

DSB

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION



P.O. Box 1200, Green Bay, Wisconsin 54305

January 7, 1980

Mr. J. G. Keppler, Regional Director
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
Region III
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

Docket 50-305
Operating License DPR-43
Reportable Occurrence LER 79-028/03L-0

In accordance with the requirements of Technical Specifications, Section 6.9, the attached Licensee Event Report for reportable occurrence LER 79-028/03L-0 is being submitted.

In the course of the inspection conducted to satisfy the requirements of IE Bulletin 79-14, it was revealed that three horizontal pipe restraints were not installed on a 16" diameter service water header. Our initial evaluation conservatively assumed that there existed a potential to lose the function of a safeguard system, a 24-hour reportable event. Upon closer examination of possible failures, it has been determined that a potential for only a portion of a safeguard system could be lost and that consists of a 30-day reportable event under Kewaunee Technical Specification TS 6.9.2.b(3).

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "E. R. Mathews".

E. R. Mathews
Vice President
Power Supply & Engineering

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Attach.

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ATTACHMENT TO LER 79-028/03L-0

Docket 50-305
Operating License DPR-43

Event Description

In the course of the inspection conducted to satisfy the requirements of IE Bulletin 79-14, it was revealed that three horizontal pipe restraints were not installed on a 16" diameter service water header. An immediate engineering evaluation as well as a seismic analysis were performed to verify integrity of the system. The results of this analysis indicated that the integrity of the 16" diameter service water line would be maintained. However, the integrity of two 4"Ø branch lines supplying a secondary water source to two auxiliary feedwater pumps could not be assured.

Further analysis by the Kewaunee Plant Architect Engineer concluded that it was necessary to install only one of the restraints. In order to take the most conservative approach in this matter, WPS elected to install all three restraints and did so within 48 hours.

In the unlikely event of a seismic occurrence of the magnitude depicted in the Kewaunee FSAR, there would have been an increase in the probability of rupturing the lines supplying the secondary water source to two of the auxiliary feedwater pumps. Had a rupture occurred, service water supply to the 1B and the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps could have been lost. The one remaining auxiliary feedwater pump is sufficient to supply the mass flow needed in any transient in the Kewaunee FSAR; therefore, no danger to the health and safety of the general public resulted from this occurrence.

Cause Description and Corrective Action

The cause is apparently due to an omission in the design process. From tracing of records we have found that the seismic analysis was performed and resulted in a qualified system when these restraints are in place. However, the restraints themselves were apparently never designed.

The corrective action consisted of installing the three restraints that were called for in original design. We believe this to be a singular occurrence as no other unresolved seismic discrepancies have been identified to date in our investigations related to Bulletin 79-14.

No further action is necessary for this event.