

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
DIVISION OF COMPLIANCE
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

TELEPHONE
(312) 858-2660

A. RO Inspection Report No. 050-305/73-12

Transmittal Date : July 31, 1973

Distribution:
RO Chief, FS&EB
RO:HQ (5)
DR Central Files
Regulatory Standards (3)
Licensing (13)
RO Files

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RO Chief, FS&EB
RO:HQ (4)
L:D/D for Fuel & Materials
DR Central Files
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B. RO Inquiry Report No. _____

Transmittal Date : _____

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RO:HQ (5)
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
C. Incident Notification From: _____
(Licensee & Docket No. (or License No.))

Transmittal Date : _____

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RO Chief, FS&EB
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UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

TELEPHONE
(312) 858-2660

July 30, 1973

Wisconsin Public Service Corporation
ATTN: Mr. E. W. James, Senior Vice President
Power Generation and Engineering
P. O. Box 1200
Green Bay, Wisconsin 54305

Docket No. 50-305

Gentlemen:

This refers to the inspection conducted by Messrs. C. M. Erb and M. W. Dickerson of this office on June 6 - 8, and 13, 1973, of construction activities at the Kewaunee site authorized by AEC Construction Permit No. CPPR-50 and to the discussion of our findings at the conclusion of the inspection with Messrs. E. R. Mathews, L. O. Ramsett, and others of your staff.

The areas examined during this inspection included your valve wall thickness verification program, the collapse of a radwaste holdup tank, cleaning procedures relative to the primary coolant system, rerouting of high energy fluid lines, and the separation of electrical cables. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examination of procedures and representative records, interviews with plant personnel, and observations by the inspectors.

During this inspection, it was determined that certain of your activities appear to be in violation of AEC requirements and in nonconformance with your Quality Assurance Manual. The activities and references to the pertinent requirements are listed in the enclosure to this letter.

This letter is a notice of violation sent to you pursuant to the provisions of Section 2.201 of the AEC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations. Section 2.201 requires you to submit to this office, within thirty (30) days of the date of this letter, a written explanation in reply, including: (1) corrective steps which have been taken by you, and the results achieved; (2) corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations; and (3) the date when full compliance will be achieved.

July 30, 1973

By way of this letter, we wish to confirm our understanding, during this inspection, that you intend to: (1) obtain information from the Ingersoll Rand Engineering Company relative to the required locking method for impeller bolts in containment spray pumps, (2) install replacement discs of Type 410 steel in the main steam check valves, and (3) replace a number of check valves which were found to be leaking during the containment building overpressure test. We will examine your actions regarding these matters during our next routine inspection.

Should you have questions concerning this inspection, we will be glad to discuss them with you.

Sincerely yours,

Boyce H. Grier
Regional Director

Enclosure:
Description of Violations

bcc: RO Chief, FS&EB
RO:HQ (4)
Licensing (4)
DR Central Files
RO Files
Regions I & II
PDR
Local PDR
NSIC
DTIE
OGC, Beth, P-506A
R. Renfrow, GC (2)

ENCLOSURE

Wisconsin Public Service Corporation
Docket No. 50-305

Certain of your activities appear to be in violation of AEC requirements and in nonconformance with your Quality Assurance Program.

The following apparent violations are considered to be of Category II severity:

1. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, states, in part, that: "Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, or a type appropriate to the circumstances, and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished."

A Pioneer Service and Engineering Company Administrative Procedure, No. AD-02, Paragraph 2.1.2, states that control and completion of all documentation, as the cleaning is performed, shall be a Pioneer Service and Engineering Company responsibility.

Contrary to the above requirements, certain records of procedural activities, required to be completed during cleaning of the reactor pressure vessel and the piping between the reactor pressure vessel and steam generators, had not been completed at the time of the inspection on June 6 - 8, 1973, even though the work in question was completed on May 8, 1973.

2. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VI, states, in part, that: "Measures shall be established to control the issuance of documents, such as instructions, procedures, and drawings . . . which prescribe all activities affecting quality. These measures shall assure that documents, including changes, are reviewed for adequacy and approved for release by authorized personnel and are distributed to and used at the location where the prescribed activity is performed. Changes to documents shall be reviewed . . . by the same organizations that performed the original review . . ."

