



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210
LISLE, ILLINOIS 60532-4352

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July 13, 2007

Mr. Christopher M. Crane
President and Chief Nuclear Officer
Exelon Nuclear
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, IL 60555

**SUBJECT: CLINTON POWER STATION
NRC SECURITY BASELINE INSPECTION REPORT 05000461/2007401(DRS)**

Dear Mr. Crane:

On June 8, 2007, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a security baseline inspection at your Clinton Power Station and Exelon Nuclear Corporate Office. The inspection covered one or more of the key attributes of the security cornerstone of the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on June 8, 2007, with Mr. F. Kearney and January 12, 2007, with Mr. G. Kaegi and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to security and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspector reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at

EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
May be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552)
Exemption number: <u>5</u>
Nuclear Regulatory Commission review required before public release.
<u>Don Funk, RIII/DRS/PSB</u>
Name and organization of person making determination.
Date of determination: <u>06/11/2007</u>

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
C. Crane

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<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room). However, because of the security-related concerns contained in the enclosure, and in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, a copy of this letter's enclosure will not be available for public inspection.

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,


Eric Duncan, Chief
Plant Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket No. 50-461
License No. NPF-62

Nonpublic Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000461/2007401(DRS)
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: Deani Riffle, NSIR/DSO/DDSO
State Liaison Officer, State of Illinois
C. Williamson, Clinton Site Security Manager

cc w/o encl: Site Vice President - Clinton Power Station
Plant Manager - Clinton Power Station
Regulatory Assurance Manager - Clinton Power Station
Chief Operating Officer
Senior Vice President - Nuclear Services
Vice President - Operations Support
Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs
Manager Licensing - Clinton Power Station
Senior Counsel, Nuclear, Mid-West Regional Operating Group
Document Control Desk - Licensing
Assistant Attorney General
Illinois Emergency Management Agency
Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission

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/RA by J. Funk acting for/

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Plant Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

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C. Williamson, Clinton Site Security Manager

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Plant Manager - Clinton Power Station
Regulatory Assurance Manager - Clinton Power Station
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Senior Vice President - Nuclear Services
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Manager Licensing - Clinton Power Station
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SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

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Letter to Christopher Crane from Eric Duncan dated July 13, 2007.

SUBJECT: CLINTON POWER STATION
NRC SECURITY BASELINE INSPECTION REPORT 05000461/2007401 (DRS)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No: 50-461
License No: NPF-62

Report No: 05000461/2007401(DRS)

Licensee: AmerGen Energy Company, LLC

Facility: Clinton Power Station
Exelon Nuclear Corporate

Location: Clinton, IL
Warrenville, IL

Dates: June 4 through 8, 2007
January 9 through 12, 2007

Inspectors: D. Funk, Senior Projects Specialist
J. Maynen, Senior Physical Security Inspector
G. Hansen, Physical Security Inspector
L. Jones, Inspector In Training (observer)

Approved by: E. Duncan, Chief
Plant Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

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Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000461/2007401(DRS); 01/9/2007 - 01/12/2007; Exelon Nuclear Corporate; 06/04/2007 - 06/08/2007; Clinton Power Station; Routine Security Baseline Inspection.

This report covers a 2-week period of announced routine baseline inspection on security. The inspection was conducted by three Region III physical security inspectors. No findings of significance were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A. Inspector-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings

Cornerstone: Physical Protection

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

REPORT DETAILS

3. SAFEGUARDS

Cornerstone: Physical Protection (PP)

S04 Equipment Performance, Testing, and Maintenance (71130.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated this area by: reviewing procedures and records, conducting interviews with responsible personnel and plant employees, and performing walk downs of the equipment being tested.

The inspectors verified that the security testing and maintenance program: (1) complied with the NRC-approved security plan and any other applicable Commission requirements; and (2) was being effectively implemented to assure the functionality and reliability of all security equipment necessary for intrusion detection and assessment, searches, and a rapid, capable response to a Design Basis Threat and other contingencies. The inspectors conducted the following specific inspection activities:

- reviewed and evaluated licensee event reports, safeguards log entries, and corrective action documents between October 2006 to March 2007 (no licensee event reports were documented);
- verified the licensee developed appropriate testing and maintenance procedures;
- verified for the perimeter intrusion detection system that the licensee ensured:
(a) alarm devices are tamper-indicating and self-checking; (b) the system functioned as designed; (c) required alarms annunciated and could be assessed; (d) alarm station operators could recognize individuals in the detection zones; (e) compensatory measures were established, when required; (f) fields of view were effective; and (g) lighting is being maintained;
- verified for the internal detection and assessment capabilities that:
(a) equipment was maintained and tested for functionality and reliability; (b) the equipment is being tested; (c) neither the biometric readers or the card readers at the protected area access points allowed a user [redacted] into the protected area [redacted] (d) an alarm or notification was generated to advise the alarm station operators that [redacted] were attempted; and (e) security force responded appropriately to an alarm or notification;
- verified for the independent, redundant alarm stations that the licensee:
(a) ensured failure of one station would not affect the other; (b) maintained and tested all annunciator, assessment, surveillance, and communication systems;

