

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION



*Heishman -
Note data sheet
Att.*

P.O. Box 1200, Green Bay, Wisconsin 54305

JRK-7-17-80

July 14, 1980

Mr. R. F. Heishman, Chief
Reactor Operations & Nuclear Support Branch
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region III
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Gentlemen:

Docket 50-305
Operating License DPR-43
Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant
IE Inspection Report No. 50-305/80-10

This is in response to the results of the inspection conducted by your office May 19-23, 1980, as noted in the above referenced inspection report. The referenced inspection report listed two apparent items of non-compliance. We disagree with the conclusion that these are items of non-compliance with existing regulations, and request that they be retracted. The basis of our request is discussed in detail in the attachment to this letter.

Contrary to the agreement and procedures established by Mr. Keppler and Mr. Jamas, the corporate management of WPS was not notified of these items of non-compliance prior to issuance of the inspection report. We feel that had these items been discussed in detail with the corporate management, our disagreements would have been eliminated. We request that in the future, WPS corporate management be notified of possible items of non-compliance at the time of the inspection.

Very truly yours,

E. R. Mathews
E. R. Mathews, Vice President
Power Supply & Engineering

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Response to Items of Non-compliance

Item 1. Technical Specification 6.8.1 states: "Written procedures and administrative policies shall be established, implemented and maintained that meet the requirements and recommendations of Section 5.1 and 5.3 of ANSI N18.7-1972." Section 5.1 states in part: "Written administrative policies shall be provided to control the issuance of documents, including changes that prescribe activities affecting safety-related structures, systems, or components such as operating procedures, test procedures, equipment control procedures, . . .".

Administrative Control Directive 7.3, Instrument and Control Procedures, states in paragraphs 5.6.1 and 5.6.2: "Whenever plant conditions or procedural error require a change to complete the procedure, the changes shall be marked on the procedure. Prior to implementation, the temporary instrument and control procedure shall be reviewed and initialed by two members of plant management staff, at least one of which holds a Senior Reactor Operator's license."

Contrary to the above, on May 18, 1980, the licensee failed to follow ACD 7.3 when an attempt was made to perform ICP 54.30, a normally non-safety related procedure, under plant conditions that required a change to complete the procedure. The change was not documented or reviewed as required by ACD 7.3, the generator interlock trips were not bypassed, and consequently when the test was performed, 2 out of 3 sources of offsite power were lost. This affected safety related equipment in that the 1B emergency diesel generator started and supplied power to the 1-6 ESF bus.

Response:

The above identified alleged item of non-compliance is exemplary of enforcement action which does not recognize system design details and the need for practicality to minimize administrative pressures or demands upon a shift supervisor in accordance with the direction of Mr. Denton's letter of October 30, 1979. The fact in regards to this particular matter is that the procedure involved is ICP 54.30, - Turbine Generator Motoring Protection Pressure Switch Calibration. Performance of that procedure results in a trip signal to the generator breaker G1. The shift supervisor authorized performance of the procedure without the concurrence of an additional supervisor and without satisfying the initial condition specified in

the procedure. The reasoning of the shift supervisor was that electrical power necessary for safety was available through the tertiary transformer to 138 Kv and 345 Kv transmission lines with diesel generator backup. An error in judgement was made in that at the time of the event, the main auxiliary transformer was being back-fed through G1 for non vital power to the plant since the reserve auxiliary transformer was out of service. The trip action of the procedure resulted in a loss of the non vital power source to the plant and a diesel generator start signal and loading to bus 1-G.

This issue is a matter of priorities. The shift supervisor was correct in his assessment that safety would not be compromised by the performance of ICP 54.30 but incorrect in his assumption that the trip of G1 was prohibited. The Kewaunee Plant has in excess of 2600 procedures and verbatim conformance to that number of specific documents was never the intent nor policy of WPS. Verbatim conformance to procedures and activities which compromise plant safety is not the issue here; it is whether or not verbatim conformance to non safety related procedures which may interrupt the routine of plant operation is necessary.

To demand verbatim conformance to non-safety related procedures would increase the shift supervisors administrative duties to an intolerable level and distract him from his more important duty of assuring plant safety. This would be in direct conflict with the conclusions of the Bulletin and Orders Task Force as noted in NUREG 0578 and clarified by Mr. Denton's letter of October 30, 1979 (item 2.2.1.a.).

The alleged non-compliance identified above is based on the inspectors conclusion that the ICP 54.30 was safety related at the time it was performed due to the conditions of the plant. We disagree with that conclusion; our opinion is supported by the fact that the ICP was performed and, although the routine of the plant was interrupted, plant safety was never in question. This

alleged non-compliance represents an unwarranted generalization of existing requirements beyond their intended scope and should be retracted on that basis.

Even though in our view this is not an item of non-compliance, we recognize the significance of this matter regarding the importance of following procedures and administrative directives. In light of this, we have reviewed the events surrounding this occurrence with plant personnel to prevent similar occurrences.

Item 2. The Code of Federal Regulations, 10CFR 50.72(a) and (a)(7) requires that for any event resulting in manual or automatic actuation of engineered safety features, the licensee shall notify the NRC operations center as soon as possible and in all cases within one hour by telephone of the occurrence.

Contrary to the above, the starting of the 1B emergency diesel generator following loss of voltage to the 1-6 emergency safeguards bus on May 18, 1980, at 4:47 p.m. was not reported to the NRC operations center until 6:02 p.m. on May 18, 1980, fifteen minutes later than required.

*Reviewed with
S. M. Brown
5/21/80
m. 7/20*

Response:

We have determined that the automatic starting of the 1B emergency diesel generator is not a reportable event as defined by the KNPP Technical Specifications or 10CFR50.72, as amended on February 29, 1980. This determination is based on the following:

Item (7) of 10CFR50.72, as amended on February 29, 1980, states that,

"Any event resulting in manual or automatic actuation of Engineered Safety Features, including the Reactor Protection System"

should be reported to the NRC within one hour. We interpret "Engineered Safety Features" as used here to be plural and meaning the combination of systems which would be used to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This interpretation is supported by the Statements of Consideration, as published in the Federal Register on February 29, 1980:

"The events, which are described in detail in the rule, include serious events that could result in an impact on the public health and safety such as those leading to initiation of the licensee's emergency plan, the causing of the nuclear plant to be in an uncontrolled condition, the exceeding of a safety limit, an act of sabotage, or an uncontrolled release of radioactivity."

The event under consideration here is the automatic start of the diesel generator due to a loss of power on the 1-6 bus. It is important to note that at the time of this occurrence, the reactor was at cold shutdown and the plant was in its refueling outage. Due to these conditions, the diesel generators could have legally been placed in the "pull-out" condition and, therefore, would

not have started on a blackout signal. Furthermore, the initiating signal in this event (loss of voltage) is not indicative of degraded reactor coolant system conditions, and, in fact, no accident mitigating systems (e.g., safety injection) were actuated.

Since the reactor and reactor coolant system were always in a controlled and expected condition (and were not affected by this event), there was no impact on public health and safety and the event was not reportable. Since the event was not reportable the one hour reporting time limitation does not apply, therefore, this item of non-compliance should be retracted.

Our notification to the staff of this event was done out of courtesy for your information. It is disconcerting that we are being cited for a regulation that does not apply. Furthermore, we are being cited for operating in a manner more conservative than is required by regulation by keeping our diesel generators in the ready status when they are not required. It is our opinion that this sort of citation encourages plant operation in strict conformance to the regulations, even when this results in less conservative operation than is necessary.