Contrary to the above requirements, an instruction for cleaning the reactor vessel head fastening hardware appeared to have been used, even though there was no evidence that the instruction had been reviewed or approved.

3. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, states that: "Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings or a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished."

Contrary to the above requirements, a written procedure for draining a radwaste holdup tank, following completion of hydrostatic testing, does not appear to have been provided. Instead, it appears that draining, which led to collapse of the tank, was accomplished in accordance with verbal instructions only.

U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS

REGION III

Report of Construction Inspection

RO Inspection Report No. 050-305/73-12

Licensee: Wisconsin Public Service Corporation
P. O. Box 1200
Green Bay, Wisconsin 54305

Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant
Kewaunee, Wisconsin

License No. CPPR-50
Category: A

Type of Licensee: PWR (W) - 560 Mwe

Type of Inspection: Routine, Announced

Dates of Inspection: June 6 - 8, and 13, 1973

Date of Previous Inspection: May 25, 1973

Principal Inspector: *C. M. Erb*
C. M. Erb

7/26/73
(Date)

Accompanying Inspector: *M. W. Dickerson*
M. W. Dickerson
by C.M.E.

7/26/73
(Date)

Other Accompanying Personnel: None

Reviewed By: *W. E. Vetter*
W. E. Vetter, Chief
Reactor Construction Branch

7-30-73
(Date)

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS.

Enforcement Action

A. Violations

1. Contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, records for the cleaning of the reactor vessel, the lower head steam generator Loop A and Loop B, and the hot and cold intermediate legs of Loop A and Loop B, had not been recorded in accordance with prescribed documented procedures. This also appears to be in noncompliance with Administrative Procedure No. AD-02, "Construction Cleaning of NSSS Pipes and Components," dated November 30, 1971, Paragraph 2.1.2, which states that one of the Pioneer Services and Engineering Company (PS&E) responsibilities is to "Control and complete all documentation as the cleaning is performed." (Paragraph 3)
2. Contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VI, an instruction for cleaning of the reactor vessel head fastening hardware had apparently been issued and used without review or approval. (Paragraph 4)
3. Contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, a written procedure for draining a radwaste holdup tank, after completion of the hydro test, did not appear to exist. The method used for draining apparently was established by verbal instructions which were documented in a letter dated May 8, 1973, one day after the draining activity was started and which led to collapse of the tank. (Paragraph 6)

B. Safety Matters

No safety matters were identified.

Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Matters

A. Absence of Procedures and Records Relative to the Storage of Reactor Vessel Internals Inside Containment (RO Inspection Reports No. 050-305/72-18 and No. 050-305/73-01)

Review of a document titled "Cleanliness Procedure for Reactor and Auxiliary Building" and a review of records relative to the storage and protection of the subject internals established that an acceptable procedure has been implemented. This matter is considered to have been resolved. (Paragraph 1)

B. Balance of Plant Wiring Found Common With Wiring for Both Safeguard Systems (RO Inspection Reports No. 050-305/72-03 and No. 050-305/73-01)

The corrective work within the control room consoles and panels is still approximately 99% complete. However, the work is expected to be completed by the end of June 1973.

C. Lack of Separation of Wiring for the Reactor Trip Channels (RO Inspection Report No. 050-305/72-03)

Design and field installation work was reported by Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (WPS) as being complete. This matter will be reviewed for resolution during a subsequent inspection.

D. Solitary Manual Scram Switch Does Not Meet Single Failure Criteria (RO Inspection Report No. 050-305/72-03)

Separate manual scram switches have been installed in each of two consoles which are approximately ten feet apart. This matter will be included for review and final resolution during a subsequent inspection.

Design Changes

No new design changes were identified during the inspection.

Unusual Occurrences

No unusual occurrences were identified.

Other Significant Findings

A. Current Findings

1. Pressurization Test of Containment

The overpressure test at 51.8 psig was successfully completed at the site on June 8, 1973. The documentation and calibration records appeared to be satisfactory.