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(c) was not vulnerable to external manipulation; (d) ensured that no single act could remove the capability from both alarm stations; (e) provided all alarm stations with _____ that annunciate in at least the other alarm station; (f) ensured operational activities does not interfere with the execution of alarm assessment and response; (g) maintained continuous communications with each on-duty security force member and with local law enforcement authorities; and (h) maintained continuous communication between the alarm stations;

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- verified for security communication systems that the licensee: (a) maintained each type; (b) appropriately tested equipment; and (c) provided independent power for non-portable equipment;
- verified for the weapons maintenance program that the licensee: (a) maintained each weapon; (b) test fired all weapons at the required periodicity; (c) developed and maintains procedures; and (d) documented activities associated with the program;
- verified for other security-related devices and equipment that the licensee: (a) appropriately maintained and tested those devices and equipment; (b) performed appropriate tests of access control equipment; (c) performed testing in accordance with procedures; (d) ensured that testing of at least one train of search equipment included the most challenging test procedure used by the licensee; (e) established sensitivity settings on the equipment in accordance with the routine calibration/maintenance settings; (f) maintained and tested vital-area detection aids; (g) tested all assessment aids, including night-vision, thermal or other devices; (h) maintained and tested all personnel access control and personnel search equipment; (i) maintained and tested all package and material search equipment not applicable; (j) maintained and tested all vehicle search equipment; (k) maintained and tested the security system emergency power supply; and (l) powered all alarm systems by an un-interruptible power source;
- verified for new security systems/equipment that the licensee: (a) conducted pre-operational testing and evaluation prior to integration into the security program; and (b) ensured the testing complied with design criteria and performance specifications (the licensee had not installed any new equipment or systems); and
- verified for physical barriers that the licensee: (a) maintained the integrity of all its physical barriers including both the protected area and vital area along with the isolation zones; (b) periodically monitored their condition; and (c) located all vital equipment within a vital area.

The inspectors reviewed equipment performance, testing, and maintenance related issues during baseline inspection activities to verify that they were being entered into the licensee's corrective action program at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention

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was being given to timely corrective action, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed.

The inspectors completed 47 of the required 47 samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

S09 Owner-Controlled Area Controls (71130.09)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated this area by: reviewing procedures and records; conducting interviews with responsible personnel and plant employees; and performing walkdowns of the owner-controlled area (OCA) and vehicle checkpoint.

The inspectors verified that the licensee: (1) implemented owner-controlled area controls in accordance with the NRC-approved security plan, and any other regulatory requirements; and (2) ensured that owner-controlled area controls provide reasonable protection against the Design Basis Threat.

The inspectors conducted the following specific inspection activities:

- reviewed and evaluated licensee event reports, safeguards log entries, and corrective action documents between October 2006 to March 2007;
- verified for owner-controlled area controls that the licensee: (a) ensured personnel maintained communication with the alarm stations and validated owner-controlled area controls effectiveness through drills or exercises; and (b) actions taken to implement the NRC approved security plan did not impede the arrival of emergency response personnel or affect implementation of the emergency plan;
- verified for the owner-controlled area check point that the licensee, in conformance with the measures specified in the NRC approved security plan: (a) implemented procedures for controlling plant personnel, vendor, delivery, and visitor access; (b) effectively implemented procedures and controls for channeling vehicles; and (c) effectively implemented procedures for controlling vehicle entry through the vehicle check points;
- verified for owner-controlled area patrols and surveillance that the licensee: (a) effectively implemented procedures; (b) ensured personnel on patrol did not perform collateral duties that decreased the effectiveness of their surveillance activities; and (c) if required, effectively implemented procedures for maritime coordination, and surveillance; and

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- verified for owner-controlled area barriers and equipment that the licensee, in conformance with the measures identified in the approved security plan: (a) effectively implemented controls to limit the potential for unauthorized vehicles and equipment; and (b) ensured owner-controlled area patrols had the necessary weapons and equipment readily accessible.

The inspectors reviewed owner-controlled area-related issues during baseline inspection activities to verify that they were being entered into the licensee's corrective action program at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective action, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed.

