



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

CENTRAL FILES

JUN 29 1978

Docket No. 50-305/78-12

Wisconsin Public Service
Corporation
ATTN: Mr. E. W. James
Senior Vice President
Power Generation and
Engineering
P. O. Box 1200
Green Bay, WI 54305

Gentlemen:

This refers to the inspection conducted by Mr. N. C. Choules of this office on May 16-17 and 30 through June 2, 1978, of activities at Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant authorized by NRC Operating License No. DPR-43 and to the discussion of our findings with Mr. C. Luoma and others of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection.

The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, observations, and interviews with personnel.

No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were identified during the course of this inspection.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosed inspection report will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room, except as follows. If this report contains information that you or your contractors believe to be proprietary, you must apply in writing to this office, within twenty days of your receipt of this letter, to withhold such information from public disclosure. The application must include a full statement of the reasons for which the information is considered proprietary, and should be prepared so that proprietary information identified in the application is contained in an enclosure to the application.

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Wisconsin Public Service - 2 -
Corporation

JUN 29 1978

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.

Sincerely,

Gaston Fiorelli, Chief
Reactor Operations and
Nuclear Support Branch

Enclosure: IE Inspection Rpt
No. 50-305/78-12

cc w/encl:

Mr. C. Luoma, Plant

Superintendent

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OFFICE	RIII RFW for	RIII RFW	RIII GF			
SURNAME	Choules/dec	Warnick	Fiorelli			
DATE	6/28/78	6/29/78	6/29			

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report No.: 50-305/78-12

Docket No.: 50-305

License No.: DPR-43

Licensee: Wisconsin Public Service Corporation
P. O. Box 1200
Green Bay, WI 54305

Facility Name: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant

Inspection At: Kewaunee Site, Kewaunee, WI

Inspection Conducted: May 16-17 and May 30-June 2, 1978

RFW for
Inspector: N. C. Choules

6-29-78

RFW Warnick
Approved By: R. F. Warnick, Chief
Reactor Projects Section 2

6-29-78

Inspection Summary

Inspection on May 16-17 and May 30-June 2, 1978 (Report No. 50-305/78-12)

Areas Inspected: Routine announced inspection of noncompliance followup, safety injection surveillance testing, plant operations, safety limits, limiting safety settings, limiting conditions for operations, nonroutine event followup, IE Bulletin and Circular followup, and independent inspection. The inspection involved 45 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.

Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

*C. R. Luoma, Plant Superintendent
C. R. Steinhardt, Assistant Superintendent, Operations
*R. W. Lange, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance
J. S. Richmond, Technical Supervisor
W. S. Truttman, Operation Supervisor
D. M. McSwain, Instrument Control Engineer
A. J. Ruege, Plant Performance Engineer
*G. Ruiter, Nuclear Systems Engineer

The inspector also talked with and interviewed members of the Operations and Maintenance Sections.

*Denotes those present at exit interview.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Noncompliance Item (IE Inspection Report No. 50-305/77-22). Failure of Plant Operation Review Committee (PORC) to review and document violations of technical specification identified by IE inspection reports. Review of PORC minutes indicate violations of technical specifications are now reviewed and documented by the PORC.

3. Safety Injection Test

The inspector reviewed the subject test procedure, SP 33-110, Diesel Generator Automatic Test, and verified it was consistent with regulatory requirements and the licensee's administrative procedures. Selected test prerequisites from the test procedure were reviewed for completion by the inspector prior to test performance. No discrepancies were observed.

The inspector witnessed portions of the subject test. This test consisted of simulating a voltage loss to one safeguard bus, concurrent with safety injection initiation and observing that load shedding of equipment, starting of safety injection equipment, feed water isolation, service water header isolation, and control room air recirculation occur as required. The test was run twice, once for Train B and then for Train A. All testing was performed with the plant in the cold shutdown mode. A preliminary review of the test results following performance of the test indicated all systems responded as required.

During the testing of the B train, the automatic safety injection signal for the A train was inadvertently initiated. This normally would have initiated an A train safety injection sequence; however, for the condition existing in the A train, the safety injection did not occur. The signal was blocked because safety injection had been previously activated and the SI reset button had been reset while the reactor trip breakers were open. This sequence blocks automatic SI until the reactor trip breakers are closed. When the SI did not activate it took the operating crew several minutes of reviewing logic diagrams to understand why SI was blocked.

After reviewing logic diagrams, the inspector's concern was that for a spurious SI this same sequence could happen and automatic SI could be blocked for several minutes during which time the operator would have to manually initiate SI if it were required. The inspector requested that the licensee retrain the licensed operators on the above SI logic in an emergency operating procedure. The licensee stated they would comply with the inspector's request.

4. Plant Operations

a. Plant Tour

- (1) The inspector performed a plant tour accompanied by a licensee representative. During the tour the inspector noted that there were cigarette butts on the floor of the relay and cable spreading room. The inspector suggested that the licensee make this area a no smoking area to eliminate the fire hazard to safety related cabling. Prior to the conclusion of the inspection the licensee had posted the area as a no smoking area and stated that the construction foreman responsible for work in the area had been informed that "no smoking" was to be enforced. Other than the above the plant was relatively clean considering that a refueling outage had just been completed.
- (2) During the tour, selected "Hold" and "Danger" tags were reviewed for proper approval and the status log was reviewed to determine if the tags were properly accounted for, no discrepancies were noted.
- (3) Selected valves for the low head safety injection system were checked for proper alignment and no discrepancies were noted.