2. Rerouting of Feedwater and Main Steam Piping and Installation of Impingement Barriers

Approximately 90% of the welds involved in the rerouting have been completed and nondestructively tested. Some of the components for encapsulation and barriers for the high fluid energy lines are onsite, and installation is to start on, or about, June 11, 1973. (Paragraph 7)

3. Construction Status

Plant completion overall 97%.

B. Unresolved Matters

1. Ventilation Exhaust Fan Motors

Fan motors, No. SF-27912 and No. SF-27912-1, were supplied with improper insulation and with a nonradiation resistant grease. (Paragraph 10)

2. Diesel Generator Vent Fan Motors and Control Room Post Accident Fans

Fan motors, No. SF-27911, No. SF-27911-1, No. SF-27914, and No. SF-27914-1, were supplied with nonradiation resistant grease which is to be replaced by the motor supplier, Reliance Manufacturing Company (Reliance).

3. Safety Injection Pump Motors (800 HP)

These motors, supplied by Westinghouse Electric Corporation (W) to Specification No. 676427, were required by the purchase order to start with 80% of rated voltage. Some question has arisen as to whether these motors can meet this requirement. W has recalled two identical motors, which had been installed in another facility, for test and are to notify WPS if the Kewaunee motors should be reworked. This matter remains open pending appropriate resolution.

4. Containment Spray Pumps

These pumps, supplied by Ingersoll Rand (I-R) were not required in the instruction manual to have impeller fastening bolts and washers tack welded, whereas, this was required with respect to identical pumps installed at another facility. A written instruction is to be secured from I-R engineering, defining the approved method for installing the Kewaunee impeller bolts. This matter also remains open pending appropriate resolution.

5. Holdup Radwaste Tank 1-C

This tank, which was repaired subsequent to collapsing of the top course plate during draining, has been repaired and will be given another hydro test. This item is open until the cleaning and rehydro test have been completed. (Paragraph 6)

C. Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Matters

1. Lack of Fire Barriers and Seals (RO Inspection Reports No. 050-305/72-03 and No. 050-305/73-01)

This installation of fire barriers and seals in the control room was reported by WPS to be 98% complete. At present, L. K. Comstock Company (Comstock) is auditing this PS&E work against approved drawings and criteria. The audit is expected to be complete in approximately two weeks. This matter remains open pending completion of this work.

2. Limitorque Valve Operator Failure

The 72 valves identified by WPS in their letter to RO:III dated January 2, 1973, have now been satisfactorily modified and determined to be functioning properly. However, a WPS audit has established that an additional four valves, with Limitorque operator Models No. SMB-00 and SMB-000 are in storage and scheduled to be returned to the vendor for failure to meet requirements for nuclear containment in that a radiation resistant insulation was not used. This matter remains open pending receipt of the replacement valves. (Paragraph 2)

3. Safety Valve to Steam Header Attachment (RO Inspection Report No. 050-305/73-01)

The installation is complete. Barco joints were installed in all of the exhaust lines from the safety valves. The Barco joints are designed to "move" under pressure of steam release to minimize stress on valve mounting structures. The documentation appears to be satisfactory and this matter is closed.

4. Main Steam Check Valves (RO Inspection Report No. 050-305/73-01)

These valves, No. SD24-1 and No. SD24-2, will be equipped with replacement discs of Type 410 hardenable, stainless steel to be supplied by Schutte and Koerting Valve Company (S-K). Two carbon steel replacement discs and two of the original maraging steel discs will be used for the hot functional test. The Type 410 discs are designed without the machined relief around the periphery of the disc, as was the case with the original discs. The acceptability of the 410 replacement discs will be evaluated by RO:III during a subsequent inspection.

5. Residual Heat Removal Pumps (RO Inspection Report No. 050-305/73-03)

Pumps No. 1-A and No. 1-B required that certain body defects found by RT be ground out and repaired by welding. In effectuating such a repair on No. 1-A, a section of the splitter was removed for access to the inside wall of the volute. In order to close this opening, a patch was fillet welded to the volute splitter. This method of repair has been justified in a letter by W, and this matter is closed. During an earlier inspection, pump No. 1-B was found to have a sharp notch on the outside of the volute near a boss. Later examination showed the notch had been ground and faired in satisfactorily. This matter is closed.

6. Valve Wall Thickness Verification Program (RO Inspection Report No. 050-305/72-14)

A total of 73 valves were checked for wall thickness, of which ten valves were found to have wall thicknesses less than required by applicable codes and standards. Six of the ten valves were repaired by welding from the outside in the thin areas, and four were accepted without repair by PS&E and WPS. The records and documentation for the repair and nondestructive tests were examined and found to be in order. The justification for the valves accepted "as is" appears to be adequate. This item is considered to be closed. (Paragraph 8)

Management Interview

- A. The following persons attended the management interview at the conclusion of the inspection.

Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (WPS)

E. R. Mathews, Manager - Power Engineering
L. O. Ramsett, Supervisor - Quality Assurance

Pioneer Service and Engineering Company (PS&E)

F. (NMI) Hickey, Site Manager

- B. Matters discussed and comments were as follows:

1. The inspector stated that records for the cleaning of the reactor vessel, lower head steam generator Loop A and Loop B, had not been recorded in accordance with prescribed, documented procedures and that this appeared to be in violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,

Criterion V, as well as in noncompliance with Administrative Procedure No. AD-02, Paragraph 2.1.2, which states that a PS&E responsibility is to "control and complete all documentation as the cleaning is performed." Mr. Ramsett agreed that this appeared to be a violation, and stated that it had been immediately corrected. Mr. Ramsett said that Procedure No. AD-02 would be enforced by a closer check of the documentation. The inspector acknowledged that the corrective action identified by Ramsett had been accomplished.

2. The inspector stated that an instruction for cleaning of the reactor vessel head fastening hardware had apparently been issued and used, without review or approval. Mr. Ramsett stated that the instruction was based on a W letter, and steps were taken immediately to issue and relate the instruction to this letter. The instruction was approved, and the licensee stated WPS would re-emphasize the need for documentation of instructions.
3. The partial collapse of Radwaste Holdup Tank No. 1-C was discussed. The inspector stated that the reason for this incident was not apparent. Mr. Matthews said that WPS management were still investigating but felt they did not have the answer either. It could not be determined whether certain verbal instructions for draining the tank had been followed or not. (Subsequent to the inspection, the licensee was informed, by telephone, that failure to provide written procedures for this activity appeared to be in violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.)
4. The inspector stated that he had checked, by sampling, quality documentation related to the rerouted high fluid energy lines and that the documentation appeared to be in order. He added that similar documentation for encapsulation and impingement barriers relative to these lines was also examined and that this matter would be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
5. The inspector stated that the cleanliness procedure and implementation, for equipment inside containment, appeared to be satisfactory.
6. The inspector noted that the documentation and records relating to the valve wall thickness verification program appeared to be complete and that an inspection of repaired valves indicated that a satisfactory repair program had been implemented.
7. The inspector questioned the adequacy of the method used to assure that the containment spray pump impeller bolts were securely locked into position. The licensee stated that they would get a definite commitment from I-R as to the proper locking method.

REPORT DETAILS

Persons Contacted

The following persons, in addition to individuals listed under the Management Interview Section of this report, were contacted during the inspection.

Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (WPS)

G. V. Fitzpatrick, Quality Control Supervisor
P. J. Tronsdan, Quality Control Engineer
J. N. Morrison, Engineering Attendant
R. A. Krueger, Construction Coordinator
D. C. Hintz, Test Coordinator

Pioneer Service and Engineering Company (PS&E)

G. M. Hockensmith, Director of Construction Management
D. R. Berg, Flushing Engineer
J. K. Leipper, Quality Assurance Engineer
J. P. Engelbrecht, Quality Control Engineer

Phillips Getschow Company (P-G)

J. (NMI) Steidl, Supervisor - Quality Assurance

Results of Inspection

1. Absence of Procedures and Records Relative to the Storage of Reactor Vessel Internals Inside Containment (RO Inspection Reports No. 050-305/72-18 and No. 050-305/73-01)

A document titled "Cleanliness Procedure for Reactor and Auxiliary Building," dated March 19, 1973, was reviewed by the inspectors and judged to be acceptable. The procedure includes provision for the protection, inspection, and recording of inspections. The document had been written and approved by PS&E on March 19, 1973.

Records of the inspection and adequacy of protection for the RV internals were reviewed and appeared to be acceptable.

2. Limitorque Valve Operator Failures (RO Inspection Report No. 050-305/73-01)

In a letter to RO:III, dated January 2, 1973, WPS stated that 72 valves, identified as subject to possible operator failure, would require modification. During this inspection, it was determined that all 72 of the previously identified valve operators have either been modified at the site (41 SMB-00 and 16 SMB-000) and their torque switch dials reset, or they had been modified prior to shipment by Limitorque (15 SMB-000). All 72 valve operators have been tested to assure proper functioning. The checking, to ascertain previous modification or the modification at the site, was performed by PS&E. Technical assistance, during these checks, was provided by the Limitorque Corporation, and inspection was performed by Comstock. The check to verify previous modification of the 15 operators by Limitorque was accomplished by examination of the operator for red markings on the torque switch unit (and/or spring parts) signifying they had been modified.

An audit by WPS on May 9, 1973, established that all 72 motor operators had been inspected. However, it also indicated that an additional four valves, identified by PS&E as Instrument Nos. 32145, 32146, 32147, and 32148, with this type of motor operator had been received onsite for use in the hydrogen venting system. These valves had been rejected upon receipt (NCR No. 953) for failure to meet requirements for installation within nuclear containment and are to be returned to the vendor (Contromatic). Upon receipt of replacement valves and motor operators at the site, they are to be inspected to ascertain that the motor operators are acceptable. This matter will remain open pending receipt and inspection at the site.

3. Cleanliness - Class I Components

Record Review

Documentation related to cleaning of the reactor vessel, the lower head steam generator Loop A and Loop B, and the hot and cold intermediate legs Loop A and Loop B were examined and determined to be acceptable with the exception that, although the cleaning was established to have been completed by May 8, 1973, portions of the records (Data Sheet QCIP 572-3) were still incomplete at the time of the inspection. In addition, a notation had been made on the RV cleaning records that arc strikes were observed on in-core tubes and clevis insert, while no resolution of this matter was apparent.

The records omissions were completed during the inspection, and information was made available to establish that the arc strikes were associated with nonpressure boundary components.

4. Cleaning Instructions - Reactor Vessel Head Fastening Hardware
(RO Inspection Report No. 050-305/72-18)

A review of the subject instructions for cleaning the RV studs, nuts, and washers, established that, although the instructions appeared to be adequate, the instructions were undated and unsigned, except for a handwritten notation which confirmed that the cleaning had been completed on January 10, 1973. During the inspection, this omission was corrected by the addition of an approval signature and by a note by the appropriate PS&E authority that the instruction was used in conjunction with W letter WPS-S-351, dated December 15, 1972, and Combustion Engineering RV Manual No. 4969. The WPS representative stated that Procedure No. AD-02, relating to control and completion of QA documentation by PS&E, would be more carefully enforced in the future.

5. Reactor Vessel Internals Cleaning (RO Inspection Report
No. 050-305/72-18)

A review of a W procedure, titled "Reactor Vessel Internals Cleaning Procedure," dated March 14, 1973, established that the procedure had been approved and provided the necessary instructions, applicable cleaning methods (hand clean or flush) materials (acetone, Grade A flushing water and lint and chloride free cloths) acceptance criteria (clean cloth and exit water cleanliness) and record requirements.

The records reviewed establish that the work had been initiated March 29, 1973, and satisfactorily completed April 5, 1973. The records were complete and appropriate materials certification had been obtained. The material certifications had been approved by representatives of WPS engineering and quality assurance.

