow closure time of three seconds. On August 24, 1992, upon discovery

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 308A's) (17)

of the slow closure time, BT-31A was retested and found to have an acceptable closure time of 2 seconds. That BT-31A had exceeded its action level went unrecognized for 104 hours; however, during this time the redundant valve BT-32A was operable and also capable of closing.

Corrective Actions

The following corrective actions have been or will be taken:

1. Surveillance of BT-31A(B) closure timings were increased to aid in monitoring the valve's closure performance. During these timings Instrument and Control personnel were monitoring key valve functions to identify any abnormalities.
2. The solenoid valve removed from BT-31B has and will be periodically cycled and timed by Instrument and Control personnel to determine if the root cause of the slow valve closing time has been found.
3. Operator requalification training will be revised to include additional emphasis on self-assessment of data and independent verification responsibilities and their importance to safety.

Additional Information

Equipment Failures: Two 0.375 inch stainless steel Fisher Controls Company globe control valves model numbers 667-DBQ.

Similar Events: None.

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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DOCKET NUMBER (2)

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Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant


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YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER
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## ATTACHMENT 1 SECONDARY SAMPLING SYSTEM





Date: September 15, 1992

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PN39246

This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Region III staff on this date.

Facility:	<u>Licensee Emergency Classification</u>
Wisconsin Public Service	<input type="checkbox"/> General Emergency
Kewaunee	<input type="checkbox"/> Site Area Emergency <i>EA</i>
Kewaunee, WI	<input type="checkbox"/> Alert
	<input type="checkbox"/> Unusual Event
Docket No. 50-305	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> N/A

Subject: FIRE IN MAIN GENERATOR OUTPUT BREAKER

At 2:43 a.m. (CDT) on September 15, 1992, the reactor tripped following the failure of a bushing in the main generator output breaker in the 345-kilovolt section of the switchyard. The bushing failure caused a fire at the breaker, and the breaker tripped open. This lead to a turbine trip and reactor trip and to the loss of all 345-kilovolt power supplies to the plant. The 138-kilovolt power to the plant was not affected.

The City of Kewaunee fire department was summoned to the plant and extinguished the fire at 3:55 a.m. The licensee plans to repair the circuit breaker and return the plant to operation in the next few days.

The State of Wisconsin will be informed. The information in this preliminary notification has been reviewed with licensee management.

The licensee notified the NRC Operations Center of this event at 4:48 a.m. on September 15, 1992. This information is current as of 11 a.m. on September 15, 1992.

CONTACT: R. Hague	<i>R. Hague</i>	R. Greger	<i>R. Greger</i>
708/790-5546		708/790-5644	

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