- b. The jumper-bypass logs were reviewed and no discrepancies were noted. The inspector also reviewed ACD 5.9., Jumper Control Log. The ACD addresses the control of jumpers out of and into the I&C shop, the electrical shop, and the control room. The ACD does not address the actual installation and removal requirements. In actual practice, the licensee installs jumpers by approved work requests or approved surveillance procedures. The inspector suggested that the licensee revise ACD 5.9 to specify jumper installation and removal requirements. The licensee stated they would revise ACD 5.9 to address jumper installation and removal requirements.
- c. Logbooks - The inspector reviewed the control room logs and Shift Supervisor's log for the past three months and confirmed that entries were filled out to identify the action, and that the Operation's Supervisor is reviewing and initialing the log sheets indicating his review.

The inspector noted in the review of the Shift Supervisor's log that on May 6, 1978 a 1/4"x20 acorn nut worked loose from the manipulator crane and fell into the reactor vessel. The licensee stated that attempts were made to recover the nut but it could not be found. The inspector stated that the licensee should perform an analysis to assure that the nut will not block any core flow paths and cause excessive temperatures and should also establish a lost parts history file. The licensee stated they would perform an analysis and establish a lost parts history file.

- d. Night Order and Temporary Orders - The current subject orders were reviewed and no discrepancies were noted.
 - e. Incident Reports (IR's) - The inspector reviewed IR's 78-12 through 78-35. Several of the IR's were designated as reportable occurrences and have been or will be reported to the NRC. These reportable occurrences have been or will be reviewed as these are received. The licensee's corrective actions for the IR's appears to be adequate and no items of concern were identified.
5. Safety Limits, Limiting Safety System Settings, and Limiting Conditions for Operation

The inspector verified that reactor operations were in conformance with the technical specification for selected subject items by review of records, actual observations of system lineups, and instrument indication.

In the review of setpoint calibration checks for the Main Steam Safety Valves, the inspector noted that surveillance test SP-077, Main Steam Safety Valve Test, had not been revised to require additional valves to be tested in accordance with ASME Code Section XI, IWV 3510 if a valve fails to function properly. The procedure was written to comply with the Technical Specifications which require only two valves to be tested. For the relief valves the licensee is now committed to the Technical Specification and Section XI whichever is most conservative. For the testing just completed there was no failure of the valves to function and hence no violation of Section XI. The licensee stated they would revise SP-077 to comply with Section XI.

No other discrepancies were noted in the review of the subject items.

6. Reportable Occurrences

The following reportable occurrences were reviewed by examination of logs and records and through discussions with plant personnel. Occurrences were reviewed for completion of reporting requirements, investigation and determination of cause, proposed corrective measures, and completion of corrective actions.

- a. RO 50-305/78-11 1/ - Sample valves for R-19 not opened resulting in Radiation Monitor R-19 being inoperable for three hours.
- b. RO 50-305/78-12 2/ - Emergency diesel generator source breaker could not be tripped locally.
- c. RO 50-305/78-13 3/ - Train "B" containment sump isolation valve would not fully open.

In the licensee's report for this occurrence it was indicated that the valve would be repacked and general PMs performed during the refueling outage. This has been accomplished on both the A and B train valves.

Review of these occurrences indicate the licensee's corrective actions appear to be adequate.

7. IE Bulletin and Circular Followup

- a. IEC 77-16. The inspector verified from discussion with the licensee and review of an internal report that the licensee has reviewed this circular and has concluded that no action is required.

- 1/ LER 50-305/78-11, WPS to RIII, dtd 4/12/78
- 2/ LER 50-305/78-12, WPS to RIII, dtd 4/20/78
- 3/ LER 50-305/78-13, WPS to RIII, dtd 5/4/78

- b. IEB 78-04 - In the licensee's response to this Bulletin 4/, the licensee indicated that they would handle the possible failure of stem mounted limit switches by procedure and training of operators rather than replacing the switches with environmentally qualified switches. After discussions between the inspector and the licensee, the licensee has indicated that they will replace the unqualified switches with environmentally qualified switches. The licensee will issue an updated response to this Bulletin.

8. Other Inspection Items

a. Chemical Decontamination

The inspector inquired if the licensee had performed or planned to perform any chemical decontamination of the reactor coolant system. The licensee stated they had not performed, nor did they plan to perform in the near future, any chemical decontamination of the reactor coolant system.

b. High Flux Trip Check Following Refueling

In a previous inspection 5/ the inspector suggested that the licensee require an extrapolation to determine the actual power that the high flux trips will trip based on the first calorimetric performed after refueling at 25% power. The licensee has revised procedure RT-6, Power Escalation Tests, to require this extrapolation. RT-6 was used in the power escalation testing following the latest refueling outage.

c. Replacement of Containment Ventilation Valve Seats

In accordance with the commitments made by the licensee regarding the subject valves, 6/, 7/, the licensee has replaced the seats on valves RBV-1, RBV-2, RBV-3, and RBV-4. The licensee feels that replacement of the seats were probably not needed as the valves passed the leak rate testing prior to removing the seats. The licensee now feels that improper shimming of the valve seats was the prime reason that the valves originally failed their leak rate test.

d. Pressurizer Level Transmitters

The licensee had previously indicated 8/ that they would replace all strain gages in the pressurizer level transmitters to prevent instrument drift if a new model strain gage proved satisfactory. The licensee found the new model strain gage was satisfactory and has installed them in all three pressurizer level transmitters.

4/ LTR, WPS to RIII, dtd 3/23/78

5/ IE Inspection Report 50-305/78-01

6/ Updated RO 50-305/77-2, WPS to RIII dtd 3/18/77

7/ Update RO 50-305/77-2, WPS to RIII dtd 3/29/77

8/ RO 50-305/77-3, WPS to RIII dtd 3/2/77

9. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on June 2, 1978. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of his inspection. Licensee commitments in paragraph 3, 4b, 4c, 5, and 7b were discussed in detail.