6. Holdup Radwaste Tank 1-C Incident

The subject tank had been filled for a hydro test through a two-inch vent line. (The regular four-inch fill line had been blanked off.) Upon completion of the hydro test at 17.5 psig, instructions were apparently given to workmen to depressurize the 1-C tank and prepare to transfer water from the 1-C tank to the 1-B tank, by gravity feed, through a four-inch drain line in the bottom of tank 1-C. A valve in the tank 1-C fill line (the normal vent line) used was supposed to be open, allowing entrance of air to the tank as the water level dropped. A creaking noise was heard when the water level was about 27" below the 1-C tank top stiffener ring. Subsequent investigation revealed that several wall areas, in the top course of the tank, had deformed (collapsed) toward the tank center. The drain operation was

immediately terminated. According to site personnel, a check established that the vent line valve was open at the time of the occurrence. Richmond Engineering Company (RECO) was contracted to replace about 180° of the top course of the tank wall. This was done using approved procedures and NDT methods. This matter remains open pending rehydrostatic testing and cleaning and further investigation as to the cause of the occurrence.

7. Rerouting of High Energy Fluid Lines and Encapsulation

The documentation and records for the rerouted main steam and feedwater lines were examined. This work is 90% complete and is being performed by Grinnell. New weld maps have been made, and the fabrication and NDT requirements for the original pipe are being met. Very little new pipe was procured since there was enough of the original, removed piping. Records for welds No. 905 and No. 906 in the main steam system were examined, and records for Nos. 744, 741, and 742 in the feedwater system were examined. Qualification records for welders and NDT personnel were in the file and were determined to be appropriate as well as current. The work appeared to have been performed in a satisfactory manner.

The encapsulation materials are being furnished by Taylor Forge Company. The material specified is ASTM A-234, WPB. Welding is to Specification No. AWS A5.1-69. The documentation relative to materials received onsite prior to the date of the inspection appeared to be adequate. This item will be checked further during the next inspection.

8. Valve Wall Thickness Verification Program

Seventy-three valves requiring verification of thickness were identified in a letter from W to the licensee dated October 6, 1972. The identification, applicable code, and minimum wall thickness requirements were shown in tabular form. Magnaflux Company (Magnaflux) personnel performed UT measurements to detect thin walls and also performed UT examination, after repair of thin wall valves.

The procedures for weld buildup, NDT, and calibration of ultrasonic equipment were examined and found to be in order. The qualification records for welding and NDT personnel were satisfactory. All results of the valve wall thickness measurement program were checked by a Level III test examiner from Magnaflux and by a PS&E representative.

Seventy-three valves were checked and ten valves, tabulated below, were determined to have wall thicknesses which were less than required thicknesses.

VALVES REQUIRING REPAIR				
WPS Identification Number	Thickness in inches			Under Thickness (percent)
	Actual Wall	Required Wall	After Repair	
SI-116-1	.820	1.093	1.359	
SI-116-2	.902	1.093	1.154	
SI-116-3	.980	1.093	1.585	
SI-115-2	1.560	1.680	1.796	
SI-115-4	1.480	1.680	1.819	
SI-112-2	.725	1.093	1.166	
VALVES ACCEPTED ON ENGINEERING EVALUATION				
SI-116-6	1.038	1.093		5
RC-12-2	.619	.625		1
AC-105-1	1.388	1.406		1.3
SI-112-1	1.033	1.093		5.5

The thin areas were localized and, in no case, were there more than two such areas in a valve. The four valves containing undersized wall areas, which were accepted on the basis of material test reports, established tensile strengths 10% to 35% above the minimum required.

The completed measurement documentation, relative to all the above valves as well as supplementary documentation covering three of the ten valves above, was examined and found to be in order. The licensee's valve wall thickness verification program is considered to have been successfully completed.

9. Pipe Hangers, Snubbers, and Supports

The procedures and records, relative to these components, were examined. P-G is performing the installation in accordance with PS&E Engineering instructions. P-G is also responsible for hot and cold setting of snubbers and hangers.

10. Fan Motors No. SF-27912 and No. SF-27912-1

The subject motors were incorrectly supplied with a commercial insulation and grease. Motors possessing the required insulation and grease are being obtained. This matter will be reviewed further during subsequent inspections.