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WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION



P.O. Box 1200, Green Bay, Wisconsin 54305

July 26, 1979

Mr. J. G. Keppler, Regional Director
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
Region III
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

Docket 50-305
Operating License DPR-43
IE Bulletin No. 79-13, Cracking in Feedwater System Piping

In a letter to Mr. A. Schwencer from Mr. E. R. Mathews dated July 13, 1979, we transmitted a Summary Report on the Feedwater Line Cracking found at the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant. A majority of the responses requested in the above referenced bulletin can be found detailed in that report; a copy of which you will find attached. Specific responses to the referenced bulletins are detailed below.

1. Since the Kewaunee Plant was in refueling operations at the time of the discovery of cracks in the feedwater system at other PWR's, a complete investigation was immediately begun.
 - a. Radiographic and ultrasonic examinations were performed using standard volumetric testing techniques and 4 inch film prior to the receipt of the referenced bulletin. Baseline data taken on the repaired welds was performed in accordance with bulletin instructions using special 7 inch film.
 - b. Shallow linear indications were found during the nozzle-to-piping weld examination. Cracks were confirmed when a section of the FW pipe was removed. For further investigation in accordance with Section 2 of the bulletin we determined it necessary to examine all welds up to the first rigid support past the FW check valve; see Summary Report Section 2.3. All unacceptable code discontinuities were repaired.

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
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- c. A visual inspection of the FW system piping supports inside containment was performed; see Summary Report Section 3.2.
2. A complete inspection of the FW system inside containment was performed during the past refueling outage.
 - a. All FW piping welds were examined with the exception of those welds that are encapsulated in guard piping on the "B" FW train and two welds on "A" line between the rigid restraint and containment penetration. Results of the examinations showed no code discontinuities on any welds upstream of the FW check valves. Therefore, there is no evidence to link the cause of the nozzle-to-piping cracks with piping upstream of the check valve. This evidence plus the added protection of the guard piping, justifies exempting those welds in the encapsulated portion of piping from examination.
 - b. Kewaunee's Auxiliary Feedwater System ties to the Main Feedwater System near the S/G nozzles and uses the same nozzles for inlet to the Steam Generators.
 - c. See response to 1.C.
3. Kewaunee is a single unit site, therefore, this item is not applicable.
4. The above identified findings were reported to the Director of Region III via telegram June 26, 1979, and the follow-up Licensee Event Report, July 10, 1979.
5. A copy of the Summary Report was sent to the Director of Region III, July 13, 1979. The majority of the examinations and testing was completed prior to the issuance of Bulletin 79-13 so item 5a is not applicable.
 - b. The procedures dealing with feedwater line break accidents have been internally reviewed and are still undergoing review in light of both the FW piping cracks recently found and the Three Mile Island incident. We are currently anticipating suggestions for possible procedure changes from the Westinghouse owners group on Three Mile Island. When received, the applicable portion of the procedures will be promptly implemented.
 - c. Containment Sump level would be the primary means of detecting a feedwater line leak in containment. This method could determine a leak on the order of 0.5 gpm.

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Containment humidity instruments could also be used to detect feedwater leakage. It is sensitive to leaks of 2-10 gpm.

Very truly yours,



E. R. Mathews, Vice President
Power Supply and Engineering

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Enc.

cc - Director, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555