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FROM: Wisconsin Public Service Corp Green Bay, Wisconsin 54305 E. W. James	DATE OF DOC: 10-31-72	DATE REC'D 11-3-72	LTR x	MEMO	RPT	OTHER
TO: R. C. DeYoung	ORIG 1 signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR X SENT LOCAL PDR X		
CLASS: <u>U</u> PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1	DOCKET NO: 50-305			

DESCRIPTION:

Ltr re our 9-26-72 ltr...submitting results of review of the design to determine whether failure of any Non-Category I (seismic) equipment might potentially adversely affect performance of safety related equipment.....

ENCLOSURES:

PLANT NAMES: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant.

ACKNOWLEDGED DO NOT REMOVE

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION 11-4-72 fod

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


P.O. Box 1200, Green Bay, Wisconsin 54305

October 31, 1972

Regulatory

File Cy.



Mr. R. C. DeYoung, Assistant Director for
Pressurized Water Reactors
Directorate of Licensing
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D.C. 20545

Dear Mr. DeYoung:

Subject: WPS Review of Non-Category I
(Seismic) Equipment

AEC Docket 50-305



Pursuant to your letter of September 26, 1972, we submit herewith our review of the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant design to determine whether failure of any Non-Category I (seismic) equipment might potentially adversely affect performance of safety related equipment required for safe shutdown of the facility or to limit the consequences of an accident. The discussion that follows contains the results of our review.

Chemical or Oil Releases

Failure of Non-Category I (seismic) systems which might release chemicals or oil have been examined and found not to endanger safety related equipment. Spillage would be contained by cubicles or dikes which have been designed to contain the spillage, or it would occur remote from safety related equipment.

Circulating Water System

Failure of an expansion bellows in the circulating water line similar to the failure that occurred at Quad Cities, Unit 1, is not a probable event in the Kewaunee Plant for the following reasons:

1. There are no expansion joints between the isolation valves on the condenser inlet pipe and the circulating water pumps; thus there is no danger of valve closure shock causing expansion joint rupture.
2. The Kewaunee condenser inlet isolation valves are electric motor operated, not hydraulic operated, so there is no failure mechanism similar to that at Quad Cities I, which could cause sudden valve closure.

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Spillage from a credible break in the circulating water line could cause some minor flooding over the turbine building floor prior to removal from the turbine building sumps. However, since the turbine building elevation is higher than the lake surface elevation, flooding would stop when the circulating water pump operation was terminated. The control room would be alerted by the turbine building sump high level alarm. Spillage from breaks in other process lines in the turbine building basement would be similarly detected and appropriate operator action would be taken to stop pumps or isolate the line causing the spillage.

Additional Analyses

It has been determined that consequences of failure of three Non-Category I (seismic) systems could potentially adversely affect the performance of engineered safety systems. Specifically, the Non-Category I (seismic) items are the fire protection lines in the Turbine Building basement and the reactor makeup water and demineralized water line in the Auxiliary Building basement. However, because of safety equipment redundancy and design arrangement, the functional purpose of the safety equipment would not be jeopardized in the event of failure of any of these lines.

Very truly yours,



E. W. James, Senior Vice-President
Power Generation & Engineering

EWJ:sna