The inspectors completed 12 of the required 12 samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

Cornerstone: Physical Protection

.1 Safeguards Strategic Area

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the performance indicators (PIs) listed below for the period from October 2006 through March 2007. To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during that period, PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 4, were used to verify the basis for reporting each data element. A sample of plant reports related to security events, security shift activity logs, and Fitness-for-Duty reports were also reviewed. The following three PIs were reviewed:

- Fitness-for-Duty Personnel Reliability;
- Personnel Screening Program; and
- Protected Area Security Equipment.

The inspectors completed 3 of the required 3 samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

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40A5 Other Activities

1. (Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction (TI) 2201/001 - Inspection of Additional Security Measures for Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern (RAMQC)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated this TI by: reviewing program procedures, implementing procedures and records; conducting interviews with responsible personnel and plant employees and performing walkdowns, as necessary, of areas or equipment used.

The inspectors verified that the licensee successfully incorporated the Safeguards Information - Modified Handling (SGI-M) protection requirements specified in NRC Order EA-04-0191, "Imposing Requirements for the Protection of Certain Safeguards Information," issued November 5, 2004, into its information protection strategy. The inspectors also verified that the licensee effectively implemented the additional security measures (ASM) imposed by U.S. NRC Order EA-05-007, "Imposing Additional Security Measures on the Transportation of RAMQC," issued July 19, 2005. The following specific inspection activities were conducted:

- verified that the licensee has implemented the following requirements: (1) licensee verification, (2) background investigations, (3) preplanning and coordination, (4) notifications, (5) communications, (6) drivers and accompanying individuals, and (7) procedures, training and control of information.

The inspectors completed 1 of the required 1 sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

40A6 Meetings

1. Exit Meeting

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. F. Kearney and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on June 8, 2007. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

B. Hanson, Site Vice President
R. Kearney, Plant Manager
R. Schenck, Work Management Director
G. Vickers, Radiation Protection Director
R. Frantz, Regulatory Assurance Representative
J. Icard, Maintenance Rule Coordinator
K. Scott, Regulatory Assurance Director
C. Vanderburgh, Nuclear Oversight Manager
J. Domitrovich, Maintenance Director
D. Schavey, Operations Director
W. Scott, Chemistry Manager
J. Lindsay, Training Director
C. Williamson, Security Manager
R. Peak, Site Engineering Director
T. Chalmers, Shift Operations Superintendent

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

B. C. Dickson, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Tharp, Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened, Closed, and Discussed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspector reviewed the documents in their entirety but rather that selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document, or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

S04 Equipment Performance, Testing and Maintenance (71130.04)

Clinton Power Station Security Plan (SGI); Revision 4; dated April 2006

SY-AA-101-122; Testing Security Equipment; Revision 12

SY-AA-101-125; Inventory and Control of Security Equipment; Revision 9

SY-AA-101-126; Duties and Responsibilities of the Station Security Organization; Revision 5

SY-AA-101-122-1001; Performance of Security System Tests; Revision 2

SY-CL-101-2000 Attachment 7; Complete SCC Checklist; Revision 1

SY-CL-101-2000 Attachment 8; Complete Operational Test Log; Revision 1

Command History Report May 20, 2007 - June 4, 2007

SY-AA-151-1002; Firearms Practice Range Maintenance; Revision 0

SY-AA-1001; Loggable/Reportable Matrix; Revision 3

SY-AA-1015; Security Contingency Equipment Inspection and Maintenance; Revision 4

SY-AA-1021; Millennium Protective Mask; Revision 3

SY-AA-1002; Safeguards Event Reports; Revision 0

Quarterly, E Close, Lockdown and E Up Testing; dated March 18, 2007

Security Events Reports; October 2006 through March 2007

SER Event # 07-06-05; PZ 25A Failed to Alarm during Testing (NRC Identified)

LS-AA-125; Corrective Action Program (CAP) Procedure; Revision 10

CAP Reports (Security-Related); October 2006 through March 2007

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Condition Report # 00637590 - Revise SY-AA-101-122-1001 (NRC Identified)

Common Cause Analysis 569355 - Low Level Material Condition of Security Equipment BRE

Focus Area Self-Assessment (FASA) Assignment # 562996-04 - Equipment Performance Testing and Maintenance and Owner-Controlled Area Controls; dated May 2007

Nuclear Oversight (NOS) Audit NOSA-CPS-07-03 (AR 569192) Clinton Station February 5 - 9, 2007; dated February 13, 2007

S09 Owner-Controlled Area Controls (71130.09)

Clinton Power Station Security Plan (SGI); Revision 4; dated April 2006

SY-AA-101-102; Compensating for Security System Failures (SGI); Revision 3

SY-AA-101-103; Inspecting Security Barriers; Revision 3

SY-AA-101-109; Response to Contingency Events (SGI); Revision 3

SY-AA-101-116; Conducting Patrols; Revision 2

SY-AA-101-133; Integrated Response Plan with Law Enforcement Agencies; Revision 3

SY-AA-101-137; OCA Checkpoint Operations; Revision 2

SY-AA-101-115-1001; Controlling Power Operated Active Vehicle Barriers; Revision 0

SY-AA-1013; General Guidance for Use of Itemiser3 Explosives Detector; Revision 1

SY-AA-1016; Watch-Standing Practices; Revision 4

SY-CL-101-2000 Attachment 6 - Post Orders; P-6 OCA Patrol, Charlie 1, Charlie 2; Revision 1

SY-CL-101-2003; Active Vehicle Barrier Operations; Revision 0

Memorandum OCA Surveillance Activities (OCA Patrol - BRE Towers); dated November 21, 2006

OCA Patrol Map (undated)

FASA Assignment # 562996-04 - Equipment Performance Testing and Maintenance and Owner-Controlled Area Controls; dated May 2007

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SY-AA-1002 Safeguards Event Reports; Revision 0

Security Events Reports; October 2006 through March 2007

LS-AA-125; CAP Procedure; Revision 9

CAP Reports (Security Related); October 2006 through March 2007

40A1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 4, dated April 2006

LS-AA-2160 Monthly (PI) Data Elements for Protected A Security Equipment Performance Index; Revision 4

LS-AA-2170 Monthly (PI) Data Elements for Personnel Screening Program Performance; Revision 4

LS-AA-2180 Monthly (PI) Data Elements for Fitness-for-Duty/Personnel Reliability Program Performance; Revision 4

SY-AA-1002 Safeguards Event Reports; Revision 0

Security Events Reports; October 2006 through March 2007

40A5 Other Activities (TI 2201-001)

NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-12, Transportation of Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern (RAMQC) - NRC Threat Advisory and Protective Measures System; dated July 11, 2005

EA-05-007, Issuance of Order for Additional Security Measures on the Transportation of RAMQC; dated July 19, 2005

Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) and AmerGen Energy Company, LLC (AmerGen) Confirmation of Completion of Action for NRC Order EA-05-007; dated May 17, 2006

Nuclear Energy Institute 05-06, Implementing Guidance for Additional Security Measures for Transportation of RAMQC (U); dated August 26, 2005

SY-AA-101-106; Control and Classification of Safeguards Information; Revision 8

SY-AA-101-134; Hazardous Material Transportation Security Plan; Revision 2

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SY-AA-101-134-1001; Hazardous Material Transportation Security Plan Risk Assessment; Revision 3

SY-AA-101-134-1002; RAMQC Shipment Notification Requirements; Revision 0

RP-AA-600; Radioactive Material/Waste Shipments; Revision 10

RP-AA-600-1002; Highway Route Controlled Quantity/Advance Notification for Radioactive/Waste Shipments; Revision 3

RP-AA-600-1003; Radioactive Waste Shipments to Barnwell and the Defense Consolidation Facility; Revision 4

RP-AA-600-1006; Notification Requirements for Radioactive/Waste Shipments Greater Than RAMQC; Revision 4

HU-AA-1211; Briefings - Pre-Job, Heightened Level of Awareness, Infrequent Plant Activity and Post-Job Briefings; Revision 2

HU-AA-1212; Technical Task Risk/Rigor Assessment, Pre-Job Brief, Independent Third Party Review, and Post-Job Brief; Revision 1

Contract No. 01001229 Radwaste Transportation Services between Exelon and Duratek

TR-HM-001; Hittman Transportation Security Plan; Revision 5

TR-HM-002; Hittman Hazardous Materials Transportation Security Plan Risk Assessment; Revision 3

Hittman Transport Services/Duratek Memorandum Transportation Security Program for RAMQC; dated January 3, 2006

Hittman Transport Services/Energy Solutions Updated Memorandum of Understanding for The Transportation Security Program for RAMQC; dated January 22, 2007

Memorandum Hittman Transport Drivers and Operational Personnel Background Investigation Documentation; dated January 23, 2007

Energy Solutions/Hittman Security Department Surveillance Log Worksheet, dated November 20, 2006; Revision 1

FASA Report - Hittman Enhanced Security Assessment/RAMQC; dated January 4, 2006

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

CAP	Corrective Action Program
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
DRS	Division of Reactor Safety
FASA	Focus Area Self-Assessment
NOS	Nuclear Oversight
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OCA	Owner-Controlled Area
PI	Performance Indicator
RAMQC	Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern